Founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1914, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs is an educational, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that produces lectures, publications, and multimedia materials on the ethical challenges of living in a globalized world. Its work is rooted in the premise that the incorporation of moral principles into discussions of international affairs will yield a more peaceful, just world. The educational value of the Council’s programs lies in its three-part formula: thematic focus on ethics, access to world-renowned experts, and an in-house studio that produces original video and audio resources for a global market.

This collection was made possible by a generous grant from the Henry Luce Foundation, established in 1936 by the late Henry R. Luce, co-founder and editor-in-chief of Time Inc., to honor his parents who were missionary educators in China. The Foundation seeks to bring important ideas to the center of American life, strengthen international understanding, and foster innovation and leadership in academic, policy, religious, and art communities.
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Last year, Carnegie Council inaugurated its first class of Ethics Fellows for the Future (EFFs), students who are appointed and mentored by our current Global Ethics Fellows (GEFs) and are invited to attend our annual meeting and collaborate with their mentors and peers on joint projects.

Thanks in part to the generous support from the Henry Luce Foundation, more than a dozen EFFs—many from East Asian and American universities—were able to present their projects to their peers at our November 2013 annual meeting in New York City. During that meeting the EFFs also participated in discussions with GEFs on the topic of a “global ethic,” attended a lecture by philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, and visited cultural sights in New York City, including the Lower East Side Tenement Museum.

This booklet is a collection of the EFFs’ essays and project outlines as well as the winning essay of Carnegie Council’s 2014 Trans-Pacific Student Contest. The two winners of that contest are invited to participate in our 2014 annual meeting.

In the Trans-Pacific contest, students were asked this year to answer the following question: “What are shared or different values between you and your contest partner’s home country?” The winning essay by Salina Lee (United States) and Nelson Chew (Singapore) is written as a lighthearted conversation between two good friends on a sightseeing trip in New York Harbor, yet looks at serious topics that concern both nations: civil liberties, education, and race.

In their research papers, Ethics Fellows for the Future addressed Carnegie Council’s focus of ethics in international affairs from a number of different angles. Michael Angelo Liwanag, at International Christian University in Tokyo (ICU), proposed a new set of ethical guidelines for UNESCO in adding sites to its World Heritage List. He later developed this paper into his thesis project and is presenting his work at academic conferences and publishing the argument in journals.

Ethics Fellows for the Future also tackled some of Carnegie Council’s Centennial themes. On “Citizenship and Difference,” John Howard of Dartmouth College wrote a piece critical of U.S. commitment to international treaties through the lens of voting rights for Puerto Ricans. Joanna Maulbeck, at Rutgers University, focused on the theme of “Technology and Risk” in her piece, analyzing the positives and negatives of technology use for early child development.

Following the model of Carnegie Council’s Global Ethical Dialogues, some students chose to hold their own focus groups investigating ethical questions pertinent to their communities. Alison Walt held a focus group at the University of Oregon asking students their views on citizenship. Gabriel Lima de Almeida of Fluminense Federal University in Rio de Janeiro proposed a project that would include a focus group asking Brazilians about government corruption—the topic of Carnegie Council’s site visit to Rio de Janeiro last year.

The fellowship program aims to cultivate the next generation of global leaders by introducing exceptional students to educational resources on ethics and international affairs and creating opportunities for them to meet one another in person to share experiences and ideas, and to build lasting relationships.

During the November 2013 conference, we had a chance to get some of the impressions the students had of the program. EFF Berenike Schott of Georgetown University said she joined the program as a way to better understand how academic research can be relevant for political practice. Similarly, EFF Zeyu Wang of Peking University said he attended the conference because he believes ethics is not limited to social science questions but goes beyond into areas of science and technology—areas of his research.

EFF Gage Hansen of the University of Utah said that interactions that the program made possible between the mentors and students made his work more “fulfilling” and “effective.” Speaking directly to the mission of the program, EFF Marisa Roy of the University of Southern California noted that the network and conference gave her a better appreciation of the “cultures and assumptions” of others as well as her own.

EFF Vivian Ng of Singapore Management University noted that the program gave her a new appreciation of cultural differences and nuances.
EFF Oumie Sissokho of National Chengchi University in Taiwan reflected on the experience, calling the program “awesome.” She also noted that the examination of ethical matters is not a solo endeavor; rather it should be done as a community, and the consideration of these issues equips younger people to contribute to global security.

EFF Liwanag of ICU said that upon speaking with several fellows at the conference, he concluded that the program would be “instrumental” to their future careers after they return to their universities and communities.

Carnegie Council’s 2014 Centennial theme for the year is focusing on the future of the Council’s work and forthcoming global issues. Given that focus, the next class of Ethics Fellows for the Future has launched a group project called “Of All Possible Future Worlds: Global Trends, Values, and Ethics.” In this project, students take a self-paced online course designed by Carnegie Council fellow Thong Nguyen that examines how the values of liberty, justice, pluralism, and peace will shape the state of our world toward the year 2020.

In October 2014, EFFs will present their findings from the “Future Worlds” project and online course at our annual meeting and centennial celebration in New York City. This celebration also will include a lecture on global ethics by philosopher Peter Singer at City College of New York as part of our newly launched local partnerships and an interview with our Centennial Chair Michael Ignatieff at New York Public Library, another legacy of Andrew Carnegie’s philanthropy.

As part of building our network and relationships abroad, we will hold a gathering of fellows in Tokyo in partnership with ICU in June 2015. The conference will focus on our Centennial theme of “Technology and Risk,” issues that Japanese society has faced like no other, especially since the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis. Michael Ignatieff and I will continue on to conduct interviews in Fukushima as well as in Yangon and Mandalay, Burma, to examine that country’s transition toward democracy. These dialogues will culminate in a book on how communities around the world build a shared moral code and how sometimes that code is broken or rebuilt. The book also aims to illuminate how a global ethical dialogue works within and across cultures. We look forward to continuing the conversation.

New York City
August 2014

Devin T. Stewart is senior program director and senior fellow at Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. He is also a Truman Security Fellow, and an adjunct assistant professor in international affairs at Columbia University and New York University. Stewart’s writings have appeared in more than ten languages in numerous publications, including the Foreign Affairs, American Interest, Newsweek, Foreign Policy, Ethics & International Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Current History, and The National Interest. He also is a contributing author to several monographs and books, including Reimagining Japan: The Quest for a Future that Works (Simon & Schuster, 2011) and Tsunami: Japan’s Post-Fukushima Future (Foreign Policy, 2011).
What defines your country? How do you perceive someone from a totally different background? With every new person you meet, it becomes a challenge to empathize and integrate his experiences into your repertoire of what you thought you already knew about the world. Who would have guessed that an exchange between a Singaporean and an American would offer insights on the subtle connections that make two vastly different countries so very comparable?

An Educational Endeavor

“You looked so dorky!” Nelson chuckled at a photo of me in the 6th grade. We were on the ferry to Staten Island, and Nelson had cajoled me into bringing my middle and high school yearbooks on the trip. As he continued to flip through the yearbooks that marked the grand years of my middle and high school life, I grimaced at my awkward braces and youthful pigtails. As he skimmed the photos, I surveyed the back covers scrawled with notes that my old friends wrote to me and a deep sense of nostalgia overcame me. Ah, yes, we joked about being runaway princesses...and there’s the heart around my crush’s signature...I wonder what that “BFF” is doing now?

Nelson interrupted my reminiscing and exclaimed, “Why is that girl’s hair spiky and pink?” I glanced over and shrugged, “Why not? She was trying to be cool.
Same reason kids chewed gum in school or wore letter jackets. You just tried to be cool and stand out.” A curious look suddenly eclipsed Nelson’s face, and he frowned. “At Raffles, we all wore white uniforms, but I guess some girls would fold up the ends of their shirt sleeves as a fashion statement,” he said, referring to his middle and high school. I raised an eyebrow and thought, “Seriously? Is that the extent of their individual expression against the social expectations of proper teenage behavior?”

The public schools I attended in Lake Jackson, Texas, are characteristic of typical American public schools. The kids too, were largely typical of American teenagers, be they the goody-two-shoes, the rebel, the athlete, or the school pride-filled cheerleaders. I grew up loving America for her diversity and emphasis on individualism. America, the land of the free, was the bastion of individual freedom and rights. The teenagers at school showed their individual colors through various avenues of expression. Dress codes were moderate and negotiable, and students were generally free to adopt their personalized styles of dress. From dyed hair and piercings to designer outfits and brand name accessories to “camo” hunting gear, one was free to experiment with clothes and individual identity—something I understand to be of a life or death matter to teenagers. The extremes often yielded school detention, but, for many, that was worth the freedom to stand out and create a bubble of self-expression. In the education system I was familiar with, everyone strove for, and took pride in being different.

Yet in Singapore, where Nelson spent the first 21 years of his life, school uniforms are very much the norm. Students in Singapore wear school uniforms virtually every day from Monday to Friday from the first day in kindergarten to the last day of high school graduation. School regulations regarding uniforms are strict, and the threat of punishment serves as reminder for anyone tempted to step out of line. At Raffles Institution, where Nelson spent the last six years of his pre-university education, boys wore plain white uniforms and girls’ skirts are required to be at least knee length. Shoes were also white or of the respective school’s official colors. Boys had to have short hair, and girls are required to tie up their hair with plain accessories. The furthest extent of a Singaporean schoolboy’s rebellion against dress code regulations was leaving a modest piece of shirt untucked or wearing ankle-length socks. Girls tested their teachers’ patience by altering their skirts to be as short as possible, but seldom dared to don anything else beyond the uniform, for fear of expulsion. In order to ensure obedience to school regulations, a Prefect system is established in many schools, where select students of good character are nominated, interviewed and elected as school Prefects with the authority to maintain order and discipline among classmates.

Like most American public schools, the public schools I attended in Texas had very varied classes and covered broad subjects (even classes on Texas history, which, I later realized is not normal in other states). Academics balanced with athletics and the arts, and foreign languages were optional. School curriculum meant broadening your horizon as much as possible and discovering your talents, no matter what they were, and giving almost everything a try. Perhaps a telling example of that educational experience is the “Life Skills” class that always reached full enrollment. Standardized exams mainly meant that school-wide performance skimmed the minimum state requirements just enough to maintain government funding. Sports, on the other hand, often carried much more weight and interest. I remember how “pep rally schedule” disrupted Friday classes so that athletes and band members had special excused absences justified by their unfailing school spirit. The education I experienced stressed individuality and applauded the eccentric. Striking the appropriate balance of being different, yet not too different, were lessons of negotiating how to belong in this conglomerate of personalities and backgrounds, but also carving a niche of your own identity. Completing high school for me, sure, meant college, but it was also a journey to discover that everyone has struggles and successes in his own degree and respecting that aggregate is what makes a society strong.

Yet the last two years of Nelson’s pre-university education suggested that he lived in an almost entirely different academic reality from me. With a primary emphasis on stellar academic achievement, programs within Raffles are designed for students to specialize in very specific subjects by age 17, and are expected to focus and excel at those subjects. High school students such as those in Raffles take no more than four or five core courses, and spend a full two academic years studying those subjects in great depth. Compared to the American education system, the emphasis in Singapore appears to be much more on depth rather than breadth in education. Nelson himself has not taken a single course in history, philosophy, economics, literature, or computer science in the four years leading up to university. Singaporean universities are not that much different in their emphasis on early specialization, with professional degrees in law and medicine being offered at the undergraduate level. Since many requisite classes for universities are taken in high school, this means that most Singaporeans aspiring to be medical doctors would have to begin designing their course of study from the early age of 16.

Speaking to a Singaporean, an American could easily sense that, compared to America, their society is one that is largely built on conformism rather than individualism, on obedience rather than defiance. As Nelson closed my yearbook, I asked him, “Don’t you wish you went to a high school much like mine?” I did not even have to listen to the words to know his answer. With his eyes beaming with pride, and a hint of a smile suggesting that mine was a redundant question, he stated firmly, “No, not at all.” As always, Nelson
never falters in his loyalty for his country or for his beloved high school.

**Necessary Sacrifices**

My conversation with Salina was suddenly interrupted by the voice of a middle-aged man standing by the deck railings. “Konnichiwa,” he jeered at us. “What’s that about?” I wondered silently, both slightly insulted and slightly baffled at the same time. It was difficult to tell if it was a polite attempt to reach out to a foreign tourist or a racist comment. Salina is Asian, but had grown up in Texas. I too, am Asian, but as a Singaporean, English is my first language. I certainly did not need a stranger blatantly mocking Japanese, as an Asian language, to me.

Race: A sensitive issue in both America and in Singapore. Populations of different races and religions live in both countries and have been a major part of each country’s demographics throughout their respective histories. In America, the historical population of European and African ancestry has yielded to influxes of Hispanics and a growing group of Asian immigrants as the country expanded. In Singapore, a native Malay population cohabit a tiny island with Chinese and Indians. I grew up acknowledging the many demographics present. Local languages are preserved in our four official languages—English, Malay, Mandarin, Tamil—and numerous dialects are also heard on a daily basis. While racism in either country is not tolerated, the manner by which we deal with race issues could not be more different.

A young country built on the foundation of diverse cultures and languages, Singaporean leaders have publicly admitted that freedom of speech in the “classical, Western, liberal” sense does not exist in Singapore. Government tactics warn that this restriction on freedom of speech is a pragmatic measure and necessary sacrifice of personal freedom to preserve racial harmony in Singapore. Yet, to the Singaporean government, social stability goes further than just restricting free speech. Under the Ethnic Integration Policy, every residential apartment building built by the government in Singapore has quotas for the maximum number of households of each race. Chinese households, for example, are not allowed to exceed a certain “ethnic proportion” in a housing district. The policy aims to promote racial integration and prevent the formation of
racial enclaves by ensuring a balanced mix among various ethnic communities. However, this also means that one could not always be allowed to live in a certain area because of his or her skin color. For an American, this type of government policy might appear to be a severe infringement on personal freedom.

In theory, I knew of civil liberties before my university experience in America. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of press; the list of freedoms went on. I expected that such a free place would be full of even more joyous celebration of diversity that makes up a country 60 times larger than my home. Instead, I was shocked to discover the jarring discrepancies among races, from socioeconomic status to daily encounters to institutionalized decrees. Such episodes oppose my fascination with the grand land of freedom, liberty, and civil rights, which are branded as the crux of American ideals. My expectations for America came from the images of endless fields of farmland, expansive freeways, and the best universities.

As an American, Salina regards her minority status mildly; perhaps it’s because she’s always been the minority, as an Asian in America. Racial judgments are offensive, but she dismisses them as being inherent side effects of America’s history and attitude toward immigrants. Change is slow to happen and even with legal rights on her side, discrimination within the population is hard to avoid. She’s proud of being American and considers her racial position as a minority to be natural and inevitable. When America is such a huge mix of so many people, Salina talks of independent fighting over every demographic problem as a hopeless cause. The wealth of freedoms permitted in America gives everyone the right to his opinions and ideas, as well as expressing them, and each person should use such freedoms to find opportunities and contribute in a positive way. Racial remarks are useless acts of one’s right to freedom of speech, and don’t serve to benefit the speaker or the receiver.

Those who don’t use their rights to render positive impacts only waste their rights—rights they are lucky to have and that are so sought after in other countries.

From a young age, I was told that the restrictive environment in Singapore is necessary because it creates the stability and social control for such a diverse population sharing a small island. I truly believed that there is some truth to the argument that if not for the Singaporean government’s dictate of people’s rights, we would not be the successful and growing country we are in less than 50 years of existence. The historical struggles of a small nation-state have led to a siege mentality rooted in preserving the survival and prosperity of Singapore. Yet, I cannot help but wonder: How much sacrifice is too much?

**Bridging the Gap**

As the ferry neared Ellis Island, the Statue of Liberty towered over our heads. The skyline of Manhattan’s skyscrapers glinted in the sunshine. Nelson thoughtfully imagined this moment as if he were an immigrant, finally reaching his longed-for destination in America, the land of freedom and opportunity. Salina pondered her emotions and gratitude for having lived in a country grounded on protecting and offering sanctuary to all who sought it.

