Bringing Ukraine Back Into Focus: How to End the New Cold War and Provide Effective Political Assistance to Ukraine

August 19, 2015

CREDIT: Shutterstock

This article first appeared as part of the Bow Group's research paper titled "The Sanctions on Russia."

Britain's foremost expert on Russian and European politics, Professor Richard Sakwa, has precisely articulated why all attempts to resolve the crisis in Ukraine have ended in failure:

"The Ukraine conflict is the child of the cold peace. Although there are profound internal contradictions in the Ukrainian model of state development, these would not have assumed such disastrous forms if the geopolitics of post–Cold War Europe had been sorted out earlier."1

In other words, they fail because there is insufficient recognition of the fact that we are actually dealing with two crises that must be addressed simultaneously.

The first crisis is the longstanding conflict within Ukraine over whether post-Soviet Ukraine should be a monocultural or bicultural nation. For many in western and central Ukraine, including the historical regions of Galicia, Volyn, and Podolye, being Ukrainian has long meant suppressing Russian culture so that Ukrainian culture can thrive in its stead. Here, creating a Ukraine that is Russia's antithesis is often referred to as making a "civilizational choice."

By contrast, for many in eastern and southern Ukraine, including the historical regions of Donbass, Novorossiya, Slobozhanshchina, and Crimea, being Ukrainian means being part of a distinct nation that lives in close harmony with Russia. Although they do not wish to join Russia, neither do they wish to be forced to forsake Russian culture in order to be considered loyal Ukrainians. As a rule, people in these regions do not accept the idea that there is any civilizational choice to make, but if forced to choose between a Ukraine in NATO or the EU, and a Ukraine in alliance with Russia, they tend to prefer Russia by a wide margin.2

The second crisis, which has been superimposed onto the first, is the crisis in Russian relations with the West. It also has deep historical and cultural roots.3

These two crises came together with explosive impact when President Yanukovych was ousted from office on Feb 22, 2014. Many residents of western and central Ukraine refer to these events as a "revolution of dignity," while many in the east and south regard it as a coup d'état.

The United States and many Western European nations immediately recognized Yanukovych's ouster as legitimate, whereas Russia did not. Thanks to this split, the divergent narratives of Ukrainian identity became an integral part of the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West, transforming the domestic struggle over the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government into a proxy war (some scholars even refer to it as "the New Cold War") over Ukraine's proper allegiance and role in world affairs.4

This crisis can only be resolved if all parties involved, both domestic and foreign, uncouple the domestic crisis from the international crisis. Only then will it be possible to replace divisive nationalism with a unifying civic culture that encompasses both the Russian and Ukrainian speaking communities, which is the sine qua non for long term social and political stability in Ukraine.

Is Ukraine "Cleft" or "Torn?"5

Mutually exclusive nationalist rhetoric currently dominates political discourse within and about Ukraine, fulfilling a scenario discussed by the late Samuel P. Huntington two decades ago. At that time, Huntington highlighted Ukraine as an example of a "cleft country," and within Ukraine he even singled out Crimea as a region of particular contention.6

At first glance, everything that has happened in Ukraine since 2013 seems to confirm Huntington's thesis that clashes within cleft countries are the result of being "territorially bestride the fault lines between civilizations."7

The situation is not much different in what Huntington calls "torn countries." The key distinction here is that, while people in cleft countries disagree about who they are, people in torn countries agree on who they are, but disagree with their elites about which civilization they should belong to. Conflict within torn countries is therefore typically driven by elites who wish to shift their country's identity from one civilization to another.

Cleft countries often resolve their conflict by separation, whereas torn countries strive to preserve national unity at all costs. For a torn country to succeed in shifting identity, Huntington says, three things are needed. First, the political and economic elite of the country must be "enthusiastic" about this move. Second, the public must acquiesce to the redefinition of its identity. Third, elites within the host civilization must be willing to accept the new convert. To date, says Huntington writing in 2007, there have been no successful examples of such a shift.8

Sociological surveys, voting patterns, and regionally distinctive religious preferences all point to Ukraine being a rather typical cleft country, but for reasons having to do with nationalism, nostalgia, and a fear of reliving the trauma of the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine's national elites also have a pronounced aversion to separating along ethno-linguistic lines.9

