Intervention:
From Theories to Cases
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The objective of this paper is to examine the ethic of intervention in light of present policy and academic debates on the subject. It will proceed from an examination of the reasons for intervention today to an assessment of the moral and legal traditions governing intervention and a review of selected cases of intervention presently confronting U.S. foreign policy.

The Sources of Intervention: Systemic Change in International Politics
Intervention is hardly a recent phenomenon in international relations. Instead it is a pervasive reality in the modern history of world politics and was a feature of the Cold War policy of both superpowers. The nature, frequency, and methods of intervention depend in part upon the character of the international system; revolutionary and moderate international systems both produce interventions, but the role of intervention varies in each of them. When the system undergoes substantial change, the role of intervention in world affairs is likely to change too. The fact that intervention occupies a new and more central place in the U.S. foreign policy debate of the 1990s is rooted in the nature and degree of change that has occurred in the wider world. The shorthand description of the change is that we have entered the post–Cold War era. But this phrase conceals as much as it reveals. It focuses on one dimension of world politics, which by itself does not account for the growing significance of intervention in this decade. A more adequate account of the emerging pattern of world politics should distinguish two levels of transformation that intersect in the 1990s to reshape the pattern of world politics. This double dynamic involves a change in the structure of power and a change in the principles of international order.

The collapse of the Cold War order of international relations has produced a degree of change in the structure of power of a kind which usually results only

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from a major war. The peaceful achievement of this major change has been one of the striking features of the 1990s. In trying to understand the impact of this change on world politics, analysts have been unanimous in declaring the bipolar, nuclear-dominated international system dead but have rarely agreed about what pattern of power is likely to emerge in the post–Cold War future. A multiplicity of proposals fills the literature, but none has shaped a consensus. Early in the debate Charles Krauthammer argued that the collapse of bipolarity would logically lead to a unipolar world in which the United States would have unique responsibilities. Critics were quick to note that the Krauthammer position, which depended upon a univocal concept of the use of the United States’ singular (military) power, captured only one dimension of power in the contemporary international system. A more plausible position is the one represented by Henry Kissinger, most recently in his book *Diplomacy*. Kissinger urges a reconsideration of the classical multipolar world of nineteenth-century politics as a guide to understanding a new and different five-power world in which Russia, China, Europe, Japan, and the United States will have to return to some balance of power politics.

The Kissinger position identifies what clearly will be a feature of the future: the altered roles of some of the permanent members of the Security Council and the need for U.S. policy to take these changes into account. But Kissinger has encountered criticism similar to that encountered by Krauthammer. The nineteenth-century balance of power was calculated in terms of military might; today the five candidates hold their position in world politics because of diverse forms of power. A purely military calculus would leave out Japan, and a purely economic assessment would leave out Russia. Responding to their own critiques of both Krauthammer and Kissinger, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann have independently developed arguments that analyze the world in terms of multiple hierarchies of power (military and economic) and multiple actors (some are states, others are transnational institutions that complement or compete with states). This view is untidy and presents scholars and policymakers with a less clear model than that of one center of power with five centers of comparable capability. Most of the discussion of post–Cold War politics is absorbed in this debate about the changing structure of power.

A second, longer process of change has also been at work, even during the Cold War. It has been evolutionary in character and has eroded ideas once taken for granted in the discussion of world politics. At stake in this process are the two key principles of international order: the sovereignty of states and the norm of nonintervention. Jointly they have structured the understanding of world politics for over three centuries. While scholarly debate exists about their ori-
gin, they are usually associated with the Westphalian legacy of world politics. Both sovereignty and nonintervention acquired an absolute status as ideas, a status often betrayed in the daily dynamic of world politics. There was sufficient truth in each, however, to provide the basic map of the modern state system.

In the last twenty-five years, the sovereignty of the nation-state has been under multiple pressures. Normative claims for the role of human rights, the strategic logic of deterrence (which acknowledged that “defense” of territory and population were not possible), economic interdependence (including issues of the environment), and the process of “pooling” of sovereignty that marks European politics (home of the sovereign state) have all posed distinct challenges to the traditional concept of sovereignty. The cumulative effect of these forces changed the meaning of sovereignty without eliminating the reality. In the post-Cold War world, with the superpower straightjacket released, there are in fact a multiplicity of new claimants to sovereignty. But this does not conceal the shifting status of the idea: sovereignty today is a relative notion; it does not imply a state’s absolute control of its destiny. Similarly, the idea of nonintervention has been under review and under pressure, especially since the collapse of the Cold War.