The constitutional and national ideals of America highlight individual rights, freedom, and a government representative of the people. It’s all about a living Constitution, the Statue of Liberty, Land of the Free, Home of the Brave. The democratic society of America favors contesting political parties and juggles the views of a huge and dynamic country as characteristic of its development as a global nation. Whether intentionally or not, the word “freedom” is never mentioned in the lyrics of the Singaporean national anthem or its national pledge. The dichotomy and differences between America and Singapore is an ongoing conversation that exists even within each country’s domestic spheres. How much freedom is too much?

When is it appropriate to sacrifice one’s personal freedom for the security of the nation? When would a difficult truth be protected under the claim of free speech, and when would it be considered a racist comment? Singapore’s national ideals speak of democracy, peace, progress, equality, and justice.

Growing up on opposite sides of the world, one can expect our early life experiences to be fairly different, from educational experiences to political realities. Despite the structural differences in education and social surroundings, human beings everywhere desire the same things. American or Singaporean, it’s not the spiky, pink hair or the hemming of skirts that mattered per se, but the underlying need to live a life true to oneself. Americans or Singaporeans, young people seek paths of individuality, while matured adults seek political freedom.

A ray of sunlight reflected off the Freedom Torch and its touch of the American Dream warmed our faces. Staring up at the Statue of Liberty, Nelson couldn’t help but feel a sense of awe. “There really isn’t anything quite like it, is there?” he said softly. “Of course not, it’s A-mur-ica!” Salina laughed and snapped a photo of this Singaporean in the middle of iconic America, “Aren’t you feeling rather attached now and maybe just want to stay in this great country forever?!” Nelson rolled his eyes, “Aiya, already no lah. Singapore calls to me ah. Besides, if you visit one day, maybe you can appreciate the sentiments of an island-city.” Shaking her head at the familiar words, Salina embraced the sight of the giant bastion of Liberty. It’s not so much the particular location or societal upbringing that matters because, the truth is, my country is home to me and your country will always be home to you; and that should be enough to bridge our ideologies.
The Implication of the Paris Declaration: Better Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century?

Although the 2005 Paris Declaration created an improved framework for foreign aid, there is still much work to be done to make it more effective.

By Milan Chen

Introduction

Assistance may take the form of humanitarian emergency assistance, food aid, military support, debt relief, or technical assistance. Whatever the form, foreign aid by definition should be designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. The foreign aid paradigm was introduced in the 1970s when the world’s richest countries agreed to give 0.7 percent of their GNI (Gross National Income) as official international development aid to developing countries. However, despite billions given each year, countries rarely meet the actual targeted goal. In 2005, in view of more effective foreign aid, the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action were launched to set out a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid, and its impact on development. It has become the norm and principle for both donor and recipient countries to share joint responsibility to achieve effective and accountable aid.

Developing countries in Africa, Latin American, and South Asia have been receiving foreign aid for decades. The goal is simple: countries that were once dependent on foreign aid can invest it to develop infrastructure, initiate productive projects, and gain economic independence, thereby becoming self-reliant and more affluent over time. However, evidence shows that these countries continue to suffer from poverty, poor infrastructure, and unemployment. Scholars also indicate that foreign aid can actually harm the recipient countries. Furthermore, foreign aid has arguably become a way to serve solely the interests of donor countries and certain groups rather than those of the recipients. This leads to more serious poverty, severe corruption, and less development of the recipient countries.

In this paper, I will elaborate the foreign aid paradigm prior to the twenty-first century, in which the framework for effective aid was not well established. No monitoring and evaluation system existed to regulate the means and practices of international assistance. After the start of the twenty-first century, which I define as
a watershed in the aid paradigm shift, I will analyze the pros and cons of the current foreign aid paradigm based on the principle of the Paris Declaration. By indicating some remaining challenges and obstacles of the mechanism, I hope to propose some significant alternatives to increase the effectiveness and accountability of foreign aid.

What is Foreign Aid?

Based on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) definition, foreign aid, or the equivalent term, foreign assistance, is financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities provided in the form of grants or subsidies, the main objective of which is to promote economic development and welfare. In general, foreign aid is designed to meet the following four goals: 1) to stimulate economic growth through building infrastructure, supporting productive sectors such as agriculture, or bringing new ideas and technologies; 2) to strengthen education, health, environmental, or political systems; 3) to support subsistence consumption of food and other commodities, through humanitarian assistance; and 4) to help stabilize an economy following economic shocks. In order to meet these goals, aid can be provided in the form of cash grants, concessional loans, debt cancellation, technical assistance and training for individuals, and commodities such as food and medicine. No strong evidence exists, however, to show the linkage between aid and development, and some studies even point out that aid will lead to a worse performance by the recipient country.

Foreign Aid before the Twenty-First Century

Before the twenty-first century, aid was seldom given from motives of pure altruism and humanitarianism. It usually involved natural resource exploitation rights, political interest, strengthening of military alliances, national policy changes, gaining commercial access, or extending donor influence in the recipient country. As former U.S. president Richard Nixon pointed out, “Remember that the main purpose of American aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves.” Aid to underdeveloped countries has often been criticized as being more in the interest of the donor than the recipient, or even a form of neocolonialism (Hattori 2003).

Although foreign aid still remains a relatively new subject in international affairs, its effectiveness has brought much more attention and criticism from scholars of international relations, such as William Easterly who has noted that foreign aid agencies often take a technocratic and top-down assistance approach which cannot fully meet the recipients’ most essential needs. Furthermore, aid agencies often lack a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanism to properly allocate and distribute resources.

Dambisa Moyo also delivered a relatively strong criticism regarding foreign aid to Africa, in which she pointed out that aid has not helped the continent, but has done harm to the development of African countries (Moyo, 2010).

Aid has increased government bureaucracies, perpetuated bad governments, and enriched the elite in developing countries. Other critics, such as Milton Friedman and Peter Bauer, have also indicated that aid programs should be dramatically reformed, thoroughly examined, or even eliminated altogether if necessary.

On the other hand, Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, and others have argued that although aid does not necessarily bring positive results, it has supported poverty reduction and development in some cases, or prevented worsened performance in other countries (Sachs, 2005). However, both sides agreed that foreign aid needs to be reformed and reexamined thoroughly for a better performance.

Before entering the twenty-first century, foreign aid was criticized for lack of accountability, effectiveness, transparency, and unilateral practices by donors. The foreign aid paradigm needs to be adjusted, and also requires more nation states to cooperate under a stronger international enforcement mechanism.

The Foreign Aid Paradigm Shift in the Twenty-First Century: The Implications of the Paris Declaration

The global support for economic and social progress in developing countries has become one of the major agendas in the international community, especially after the launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which call for a global partnership for development. In the past few years, international assistance has been focused on diversity and density in development (MDGs, 2005), and the share of national income which has been allocated for foreign aid has increased in recent years. Although the largest source of concessional transfer to recipient countries is still provided by nation-states, many non-governmental actors are increasingly involved in assistance programs and promoting social and economic progress.

The effectiveness of foreign aid started to raise the attention of the international community at the beginning of the twenty-first century. During the Monterrey Consensus in 2002, the international community recognized the importance of the world’s well-being, and urged developed countries to provide more and better aid, while asking developing countries to strengthen their commitment to policies and institutions that can stimulate growth, reduce poverty, and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. At the three high level forums, which focused on harmonization in 2003, and on aid effectiveness in 2005, donors agreed to improve in-country coordination, reduce transaction costs for aid recipients, and to improve aid quality.

Meanwhile the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was drawn up and became an important focal point of current foreign aid doctrine; it is an acknowledgment that decades of humanitarian aid has produced few tangible results in Africa and other developing regions. The key idea was local ownership, providing a common agenda for
both global and country-level dialogue on aid effectiveness. (OECD/DAC 2008)

The agreement was strengthened by the Accra Agenda for Action, the third high level forum in 2008, a framework to accelerate achievement of the Paris commitments.

The Paris Declaration led to three important shifts in foreign aid. First, the principles of the Paris Declaration focus on 1) Ownership, which gives developing countries the right to set their own development strategies, improving institutions, and tackling issues such as corruption at the domestic level; 2) Alignment, where donor countries and organizations are able to bring the support of all together and cooperate with strategies that both agreed on; 3) Harmonization, in which donor countries and organizations coordinate their actions, simplify procedures, and share information to avoid duplication; 4) Managing for Results, under which developing countries and donors focus on producing and measuring better results, thereby creating more incentives for other countries to join the program; and 5) Mutual Accountability, meaning that both donors and developing countries must account more transparently to each other on the use of aid, and also to citizens and parliaments on the impact of the aid. In general, the Paris Declaration lays down a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid, and its impact on development.

Second, twelve indicators to monitor progress in achieving results were developed with the declaration on the global level and were gradually adopted by countries, international institutions, and aid agencies. The major significance of the declaration is that it established norms and principles for accountability and effectiveness. It promotes a model of partnership that improves transparency and accountability on the use of development resources. At the international level, it constitutes a mechanism under which donors and developing countries are held mutually accountable, and are required to respect the commitment to which they both agreed (OECD/DAC 2006).

At the national level, it encourages donors and partners to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing agreed commitment on aid effectiveness, and promoting the idea of “localization,” which enables developing countries to manage and distribute resources according to their priorities. The Declaration not only provides a periodic monitoring mechanism and evaluation of foreign aid programs, but most importantly, has brought the foreign aid paradigm to a clearly specified set of actions and behavioral changes for the twenty-first century (OECD/DAC 2006, 2011).

At the national level, it encourages donors and partners to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing agreed commitment on aid effectiveness, and promoting the idea of “localization,” which enables developing countries to manage and distribute resources according to their priorities. The Declaration not only provides a periodic monitoring mechanism and evaluation of foreign aid programs, but most importantly, has brought the foreign aid paradigm to a clearly specified set of actions and behavioral changes for the twenty-first century (OECD/DAC 2006, 2011).

The Challenges and Opportunities

Although the foreign aid paradigm has entered a new era under the Paris Declaration, several challenges of the mechanism remain when it comes to practice. According to the Paris Declaration evaluation in 2011, only one out of the thirteen targets established for 2010—coordinated and technical cooperation—has been met. It is clear that current foreign aid still remains to be reconsidered. According to the OECD Paris Declaration Evaluation Report, a number of issues stand out that require further improvement and actions. Although the Paris Declaration indeed increased the position of the recipient in the foreign aid system, the relationship still remains donor-driven, and lacks participation of the recipient countries. As mutual accountability is the key concept of the declaration, both parties should seek a better performance assessment framework and should improve the incentives system (OECD/DAC 2006).

The latest Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the fourth high level forum in 2011, pointed out that the Paris Declaration had contributed to behavior changing of the traditional donor-recipient relationship: aid effectiveness has been improved, and development results are better. The Busan forum also re-emphasized the importance of “partnership” and idea of the inclusion of civil society. In sum, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is recognizing the changes in the global economic and political environment, and the importance of including new actors in any further agreement on aid effectiveness. Furthermore, it represents a shift from a narrow aid-effectiveness agenda to a broader development-effectiveness plan, and the aid paradigm is moving toward more inclusive development with the checks-and–balances system and the involvement of civil society.

An Ethical Consideration of Foreign Aid

Despite the aforementioned challenges, the current foreign aid system, which is built within the Paris Declaration framework, is already a significant improvement compared to the previous situation. In order to have a more effective and accountable foreign aid paradigm, however, some aspects need to be reconsidered. It is widely accepted that the objective of aid is joined with various interests of different actors, and consideration of national self-interest inevitably comes into play. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, we have seen that foreign

Beneficiary carrying vegetable oil in Jonglei State South Sudan.

aid can be understood as a moral practice. Scholars have also pointed out that foreign aid is an obligation of humanity, and a corrective justice that requires developed states and their citizens to give far more foreign aid than current practices dictate. Thus, ethical concerns have gradually been coming into play and leading the foreign aid system to put more focus on the multidimensional well-being of recipient countries (Bealinger 2006).

Moreover, it also argues that in order to pursue more effective and sustainable development, foreign aid policy should pay more attention to the guiding principles of pluralism, fairness, rights and responsibility to really carry out the original meaning of aid (Chandler 2007).

Another obstacle of the Paris Declaration is that various uncoordinated aid agencies participate in foreign aid programs, each of which has its own guidelines for cooperating and doing business with the recipient, thus making the aid transferring process difficult to regulate and monitor (Gasper 1999).

Thus, international institutions should take part and serve as a platform for each donor and recipient to have communication and interaction with each other. They should also guarantee the transparency of aid distribution and allocation to avoid further corruption of both parties.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international community was aware that increasing aid was not producing the expected impact. Thus, an unprecedented consensus emerged on what needed to be done to produce better results (Easterly 2008). This consensus later led to the agreement in the Paris Declaration in 2005. Growing support for the Paris Declaration principles has produced changes in the donor-recipient relationship. Several norms have been established under the monitoring of aid agencies and NGOs; for example, that aid recipients should discuss their national development strategies at the domestic level, and donors should support these strategies. Donors should also streamline their in-country efforts. Both parties are linking actions to clear goals, with progress measured against concrete targets, and they are responsible to each other for achieving these goals.

After the Paris Declaration set out guidelines and principles for foreign aid, transparency has also shown significant improvement, and the paradigm has shifted for more effective and accountable foreign assistance. Increase in aid strengthens the cooperative relationship of the donor and the recipient, and reinforces aid management. However, the declaration still left much room for improvement, especially in the donor-recipient relationship, the accountability of program and aid agencies, and the need for proper management. Thus, besides focusing on the result of foreign aid, the international community should also consider how to make it work properly through a variety of aid instruments, respecting pluralism and diversity, and dealing with the urgent challenges of global poverty and human security in highly diverse operating contexts.

Bibliography


The global resurgence of religious fundamentalism and the rise of politically active Islam have prompted a critical reassessment of the role of religion in democratic politics. This reassessment has largely been waged as a critique of Western secularism and its ostensibly axiomatic separation of religion from politics. According to a recent volume, new trends in global politics have begun to challenge “established understanding of how the terms ‘secularism’ and ‘religion’ function in public life, [calling] into question a supposedly clear division between the religious and the secular.”

This skepticism raises some important questions for secularism and its relation to democracy. What role should religion have in democratic politics? To what degree, if any, should democratic society be secular? These questions depend on our particular conception of democracy. If the reference point is a liberal democracy that guarantees equal civil and political rights, then a secular state—one that distinguishes religious authority from state authority—is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democracy. It is necessary as a means of ensuring state neutrality and impartiality towards competing religious worldviews. State neutrality, in turn, is antecedent to democratic equal liberty, although it is not sufficient. In addition to being impartial with respect to religion, the state must also guarantee a family of basic democratic rights—both civil and political.

My claim pertains only to the democratic state, and not lower tiers of society. I refer to the statewide separation from religious authority as “institutional secularity” or “state secularity.” Conceiving of requisite democratic secularity at the state level has the important consequence of opening the political sphere to religion. The democratic political sphere, which encompasses a range of political activities that occur within political institutions, need not enforce secularity. Religion in the political sphere is consistent with a minimal conception of liberal democracy, provided that citizens’ basic democratic rights are upheld.

Section II presents a normative conception of democracy as the point of reference for evaluating secularity. I advocate a conception of liberal democracy based on Robert A. Dahl’s widely accepted...
eight institutional guarantees, with the additional provision of equality. In section III, I clarify institutional secularity as a political principle, arguing that it is not constitutive of an ideological secularism that seeks to normatively contain religion. Section IV disaggregates the public space of democratic society into three spheres: the state or institutional, the political, and civil society. This disaggregation makes a finer analysis possible. In Section V, I turn to a discussion of the sphere of state institutions, asking whether the separation of religion and state is a necessary condition of liberal democracy. And finally, Section VI examines whether secularity applies to the political sphere.

II. We might draft a preliminary statement: democracy must be secular in order to be sufficiently democratic. But this statement raises two additional questions. First, what is “democracy”? Is it primarily a descriptive or normative category? And second, what is “secular” in the context of democracy? What does it mean for a democracy to be secular? Secular in which parts? While this section focuses on the former question, the next section will address the latter.