As Oles Buzina, a Ukrainian writer recently murdered in Kiev once wrote: "Our debates are not between the government and her Majesty's opposition, not between two schools of a respected science, but between two different countries. As if a contemporary evolutionary biologist could have a discussion with an inquisitor from the Middle Ages. . . At best they will simply choose to ignore each other. At worst, one of them will smash the other's skull without, by the way, having proved anything to his opponent."10

In order to preserve national unity while maintaining their often contradictory regional narratives about Ukrainian identity, they have alternated the presidency, thereby preventing the consolidation of one narrative at the expense of the other. The resulting political gridlock was Ukraine's way of avoiding civil war, which many believed would erupt if one side were to dominate and turn its definition of Ukrainian identity into a test of civic loyalty.

The violent ouster of the Yanukovych government ended this delicate balance, and the civil war came. Following Huntington’s logic, the conflict in Ukraine can now have one of only two possible outcomes. The first is the separation of Ukraine into two territories corresponding to their predominant cultural identity. The second is the subjugation of one cultural identity by the other.

Neither of these, however, is likely to succeed because both parts of Ukraine claim to speak for the whole. Thus, even if the rebellious Donbass were to achieve independence, its current leaders would strive for a united Ukraine that is far closer to Russia than many western Ukrainians are comfortable with.11 Meanwhile, the government in Kiev is so intent on severing all ties between Ukraine and Russia that it is, quite literally, building a wall to keep the two countries apart.

The second possible outcome would involve the victory of one regional elite over the other and the imposition of its narrative on the recalcitrant portion of the population. Even in the event of complete military victory by Kiev over the rebels in Donbass, however, this option is unlikely to lead to political stability.

First, because of the breadth of local support demonstrated by the resistance, which even local Ukrainian officials now acknowledge.12 Moreover, polls taken over the past year show that local attitudes against re-integration into Ukraine have hardened as the death toll and damages have risen.13

Second, such a victory would most likely result in underground resistance to the imposition of the Galician Ukrainian narrative. Kiev would have to respond by replacing most of the current political and economic elite, and imposing its will through military occupation.14 Such institutionalized subjugation of the local population is likely to spawn a permanent subculture of resentment.

The practical difficulties of dividing Ukraine, or imposing a single identity, serve to underscore a key point—Ukraine owes its current identity to both Europe and Russia. Asking it to choose between them is therefore asking it to deny part of its heritage.

On the other hand, the fact that these two populations, which are roughly comparable in size, managed to avoid civil war for the past quarter of a century suggests that they complement each other in important ways. This suggests that social peace lies in identifying ways that reinforce that complementarity, such as fostering a civic culture that respects Ukraine’s bicultural identity. While promoting an inclusive Ukrainian civic culture might seem fanciful today, given the ongoing war, it is the only alternative to separation or suppression.

In keeping with the need to address both the internal and international aspects of this conflict, I see two core components to such an alternative. The first involves promoting a civic culture through constitutional reform. The second—treating economic recovery as an opportunity to transform Ukraine from an international source of contention into a joint international project.

Part I: Promoting a Civic Culture through Constitutional Reform

Conflating cultural identity with citizenship is almost always a recipe for disaster. It inevitably alienates minorities and undermines the very national unity being sought. A better alternative is to make cultural pluralism serve the security interests of the nation.

The value of "cultural security" has long been touted by international relations theorists of the Copenhagen School.15 Whereas traditional realism treats minority concerns as a challenge to state authority, the Copenhagen School argues that in today’s global environment it is no longer possible to reduce security to the nation-state level. Additional security challenges arise from the existence of both subnational and metanational identities.

Traditionally the security of the state has been bought at the expense of minorities, but the Copenhagen School argues that states are better off if they anticipate the needs of their minorities before they can be undermined by them. As Barry Buzan and Ole Waever put it, security theory must "leave room for a concept of politics detached from the state, and for circumstances in which identity politics [is] about maintaining difference rather than finding a collective image."16

Ukraine's security is threatened not just externally, but also by the ongoing conflict over identity—both at the subnational level, where cohesion and loyalty are essential for a society's survival, and at the national level, where security threats have arisen because of divided cultural loyalties. The solution lies in encouraging the formation of overlapping identities that do not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of nation-states. This can be done by promoting an inclusive Ukrainian civic culture.