An important distinction should be noted here: nonintervention has often been violated as a norm, but the process examined here is not the breaking of the norm but the erosion of its content. The intrinsic linkage of sovereignty and nonintervention guarantees that changes in the meaning of sovereignty will produce changes in the understanding of nonintervention. While challenges to sovereignty have accumulated incrementally over many years, the calls for altering the norm of nonintervention are largely the product of the post-Cold War years. During the Cold War the pressure on the nonintervention principle was evident. Professor Adam Roberts, in a recent article, described John Vincent’s definitive book on nonintervention as “a reply to those who thought that the day of nonintervention was over.” And in 1984 Hedley Bull closed his introduction to an anthology of essays on intervention with the question: “Is the gap between the rule of nonintervention and the facts of intervention now so vast that the former has become a mockery with which it would be better to dispense altogether, or does the proscription of intervention remain a vital part of the normative structure on which international order depends?”

These theoretical echoes of the intervention debate have two sources. First, the increasing integration of international society has expanded the opportuni-

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ties and the means for various kinds of intervention in the internal life of other societies. Admittedly, military intervention—our concern here—has always had a distinctly different status than that of other forms of intervention, but the increase of nonmilitary intervention has altered the environment in which military intervention occurs. Second, the nonintervention rule has always rested on a fragile moral foundation. The ethical calculus supporting the rule involves a clear consequentialist choice to give priority to order over justice in international relations. The roots of this choice lie in Westphalia, which had as one of its purposes ending the interventionist cycle of the religious wars. Statesmen established nonintervention as a standard to preserve the peace in a world of states divided by nationality, religion, and ideology. Clearly there were costs to the choice: human rights were excluded from the domain of foreign policy; patterns of injustice within states were exempt from review; and atrocities reaching to the threshold of genocide could be insulated from the scrutiny or action of individual states or the international community. Today, in an era of fundamental transformation in world politics, both theory and practice in international relations are moving toward a reassessment of the costs and benefits of the non-intervention rule.3

The sources of intervention in the 1990s are found in both of the aforementioned changes in world politics. The restraints on intervention during the Cold War were both rules of prudence and principles of order. Rules of prudence constrained the superpowers from some—although not all—interventions because the risk of escalation to superpower and/or nuclear conflict outweighed the perceived interests or moral imperatives that called for intervention. The collapse of the bipolar order (except the remaining nuclear relationship) has drastically diminished the risk of U.S.-Russian conflict; hence the possible costs of intervention have been diminished as well. The declining risks associated with intervention are joined today by increasing incidents of atrocities within states. Some, but not all, of these can be traced to the loosening of the Cold War vise which held much of world politics in an artificial state of stability. As internal conflicts are brought to their attention, the world’s states and citizens instinctively expect more from both international institutions and individual states than they did during the Cold War. This in turn intensifies the pressure on the principles of order, provoking further erosion of the traditionally sacrosanct status of states.

To summarize, a singular characteristic of international politics in the 1990s is the way in which both the empirical character of state behavior and the norms governing world politics have combined to increase the scope of interventionary activity and to raise the question of whether a change in the normative view of intervention is needed today. Neither a purely political nor a purely ethical argument will be sufficient to respond to this question.

The Normative Traditions: Moral and Legal
The Westphalian norm of nonintervention will not be easily altered, nor should it be. While its moral foundation is fragile, it is not devoid of merit. The rule of nonintervention has narrow objectives, but crucially important ones. It seeks to keep the peace in an environment of military “self-help” where each state is its own arbiter in justifying the use of force. As a guardian of order, the rule of nonintervention has been in effect for over two hundred years. Yet in spite of its dominant role in the modern state system, the rule does not express the full range of moral wisdom regarding intervention.