Determining whether a model of religion-state relations is compatible with democracy depends on one’s definition of democracy. On the one hand, we could employ a minimalist procedural definition of democracy à la Schumpeter, which conceives of democracy as a procedural method. Though this minimalist definition recognizes political liberties, in its effort at conceptual simplicity it ignores important civil liberties that make the exercise of political liberties possible. We need a conception of democracy that recognizes the full scope of liberty and equality. To that end, I opt for Dahl’s eight institutional guarantees of democracy: “1) freedom to form and to join organizations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) the right to vote, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, 6) alternative sources of information, 7) free and fair elections, and 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.” While these institutional guarantees are crucial to the realization of liberal democracy, we might also recognize the necessity of equality. For instance, not only must citizens be eligible for public office, but they must also be able to exercise this right on an equal basis. Moreover, state neutrality towards religion is an important institutional feature for guaranteeing this requisite democratic equality.

III. Contesting its purported neutrality, critics have pointed out that secularism is often ideologically driven and invested in ridding democratic politics of religion. This is a worrisome charge, for, if true, it would mean that secularism violates the very neutrality that it seeks to establish. I suggest, however, that a closer look at secularity reveals that “institutional secularity” constitutes a non-ideological secularism.

Seeking to gain greater analytical clarity, José Casanova proposes the “basic analytical distinction between ‘the secular’ as a central modern epistemic category, ‘secularization’ as an analytical conceptualization of modern world-historical processes, and ‘secularism’ as a worldview and ideology.” But layered beneath these three concepts is an additional variant: namely, “secular” as a descriptive attribute and the corresponding condition of “secularity.” While secular sometimes contains a tacit normative opposition to religion, I reserve a non-ideological, neutral meaning for “secular” as it relates to democracy. Secular democracy refers to an institutional arrangement, not a comprehensive ideology. The basic institutional arrangement of secularity necessary for democracy is that religious authority remains separate from political or state authority. This institutional arrangement is breached when, for instance, a religious establishment has a special power, conferred on it by the people or appropriated by force, to govern.

If secularity is a matter of political authority, it follows that it pertains to the level of the state. In other words, secularity only applies directly to the political institutions that command authority, not to lower tiers of society. This fact will prove important in the next section when we differentiate and identify these societal realms. In contradistinction to an ideological secularity or secularism that would regulate all corners of society, institutional secularity is political in the sense that it is addressed to the site of political authority and is indifferent to competing religious views. As a political secularity invested in institutional organization, it says nothing directly about what religion is, how it should be practiced, or what role it has in people’s private lives. Nor does it follow that in a secular, democratic state citizens share a set of secular ideals or assent to any particular secularism. Additionally, secularity does not imply democracy. Secularity is, of course, a prominent feature of democracy, but pure secularity does not presume a democratic political ordering: it strictly indicates the relationship between modes of political and religious authority.

Institutional secularity, resisting secular ideology, reflects what José Casanova calls “secularism as statecraft principle:”

By secularity as statecraft principle, I understand simply some principle of separation between religious and political authority…Such a statecraft doctrine neither presupposes nor needs to entail any substantive ‘theory,’ positive or negative, of ‘religion.’ Indeed, the moment the state holds explicitly a particular conception of ’religion,’ one enters the realm of ideology.

For secularity as statecraft doctrine, the value of separation between religious and political authority emanates from the commitment to liberal democratic ideals of religious liberty, civil and political equality, and toleration of difference. As “statecraft doctrine” is indifferent with regard to competing truth doctrines—religious or nonreligious—to the extent that they abide by liberal democratic rules, it should not be confused with an ideological secularism that harbors distaste for religion, classifies it pejoratively, or anticipates its dissolution from public life.
IV. An analysis of the relationship between secul arity and democracy requires both the clarification of the condition of secul arity and clarification of the object to which this condition applies—democratic society. The first step was undertaken in the last section, where I interpreted secul arity in a political sense as the condition of separation of religious and political authority. Here the question shifts from “does democracy require secul arity?” to “which part(s) of democracy might require secul arity?”

Accordingly, we must disaggregate democratic society and contract the frame of analysis to an examination of societal sub-spheres. José Casanova offers a useful model, which identifies three spheres of the democratic polity: civil society, political society, and the state. The sphere of state institutions corresponds to the political system’s basic structure, such as the constitution, branches of government, the legal system, and electoral procedures. The sphere of political society, by contrast, demarcates the region in which individuals and groups interact within the political field created by state institutions. Political parties, campaigns and the pursuit of political office, lobbies and special interest groups, and nonprofits that analyze and recommend policy take place in the sphere of political society. Whereas the institutional sphere is defined by its capacity to exercise coercive authority over citizens, the political sphere is a forum of discourse among political actors who occupy positions within the state apparatus, competitors for political office, or those attempting to influence officials, especially regarding policy outcomes. And finally, civil society is the undifferentiated landscape of free association and expression, political or nonpolitical, including churches, educational institutions, private corporations, and other daily activity.

V. With democratic society analytically differentiated, we now turn our focus to secul arity at the level of state institutions. I argue that democratic political institutions require autonomy from religious authorities sufficient to the task of governing with neutrality. Secularity of the institutional sphere is a necessary condition of liberal democracy as a means of maintaining state neutrality. I develop this idea in terms of what Alfred Stepan calls the “twin tolerations”—“that is, the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions.”

In a recent essay, José Casanova expresses skepticism towards state-religion separation. Acknowledging that his previous attempt to normatively limit public religions in the public sphere suffered from a misguided Western-Christian centrism and a disregard for the possibility of other forms of public religion and de-privatization, he admits,

I cannot find a compelling reason, on either democratic or liberal grounds, to in principle banish religion from the public democratic sphere. One could at most, on pragmatic historical grounds, defend the need for separation of church and state, although I am no longer convinced that complete separation is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for democracy.

Objecting to the necessity of church-state separation, Casanova calls into question the strict need for secul arity of the institutional sphere of democratic society. Apparently he believes that the religious state, where the state is more or less under the control of an established religious authority, is compatible with democracy.

Despite sharing some of Casanova’s concerns, Stepan’s first “twin toleration” suggests a religion-state separation: “Democratic institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution and human rights, to generate policies. Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate public policy to democratically elected governments.” Though Stepan does not explicitly associate this institutional arrangement with a form of secul arity, it nevertheless reflects the principle of secul arity. Democratic institutions that are free to generate policy are secular in that they are not under the power of a religious authority.

For the same reason that Casanova is wary of church-state separation as constituting an unjustified abridgement of freedom, I view institutional secul arity as a primary means of maintaining equal democratic freedoms for the religious and non-religious alike. A secular institutional sphere, where state power is not in the possession of a religious authority that governs on the basis of religious belief, is a mechanism of state impartiality whereby the state is obligated by law to treat citizens equally irrespective of religious affiliation. The principle of impartiality means that the state is neutral with regard to competing religions and fair in its application of coercive power. The secular democratic state as such neither assigns superior status to certain individuals nor distributes privileges to certain classes of citizens, especially on the basis of religion. Religious equality follows from state impartiality: citizens are equal inasmuch as their religion (or lack thereof) is indistinguishable in the eyes of the state.

The justification, then, for limiting religion in the institutional sphere is not to protect society from the supposed dangers of politically active religion, but to preserve democratic equality and liberty. Insofar as liberty and equality are essential to liberal democracy, and institutional secul arity is essential to liberty and equality, then institutional secul arity is a necessary condition of liberal democracy. But although this condition is necessary for democracy, it is not of course sufficient. A secular institutional sphere guarantees impartiality with respect to religion, but it does not guarantee impartiality on all matters. A secular state may discriminate on some basis other than religion, such as race, class, or gender. In fact, it may be an authoritarian or illiberal regime outright, with no guarantees of civil or political rights. As mentioned in Section III, secul arity does not imply democracy. For a secular state to be democratic it must be embedded in a democratic framework.
that preserves equality and satisfies Dahl’s eight institutional guarantees.

VI. Whereas the sphere of state institutions concerned the democratic legitimacy of a religious state authority, the question for the political sphere is whether religious actors, individual or collective, should be (1) free to participate in democratic politics and (2) guided by their religious convictions and values. This distinction is based on the difference between including individuals in the political process, and including religious content—ideas and values—as the basis for political decisions. I argue that individuals and their religious views should not be limited in the political sphere provided that in so doing they do not infringe on the rights of others. In other words, the political sphere need not be secular if it is preceded by secularity of the institutional sphere. Institutional secularity acts as a buffer against discriminating legal judgments or policy efforts, preventing them from taking root in state institutions.

Whereas the first “twin toleration” applied to the sphere of state institutions and asked what minimal boundary of freedom of action is necessary for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, the second toleration relates to the sphere of political society and asks what minimal boundary of freedom of action is necessary for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions. Stepan answers that “as long as groups do not use violence, do not violate the rights of other citizens, and stay within the rules of the democratic game, all groups are granted the right to advance their interests, both in civil society and political society.”

I am inclined to agree. Stepan pushes the freedom and equality implied in liberal democracy to its logical conclusion. Liberal democracy requires that all citizens have equal access to the political process. This freedom to participate in politics is guaranteed irrespective of religious affiliation, since the institutional secularity operates behind a lens of impartiality. That is, if all citizens are viewed impartially, then barring violence or rule breaking, no objective basis exists for limiting some citizens’ political freedom. But at the same time this freedom does not extend to the institutional sphere. Institutional secularity exists to filter out attempts by politicians or government officials to craft discriminatory laws or policies that privilege one religious group at the expense of others. Democratic institutional secularity, therefore, does not restrict the freedom of religious citizens, as Casanova suggested, but supports it.

A different question concerns the permissibility of religious content in the political sphere, as when government officials justify legal decisions, legislation, or policy in terms of their religious beliefs. I argue that government officials should be free to hold religious beliefs and to express them publicly as justifications for their political decisions; doing otherwise would constitute an undemocratic infringement on freedom of conscience and expression. Yet, the state itself must remain neutral with respect to the religious convictions of its government officials—this is the condition of institutional secularity. The question, then, is at what point do the religious convictions of government officials merge with the state? When do appeals to religious ideas and values violate the state’s guarantee of impartiality and render some citizens unequal?

As long as appeals to religious ideas and values do not infringe on citizens’ basic rights, their use as political justification is consistent with democracy. Employing “private” religious reason as justification for political decision-making may not be ideal, but as long as the state’s laws are fair, neutral and constitutional, the content of their justification is irrelevant. This is because the justifications for a given law do not acquire the coercive power of state authority. What assumes authority is the law itself. Individuals are therefore free to employ religious reason for political decisions provided that government officials keep their religious convictions distinct from the official viewpoint of the state. They must not design laws or policies that privilege one class of citizens on the basis of religion.

In conclusion, despite considerable impetus to rethink the role of religion in politics, there is still good reason to accept institutional secularity as a permanent and essential feature of liberal democracy. Rajeev Bhargava is correct when he says that secularism requires rehabilitation, not abandonment. As a mechanism of neutrality, secularity preserves equality by administering power equally across various religions. But, secularity must not overstep its limits; it must remain within the bounds of the democratic constitution and its guarantees of equality and liberty. Recognizing it as part and parcel of a group of democratic rights, we might view institutional secularity not as a self-sufficient precondition for liberal democracy, as something that must be instituted independently of other rights, but rather as a natural outgrowth of liberal democracy, as produced by the very rights that it reciprocally supports. Viewed in such a way, institutional secularity is surprisingly familiar in the concept of liberal democracy itself.

Notes

1 By “Western secularism” I refer to the patterns of religion-state relations that emerged in Europe and North America in which religious institutions were excluded from holding a position of state authority. Within this very broad category are a number of variations. French laïcité and American church-state separation have been the most influential strains.


3 I do not attempt a thorough survey of these democratic rights, but assume that they include freedom to vote and run for office in competitive and fair elections (political) and freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, the press, and freedom from discrimination (civil).

4 I take “authority” to mean an agent (an individual, group, institution, or even authoritative text) equipped with the power to use/employ coercive force or influence
governance over a collectivity (community, group, state).

5 For Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of the democratic method, see Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1972), page 242: “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”

6 For example, the right to vote is only meaningful if citizens are free to vote their conscience, or if they have a free press to inform them on the relevant issues.


8 Alfred Stepan points out that “no matter how free and fair the elections and no matter how large the government’s majority, democracy must also have a constitution that itself is democratic in that it respects fundamental liberties and offers considerable protections for minority rights.” See Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations,” Rethinking Religion in World Affairs, 56.


10 It is indeed another question whether the institutional arrangement of secularity is part of a self-contained secular ideology.

11 I understand secularity as political in the tradition of John Rawls’ political liberalism. Whereas comprehensive doctrines affirm a particular conception of the good, religious or nonreligious, and apply to “all subjects and cover all values,” Rawls maintained that political conceptions of justice apply only to the basic structure of society. Similarly, secularity as I understand it pertains only to the basic institutional features of the democratic state. Expanding its scope of application any further would violate citizens’ equal liberties; contracting it would compromise democratic equality.


13 This sphere is defined by its capacity to exercise coercive authority over citizens. Established state churches are a paradigmatic example of religion at the state level.

14 Rawls calls this the “public political forum” and divides into three parts: the discourse of judges in their decisions, the discourse of government officials, especially in the executive and legislative branches, and the discourse of candidates for public office.


16 Casanova, “Rethinking Public Religions,” Rethinking Religion in International Affairs, 30.

17 While some note a difference between church and state and religion and state, I use these terms interchangeably.

18 “Apparently” because Casanova does not state this directly and does not specify under what conditions separation of church and state is unnecessary or insufficient for democracy. Moreover, he suggests that a “complete” separation may not be necessary or sufficient for democracy. But it is unclear what degree of incompleteness he is willing to tolerate.

19 The second toleration also pertains to civil society, but the focus here is on the political sphere.


21 By this I only mean that citizens should not be required by law to justify their views and political decisions in nonreligious terms. A different issue is whether citizens have the moral duty to offer certain types of justifications.

22 Assuming, of course, that the constitution is sufficiently democratic.

23 This may be disputed on the grounds that justifications for laws are not so easily distinguished from the laws themselves. This raises the issue of intent behind legal decisions, legislation and policy. It is certainly open to debate whether justifications for laws or policies are simultaneously enacted. But my claim is that justifications for political decisions, including appeals to religious ideas and values, remain in the political sphere and are thus excused from constraints of secularity.

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The Caribbean island of Puerto Rico is a part of the United States. Its legal relationship vis-à-vis the mainland United States has several unique features. Designated a “Commonwealth” by the U.S. Congress in 1954, Puerto Rico enjoys a good deal of autonomy in matters of local governance. At the same time, also by virtue of Congressional enactments, Puerto Ricans are full citizens of the United States. These U.S. citizens cannot, however, vote in U.S. elections. This paradox—an established democracy nevertheless denying the franchise to millions of its citizens—is the subject of this paper.

The right to vote is universally acknowledged to be the *sine qua non* of the legitimacy of the modern democratic state. Thus, the international community has agreed, in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the right to vote, as a fundamental human right, is a basic attribute of citizenship: “every citizen shall have the right and opportunity. . . to vote.” The United States is a signatory to that treaty, and the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that the “right to vote, as the citizen’s link to his laws and government, is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges.” Moreover, the Court has held that “[s]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”

The reason that “careful examination is
necessary [is] because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government.  

To be sure, the existence of such issues in developed democracies does not often make the news. Open conflict and other raw tensions between sovereigns and individuals more frequently are the grist of modern journalism. Media venues old and new are teeming with gripping accounts of confrontations between nations and individuals who are bound more by fealty to a movement than by common nationality, as well as between people and their domestic sovereigns. A government authorizes drone attacks on foreign citizens deemed to pose threats, and in some cases even on its own citizens. States of unrest or revolution have arisen in countries from the Maghreb to the Eastern Mediterranean. Leakers of classified government information are branded as criminals and hunted by some, hailed as heroic whistleblowers by others. Some of these headline stories have their roots in longstanding religious or ethnic differences. Others involve ancient grudges, rising expectations, or tensions between the asserted needs of a government and individual liberties. All of them raise difficult issues concerning the often complex relationships between sovereigns and individuals.