In their classic study, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba describe a civic culture as the result of the proper mixture of three disparate components that are always present in the general political culture—parochial, subject, and participant.

Counterintuitively, they find that stable democracy does not result from having homogeneous political or cultural attitudes, but from society’s ability to develop institutions that not only manage these conflicting elements within a culture, but also preserve a balance among them.17 A society that tries to isolate or diminish the political influence of its parochial (minority) cultural or religious communities is therefore not only undermining human rights, but also undermining its prospects for stable democracy.

Despite all its flaws, the Minsk Accords recognize this basic liberal truth by calling for the diversity of religions, languages, and cultures within Ukraine to be enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution.18 While disagreement still rages on how much local self-government should be granted to regions, both sides have agreed that constitutional reform must be based on the principle of what President Poroshenko calls "deep decentralization." Moreover, by signing the latest accords, most of which they proposed, Donbass rebel leaders have officially acknowledged that if meaningful local autonomy were constitutionally enshrined, it would suffice to assuage their concerns regarding the preservation of the Russian language and the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).19

Many observers doubt that this will be enough to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity. Some have suggested that Ukraine look at the border regions of Alsace/Elsass or Alto Adige/Sued Tirol, where special privileges have been established for the local population. The divisions within Ukraine, however, are even more complicated. We are talking not just about border regions, but large swaths of the country, including most Ukrainian cities, higher educational institutions, and cultural venues, where the Russian language predominates in daily use.20

Ukrainian legislation, adopted with great difficulty in 2012, already permits some regional bilingualism, similar to the Spanish policy of "territorial bilingualism." In Spain, while Spanish is the national language, other languages are recognized as official in the regions where they are spoken, and regional governments are allowed to determine the status of those languages and adjudicate disputes. However, its critics say that the policy has resulted in regional languages becoming the vehicle for nationalists who argue that their linguistic rights, while guaranteed regionally, are slighted elsewhere in the country. Such nationalists then make the case that their full cultural identity can only be realized through a separation from Spain.21 Precisely the same argument has been made by nationalists in Ukraine.

A better model for developing linguistic harmony might be Canada, where English overshadows French culture in a manner very similar to the way Russian does in Ukraine. In Canada, regional language laws are applied asymmetrically. Most provinces are officially English speaking, but provide some services in French; the province of Quebec is officially French speaking, but provides some services in English; just two provinces are officially bilingual. Official bilingualism at the national level, however, guarantees everyone equal access to key federal services wherever they may live, and is widely credited for having preserved national unity.

A constitutional reform that addresses the language issue in a way that will guarantee equal rights for all Ukrainians, regardless of where they reside, would thus seem to be the best way to foster both unity and equality. Ideally, it should include a statement about the cultural rights of all citizens that, while guaranteeing an individual’s right to his or her cultural, linguistic, or religious heritage, would avoid linking these with citizenship or national identity.

In sum, when proposing constitutional reforms it is important to keep two points in mind. First, security and cultural identity are inextricably connected. It is therefore no coincidence that decentralization, language, and religion have been driving forces in this rebellion.

Second, the views of the parties have become so polarized during this conflict that no agreement will ever fully satisfy their mutually exclusive visions of Ukrainian identity. The better option is therefore replacing the current emphasis on building a distinctive Ukrainian cultural identity with an emphasis on building an inclusive Ukrainian civic identity.

Such an approach should satisfy the key external parties as well. The stated objective of Russian policy in Ukraine is to safeguard the rights of Russian-speaking citizens. Although Russia would prefer a federal solution, by signing the latest protocols adopted in Minks on February 12, 2015, it has accepted "deep decentralization" as sufficient, provided that the regions directly affected have a voice in the constitutional reform process.

In theory, this approach should also be supported by the EU, which has always placed special emphasis on minority rights.22 As then president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, stated in the programmatic speech that led to the creation of the European Neighborhood Policy:

"The Union makes borders less meaningful, so being a minority within a single Member State is less of a problem. In our Union, everyone is—in a sense—in a minority. And in our Union, no state can lord it over the others. Fundamentally, no religious, ethnic, cultural or other component must be able to dictate to others, but all must have equal dignity. That is why I call our Union a 'Union of minorities'."23

The key external actors therefore have good reason to apply their full efforts to achieving a constitutional accord that focuses not just on the narrow issue of regional autonomy, but also provides a comprehensive settlement of the cultural issues that have for too long been the "third rail" of Ukrainian politics.