As the rule comes under scrutiny, it is important to recall that the full normative tradition of intervention is divisible into two broad periods. The moral tradition in intervention—closely linked to the traditional just war doctrine—was in effect from the fourth through the seventeenth century. The legal tradition, which produced the nonintervention rule, took shape in the eighteenth century and remained unchallenged (in principle at least) until the founding of the United Nations.4

Each of these positions on intervention is drawn from a wider argument which includes a conception of political community, a judgment about the use of force, and a specific application of the theory of force to intervention. The moral tradition emerged from, and expressed the values of, the medieval structure of politics. In its clearest expression, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the moral tradition on intervention served the medieval “Republica Christiana” of Europe. Within that political community, in which the church’s role as an authoritative teacher of moral norms provided significant moral cohesion, the use of force was understood to be an instrument of justice. Hence, the just war doctrine could only be invoked when a crime had been committed. Then the rest of the community had a duty to vindicate the moral order of the

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society. Intervention in this framework was an expression of solidarity with those who had been victims of injustice. Hence, intervention was a morally prescribed duty, not an offense against a ruler’s right.

Between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries two phenomena reshaped the framework that had produced the moral theory of intervention. The first phenomenon was the rise of the secular state (or the lay state, as it was called in the church-state conflicts of the time) which did not recognize any higher political authority, and the second was the Reformation, which challenged the idea of a single moral authority in the political community.

The new political order in effect by the seventeenth century was rooted in the sovereign nation-state. It was also based on the droit de guerre, the idea that each state has a sovereign right to resort to force to pursue its national interests. The collapse of the medieval order revised the basic framework of politics and war. In the medieval system the moral duty to assist those under attack produced an interventionist moral and political order. In the modern state system, where force is primarily understood not as an instrument of justice but as an instrument of policy to be used at the will of the sovereign ruler, a permissive view of intervention threatens to produce chaos rather than a redress of injustice.

In the face of this prospect and in light of the interventionist character of the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the modern state system sought to rule out intervention. In the Westphalian order both state sovereignty and the rule of nonintervention are treated as absolute norms. In effect, the legal tradition of intervention reversed the normative judgment that had sustained the moral doctrine since the Middle Ages. In the legal tradition the burden of proof is on the intervening party; sovereignty and nonintervention are regularly invoked in international institutions, by foreign ministers and in the literature of international politics. But the theory and practice of contemporary statecraft illustrate that sovereignty has been eroded, and nonintervention is under both pressure and review. No one expects, and few seek, the disappearance of the Westphalian concepts as principles of order. But Hedley Bull’s comment of the 1970s about the gap between the facts of world politics and the role of nonintervention has taken on a new significance. Adherence to the absolute interpretation of nonintervention will paralyze the international community in the face of events that demand action.

There is a need, therefore, to revise our conception of sovereignty and nonintervention at the normative and empirical levels. Revising Westphalia requires both an understanding of the modern state system’s attempt to prevent random and frequent intervention and an accommodation of the needs states have for a less moralized doctrine of war.
have for a more integrated order. Revising Westphalia means broadening the moral tradition and reshaping the legal model.

In *Just and Unjust Wars*, Michael Walzer defines war and intervention in similar terms. The proposal here is to distinguish them sharply: war is the international system’s response to aggression undertaken in the name of protecting both a sovereign state under attack and protecting the system of sovereign states; intervention involves the use of force within a state’s borders, usually to influence the policy or status of a sovereign government. In many ways the character of intervention makes it more difficult to justify than war. There is a logical fit between the “anarchical” character of international relations and the institution of war as the *ultima ratio* in a political order devoid of centralized authority. The idea of intervention threatens an already fragile system by challenging the one principle of authority (the state) in the system. This insight shaped the cautious legal approach to intervention; an interventionist system, even one guided by the best of intentions, seemed to promise only destruction, not justice.

Any proposal to revise the Westphalian norm must be conscious and respectful of the threat of chaos yet convinced of the need to respond to conflict and chaos within states as a means of moving beyond anarchy in international relations.

How can the balance be struck for an ethic of (military) intervention? The framework for revising the legal model resides in the core ethical doctrine of the moral tradition, the just war ethic. The structure of the ethic is determined by three steps. First, the moral argument starts with a presumption against the use of force; the presumption, however, yields to specified exceptions determined on the basis of moral criteria. Second, the criteria are developed by asking three questions: Why can force be used (for what purpose)? When can it be used (under what conditions)? And how should it be used (by which means)? Third, the questions yield the multiple criteria of the moral doctrine, including just cause, right intention, proportionality (of objectives and means), and noncombatant immunity.