But not all stories about serious disconnects between people and governments make the headlines. Some disputes are more civil and less enthralling. Yet they are no less important to those whom they affect. They are no less frustratingly complicated or seemingly intractable. And they are viewed by many as unacceptable injustices in an era of human rights. As described earlier, this paper is concerned with one such injustice: despite being United States citizens, Puerto Ricans are prohibited from exercising the fundamental right to vote in national elections.  

Prior to the 1898 armed conflict between Spain and the United States, the people of Puerto Rico were entitled to vote into office and be represented by three senators and sixteen deputies in the Spanish parliament, the Cortes. At the close of the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico was among the Spanish possessions transferred to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. United States citizenship was not expressly granted to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico by the treaty. Instead, in the second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Peace, the “civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of [Puerto Rico]” were left to future determination by the United States. In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker Act, establishing a civil government for the island. That Act also stated that the United States would protect the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, who were declared by the law to be “citizens of [Puerto] Rico.”

The Foraker Act did not by its terms grant to Puerto Ricans the status of U.S. citizens. Citizenship status was, however, established by the Jones Act, a law enacted by Congress in 1917. Still, the question of

Puerto Rican Day Parade in New York City.
what was meant by “citizenship” in the Jones Act became the subject of litigation. After the Foraker Act was passed, the Supreme Court had ruled that Puerto Rico, as a territorial possession, could be treated differently from the mainland states of the United States. Even after the Jones Act declared that Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens, the Court built upon the reasoning in its post-Foraker Act cases to conclude that Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated territory meant that its inhabitants did not have all of the constitutional rights that other U.S. citizens of enjoyed. The Court held, rather, that the “citizenship” conferred by the Jones Act permitted a Puerto Rican to move to a mainland state and there “enjoy the rights of other citizens.”

Justices who dissented from the holdings in these early twentieth-century cases were particularly prescient and insightful. One argued that the United States Constitution defines the powers of government, and nowhere does that document permit the government to acquire possessions throughout the world and then govern the inhabitants of those territories under different rules from those that apply domestically. Another observed that the Constitution is what distinguishes the United States from monarchies. Monarchical governments may not have been restrained by domestic law from colonizing other parts of the world and from ruling indigenous peoples as they chose, but the drafters of the United States Constitution contemplated no such long-term anti-republican imperialism. Irrespective of the persuasiveness of the dissenters’ arguments, however, the concept of limited citizenship persisted with respect to the inhabitants of territories obtained by the United States.

At various times during the twentieth century, Congress expanded the citizenship rights of Puerto Ricans, as when it made some civil rights statutes applicable in Puerto Rico. At other times, Congress continued to impose differential treatment, in the provision of Social Security benefits, for example. Finally, in 1977, just past the three-quarter mark of the century, the executive branch of the government signed the treaty known as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ICCPR. Article 25 of the ICCPR provides:

Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity and without unreasonable restrictions to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives and to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.
Under the United States Constitution, treaties entered into by the president do not become binding unless and until they are ratified by the U.S. Senate. In 1992, as the twentieth century drew to a close, the Senate ratified the ICCPR thus making it the law of the land, the same as a duly enacted domestic law. In ratifying, however, the Senate had added a declaration that the treaty would not be “self-executing.” That meant that Congress would need to enact implementing legislation (an action that Congress has not yet taken) before any person who is arguably protected by a provision of the ICCPR could sue to enforce his or her rights. In other words, an individual who has been denied the right to vote cannot ask the courts to apply Article 25, even though it is the law of the land.

Let us return to the two court cases that were introduced earlier in this discussion. Recall the assertion that a United States appeals court ruled in 2005 that Puerto Ricans cannot vote in Presidential elections, and in 2010 that they cannot vote in Congressional elections. Several arguments were advanced in support of the right to vote, including the argument based on the ICCPR, all of which were rejected by a majority of the judges. In the first case the court noted that the United States Constitution provides that the various states are to appoint electors who decide the presidency. In the second case, the court observed that the Constitution expressly provides that voters are to elect representatives from their state. The court reasoned that, logically, no other source of law could trump the express provisions of the country’s basic charter. And thus it came to be that nearly three million adult Puerto Ricans continue to be denied the ability to participate in choosing their nation’s leaders.

In the 2005 case dealing with presidential elections, one dissenting judge posited that the Senate, in fact, failed to successfully impose the qualification on the ICCPR that it would not be self-executing—and therefore unenforceable in United States courts. That judge argued that declarations by the Senate when ratifying a treaty are of no legal effect. Under the Constitution the Senate may choose to return an unratified treaty to the president and state its reservations. The president can then renegotiate the treaty and return it to the Senate, but a Senate can formally ratify only the entire treaty. It can neither cherry-pick provisions that will become law, nor add provisions. A majority of the court remained unpersuaded. Puerto Ricans remain excluded from national elections.

The Puerto Rico quandary raises difficult questions about the ethical obligations of sovereigns with respect to the voting rights of their citizens. It is also a cautionary tale for other sovereigns; the vindication of human rights is sometimes easier said than done, but should always be of foundational importance in a successful democracy.8

Notes
4 The prohibition applies to all U.S. citizens who live in Puerto Rico and are not otherwise eligible to vote as citizens of one of the mainland states of the United States. As a practical matter, it is the nearly three million adult native Puerto Ricans living on the island who suffer the injury.
5 Igartua-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005).
6 Igartua-de la Rosa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010).
7 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308 (1922). The cases during this period that defined the status of the territories and their inhabitants are known collectively as the “Insular Cases.”
8 In addition to the primary source judicial decisions that are discussed, other primary sources included interviews with United States judges. The main secondary source was Alexander Odishelidze’s work Pay to the Order of Puerto Rico, Allegiance Press, 2004.
**Introduction**

Titled the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ of Asia-Pacific, the highly publicized efforts of U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration to concentrate and centralize U.S. defense, security, diplomatic, and economic influence within the region has garnered critical yet crucial attention that is essential to structuring, clarifying, and improving any public governmental policy. Despite ideals in place since previous U.S. administrations, neither Democrat nor Republican efforts to spearhead and transform these ideals into actual policy were able to be realized due to tragedies such as the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Today, more than a decade after 9/11, the U.S. murmurs on ‘rebalancing’ have finally increased in decibel level. Imminently significant, however, is an issue heretofore less than thoroughly discussed: Will the United States be a great power that is capable of and willing to engage in discourse on the ethical integration and responsibility of the U.S. military influx vis-à-vis the island territory of Guam? Will the United States make ethical decisions with regard to the islanders as well as respect their sociopolitical and natural environments? Or will defense, security, and budgetary concerns outweigh ethical matters in discourse regarding, for instance, local identities, language, cultures, and mutual understanding?
Similar to Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, military adjustments in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly that of Guam and Okinawa, represent real current and future concerns regarding the impact of different identity groups, such as islanders vs. military, once influx and interactions actually begin. To prevent discord, it is absolutely vital to further establish better-understood protocols in the attempt to engage in cooperative dialogue between the U.S. department of defense, that is, the military, and the Guamanian people in order to foster mutually beneficial and hospitable environments without which the ‘rebalancing’ on the island-territory cannot survive.

First and foremost, however, a brief understanding of the framework, structure, and situational circumstances of the island is essential to better provide critical analysis for the future, both short and long-term. An unincorporated island-territory acquired by the United States after the Spanish-American War in 1898, Guam, or Guahan in the indigenous Chamorro-language, a strategic hub to the Asia-Pacific ‘rebalancing,’ is three times the size of Washington, D.C. with a population of roughly 160,000 (Kan 2013: 1). The island is host to two major U.S. military bases, Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base, in addition to which the U.S. military currently possesses roughly one-third of the island’s territory. The unincorporated territory is also host to three nuclear-attack submarines as well as Global Hawk reconnaissance drones, and allows for the joint training of military units between the United States and other nation-states (Kan 2013: 2-3).

More recently, under an agreement entitled the ‘U.S.-Japan Joint Statement’ in April 2012, the United States has tentatively given approval for the relocation of 9,000 marines from the island of Okinawa, 5,000 of whom will be shifted to Guam; half of them will be under rotational deployment. Under the agreement, estimated costs for the upcoming buildup run near $8.6 billion, with Japan contributing approximately $3.1 billion in funding. Furthermore, in testimony to Congress in early March 2013 the commander of the Pacific Command mentioned the completion of said ‘contract’ and details by 2020 (Kan 2013: Sum.).

More sensitive subjects surrounding the ‘rebalancing’ or ‘buildup’ on Guam could, if mismanaged, have potentially devastating and widespread domestic and regional consequences. These widely diverse issues range from civilian infrastructure, utilities, roads, and water supplies to concerns about human capital, communities, and the natural environment itself. And, as is the *modus operandi*, to address all of these major concerns, the U.S. government has drafted an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to assess the various influences of a military influx. Unsurprisingly, it was mostly inadequate, with even the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) questioning and attacking a record of decisions released subsequent to the EIS. This record stated realistic projections of an influx of nearly 60,000 individuals (59,173) into the population by 2015, including military personnel, dependents, and workers (Kan 2013: 8-9, 12). In spite of such alarming figures, concerns, and questions of possible ethical integration and responsibility on the part of the U.S. military, the argument with specific illustrations below demonstrates the absolute necessity of ensuring the co-existence between Guamanians, Chamorros, and the incoming military influx in a proper manner via dialogue, activism, and multifaceted channels.

**Highlighting Differences between Guam and Okinawa**

Guam and Okinawa are similar in that they are both tiny islands that are part of two much larger nation-states, although the latter is far more exposed to unruly events that have occurred as a result of mismanagement by the U.S. military. We should highlight the differences that separate and differentiate the two, and how these differences allow Guam to avoid ethical crises in the face of a military influx and buildup.

First and foremost, language is not an issue. Guamanians speak English and are therefore more able to express their concerns successfully with no language barrier. Second, the islanders are much more Western- thinking, with assertiveness, pride, and passion in their thoughts, actions, and concerns on an island where protest and dialogue do result in significant and active changes. And lastly, many Guamanians do serve or have served with the Guam Guard as a part of the United States Army, and as such are patriots who deserve a voice within the military system.

**Argument**

As military developments and influx occur, it is absolutely fundamental to ensure that the island’s traditional culture (lifestyle, people, and environment) are ethically and duly treated by the incoming military personnel and subsequent indirect exposure to outside influence. With the military owning almost one-third of the territory, Guamanians are already denied access to various parts of their own island; this is even more true for the indigenous Chamorros. In addition, the differences in standards of living, education, and healthcare in and outside of the military bases already vary widely. If the subsequent military developments create an even wider gap between the islanders and the military in those terms, Guam is in danger of becoming an M-society [a polarized society of extreme rich and extreme poor] where standards are extremely distorted by giving priority to one group of people over another. As specialist-scholars Lisa Linda Natividad and Gwyn Kirk note, the focus is on “unequal amenities and opportunities inside and outside the military fencelines [sic]: military personnel have higher earning power than members of local communities; the military hospital and on-base schools have better facilities than the civilian hospital and public schools; water use by a larger military population is likely to result in shortages for local people; private military beaches deny
local community access to their ancestral heritage” (Natividad & Kirk 2010: 8). A member of the local political leadership, former Governor Felix P. Camacho explains, “Madeleine Z. Bordallo, non-voting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, and other leaders, while supporting the military buildup, kept calling for infrastructure improvements outside the fence, and expressing environmental concerns such as possible damage to the coral reef” (Yoshida 2010: 8).

Whether from the local Guamanian population or the political leadership, a common unified voice has been raised in concern over how the U.S. military, now or in the future, decides to handle strategic maneuvers in and around the island-territory. Likewise, there is an immense call for serious consideration regarding the proper methods leading to ethical integration and responsibility of and between the U.S. military and the islanders in the aforementioned areas, for example, infrastructure developments or sociopolitical incorporation. Rather than total support for or complete opposition to the ‘rebalance,’ ‘buildup,’ or U.S. military influx, it is far more pragmatic to consider the ethical matters surrounding U.S. decisions in discourse concerning the Guamanians, the Chamorros, and the U.S. military.

**The Case of Pagat**

Of “historical and cultural importance[,] Pagat Village dates back 900 years or more and provides a concrete way for any visitor to Guam to see first-hand the remnants of a complex Chamorro narrative that developed before, during, and after contact with the Spanish” (Camacho & Broudy 2013: 1). Beyond its historical and cultural relevance, “Pagat Village is located over Guam’s aquifer, which provides drinking water for 85 percent of Guam’s population” (Camacho & Broudy 2013: 1). It is thus clear that in at least three critical spheres, that is, historical, cultural, and natural resources, Pagat can neither be replaced nor taken by the U.S. military to serve as a military firing range complex.

Pagat does, however, serve as an example of the near mismanagement by the U.S. department of defense in its engagements with the islanders and government of Guam. Furthermore, the Pagat case exemplifies why ethical integration and responsibility cannot be overlooked. Although Pagat is considered to be an ancient burial village on the island, the military was in effect attempting to dominate the land for the purposes of a live training firing range. This provoked an uproar among the indigenous ethnic Chamorros and Guamanians alike, resulting in a multiethnic, multifaceted voice, approach, and movement known...
as the “We Are Guahan” activist group. Jon Blas of the coalition has gone so far as to state that, “We have not been able to say yes or no to this. Hawaii said no. California said no. But we were never given the opportunity,” in reference to expansion plans (Natividad & Kirk 2010: 2). Once again, Guamanians may be U.S. citizens, but sadly, without proper representation in Congress, the fear of the likelihood of the U.S. military simply disregarding or rejecting a unified Guam voice is extremely real and disconcerting. As previously mentioned this is exactly why transparency and ethics with respect to military maneuvers, integration, and development is a mutually beneficial strategy, both for the Guamanian people and the U.S. military.

Through various public fora, voicing concern to local political leaders such as legislators and our congresswoman, the U.S. military was pressured to change its rash act of land grabbing. The project, which began a few years ago, concluded in September 2013 with a formal announcement that the U.S. department of defense had tentatively dropped the idea and will move to another preapproved blueprint location or off the island.

United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization

As an unincorporated territory of the United States, the island of Guam is in effect still a colony. Thus, in accordance with the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, Guam occasionally sends a delegation to voice concerns regarding the right to self-determination. Although not as significant and powerful an initiative as the “We Are Guahan” movement, it is in an international forum where a segment of the Guamanian voices are heard regarding matters such as the U.S. military influx. It is significant to note that according to the Commission on Decolonization, under former Governor Camacho (2002-2010), the commission was mostly inactive and only gained renewed prominence after current Governor Eddie Baza Calvo came to office in the 2011 gubernatorial election.

One strong voice exists in Sabina Flores Peres, where “before the UN Committee of 24 in 2008, Sabina referred to the extremity of “the level and grossness of the infraction” of the UN Charter by the U.S. in its further militarization of the island” (Lutz 2010: 9). Those who have sought to draw attention to Guam’s struggle for a definite status include, among others, “Chamorro human rights attorney, Julian Aguon, and Chamorro educator and poet, Melvin Won Pat-Borja, [both of whom] have articulated dissent to the planned build-up on Democracy Now in an effort to gain national and international support for their struggle” (Natividad & Kirk 2010: 5).

Conclusion

“Guahan (Guam), an unincorporated territory of the United States, could hold a plebiscite to determine its political status. This self-determination plebiscite will give the electorate the opportunity to deliberate on one of three internationally recognized political plans for the future: Statehood, Independence or Free Association” (Na’puti & Hahn 2013: Abst.). Although a plebiscite may be held as soon as 2015, we should bear in mind that regardless of the future relationship between Guam and the United States, it is most likely that some form of relationship between the island and the U.S. military will remain.

As previously noted, throughout Guam’s history of centuries-long colonization by Spain, and then Japanese and U.S. occupation, the Chamorros and Guamanians have been constantly and consistently calling for a stronger voice, true representation, and ethical reciprocation by the United States. Be it through the Pagat case, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, or local advocacy groups/local political leaders, one U.S. Senator James Webb put it quite accurately, that “Guam has been a loyal, though often unrecognized and ignored, segment of the American system” (Kan 2013: 14). This status quo must, will, and is changing.