Part II: Making Ukraine's Economic Recovery an International Project

Even if a constitutional settlement is achieved, however, Ukraine will remain a source of global conflict between the West and Russia, as it already was before the onset of the current crisis.24 The current crisis has only intensified the existing conflict, with many Western officials now echoing the sentiments of Ukrainian politicians who place Ukraine at the center of a twilight struggle with Russia for the salvation of Western civilization.25

Any long-term solution must therefore also channel relations between Russia and the West into a new and more constructive pattern. A good way to do this would be to make Russia an integral part of the West’s overall strategy for Ukraine's political and economic survival.

It must first be acknowledged that Ukraine's economic survival depends not on Western bailouts, but on renewing Russian investments there. This point was reinforced recently by a World Bank report that projected deep cuts in Ukraine's GDP in 2015 because of the deterioration in its trade relations with Russia.26

In fact, in the current context Russian economic investment and support has become more vital to Ukraine. As one recent study notes, despite temporary tariff preferences introduced last year to encourage Ukrainian exports to the EU, many regions of Ukraine are now more dependent on Russia than they were a year ago.27 And as the Ukrainian economy continues to shrink, more and more families find themselves relying on remittances from migrant workers, the majority of whom still find work in Russia.28

The Ukrainian government has responded by severing even economically sensible ties with Russia, thereby damaging the country's economic recovery, and further alienating the population in the more industrialized regions of the country.29 Western governments should follow the lead of the IMF and the World Bank, and insist that economic rationality take precedence over economic nationalism. Simply put, this means publicly recognizing Russia's enduring importance to the Ukrainian economy.30

Since stabilizing the Ukrainian economy is a task that Western financial institutions cannot afford on their own, securing Russia's assistance offers a rare opportunity for practical cooperation.31 Since the collapse of Ukraine is something that both Russia and the West say they are eager to avoid, it makes eminent sense to forge a clear program for the economic recovery of Ukraine that Russia and the West can implement together.

By demonstrating political maturity, overcoming the Ukrainian government's ideological resistance to Russian investment in Ukraine would also go a long way toward restoring international investor confidence in the country. In the long term it might even lay the foundation for transforming the current Eastern Partnership program from its current confrontational "two against one" stance, into a trilateral EU-Russia-Ukraine partnership. This would be consistent with the long-term strategic objective of reducing tariff barriers between with European Union and the Eurasian Union, which was proposed by Russian president Putin in 2010, and recently revived by German Chancellor Merkel.32

Conversely, if Ukraine's markets with Russia are not preserved, warns pro-Maidan political analyst Vadim Karasyov, Ukraine could simply lose its industrial base, which is heavily dependent on the Russian market. "A one-time great industrial power," he writes, would then "end up joining Europe as an agricultural country."33

Conclusion: Bringing Ukraine Back into Focus

All of the above of course presumes that the parties in the conflict actually wish to work out a mutually acceptable compromise. While the latest protocols to the Minsk Accords suggest that such a willingness exists on paper, it is still not clear if there is in fact sufficient political support to implement them.

The Ukrainian parliament, for example, has recently passed legislation that calls into question its willingness to countenance true autonomy, which is a sine qua non for Donbass. For its part, some Donbass leaders continue to argue for a campaign to liberate Kiev and thus expand the civil war.

Another troubling trend is the persistent desire to write one's political opponents out of Ukrainian history.34 As Ukrainian historian Egor Stadnyi points out, such efforts to legislate the "correct" interpretation of history have more in common with the Soviet era than with contemporary Europe.35

This brings us to the core impediment to resolving the crisis—the absence of a true dialogue among Ukrainians. Such a dialogue is absolutely essential if Ukraine is to develop a unifying civic culture that encompasses both its Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking communities.

While many useful institutional and constitutional reforms can be proposed, none of this will matter if Ukrainian elites persist in trying to promote national unity by imposing highly divisive national symbols, rallying around an "eternal enemy" (Russia), and insisting on a new national identity as a litmus test of loyalty.36 This can only lead Ukraine back to the two options envisioned by Huntington: separation or suppression.