The adaptation of the classical moral doctrine to intervention involves four steps: (1) defining how the presumption/exception logic should be stated; (2) expanding the criteria of just cause for intervention; (3) restricting the authority of states to intervene unilaterally; and (4) enforcing a demanding standard of the means test.

The first decision faced in revising the nonintervention norm is whether the presumption should remain with nonintervention or should return to the moral doctrine’s conception of a duty to intervene. The determination of the presump-
tion will have a systemic effect on the process of moral analysis. In the case of intervention, shifting the presumption would be particularly significant because in the legal model few exceptions were admitted beyond the case of genocide. Much of the policy debate today, however, is focused on whether or not particular cases warrant intervention. With an increasing number of such cases arising in world politics the logic of the intervention debate must move beyond cases to the rule itself. Would the demands of international order and justice be better served by a more interventionist system? While revision of the norm of non-intervention is appropriate at this time, there should not be a change in the presumption of the doctrine. In spite of an increasing number of instances in which intervention must at least be considered, the character and composition of the international system requires presumptive restraint on intervention.

Two features of world politics point to this conclusion. First, the formal equality of states does not compensate for the enormous differences in power and potential that exist among them. Second, intervention is precisely the kind of issue that makes traditional realists suspicious of moral claims in international politics. Under the shield of humanitarian claims or, today, protecting the safety of the international system on issues as distinct as proliferation and the environment, states can intervene for reasons of power politics. Because of the diversity of states and the dangers of rationalization, the wisdom of Westphalia should be heeded. Intervention may be necessary but it should not be made easy. Hence the need to sustain the presumption against it.

In the legal model the presumption yielded only to genocide, or when an alliance was to participate in the intervention. Today, the international system would be better served by a wider range of exceptions. The “just causes” for intervention must go beyond genocide. The intellectual and political challenge is to identify a wider range of exceptions without eroding the presumption against intervention. One could, for example, think of a spectrum of problems from human rights violations to genocide. The former should be addressed by a variety of political and economic measures but should not constitute a cause for military intervention. The latter, of course, would constitute such a cause. Between them lies undefined territory, in the sense that the legal model would find nothing short of genocide demanding intervention, while the atrocities projected throughout the world by CNN create expectations that something more than respect for sovereignty should guide the politics of states. Expanding the justification for intervention on a systematic basis rather than by ad hoc decisions is a requirement for international order.
Two examples arising from the politics of the 1990s are ethnic cleansing and failed states. Ethnic cleansing approximates genocide and should not be classified simply as a human rights violation. It should be publicly identified as a distinct offense that the international community is willing to address through military measures. The failed-state phenomenon arises when the conditions associated with sovereign control (that is, internal order) collapse, and chaos threatens individuals and the international order. The 1990s have seen an increase in the number of failed states and a lack of consensus among states and international institutions about how to respond to the collapse of order within societies. Military intervention has occurred in Somalia and Rwanda, but the foundations of a policy are lacking. Establishing policy requires defining the phenomenon of a failed state as a potential threat to international order. This, in turn, would require criteria for triggering international action and providing authorization for states, or, preferably, for international institutions, to assume responsibility for failed states.

These two cases do not exhaust the range of exceptions that must be identified in order to develop a framework of law and policy that goes beyond the practice of the legal tradition of intervention while still maintaining the presumption against it in the daily life of states.

To maintain the presumption, the expansion of the category of just cause for intervention should be accompanied by a corresponding prohibition of the right of individual states to intervene. Such a prohibition would have to leave intact existing rights of states to defend themselves and fulfill alliance commitments. But the expansion of the just causes for intervention are not designed to meet those cases. Rather, such expansion is designed to overcome the paralysis of the international community in the face of internal chaos in states.

The wisdom of Westphalia, however, is a reminder that such a broadening of the reasons for intervention involves the risk that states will invoke humanitarian reasons while pursuing other objectives through military intervention. Disparities in size, power, and status among states and the historical memory of how states rationalize their policies under the guise of moral humanitarian motivation illustrate the need to use the proper authority criterion as an instrument of restraint in the politics of intervention.

In a revised ethic of intervention, multilateral authorization should be the norm. Increasing the number of actors needed to justify intervention does not guarantee greater moral probity, but it does draw on the wisdom and experience of constitutional governance within states; that is, when seeking to restrain the
use of power, procedural limitations on actors can serve as a test of the intention, purpose, and objectives of a policy.