Recently, at the Hyatt Regency on Guam, specialists gathered for a public forum and dialogue entitled the “Guam-U.S. Asia Security Alliance” which provided an opportunity and instance of interaction for the improvement of the future of the U.S. military influx, the islanders, and Guahan.

To conclude, it is of utmost importance, as well as extremely prudent, that the Guamanian people present a unified front in solidarity for the ethical integration and responsibility of the U.S. military in nearly all levels and platforms; unified solidarity is a step forward to the future.

Bibliography


Should guidelines based on ethical principles be part of the World Heritage Committee’s decision-making process concerning nominations to the UNESCO World Heritage List?

The basis for the inscription of a cultural or natural heritage site on the World Heritage List of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as well as the official process that leads to that inscription, is well defined in the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage—more popularly known as the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter the Convention)—and its accompanying manual, the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention. The latter was first drafted in 1977 by the World Heritage Committee (hereinafter the Committee), the intergovernmental body in charge of overseeing the Convention. It has since been revised by the Committee seventeen times to respond to new concepts, scientific information, and practical experiences with respect to the Convention and its implementation (“UNESCO World Heritage Centre—The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention,” n.d.). The 2013 edition of this document, however, still has no section that definitively sets ethical guidelines to constitute part of the Committee’s basis for accepting nominations—in particular, a set of ethical guidelines that Committee members can refer to while deliberating on whether to accept a nominated site which is disputed by or under protest from another State Party (a state or territory that is a signatory to the Convention) based on non-technical grounds. Moreover no guidelines are set forth to aid the Committee in deliberating.

The inconsistency in past inscriptions on the World Heritage List shows the need for new ethical guidelines that would reduce conflict over the addition of new World Heritage sites.

By Michael Angelo V. Liwanag

The Genbaku Dome known as the “A-bomb Dome”.

Photo: Freedom II Andres www.flickr.com/photos/freedomiiphotography/6203083791 (CC)
on whether the implications of inscribing a nominated site, even in the absence of any dispute or protest, can lead to the disadvantage of or conflict with other States Parties.

**Background Information**

**The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage**

The World Heritage Convention was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO during its seventeenth session held in Paris, France, in November 1972 (“UNESCO World Heritage Centre - Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,” n.d.). The main product of the Convention is the World Heritage List (hereinafter referred to as the List), an inventory of cultural and natural heritage sites officially recognized by the Committee to have outstanding universal value (OUV) to all of mankind.

**The World Heritage Committee**

Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Convention mandates the creation of the World Heritage Committee, formally known as the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, to oversee the proper implementation of the Convention. The Committee, composed of twenty-one States Parties to the Convention, meets once a year to deliberate on World Heritage nominations (“UNESCO World Heritage Centre—The World Heritage Committee,” n.d.).

**Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention**

Among all the statutes of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter referred to as the Operational Guidelines), its foremost contents are arguably the ten criteria for inscription on the List. From the inception of these criteria for OUV assessment to the latest version of the document, however, the Committee has not put forth any definition of what a nominated site should not be—negative definitions of inscription, arguably based on ethical grounds, that may rule out a nominated site even if it satisfies one or more of the ten positive criteria.

**Hypothesis**

**The inclusion of ethical principles to form part of the World Heritage Committee’s criteria for deciding on nominations to the UNESCO World Heritage List can help prevent conflict.**

In this respect, ethical principles can refer to a set of negative definitions that stipulate what a nominated site should not represent or exemplify in order to be eligible for inscription on the List, whether or not the nominated site satisfies any of the ten established positive criteria. These ethical considerations can accompany the established positive criteria for recognizing the OUV of sites, or lack thereof, and provide the Committee with a well-rounded and judicious basis for ruling on nominations that, if approved, could potentially result in conflicts between States Parties or religious, ethnic, and social groups.

Nominations of sites to the List have in the past caused conflicts both on the international and local levels because of the Committee’s episodic inability to account for potential political friction caused by inscription (Galis, 2009). Whether a particular nominated site is under official protest or not, an assessment of the implications of approving the nomination based on a universally accepted set of ethical considerations, not just on technical, aesthetic, or scientific factors sufficiently covered by the Convention and its Operational Guidelines, can prevent consequences such as the trampling of another nation’s sensibilities or the disruption of a whole people’s way of life. As such, the inclusion of ethical considerations in deciding on World Heritage nominations will be better served if applied when deliberating on the implications of two aspects of the potential inscriptions. First, an ethical assessment of the implications of approving the nominated site based on what it exemplifies or represents, arrived at by addressing certain questions. For instance, if the site itself is a representation of heritage that highlights human values which are universally accepted as unethical—sometimes referred to as “negative heritage” or sites that may be interpreted as commemorating conflict and trauma (Rico, 2008)—is the nomination sufficiently designed to promote the site as an expression of what should be avoided? Or, does it in fact celebrate these unethical values? Additionally, if the nominated site is an example of outstanding human achievement in a particular field, was this achievement attained in a universally accepted ethical manner or at the expense of the rights or well-being of certain groups?

Second, should the nominated site satisfy the abovementioned ethical assessment of what it represents, consideration should then be focused on the ethical implications of its inscription. If placed on the List, will the site—and all the accompanying requirements of a World Heritage designation—initiate or perpetuate a universally accepted unethical situation that puts certain groups at a disadvantage? For example, will the creation of a buffer zone around the site, a prerequisite for inscription stipulated in the Operational Guidelines, result in the deterioration of living conditions for a segment of the local community? Will the inscription of a site exacerbate an existing dispute between social, religious, or ethnic groups? On an even broader scale, will inscription lead to conflicts between States Parties?

It may be easy to assume that the answers to the preceding questions need not be arrived at using negative definitions, that decisions over World Heritage nominations will always be made with universally accepted ethical standards in mind, and that politics on the local and international level will not unduly influence any outcomes. Without a codified set of ethical considerations, however, much
is still left to chance. The current set up as stipulated by the Committee’s Rules of Procedure (including secret balloting wherein decisions need not be explained, requiring minutes of private meetings to be made public only twenty years later, and allowing States Parties’ representatives to decide if an issue is actually covered by the Convention) may afford some anonymity in the decision-making process that could benefit States Parties wishing to escape political pressure, but also somewhat diminishes accountability. Moreover, the interpretation of emerging sensitive issues is left to a Committee membership that, because of its temporary nature, is in constant flux.

Although the term “universally accepted” as it pertains to ethical principles may still be a matter of debate, the potential benefits of including ethical considerations in the process of deciding on World Heritage nominations, particularly in preventing conflict, warrant further exploration of this proposition.

**Case Studies**

Notwithstanding the overwhelming advantages gained by a World Heritage designation, inscription on the List has also had undesired effects, partly due to what some argue as a questionable and highly politicized selection process (Frey & Steiner, 2011). Consequently, some nominations and eventual inscriptions that have bolstered one State Party’s national pride have also adversely affected the national sensibilities of another. Though most of the nominations have not come with existing or potential ethical dilemmas, a number of controversial cases have worsened diplomatic relations between States Parties.

**Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) (Inscribed in 1996)**

The Genbaku Dome, one of the few structures to survive the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, had become the enduring symbol of the first detonation of a nuclear weapon on a civilian population. The Japanese government therefore wanted to commemorate it as a representation of world peace as well as a reminder of the tragic consequences of using nuclear weapons.

The United States, however, asserted that designating it as a World Heritage site without the complete context would reflect an inaccurate and anti-American representation of history (Beazley, 2007). The case highlights the need for ethical guidelines when deciding on nominations involving sites marking wartime events because previously combating States Parties often have differing versions of history. The lack of ethical guidelines to accompany the Committee’s future decisions concerning sensitive sites similar to the Genbaku Dome leaves the door open for future controversial nominations with the potential to bring States Parties with differing historical accounts of tragic events into conflict.

**The Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls (Inscribed in 1981)**

Jordan officially nominated Jerusalem in 1980, even though sovereignty over the city was still a matter of dispute. The United States, invoking Article 11, Paragraph 3 of the Convention, specifically the portion stating that consent of the state concerned is a prerequisite for inscription of a property on the List (“UNESCO World Heritage Centre—The World Heritage Convention,” n.d.), moved that, as the State Party in fact administering the city of Jerusalem, Israel be given the right to express its views on the matter to the Committee. The Committee rejected this motion (Lapidot & Hirsch, 1994) and approved the nomination despite U.S. objections.

Accusations of using Jerusalem’s World Heritage designation for political purposes persisted long after its inscription on the List in 1981. In 2000, Israel attempted to nominate to the List archaeological sites located in East Jerusalem (Galis, 2009), an area of the city claimed by Palestinians as the capital of the Palestine state (Hasson, 2007). In response, the Palestinian Authority and the League of Arab States issued a resolution to the U.N. Secretary-General condemning the initiative (Aziz, 2003). Citing the possibility of worsening the area’s existing conflict, the Committee decided against approving Israel’s nomination (Galis, 2009).

This case shows that Committee decisions may be inconsistent over time given the lack of standard ethical guidelines to help determine a prudent course of action in the face of a disputed site. Basing decisions on situations such as those posed by Jerusalem on a set of universally accepted ethical guidelines can standardize decisions regardless of changes in the Committee’s constituency and shifts in political trends over time.

**Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution (Nominated in 2013)**

Of the twenty-eight facilities included in this serial nomination, presented as a single heritage cluster that drove Japan’s modernization during the Meiji Era (1868-1912) (“Japan to seek World Heritage status for sites in Meiji industrialization drive,” n.d.), the Nagasaki Shipyard is notable not just for its pivotal role in helping launch Japan’s industrial transformation but also for building Japan’s warships during World War II. During this period, the tail-end of Japan’s thirty-six year colonial regime over Korea, the South Korean government claims that Korean laborers were forced to work in the shipyard (Morris-Suzuki, Low, Petrov, & Tsu, 2013). As such, South Korea is reported to have already lodged a complaint against Japan (Sung, 2013).

This is a crucial example of a case in which considerations beyond the statutes delineated in the Convention and its Operational Guidelines are necessary to judiciously deliberate on the true historical representation of a site as well as the implications of its inscription. Even though the nomination highlights the Meiji era which ended in 1912, the Nagasaki Shipyard’s role in Japan’s World War II effort has apparently stirred resentment from South Korea such that ethical considerations are all the more
warranted to ensure that the Committee is fair to both countries. Anything less could spark conflict.

**Recommendations**

Although each World Heritage nomination presents unique circumstances, the Committee’s differing decisions on Jerusalem in 1980 and 2000 shows the need for more consistency.

In order to avoid decisions that may be perceived as favorable to any particular State Party, a prudent approach would be a basic ethical principle stating that the Committee shall simply not accept nominations of properties whose ownership is under dispute—or, at the very least, until such a dispute has been amicably settled by the States Parties involved through internationally accepted means and to the extent that no foreseeable violent consequences shall arise from inscription. The Committee shall then only accept such nominations if both of the preceding conditions are satisfactorily met. Until such time, conservation of such properties shall continue to be undertaken but without their being granted World Heritage status. Such a guideline could help prevent conflict by deterring countries from nominating contested sites before disputes are resolved.

Nominations such as the Genbaku Dome and the Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution, on the other hand, may attain inscription on the List without necessarily leading to conflict if ethical guidelines such as the following are adopted by the Committee:

First, a basic ethical principle stating that the Committee shall only accept nominations of properties which were venues of wartime historical events, the versions of which differ among State Parties involved, if a complete account of such historical events is verified by independent authorities acceptable to all parties concerned. Furthermore, nominations shall require that the agreed upon complete historical accounts be presented as part of the sites’ OUV statement and eventual public presentation. The Committee shall then only accept such nominations if both of the preceding conditions are satisfactorily met. In the absence of incontrovertible proof to this end, the Committee shall defer the nomination until such time as the required proof is made available. Such a guideline could help prevent conflict by encouraging States Parties to nominate sites with complete historical contexts.

Second, a basic ethical principle stating that the Committee shall only accept nominations of properties which are verified by recognized independent authorities to have been venues for human suffering if they are presented as sites commemorating human values and behavior that should never be repeated. Should a site be proven to have been involved in both outstanding human achievement and human suffering at different times in its existence, the Committee shall then only accept the nomination if both noteworthy aspects are made part of the site’s OUV statement and eventual public presentation—regardless of the aspect for which it is being nominated.

Ethical guidelines such as but not limited to the abovementioned, though not necessarily legally binding as codes of ethics usually are not (Carducci, 2005), could at the very least provide the Committee with an additional tool, beyond the limits of the Convention and its Operational Guidelines, to tackle increasingly creative World Heritage nominations from State Parties keen on capitalizing on the political and economic benefits of inscription.

**Additional Justification**

The increasing importance of ethics in the internal workings of UNESCO as an international organization is evidenced by the creation of the Ethics Office in 2009. This inward reflection was deemed essential by Director-General Irina Bokova if UNESCO is to better improve its outward performance and standing (Ethics Office Annual Report, 2011).

Externally, different committees, programs, and documents through which UNESCO carries out its mandate already reflect the shift to employ ethics as a means of achieving its aims in a fair and just manner. This move is the result of UNESCO’s decision in 2002 designating ethics as one of the organization’s top five priority areas (Have, 2006). As early as 1998, UNESCO set up the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) for its Social and Human Sciences Sector (“UNESCO Social and Human Sciences—World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology,” n.d.). The growing need for ethics beyond the Sciences Sector was not lost on UNESCO’s thirty-second General Conference in 2003 as member states recognized the need to initiate teaching programs in ethics. On this basis, UNESCO enacted the Ethics Education Programme in 2004 (“UNESCO Social and Human Sciences—Ethics Education Program”, n.d.).

The whole point of “implementing a system of ethics based on principles,” as the Ethics Office aptly points out, is that “rules and regulations can never cover every possible scenario” (“UNESCO Ethics Office,” n.d.).

**Conclusion**

The Sectors of UNESCO, its member states, its executive board, and its director-general are all updating and consolidating their approach to include ethical principles in both the discharge of their duties and the attainment of the organization’s goals—both broad and specific, internally and externally. The organizational framework is therefore already in place for the introduction of ethical guidelines into the different UNESCO programs. For the World Heritage Convention in particular, the urgent need for ethical guidelines in addition to its Operational Guidelines is apparent as the case studies show; their adoption can only help the World Heritage Committee decide on future World Heritage nominations in a manner that will be as fair and just as possible for all States Parties, thereby limiting possible conflicts as a result of the World Heritage designation.
An Analysis of Technology Use in Early Childhood: Has Increased Use of Technology Slowed our Children’s Development?

Finding the right balance of technology use, in terms of both type and frequency, is key to healthy child development.

By Joanna Maulbeck

Introduction

This paper explores the effects of technology on early childhood development from an international perspective. The reasons for my focus on this topic are twofold: first, it relates to Carnegie Council’s Centennial theme of Technology and Risk; second, it is rooted in my experience as an early childhood educator. Having taught in public and private elementary schools in Mali, South Africa, and the United States, and having conducted research in numerous classrooms internationally, I have noticed that the types of technology that are used with young learners vary, as does the purpose and frequency of their use. This led me to ask the following questions: What type of technology tends to be used in early childhood classrooms? How is it used? What is the frequency of its use? And finally, what effect does such use have on child development?

The answer to this final question has pivotal ethical implications. Technology shapes people, especially youth. Given that children’s brains are malleable, early experiences, including exposure to and use of technology, have an especially profound effect on child psychology and development. Understanding effects of technology use allows policymakers, educators, and parents to ethically approach early childhood education.

In this article, I use current literature and an interview that I conducted with an early childhood educator to deepen understanding regarding technology use in primary school and its effects on child development. To this end, I explore the types of technology that are used in early childhood education classrooms, indicate how they are used, as well as frequency of use. I then discuss the effects of this
use of technology, including its ethical implications.

**Types of Technology and Their Use**

What type of technology is used in primary school classrooms and how is it used?