The way out of this conundrum is to change the political discourse from one that focuses on the differences between Eastern and Western Ukraine, into one that highlights what they have in common.

To accomplish this, however, important constituencies in Western Ukraine will have to give up their dream of a Ukraine that is Russia's perennial nemesis, just as their counterparts in Eastern Ukraine will have to give up their dream of Ukraine someday re-forging a common state with Russia. But, while acknowledging, as the former president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma wrote in his famous 2003 book, that "Ukraine is not Russia," it would be foolhardy to ignore that it has profound religious, cultural, and historical ties with Russia.

Given Russia's nearly ubiquitous cultural presence in Ukraine, building a Ukrainian national identity at the expense of Russian would be like trying to build Canadian identity around anti-Americanism and a refusal to speak English. Even if it could somehow be done, the social, psychological, and economic scars left by the process would last for generations.

In the long run, therefore, Ukraine will thrive only if its bicultural and bilingual identity is seen as a source of strength, rather than as a weakness to be eradicated. External actors who seek to promote a viable and sovereign Ukraine should therefore do everything in their power to promote a political settlement on principles of mutual cultural respect, since this is the best hope for preserving Ukrainian statehood.

Unfortunately, there are many in West who believe that acknowledging even the legitimate grievances of Eastern Ukrainians is somehow tantamount to "rewarding Russia." They have lost sight of what is in the best interests of Ukraine, because their focus is on Russia. Western analysts can bring Ukraine back into focus by doing four things:

First, stop talking about Ukrainian identity as if it were a monolithic concept, rather than two closely related, but distinct, cultural heritages.

Second, oppose attempts to ignore or minimize the importance of the Russian cultural component of Ukrainian national identity. Historically such efforts have always resulted in bloodshed.

Third, stop trying to force Ukrainians to choose between Europe and Russia. Instead, adopt a broader view of European identity that accepts both Russia and Ukraine as quintessential parts of Europe.

Finally, recognize that all actors share a common interest in resolving this crisis through a direct dialogue of the conflicting parties. Tension between Russia and the West merely allows domestic actors to lobby external patrons for support, and avoid the direct negotiations that must precede any peace settlement.

"The cold peace was always pregnant with conflict," Richard Sakwa writes, "and it has now given birth."37 Likewise, however, a resolution of the current conflict in Ukraine also contains the potential for resolving the broader geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West. All that remains to be seen is whether current political leaders are any better than their predecessors at recognizing this potential, and at preventing another division of Europe.