The policy question that perhaps best illustrates the dynamic between expanding the cause criterion and restricting the authority to intervene is the post-Cold War problem of nuclear proliferation. The rising significance of proliferation as a problem of the international order provides a foundation for building the case that proliferation constitutes a threat to the international system. Achieving a consensus on this proposition will be very difficult because it assumes the existing division of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear states. Even in the face of this formidable obstacle—which is both normative and empirical—there are multiple reasons to move toward a definition of proliferation as a systemic threat and to develop multilateral measures to prevent individual states from acquiring nuclear weapons. If nonproliferation measures fail and a state is on the verge of crossing the nuclear threshold, the possibility of military action undoubtedly will arise. Moreover, only a very small number of states will be equipped to inhibit proliferation. The danger thus arises that the capability to intervene effectively will be identified with the authority to intervene unilaterally. Legitimizing such unilateral measures could in fact increase the instability of the international system since proliferation is often linked to long-standing political tensions (for example, those between North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, or in the Middle East). Even in the case of proliferation, therefore, the desired norm should be multilateral authorization of any military intervention. The norm would have particular relevance to the United States since the United States would be the most likely candidate to take action against a serious threat of proliferation.

The final test of a revised ethic of intervention should be the development of strict standards to assess the just means criteria. The standards should make it possible to evaluate any contemplated intervention in light of the means to be employed. In addition, of course, the criteria for assessing justifiable means would have to be met during the course of an intervention. The significance of a strict means test to justify any intervention can be appreciated by reflecting upon the recent history of the just war ethic. From the strategic bombing policy of World War II to the debates about nuclear deterrence to the Vietnam and Gulf wars, the central problem of the normative debate on warfare has been how to impose constraints on the modern technology of war.

In Vietnam the disjunction between the ends pursued and the destruction caused by the war became the central ethical critique of U.S. policy, a policy which was tragically embodied in the idea that we had “to destroy the village in order to save it.” In response to Vietnam, the U.S. military developed a consen-
sus that any future use of force should employ the strategy of bringing massive power to bear upon an enemy for a short, defined period of time. This strategy has been crystallized in criteria proposed by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and later by General Colin Powell. The strategy seeks to avoid the policy of incremental escalation followed in Vietnam in favor of bringing massive power to bear in pursuit of a clearly defined set of objectives. In its pure form the doctrine poses a threat to the central tests of just means: noncombatant immunity and proportionality. The Gulf War is a case study of how the strategy can be executed. In fact, substantial attention was given to avoiding the direct targeting of the civilian population. But troubling questions remain about the proportionality standard and the Gulf War strategy.

Both Vietnam and the Gulf War, therefore, overshadow attempts to construct criteria to enforce a just means test for intervention. Unlike a war of self-defense, in which there must be an immediate response to aggression, the kinds of conflicts arising in the 1990s allow time for consideration of the means contemplated and the destruction envisioned by resort to force. The development of specific tests to provide a systematic a priori assessment of strategy should be part of a revised ethic of intervention. These tests in turn can be complemented by the criteria of last resort and possibility of success, providing a framework for evaluating the costs and benefits of a proposed intervention. A strict means test is one more method of maintaining a presumptive restraint on intervention, even if the reasons for intervention have been expanded.

Deciding Cases: Reflections and Indications

The test of a revised ethic of intervention will ultimately be its ability to address specific cases. The three cases that have absorbed U.S. policy in the 1990s have been Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Rather than “deciding” these cases in thorough casuistic fashion, limits of time and space point here to a more modest commentary, in light of the criteria just developed, on how these cases have been framed and argued in the U.S. policy process.

Bosnia: By any revised standard of just cause, the war in Bosnia warrants international action. Moreover, it is not difficult to identify multilateral authorities with the right and duty to assume responsibility for the carnage: European institutions, NATO, and the United Nations might all legitimately assume responsibility for the Bosnian case. The sticking point in the Bosnia policy may be best captured by the Kantian dictum that “ought implies can.” The moral and political urgency of the case is compelling; what is less certain is whether or not outside agencies have the capability to use force effectively and proportionately in the situation. The problem might be phrased this way: in Bosnia primitive
violence has inflicted massive suffering; proposals for military intervention have been predicated on the hope that high-tech violence (like that used in the Gulf War) could effectively suppress this primitive violence and impose conditions for a political settlement. The lingering doubt and fear has been that the high-tech strategy would fail, thereby escalating the destructiveness of the war, engaging major powers who would find it difficult to disengage, and not achieving any political result.