Various portals, including not limited to blogs, videos, and electronic games, are used in primary schools. Teachers often communicate with parents by blogs. They allow for debriefing on daily classroom events, and provide a venue for posting necessary paperwork, such as permission slips. Streaming videos allow students to experience the world outside of the classroom without setting foot outside. Similarly, programs such as Skype allow students to meet face-to-face with individuals in other parts of the world. Electronic games are often used to reinforce concepts learned. Blogs, videos, and games may be accessed from personal computers, laptops, or iPads and Android tablets. These devices also provide students with tools, such as built-in dictionaries, calculators, word processors, and various applications for presentations.

Specific types of technology are used to assist students with various types and levels of disabilities. Word processing software, for example, allows children with delayed fine motor skill development to produce the written word. Word prediction software, which reduces the number of keystrokes needed to type a word and provides assistance with spelling, is sometimes used by students with mild motor and communication disorders. Students with limited or no speech are often serviced with augmentative and alternative (AAC) devices. A number of variations of such devices have been developed. One, for example, consists of touch sensitive pads that children use to select pictures or graphics, which cue the device to produce synthetic speech that corresponds with the graphic.2

In short, some technology within the classroom targets all students, serving a variety of purposes, such as communication with parents, connection with the world outside the classroom, reinforcement of concepts learned, and access to various tools, such as dictionaries. Other technology targets students that need extra support, such as with communication enhancement.

**Frequency of Use**

Frequency of technology use varies based on several factors, including school pedagogy, socioeconomic status, and place of residence. Some elementary schools’ pedagogical philosophies embrace technology more than others. Other than using technology for students with special needs, the Denver Waldorf School, in accordance with the Waldorf pedagogy, does not use any technology within the classroom. Instead, materials such as musical instruments, needles, yarn, and paint are used in an effort to teach by doing. Aspen Academy, also in Denver, on the other hand, provides every five-year-old with an iPad which is integrated into but not integral to the curriculum.3 Conversely, technology is central to curriculum at Blessed Sacrament School of Belleville, Illinois. By eighth grade each student receives an iPad that is used at home and school for a variety of purposes—design of presentations, typing, and access to netbooks. Even assessments are administered utilizing the iPad—distributed, completed, and submitted electronically. As the digital age is embraced, books are no longer used at the Blessed Sacrament School.4

I interviewed a teacher who had worked in the United States and Colombia about her classroom technology in both countries. Her first-grade classroom in an affluent public school in New Jersey is equipped with a personal computer, an Elmo projector, video camera, and three Macbooks, which are sometimes used by children in small groups for various lessons, ranging from literacy to math. In addition, she is able to rent a laptop lab for a part of the day. Her third-grade classroom in an affluent private school in Bogota, Colombia, similarly, had a personal computer and projector in the classroom. She also had two iPads, which were often used to construct presentations. In addition, the interviewee was able to rent four more iPads from other teachers, and use a computer lab with her students. These schools resemble Aspen Academy, where technology is incorporated into but not central to the curriculum.

Socioeconomic status (SES) also affects the extent of use of technology. While teaching in Colombia at the affluent private school, the interviewee noticed that her students were not only being exposed to technology in school, but also had technological resources at home. Meanwhile, a sister school in Bogota, is composed of students of low SES background who have technology neither at home nor at school.

Such disparity is also pronounced in the United States. Various studies, including those of Sun and Benton (2008), Kemker (2007), and Warschauer, Knobel, and Stone (2004) note that American students’ ability to access technology for educational purposes is largely based on family socioeconomic status.

Digital divides are pronounced in various parts of the world. UNICEF’s research indicates that children in urban areas of South Africa, Vietnam, and Zambia are more likely to use technology for educational purposes than those in rural areas. In Vietnam, for example, 40 percent of rural children have used the Internet for educational purposes, with 34 percent sending school-related text messages. In urban areas, this spiked to 62 percent and 57 percent respectively.5

A divide is also evident on an international scale. In 2012, for example, 78.6 percent of the population in North America had consistent access to the Internet, while 27.5 percent did in Asia.6 As a result, American children tend to use technology pervasively, with most eight to eighteen-year olds using digital media for an average of 7.5 hours per day.7 As for children aged eight and under, about half have access to mobile devices at home.
including smartphones, iPods, iPads, and other tablets. Twenty-nine percent of parents have used these devices to download applications specifically for their young children—despite the recommendation by the American Academy of Pediatrics of no more than one-to-two hours per day of screen-time.\(^9\) On the other end of the spectrum, even though the cost of technology is decreasing, more than half of children from rural areas of Vietnam have never used a computer for educational purposes at all.

In short, technology is used to varying extents by children of primary school age. Some schools, such as the Waldorf School, choose not to use technology. Others, such as the sister school in Colombia mentioned by the interviewee, do not have a choice. Some children have not used a computer for educational purposes because of lack of access.

**Ethics and Consequences of Technology Use**

The effect of technology on child development is often linked to frequency of use. Having no access to technology can be a disadvantage, as can overuse.

Although a child does not need technology to develop in a healthy manner, minimal exposure is beneficial. Children gain a foundation in digital literacy which ensures access to information without going to the library, mail without the line at the post office, and an awareness of current events without buying a newspaper. Students using computers also have an opportunity to express themselves through activities such as design of visual presentations, websites, and blogging. Digital literacy, in a sense, empowers children by providing them with information and a voice. As the interviewee indicated, since the world is becoming more and more digitally oriented, some exposure to technology in early childhood is helpful to begin to prepare students “for the real world.” According to cognitive psychologists, learning is incremental through repetition and practice. Minimal practice with technology in the early years is thus beneficial for students—the more time they have to practice, the more they are likely to learn.

In addition to providing students with a foundation in digital literacy, minimal practice with technology creates specific learning opportunities. As Thomas-Fox (2013) indicates, when used in moderation, video games and other screen media improve visual-spatial capabilities, increase reaction times, and the capacity to identify details among clutter. Learning opportunities are especially created for students with disabilities. As mentioned above, word processing software, word prediction software, and augmentative and alternative (AAC) devices help students with disabilities to communicate.\(^10\)

On the other side of the spectrum, when used too frequently, technology is likely to have negative effects on child development. Rowan (2013), a pediatric occupational therapist, indicates that four critical factors are necessary to achieve healthy child development: movement, touch, human connection, and exposure to nature. Technology overuse diminishes children’s exposure to these factors. Thus, the vestibular and proprioceptive systems (related to a sense of coordination), tactile and attachment systems (related to a sense of security and regulation), and parasympathetic (related to a sense of calm and focus) are under-stimulated. On the other hand, visual and auditory sensory systems are over-stimulated leading to an increase in attention deficit disorder, autism, coordination disorder, developmental delays, unintelligible speech, learning difficulties, sensory processing disorder, anxiety, depression, and sleep disorders. In essence, overuse of technology is associated with negative effects on sensory, motor, and attachment systems, which can lead to various disorders.

Taylor (2012) further elaborates on the negative impact of technology on attention. Studies indicate that reading uninterrupted text is associated with more understanding, recall, and learning than reading text filled with hyperlinks and ads. Along similar lines, text-only presentations are considered more engaging, informative, and entertaining than those that include video. Additionally, students who do not use Internet in class outperform those that do. Finally, reading develops reflection, critical thinking, problem solving, and vocabulary better than visual media.

Shields and Berhman (2000) and Hittleman (2013) indicate that children who spend an excessive amount of time in front of computers are less likely to participate in other activities that are critical for healthy development. In addition to the risks mentioned above, Shields and Berhman (2000) further indicate that excessive sedentary time, defined as five or more hours per day, is related to childhood obesity. Hittleman (2013) stresses the importance of social interaction. Social skills are not inborn but rather acquired through practice. Overuse of technology may impede that practice. More specifically, virtual social networks are associated with a decrease in empathy and increase in narcissism. Dr. Larry Rosen even writes of iDisorder—tech-related psychiatric symptoms, expressing concern over social and personal development during the digital age—which allows for individuals to say anything on the Internet, without seeing how it impacts others.\(^11\)

In essence, all is good in moderation, including technology. As Kim Gorgens, professor at the University of Denver explains: “When the attention is more focused on technology, in lieu of social engagement, for example, or in lieu of academic work, or at the expense of other activities that they might otherwise enjoy, that’s when technology engagement starts to become problematic. [It’s] at the cost of other areas of living, really.”\(^12\) Thus, technology is effective when it does not take away from the variety of experiences that children need.

**Conclusion**

Some children are over-exposed to technology, taking away from other experiences connected to movement, touch, human connection, and exposure to
nature—all of which are critical for healthy development. Meanwhile, others are under-exposed which is especially detrimental for students with disabilities, who are often deprived of tools that assist them in not only everyday classroom activities but also critical functions, such as communication. Although non-disabled children do not need technology to develop in a healthy manner, many agree that it is beneficial to acquire a certain level of comfort and competence in using computers that can later be easily built upon to develop digital literacy. Over-exposure and under-exposure of children to technology is a multifaceted problem which differs from one country to the next. In a complex, diverse world, how do we achieve balance that encourages healthy child development? More extensive research must be conducted to answer this question. However, I do believe that the first step is to realize that too much of anything is just as bad as too little. Technology has potential risk to our children if it continues to be used to extremes.

Notes


Bibliography

December 10, 2013 marked the sixty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly. More than half a century after its adoption, the UN and its member-states still have much work to do towards the attainment of basic human rights for all, especially with regards to the poor and marginalized.

Left on their own, nation-states have, over time, proven to be unreliable in guaranteeing these rights, because of the anarchic nature of the international system in which only the fittest survive. It is a system that recognizes the interests of states rather than those of the individuals that make up the nation.

The impact of globalization and technological advancements on the international system has further compounded the human rights question. In view of the gaping deficit in ensuring human rights, the work of certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has traditionally been geared towards addressing this problem. In recent times, parliamentarians and parliaments have also joined the cause.

This paper seeks to shed light on the work that parliamentarians are doing with regards to human rights diplomacy in international relations.

Introduction

Diplomacy, which may be defined as the ways and means through which states relate to each other on the international stage, has traditionally been in the hands of the executive and his or her representatives since the notion of the nation-state was born. However, with the advent of globalization and technological advancements, the practice of diplomacy no longer lies solely in the hands of governments and their agents. NGOs, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), multinational corporations (MNC), parliaments and even certain individuals, commonly categorized as non-state actors, have all been playing remarkable roles in diplomatic relations among states.

The activities of parliaments and parliamentarians in diplomacy, also known as Parliamentary Diplomacy (PD), is a developing concept in international relations. Consequently, a significant amount of research is ongoing towards its definite conceptualization. Norbert Götz argues that PD is seen by its practitioners as parliamentarians either playing the role of diplomats, or parliamentary assemblies actively influencing foreign policy formulation. He further attributes its current popularity to globalization and the
growing need for parliamentarians to tackle transnational issues. Götz then observes that PD actors range from “individual parliamentarians, to political parties, to local parliaments or assemblies, to national parliaments, to regional parliaments and ending with international parliaments.”

Stelios Stavridis, for his part, defines parliamentary diplomacy as a number of different and varied actions which comprise “all activities and actions that parliamentary bodies and their members take in international relations.” He illustrates this notion with the following list of activities:

1. Members of Parliament’s (MPs) missions abroad and participation in transnational parliamentary bodies;
2. Visits by other MPs and parliamentary delegations to parliaments and other institutions (national or transnational);
3. Questions (written and oral), reports and other studies on foreign affairs that take place within a parliamentary body;
4. Activities of transnational parliamentary bodies; and
5. Parliamentary participation in the monitoring of elections in third countries.

Although Parliamentary Diplomacy as a field of study is in its beginning stages, Daniel Fiott has shown that the practice of PD or its contracted form ‘parlomacy’—his personal coinage and which this paper will use interchangeably can be traced back to ancient Rome where, at the behest of Roman Generals, the Roman Senate successively sued for peace and then sanctioned war with Philip V of Macedon after the failure of the Treaty of Phoenice in 205 BC. He further cites the example of the germane role that political parties across Europe played in supporting a nascent moderate Socialist Party of Portugal (PSP) to choose a democratic rather than a Communist path during the 1970s political upheavals in Portugal. Through financial and human resource aid, these political parties were able to support the PSP which was eventually elected to pursue democratic tenets. Thus, these political parties played the role of a midwife in the birth of democratic governance in Portugal.3

In this paper, we will proceed by briefly examining the historical landmarks that have contributed to the current state of affairs in contemporary diplomacy and human rights development. This will shed more light on what parliamentary diplomacy entails, and highlight its relationship with the promotion of human rights in contemporary inter-state relations.

By so doing, we will then employ a real life story that relates to human rights to illustrate why the development of parliamentary diplomacy is critical to the promotion of human rights issues in a statist international political system that is less than mindful of the rights of individuals.

The Emergence of Non-State Actors in International Relations

A critical examination of the history of humankind always reveals that governance, when not based on the free will of the masses, never endures. It is in this light that the ongoing democratization of international relations is better understood. Since the dawn of human relations, any dictatorial or totalitarian tendencies that reigned in national or world affairs, no matter how long they retained power, were eventually removed, however painful or tardy the process. The wars fought in antiquity, Europe’s Thirty Years War of 1618 to 1648 and the First and Second World Wars are enough proof that human Treaty of Phoenice in 205 and by extension international relations Treaty of Phoenice in 205 will only thrive in a context of democratic principles. The series of ‘international democratic deficits’ as Stavrids Stelios4 puts it, has led to the on-going democratization of international relations and diplomatic practices. Orthodox diplomacy, which thrives on state-centrism, has to a very large extent lost its absolute control in the current state of world politics. George Young puts it succinctly: “The public is revolting against orthodox diplomacy, much as it did against orthodox divinity, and for the same reason—its failure to secure peace on earth to men of good will.”5

The state-centric international system mirrored by orthodox diplomacy invariably served the interests of states, much to the detriment of the individual’s interests. Historically, the more heated the revolt became, the more premium was put on the individual’s human rights. It was under such circumstances that the aforementioned non-state actors emerged in international politics. Undoubtedly, human rights issues lay at the heart of their activities, and what better institutions than parliamentarians and their parliamentary apparatus to represent the interests of the very people who have entrusted them with the mandate to so act. This is, in sum, the connection between parliamentary diplomacy and human rights in international relations.

A Brief Background to the Development of Human Rights

Human rights have been described as the rights that individuals enjoy because they are human. Originally, these innate rights were not a given; individuals had rights only because of their membership in a group or family. People were either of noble birth and thus free or were slaves or bound.

The tide began to turn in 539 BC when Cyrus the Great, after conquering the city of Babylon, freed all slaves to return home. He further declared that people should have the right to choose their own religion. His statements which were contained in the ‘Cyrus Cylinder’, a clay tablet, are regarded as the first human rights declaration in history. The idea of human rights then spread quickly to other parts of the world such as Greece, India, and Rome.

The most important advances in the struggle to popularize and standardize human rights since then have included:

- **1215: The Magna Carta (England):** granted the people new rights and made the king subject to the law.
- **1628: The Petition of Right (England):** set out the rights of the people.
- **1776: The Declaration of Independence (United States):** proclaimed the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
- **1789: The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France):** a
document stating that all citizens are equal under the law.

• 1948: The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the first document listing the thirty rights to which everyone is entitled.

The Impact of Parliamentary Diplomacy on the Promotion of Human Rights

Sixty-five years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly, worldwide respect for human rights leaves much to be desired. The concept of the sovereignty of the state still reigns supreme in national as well as international governance. In international relations, especially where the individual is hardly considered an actor, rights are often overlooked. The individual is often helpless against the might of the state and its agents even in circumstances where his or her basic human rights are being violated.

In a globalized world, the individual’s rights appear insignificant compared to his or her relations with the state. Other giant business concerns, such as multinational companies with profits exceeding those of some nations, dominate relations with individuals. The very state apparatus that is supposed to protect interests of the citizenry against exploitative behaviors is more often than not unreliable. In view of the huge economic returns that countries often reap from these multinational companies, they are often unwilling to intervene in human rights infractions against their citizenry.