1 Richard Sakwa, “Back to the Wall: Myths and Mistakes that Made the Ukraine Crisis, Russian Politics, vol. 1, no.1 (January 2016), forthcoming.
2 Nicolai N. Petro, "The Real War in Ukraine: The Battle over Ukrainian Identity," The National Interest, December 4, 2014.
3 David S. Foglesong, The American Mission and the "Evil Empire." New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Martin Malia, Russia under Western Eyes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999
4 Robert Legvold, "Why the new Cold War matters," CNN, January 15, 2015.; Stephen Cohen, "The New Cold War and the Necessity of Patriotic Heresy," The Nation, August 12, 2014.
5 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2007 p. 138.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, p. 137.
8 Ibid, p. 139.
9 Roger Annis, "Most Ukrainians want a negotiated settlement to the war in eastern Ukraine,", May 4, 2015.
10 Oles Buzina, Ukraina—ne Galichina (part 3), September 28. 2010.
11 This does not appear to be true for Crimea, which is the only region of Ukraine where a majority of the population identifies itself as ethnically Russian. Konstantin Kosaretsky, "German sociologists on Crimea's choice," Oriental Review, February 10, 2015.
12 Donbass leaders appointed by Kiev, like Sergei Taruta and Alexander Kikhtenko, concede that the rebels enjoy significant local support. Sergei Taruta, "Esli my ostavim v Donbasse vyzhzhennuyu zemnlyu, to veter unichtozhit vsyu Ukrainu," Zerkalo nedeli, April 29, 2015.; and "Situatsiya v Donbasse," Analitik, February 12, 2015. Ukrainian military officials regularly estimate the percentage of local fighters among the rebels at between 75 percent and 80 percent. "Turchinov dolozhil Verkhovnoi rade o 'rossiiskikh voiskakh' v Donbasse," Regnum, January 15, 2015.; "V Minoborony ob'yasnili slova Muzhenko," BigMir, January 30, 2015.; "Ukraine military says almost 9,000 Russian troops in country's east," 5 Kanal TV (Kyiv), May 14, 2015. Both Richard Sakwa and Canadian historian and former military intelligence analyst Paul Robinson, however, put the percentage of local fighters among the rebels at closer to 90 percent. Nick Miller, "Russia expert warns Western powers 'are in the logic of 1914' on Putin, Ukraine," Sydney Morning Herald, March 6, 2015. Halyna Mokrushyna, "A Very Difficult Task of Reconciling Donbas and Euromaidan Ukraine," Truth-Out, December 18, 2014.
13 Nicolai N. Petro, "Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine,", March 13, 2105.
14 The Parliamentary accords signed on November 21, 2014 contain, as a key provision, the military redistricting of the country to ensure "a permanent military presence in the East." "Opublikovan tekst koalitsionnogo soglasheniya," Vesti Ukrainy, November 21, 2014.
15 Nicolai N. Petro, "The Cultural Basis of European Security: Analysis and Implication for Ukraine" Sotsialna ekonomika, No.1 (2009), pp. 35–41.
16 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable? The Copenhagen school replies," Review of International Studies (1997), vol. 23, p. 248.
17 Harry Eckstein, "Social Science As Cultural Science, Rational Choice As Metaphysics," in Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky, eds. Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 30–31.
18 "Minsk agreement on Ukraine crisis," The Telegraph (UK), February 12, 2015.
19 Nicolai N. Petro, "Ukraine or the Rebels: Who Won in Minsk?," The National Interest, February 13, 2015.
20 Nicolai Petro, "Ukraine's Ongoing Struggle with its Russian Identity, World Politics Review, May 6, 2014.
21 Mercé Villarubias, "Un nuevo actor lingüístico en España," El Pais, Apirl 20, 2015.
22 Daria Chernyshova, "Ukraine Decentralization Key to Peace Process - Council of Europe Chief," Sputnik, April 21, 2015.
23 "President Prodi's Speech on 'Europe and peace' at the University of Ulster," , April 1, 2004.
24 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Mar.-Apr., 1994).; Nicolai Petro, "Reversing Field: A Ukraine-Russia Relationship America Can Support," The American Interest, vol. 6, No. 2 (November-December 2010), pp. 37–42.
25 Fred Weir, "Walled off: In non-rebel eastern Ukraine, frustrations with Kiev mount," Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 2015.; John Herbst at al., "The Ukraine Crisis: Withstand and Deter Russian Aggression," The Atlantic Council, February 5, 2015.
26 Szu Ping Chan, "Ukraine's conflict with Russia leaves economy in ruins," The Daily Telegraph (UK) April 29, 2015.
27 "Vneshnaya torgovlya ukrainskykh regionov," Evropeiskaya pravda, December 17, 2014.
28 "Iz kakikh stran ukraintsy poluchayut dengi," Vesti Ukrainy, April 1, 2015.
29 Taruta, "Esli my ostavim v Donbasse vyzhzhennuyu zemnlyu," Zerkalo nedeli, April 29, 2015.
30 Ed Adamczyk, "Ukraine economy would have collapsed without Russian aid, IMF chief says," UPI, April 4, 2014.
31 "Ukraine's Economy Needs Russia," Stratfor, Feb 18, 2015.
32 "'From Lisbon to Vladivostok': Putin Envisions a Russia-EU Free Trade Zone," Spiegel, November 25, 2010.; Justin Huggler, "Ukraine crisis: Angela Merkel 'offers Russia free trade deal for peace," The Telegraph, January 23, 2015.
33 Weir, "Walled off," Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 2015.
34 Fred Brendle, "In Western Ukraine the Holocaust Has Been Erased from History," Russia Insider, December 26, 2014.; Andrew Kramer, "Ukraine Separatists Rewrite History of 1930s Famine," New York Times, April 29, 2015.
35 Egor Stadnyi, "Chto nam ne skazali o dekommunizatsii?" Ukrainska pravda, April 20, 2015.
36 Halyna Coynash, "'Decommunization Laws:' Deeply Divisize and Destined for Strasboug," Krytyka, May 2015.
37 Sakwa, "Back to the Wall," Russian Politics, forthcoming.

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