In brief, many who have been convinced of the just cause reasons for intervention in Bosnia have been unable to satisfy the means test. In retrospect, a case can be made that the early use of selective air strikes directly against Serbia could have met the means test and been an effective instrument of a broader diplomatic policy. With that moment gone, however, the proposal to use force in Bosnia faces difficult challenges. It is possible to achieve a specific tactical objective like lifting the siege of Sarajevo, but any wider use of force moves quickly toward the goal of retaking territory to reverse the gains of the Bosnian Serbs. Such a policy option encounters serious difficulty in satisfying the proportionality test and the possibility-of-success test. Even in the face of clear just-cause arguments, few voices have been able to meet the a priori means test.

Somalia: The Somalia case exemplifies the failed state challenge of one state to the others in the system. Again, by any expanded version of just cause, Somalia required a response, including the military means necessary to render humanitarian assistance effective. Moreover, the UN authorization clearly passed the multilateral authority test. Finally, the means tests also were met. In brief Somalia should stand as a case study in justifiable intervention. But in the U.S. debate it hardly has this status. The costs of U.S. casualties were regarded as disproportionate, a perception which points toward one of the political-moral issues of the intervention debate of the 1990s. During the Cold War, interventions were justified for security reasons. Without addressing here the credibility of this sort of justification, it is enough to highlight how different the rationale for intervention must be in cases of failed states. In most of these failed states, no security rationale will be convincing (as for example, in the case of Rwanda or Somalia). Without this rationale, it is necessary that the U.S. public develop some consensus about which reasons, if any, have the political-moral weight to sustain the expenditure of treasure, talent, and lives. Because no such consensus exists at the moment, an expanded range of moral reasons to justify intervention will stand without any support in the body politic.

Haiti: The case of the intervention in Haiti manifested much of the public resistance to intervention that had surfaced in the case of Somalia. Again, at the level of principle, Haiti provided overwhelming evidence, on human rights
grounds, to support a just-cause argument. The United Nations gave the United States multilateral authorization, but the Organization of American States (OAS) clearly did not. The authority criterion was, therefore, not crystal clear and exhibited a well-founded Latin American suspicion of U.S. interventions. The means test clearly could have been met in the sense of the certitude that the Haitian military would collapse. One question remained: if the Bosnian debate can be captured in the phrase “ought implies can,” the Haitian case raised the question of whether “can implies should.”

The feasibility of the Haitian policy—at least in the sense of deposing the military rulers—was not under debate, but political considerations of two kinds were uncertain: first, the impact of yet another U.S.-led invasion on the politics of the hemisphere, and second, the question of domestic political support for the policy. These considerations are not easily captured by the standard just war criteria, but the first is rooted in the Westphalian legacy of protecting small states from continuing interventions, and the second raises, again, the feasibility of sustaining a policy based on the revised ethic of intervention. In the end, the U.S. military role in Haiti has met all relevant tests of a proportionate use of force in support of a clearly justifiable objective. The fact still remains, however, that prior to the sending of U.S. troops, President Clinton had virtually no public support. It is not clear that the Haiti experience has substantially changed U.S. public opinion about intervention.

Indeed, neither at the level of public opinion nor policy formulation is there a clear sense of direction in the United States about the legitimacy or feasibility of intervention in the kinds of cases the 1990s are producing. The Morgenthau Lecture series at the Carnegie Council honors a European intellectual who decisively shaped American policy and public opinion about the exercise of responsibility at a time of fundamental changes in world politics. The changes of the 1990s are no less profound than those Morgenthau confronted in the 1940s. We are back again to issues of power and purpose, strategy and ethics, a sense of limits and a sense of purpose. Morgenthau no doubt would have relished the challenge, but it must be met by others who have been moved by his wisdom and courage to shape a new policy framework for a very different world. A revised ethic of intervention will not, by itself, shape an adequate policy of intervention. But it is one place to begin building the framework for a policy equal to the demands of this decade.