The pressure of globalization has further increased human rights concerns worldwide; hence the emergence of numerous non-governmental organizations. Although, human rights issues have such a public appeal as to make it difficult to keep them out of international diplomacy, their interference with equally sensitive concepts such as national sovereignty or community rights makes it extremely difficult to operationalize human rights in mainstream politics.

It is in the light of such developments that national parliaments and parliamentarians have extended their activities to solving inter-state exigencies that relate to the human rights of individuals; this field is referred to as human rights diplomacy.

Considering that the involvement of a state’s parliamentary apparatus in human rights diplomacy is a comparatively recent development in international politics, limited success has been attained. The level of success is usually dependent on the governance system that exists in the countries in question. The more democratic principles a state embraces, the more liberated and empowered its parliament is to engage in international politics and even tackle sensitive issues like human rights. Accordingly, Western countries which are regarded as beacons of democracy invariably champion the promotion of human rights issues in international relations.

The European Union (EU) has been outstanding in the popularization and institutionalization of human rights over the years; the European Parliament (EP) has played a catalyzing role. Towards this end, the EU’s work is gradually and steadily moving from trade and aid to more political and even more security-related work among which are human rights. Currently, the EU’s priority is to put human rights at the center of foreign policy.

Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty commits the EU to pursue universal and indivisible human rights and fundamental freedoms in all its external activities, making it the most committed state-based actor to promote these principles.

The Story of Yumi

The story of Yumi Hwang, shown on Al-Jazeera in August 2013, is the one story that brought issues related to human rights into sharp focus for me and also inspired the writing of this paper. It recounts the story of a grieving father who is determined to seek posthumous justice for his daughter who died as a result of her employment at a factory hand with Samsung.

I decided to use this story for a number of reasons. First, the story depicts how individuals are almost insignificant actors in national or international politics, which has led other non-state actors to emerge strongly in international politics to their defense.

Second, I believe that with the world as a global village, we should be each other’s keeper because we may each be directly or indirectly affected by the sufferings that others may be enduring. Samsung products, especially their mobile phones, are now common worldwide.

Third, the platform that the Ethics for Future Fellows offers is a unique and privileged one since it seeks to promote principles of ethics and justice through discussions of practical issues in the international arena. By citing Yumi’s story in this paper, I hope to make a small contribution to the unrelenting struggles of her father in his quest for justice. We will all be sensitized to the plight of the voiceless throughout the world. The following is her story:

In October 2003, Yumi, then a twenty-three-year-old undergraduate student, was hired as a factory employee at Samsung, one of South Korea’s largest industrial conglomerates. Her work involved cleaning semiconductor ‘wafers’ for microchips. By June 2005, she was diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia, a rare disease which affects two to four out of 100,000 persons, and she died six months later. The rest of the story details her father’s ongoing struggles to establish the actual cause of his daughter’s sickness which led to her untimely death.

Mr. Hwang works as a taxi-driver in Sokcho, a four-hour drive from Seoul. Having convinced himself that the fatal disease was not hereditary, he launched an ardent quest to verify the actual cause of his daughter’s death. Interestingly, he discovered that from the one hundred thirty-seven South Koreans who had been diagnosed with the same ailment, fifty-three had died. Moreover, those afflicted were all former employees of factories such as Samsung. He also realized that about five of Yumi’s former Samsung colleagues had also been diagnosed with
leukemia and eventually died or were incapacitated for life.

Armed with these revelations, Hwang wrote to the Samsung authorities to inform them about the incriminating facts he had uncovered. Samsung responded that none of the epidemiological studies it had sanctioned in the past had found a scientific basis for a causal link between its workplace environment and the employees’ sickness. Hwang’s contention was that at least Samsung would admit that with its former employees developing the same disease, the facts were too convincing to pass off as mere coincidences, and would be humane enough to ensure that the victims are properly treated and compensated. But Samsung chose to rely on the so-called scientific investigations that exonerated it of any culpability.

Hwang subsequently filed a claim with the Korea Workers Compensation Welfare Service (KCOMWEL), which is the government’s industrial regulatory body. No adjudication by the government agency seems to have resolved matters. Their only response is that none of the national and international studies conducted has come out with a conclusive declaration on the linkage between the victims’ illnesses and their work.

Consequently, Hwang and the other victims and their relatives who have joined him in his demonstrations have yet to receive justice. Hwang has vowed to continue his demonstrations against Samsung until justice is served.

**Challenges of Parliamentary Diplomacy in the Promotion of Human Rights**

The involvement of parliamentarians and parliamentary bodies has undoubtedly made a significant impact in the promotion of human rights throughout the world. The potential of parliamentarians involved in human rights diplomacy has not, however, been fully explored in view of a number of identifiable challenges.

Traditionally, the work of national parliamentarians and parliamentary bodies centers on meeting the day-to-day challenges of their constituencies. They are often overburdened and not eager to engage in extra duties which do not fall directly under their official functions. The development of special parliamentary committees as well as regional and international parliamentary bodies is all targeted at correcting the inadequacies of national parliaments, and human rights diplomacy has become popular among their activities.

In instances where parliamentarians are willing to take on human rights issues, they may be hampered by lack of financial resources. National parliaments often operate on tight budgets with very little to spare for causes that would promote the human rights of their electorate. The supranational parliaments, which often focus on such issues, receive the bulk of their funding from their sending parliaments or member-states.

As a result of inadequate funding, supranational parliaments often resort to non-institutionalized systems and procedures in tackling human rights concerns. Members rarely meet, and these bodies are mostly run on an ad hoc basis. Very few results are attained in such settings.

A further challenge that hampers the general effectiveness of parliamentary diplomacy is the proliferation and consequent duplication in the activities of some regional parliaments. Daniel Fiott cites the examples of the Latin America Parliament (‘Parlatino’), the Andean Parliament, and the inter-American Parliamentary Group (IPAG), all operating in Latin and Central America with similar functions and objectives.

The ambitions of giant business concerns. States and specifically their executives are increasingly neglecting the protection of their citizenry in favor of financial returns to be reaped from their new-found relationship with multinational companies.

It is in light of these developments that a plethora of non-governmental organizations have emerged to contribute to the laudable and noble cause of ensuring the basic human rights of the individual.

That parliamentarians and parliamentary bodies are also contributing to the promotion of human rights is yet another laudable milestone considering their proximity to their electorate. As moral tribunes in an international system of realpolitik, the role that parliaments are now playing towards human rights diplomacy is indeed critical to mitigate the harsh effects of globalization.

Parliamentary diplomacy or involvement in international relations will continue to increase in the years ahead and will be critical in the fight against human rights abuses.

**Notes**


4 Stavridis, as cited above.

Introduction

The uprising in Egypt in 2011 and the subsequent attempt at transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic system has pointed to the challenge of establishing functioning democracies with a range of actors, some of whom had never before participated in peaceful elections, had relied on militias, or had not supported democratic ideals. These groups thus did not qualify as “moderate” but were associated with “radical” behaviors and values. The Arab Spring raised questions in particular about the role that Islamist groups would play in post-revolutionary politics, several of which had at one point in their history endorsed the use of violence for attaining political goals and were not known for supporting pluralism. Thus, the question arises of how these groups are expected to develop in the new political setting and how their moderation can be supported.

In this context, the moderation theory intuitively appears helpful. This theory stipulates that inclusion of radical groups in the political process leads to their moderation. Allowing these groups to partake in the democratic decision-making...
process is expected to de-radicalize them as they learn from and socialize with more democratically-minded groups and make the strategic decision to give up undemocratic behavior in favor of gaining legitimacy through participation in formal politics. However, the moderation theory suffers from being under-theorized, lacking clear scope, conditions, and analyses of possible intervening variables. The puzzle is thus two-fold, both empirical and theoretical. By seeking to apply the assumptions of the moderation theory to Egypt, a state in transition rather than an established democracy, a cursory view already reveals both possible limitations to the scope of the moderation theory as well as expected challenges to moderation processes in the post-Arab Spring countries. This brief essay aims to raise some of the questions to be addressed if the moderation theory is applied in the Egyptian context of revolution and transition rather than one of a consolidated democracy. The essay is exploratory in nature and not intended to be comprehensive.

**Set of Actors: Who is “Radical”?**

Moderation theory claims that radical groups de-radicalize when included in the democratic political process. Just who are those radical groups in the context of this theory? Which behaviors or convictions make them radical and are there different degrees of radical character? One possibility would be to think of radical groups as those that pursue an anti-system agenda. This would fit the context of an established democracy; groups that aim to undermine or fundamentally change the political system in such a context would indeed be anti-democratic and thus, in line with the theory, radical. On the other hand, groups supporting the democratic system and adhering to its rules would be considered moderate. Yet, in the context of revolution and transition, as is the case in Egypt, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “system” when possibly defining radical groups as those who pursue anti-system agendas or display anti-system behavior. A revolution by definition aims at the fundamental change of a system, in these cases the authoritarian system under Mubarak, thus making all revolutionaries radicals if radical is defined as anti-system. Yet, even if we take “system” to refer to the new politics after the uprising and the ousting of the old regime, these new politics are still far from being grounded in a stable and well-functioning democratic system. The term anti-system is thus ambiguous in the context of revolutions and states in transition from one system of governance to another.

In addition, when considering Islamist groups, this theory requires a clear definition of which kinds of groups are meant, as not all Islamically-oriented political groups are radical. Is it for example helpful to distinguish between Islamic and Islamist groups? Is there a fundamental difference between Salafi and other groups when it comes to the degree of possessing a radical character in line with this theory? Such distinctions might not only clarify which set of actors is being analyzed, but
also further inform the multiple meanings of “radical,” be they mainly focused on behavior or values.

**Independent Variable: What is “Inclusion”?**

Both the scope of the set of actors under analysis and the process of inclusion, constituting the independent variable, should be clarified. First, does inclusion always imply inclusion into a democratic system and, if so, would it need to be a consolidated one? Considering that the majority of states worldwide are democracies, yet few are well functioning and consolidated, is there a minimum degree of democratic character that a state needs for inclusion to function as predicted by the moderation hypothesis? Are certain indicators of democratic character more relevant than others when it comes to this theory in particular?

In addition to the question of into what kind of system the radical groups are included, this variable raises questions regarding the agency of the actors. The moderation theory looks at the entire issue from the viewpoint of the government, the system, and the majority, rather than from the perspective of the radical groups. It further assumes the agency to lie with the system, with those who include, rather than with those who are being included. Yet, what does the process of inclusion mean from their perspective? Letting one’s group be included might be seen as accommodating the system, renouncing essential beliefs or practices, and possibly giving up the aim of fundamentally changing the system. Especially in a state in transition, these concerns can be expected to be more widespread than in a stable system if change is considered to come from the outside rather than from within the system. The moderation theory assumes that “moderate” denotes constructive and “radical” means destructive behavior. Yet, if the status quo is not a well-functioning democracy, do these categories always hold?

Lastly, the moderation theory focuses on inclusion into formal politics rather than, for example, increased political engagement within civil society. It is worthwhile exploring whether options may exist between becoming a political party that participates in national elections and being entirely excluded from politics. Other kinds of inclusion into the wider political sphere might offer more benefits for both the governing majority and the radical groups, as both would need to make fewer concessions.

**Dependent Variable: What is “Moderation”?**

Finally, for a useful application of the moderation theory, the dependent variable “moderation” should be specified. The first and obvious challenge lies in the fact that moderation is a process rather than an outcome, thus making an assessment
of moderation difficult. However, Khalil Al-Anani (2010), for example, has suggested three elements of moderation that help approximate the groups’ degree of moderation: peaceful participation in elections, ceasing to rely on militias, and accepting democratic ideals such as freedom, equality, and tolerance. As mentioned above, the moderation theory assumes radical groups to de-radicalize both through a process of socialization with the established political actors and through strategic choice to change their behavior. The first two elements of moderation, participation in elections and absence of a militia, relate to behavior and are relatively easy to assess; yet the third, the endorsement of democratic ideals, concerns ideological change and is much harder to trace. It is also the part of the process of moderation that is most dependent on the process of learning and socialization rather than one of strategic choice, thus raising the question of which kinds of ideals are endorsed by the majority of the political actors with whom the then included radical groups interact. If the state is in a process of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system and, except for the elite that has been ousted, it is governed by the same people who governed it pre-transition, can we expect such a process of socialization of radical actors toward the endorsement of democratic values at all?

Conclusion

At first glance, the moderation theory appears fitting to analyze and predict the development of more radical groups in post-revolutionary Egypt where several formerly radical groups joined the political arena after the uprising, and to potentially inform policy making by the Egyptian state, foreign states and/or non-governmental agencies working with political groups in those countries. However, as this brief essay has noted, several aspects of the theory need to be clarified if applying it to states in transition such as post-uprising Egypt. We need to specify which sets of actors the theory applies to, that is, who is “radical”, what the process of inclusion looks like, and what kind of moderation we expect in contexts other than consolidated democracies. Working out these parameters will help clarify the scope of conditions of the moderation theory and evaluate its explanatory power in cases such as Egypt and Tunisia.

Notes

1 See for example the briefing on Salafi parties in Egypt by Stéphane Lacroix (2012).
2 See Khalil Al-Anani’s (2010, 1) definition of (Islamist) moderation as “the extent to which movements accept peaceful political participation, do not rely on militias, and accept the values of democracy and its various components, such as freedom, tolerance, and equality, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, or gender.”
3 On the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, see for example Carrie Wickham (2013); on Salafi groups see Lacroix (2012) and Hamzawy & Grebowski (2010).
6 Schwedler (2011, 350)
7 Marshall & Cole (2011, 10-11)
8 See Khalil Al-Anani’s (2010, 1) definition of moderation cited in footnote 1

References

Environmental Degradation and Feminizing the Dilemma of Human Rights Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Nigeria’s Delta Region

Until women are given equal voice, human rights issues and environmental protection cannot be adequately addressed in Sub-Saharan Africa.

By Oumie Sissokho

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa has received much attention from the period of colonialism up until today. This vast area of human settlement is home to multiple groups of people living in different climatic zones and under similar challenges of human well-being. The region stretches from South of the Sahara to the mountainous and coastal areas of the Capes, home to over 900 million people according to World Bank (2012) estimates. With the abundance of natural resources in some countries, Sub-Saharan Africa has often been thrust into the limelight.

Ample literature can be found on the ‘resource curse’ theory, such as the works of Auty (1993); Sachs and Warne (2001); Roland (2006) and (Watts 2010), but little priority is given to the position of women in relation to the problem. Limited literature exists on the position of women’s access to and control over natural wealth or even their contribution to conservation in an African setting. One of a few exceptions is Kenyan environmentalist and Nobel Laureate Wangari Maathai. This reality is indeed ironic considering the role of African women in the provision of livelihood, as the majority of the continent’s uneducated rural women work in the sectors of agricultural and fishing (Ukeje 2004).

Government response to the human rights community’s call for respect for
the people’s demand for environmental management is a highly controversial subject in some African countries. In this case, an analysis of how corporate presence in Nigeria has resulted in a controversial environmental situation and the vulnerability of the country’s poor will be discussed with a focus on women. The case of Nigeria will be broadly introduced, and then the Delta conflict placed in a more narrow context. In the second part of the paper, I will explain the existing links and practices that support gender equality (or lack thereof) and the relationship to environmental sustainability. Third, I will analyze the link between human rights demands and violent reaction instead of dialogue between the citizens and the state. Finally, we will examine how government transparency and corporate accountability are fundamental to achieving both economic growth and environmental sustainability in a developing country like Nigeria.

The Nigerian Case

It is often said that Africa, despite its high rate of poverty and relatively low human development, is abundantly blessed with natural resources capable of bringing enormous economic growth (Conceicao et al 2011; ECA 2012). Although some of the optimism is warranted, much exaggeration exists, considering the real situation of poverty and income inequality, institutional inefficiency, and poor infrastructural development in most Sub-Saharan African countries and more specifically in Nigeria. However, it is noteworthy that natural resources have spurred or contributed to economic and social progress in some countries around the world such as Angola, Botswana, and Norway (Roland 2006).

Nigeria is a country of multiple characters, a celebrated nation of pride, innovation, and charisma, but is also a prime example of the African leadership problem (Meredith 2005). The country, located on the Western coast of Africa on the Gulf of Guinea, is the most populous in Africa with a little more than 160 million people (World Bank 2013) on a land mass of 983,213 square kilometres (Omofonmwan and Osa-Edoh 2008). Like many others in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has struggled with post-colonial nation building by concentrating on means of increasing economic productivity (Meredith 2005). However, it has been trapped in a fragile democracy with military interference causing disruptions along the way. In addition to leadership challenges, widespread bribery, patron-client relations, public resource diversion, high income disparity, and ethnic tensions are the political and socio-economic realities. A nation endowed with both natural and human capital is ranked one of the poorest in the world with up to 70 percent of its people in 2010 continuing to live below the poverty line (World Bank 2013).

Yet, Nigeria is blessed with resources such as iron ore, niobium, lead, oil, natural gas, and zinc (World Fact Book 2013). The country ranks as Africa’s largest oil producer and tenth on the global level (OPEC 2013). According to OPEC, the oil sector provides up to 35 percent of total gross domestic product and 70 percent for total export earnings, and is often the subject of controversy with accusations of gross injustice and irresponsibility. Many unsatisfied citizens and outside observers have accused the sector of unhealthy competition, theft, and corruption within a government-private sector partnership at the detriment of indigenous communities (Amunwa 2011).

The Niger Delta is a multi-billion dollar source of revenue for Nigeria and an important contributor to “global energy security” (Newsom 2011, 1). Although the area gives Nigeria an important geopolitical status, it remains the country’s most controversial region due to its environmental and human rights records over the past decades. With its tributaries, creeks, lagoons, rivers, and stagnant swamps, it is Africa’s largest wetland and second in the world (Odoemene 2011). The Delta has become important to both Nigeria and international actors with such resources at its disposal.

After six decades of oil exploration, there has been an irony of development in the region called Nigeria’s “source of wealth.” The Delta is inhabited mainly by minority groups who have less influence over the determination of
resources extracted from their territory (Chidi 2008). This lack of representation increases the region’s vulnerability to both government and corporate negligence and exploitation. “Despite its huge asset to the Nigerian nation, this area [the Delta] is characterised by extreme poverty, serious dearth of serviceable infrastructure and environmental degradation occasioned by oil spillage and gas faring” (Ogbodo 2012, 18). Economic opportunities are largely unavailable to oil-producing communities despite what Akinbi (2012, 151) calls the “umbilical cord” of the federal treasury being tied to the Delta. Petro-commerce has resulted in ecological damages to water, land productivity, and air quality (Afinotan and Ojakorotu 2009) which has pushed the people into environmentally induced poverty (Odoemene 2011). Between 1976 and 1990, 2,676 cases of oil spillage were documented, and in 2010 a total of 3,203 cases were recorded (Odoemene 2011). Further claims state that thousands of hectares of mangroves have been destroyed by the oil and gas exploration (Polgreen 2007). Therefore, the area has witnessed a drastic decline in both flora and fauna which are crucial to African rural livelihoods.

Multinational corporations, militant groups, individuals and communities, religious movements, and federal and local governments have all become key elements in the conflict. While the federal government and its subsidiary bodies (state and local) are accused of corruption and mismanagement of resources in the interest of elites, oil companies have been indicted for exploiting resources without due consideration for corporate, social and environmental obligations (Ogbodo 2012; Afinotan and Ojakorotu 2009; Ibaba and Opukri 2008).

Although the situation of the Delta is given much recognition in African academic research, markedly lacking is an analysis of the conflict’s effect on women in their role as prime supporters of their households. Even though African writers, especially Nigerian intellectuals, have done substantial work for the government’s attention to the Delta crisis, limited efforts have been made to feminize the situation. This has resulted in the omission of an important area for both academic enquiry and policy orientation.

**A Feminine Perspective of the Delta Crisis**

In an African setting, it is misleading to continue to ignore the close link between women’s communal and domestic responsibilities and long-term sustainability (Dankelman and Davidson 1993). Even though the critical roles of women in building, maintaining and serving communities are evident, their role in contributing to environmental conservation has not gained much recognition because of patriarchy, the domination of women in...
more powerful economic sectors and their limited influence over policy-making. This situation of the women of the Niger Delta could be categorized in all key schools of feminist theory.

Because most traditional roles of women are not valued, the productive sectors that are dominated by men are given priority. This limits women’s influence over the allocation of resources and their ability to demand environmental justice. This shortcoming is what radical feminists argue as a fundamental result of patriarchy and subordination of women (Willis 1984; Napikoski 2013) with its results of marginalization from decision-making even on the very policies or issues that directly affect them.

The identity politics of Sub-Saharan Africa has left women and men with distinct levels of success based on social orientations. This trend is changing in some countries, notably in Rwanda which is at the forefront of revolutionizing women’s access to political positions. However, the glass ceiling still exists as a tangible barrier to millions of women in the sub-region and thus has a direct impact on their influence over environmental politics. In an African political setting, men remain the dominant players in the game. In Nigeria’s House of Representatives, only twenty-five of 360 members are women, while of the Senate’s 109 members only seven are women (British Council 2012).

The country is characterized by high income-inequality, which means that women lack equality in the public sphere to gain parity not only economically but also in all realms of public life (Lewis 2013). The appalling statistic that 60-70 percent of women are five times less likely to own land of their own (British Council 2012) means that oil exploration further plunges them into poverty as their limited land resources are at risk of being unproductive for agriculture.

Women by far account for the largest number of victims of conflicts (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Ogege 2009). For the case of the Delta region, women are both productively and reproducitively affected by the environmental constraints that oil exploration has brought (Ukeje 2004). Even though economic activities are gravely affected by environmental activities—notably oil spillage with its negative effects on agricultural land, damage of cash crops for economic incentives, and threatening household food security—women have little opportunities to directly tackle these challenges without relying on established male power. While the contribution of women to the upkeep of their households is deeply rooted in the African context, they lack the recognition and institutional support to demand justice and protection of their rights to fully execute social and economic interests.

Capitalism, on the other hand, especially in male-dominated societies, can further contribute to the marginalization of women in economic activities especially when they lack access to labor, capital, and skills. Socialist feminists stress that the free market system exploits and drives women away from fair economic participation (Napikoski 2013). Few women have the opportunity to be entrepreneurs in the oil industry, which therefore increases their chance of exploitation; women’s economic earnings are treated as secondary compared to men. However, it is noteworthy that the capitalist system has in many ways contributed to the free participation of women in business especially if they are empowered with the necessary opportunities.

**The Conflict over Human Rights**

The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People utilized peaceful strategies to engage the Nigerian government in the early 1990s. However, the government could not cope with such an engagement considering the military dictatorship of the time. In 1995, Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists were hanged to death (Akinbi 2012). This incident created a global stir against the Abacha dictatorship but it did not lead to an improvement in the human rights situation in the Delta, neither did it result in a change of strategy by the government (Omofonmwan and Osa-Edoh 2008).

Until this day, criticism through political activism can pose risks of intimidation. A recent Human Rights Watch report accuses multinational oil companies and the Nigerian security forces of being partners in violent abuses—destruction of communities and property, displacement of families, extra-judicial killings, and sexual harassment in the Delta communities. However, in some cases, interested political figures conspire with militant groups to incite violence against demanding communities (Ojakorotu 2009).

Perhaps no one sums up the Delta’s problem better than Newson (2011) as he brings to light the entrenched challenges of economic gains and political instability in a web of a human rights crisis. Part of the issue is the state’s insensitivity to some critical matters such as “patronage” and a tradition of injustice in the face of deteriorated human dignity. He further states that the Delta region has provided up to $400 billion for oil since independence, but the majority of the people still live in poverty with limited opportunities for attaining the most basic of rights: education and health. Until development is perceived and approached as a matter of human rights and its demand is objectively accepted, agitation between the people and the state will likely continue. The region has become a conflict zone between inhabitant rebel groups and state security institutions, both of whom fail to peacefully negotiate for tangible solutions without the use of force. Multinationals continue to be suspiciously perceived as culprits and/or partners in the state’s human rights abuses.

**Is Transparency a Solution?**

The good governance paradigm in development discourse has become an influential focus especially in an African context. Proponents of this practice are often outside the ambit of the state and are vocal in calling for greater accountability from public institutions for their effectiveness.
and efficiency in delivering goods and services to the people. If the objective of holding public officials accountable is a way of improving resource management and allocation, perhaps there could be some improvement in the Delta region. This idea is closely related to what Newson (2011, 10) calls the Nigerian state’s “missing lever [of] democratization” by improving public involvement in policy making to reflect the needs of the Delta people. According to a development guideline report of the OECD (1995, 6), “the agendas for good governance, participatory development, human rights and democratization are clearly interlinked.”

Direct interaction with government officials to improve both sustainable investment and results-based management in the interest of the people is needed in the Delta. Such an interaction and cooperation will potentially build mutual trust, foster partnership, and improve government-citizen relations in the interest of economic growth and environmental conservation.

Transparency in resource allocation and expenditure is relevant to the reduction of corruption, especially in a region whose top political figures are widely distrusted. Improvement is needed in this aspect so that public questioning, criticism and monitoring of resources will yield better and sustainable results.

On the other hand, the lax environmental behaviors of most of the corporate bodies have contributed to an intense social movement in the Delta. Since the beginning of demand for greater respect for human rights, environmental justice, and greater local control of oil through Sara-Wiwa’s activism, global attention has been focused on corporate behavior in Nigeria’s petro-business (Chidi 2008; Akinbi 2012). Perhaps if oil companies improve on their corporate responsibility in a fair manner, increased trust between them and indigenous people who perceive them as threats to their sustenance will result. What the Platform (a UK environmental organization) calls the “capitalist approach” by multinationals, only sustains an ongoing conflict as the root causes are continually ignored in favor of profit-making.

**Conclusion**

The gender dimension in most of the resource-based conflicts of Sub-Saharan Africa is only minimally discussed. With a lack of-consideration for the fundamental rights of the people of the Delta, various regimes have ignored their responsibility to this fragile region thus making it one of the oldest and most violent conflicts in Nigeria. If the Nigerian state could engage its citizenry, promote a sense of transparency and accountability, and improve the conduct of business with private oil companies, the Delta region could be more secure than it is today.

If the current exclusion of women persists, little improvement will be seen in the sustainability of peace initiatives or development programs the government has or will commission for the region. Women’s experience and their contribution to the reconciliation process have been significantly ignored. Women must no longer be left in the marginal space as second class citizens in a conflict that has affected all aspects of their lives.

Significant corporate presence in a country may potentially improve economic progress and employment opportunities for citizens, but in Nigeria’s Delta, the opposite case appears to persist with a serious impact on gender relations and responsibilities in a traditional society that gives little to its women and yet expects much from them. Indeed in the Delta, civil demand for environmental management has resulted in severe abuses, as the interest of economic gains from multinationals and government elites is considered more important than the acceptance, respect, and protection of the rights of its citizens.

**Notes**

1 The author is grateful to Scott Y. Lin and William Vocke (mentor) for their time and advice. My mentor’s insightful suggestions on the proposal can be seen in this project. Valentine Olushola Oyedipe, your observations and suggestions, for which I am grateful, were all very important to the completion of this work.
Corruption and Trust in Brazil: A discussion on Ethics, Equality, and Law as Seen through the Mensalão Case

By Gabriel G.S. Lima de Almeida

Introduction

This year, Brazil watched the trial of criminal case number 470, known as Mensalão, in which many politicians were condemned for crimes of corruption. The Mensalão (a neologism for “big monthly payment”) was a significant scandal in which a vote-buying scheme was discovered in the Brazilian National Congress. This was an important episode in Brazilian politics, and also Brazilian law: the Federal Supreme Court convicted twenty-five politicians and others of corruption.

Corruption is one of the most difficult challenges that Brazil faces in the process of establishing democracy. Although we have specific local issues, we realize that corruption is not a problem exclusive to Brazil. How do other countries deal with the challenge of corruption? What can we learn from them, and vice-versa?

This project aims to provide some answers from the Brazilian experience. By examining characteristics of Brazilian law guaranteeing that everyone is “equal before the law,” using this historical case as an example, and the implications that these issues have on the field of ethics and public trust, we hope to contribute to the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs and its Global Ethical Dialogues (GED), one of the Council’s Centennial programs, in which, as Carnegie Council Centennial Chair Michael Ignatieff explained, “Carnegie Council goes around the world looking at ethical problems and understanding what we have in common; the problems we have in common and the language we have in common to solve them.”

The first part of this project was the hosting of the 2013 GED delegation from Carnegie Council in 2013, which began in Uruguay and Argentina and then traveled to Brazil. From June 17-21, the delegation held meetings in Rio de Janeiro with teachers, researchers, members of the judiciary, the executive, the legislature and civil society, debating issues of ethics, corruption, public trust, environment, and sustainability.

Corruption and Public Trust was the main theme of the first two days of the GED in Brazil. On June 17, scholars and researchers from the INCT-InEAC gathered at the CCJF (Federal Justice Cultural Center) to discuss Brazilian law and legal culture, and its relationship to ethics. The discussion was moderated by
Global Ethics Fellow Fernanda Duarte. According to Dr. Roberto Kant de Lima, professor at the Federal Fluminense Law School, the first point of note about the Brazilian system is that “it is related to a dogmatic field of the law, where ideals are associated with the state; ‘public’ in Portuguese is associated with state; it is ‘state-owned.’ The state therefore holds a higher rank in the hierarchy than society, and thus governs based on its own rules.”

On the second day, at Estácio de Sá University, Professor Delton Meirelles of LAFEP-UFF moderated a dynamic debate between Michael Ignatieff and the public during which students could share their impressions about the topics under discussion.

The theme on the third day was Environment and Sustainability. The challenges of protecting the environment and the tensions between protection and development were the main points of the day’s two debates, which included dialogues between researchers, judges, journalists and members of the Carnegie Council delegation.

After three days of holding meetings and roundtables, Michael Ignatieff delivered an excellent lecture called “The Ethics of Globalization and the Globalization of Ethics.” (Available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20130621/index.html)

The summary of the event is available on EFF Gabriel G. S. Lima de Almeida’s blog, on the Global Ethics Network website: “Global Dialogues in Brazil—A Starting Debate on Ethics, Politics and Democracy.”

The Project

This project comes out of the fascinating debates held during the GED in Rio de Janeiro. The proposal consists of providing a questionnaire to a broad public in order to determine the concepts and perceptions of ethics and politics, and the relationship between the two, in Brazil. To this end, we have chosen to use Survey Monkey, an online tool for collecting answers, so that anyone can answer these questions and contribute to the project.

Questionnaire
Access through this link:
https://pt.surveymonkey.com/s/carnegieEFFprojectBrazil

Demographic Data
These questions aim to elicit demographic data on the individuals participating in research on the theme “Ethics, Politics and the “Mensalão” Trial.” No personal data will be revealed, and all responses will remain completely anonymous.

1. What is your gender?
2. How old are you?
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. What is your mother’s highest level of education?
5. What is your father’s highest level of education?
6. In what field do you currently work?
7. How many hours do you work per week?
8. In Brazil “everyone is equal before the law.” Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Explain.
9. Do you believe that Brazilian law has the tools to prevent and punish corruption? If so, can you provide specific examples? If not, what should be improved?

The Focus Group Proposal

In order to answer these questions and explore these topics, a focus group composed of undergraduate and postgraduate students will work on the “Mensalão” case and the ethical issues and political practices regarding corruption and the Brazilian law, and answer the selected questions, under the supervision of Fernanda Duarte. This group is composed of students from our home institutions, Federal Fluminense University and Estácio de Sá University, specifically from the Laboratório Fluminense de Estudos Processuais—LAFEP-FD/UFF and the Núcleo de Estudos sobre Direito, Cidadania, Processo e Discurso—UNESA.

The group will also provide the questionnaire with the selected questions to undergraduate and post-graduate students in order to produce a relevant amount of data.

The group will organize an event in one of our home institutions, in the form of a round-table where experts will provide their thoughts on the “Mensalão” case and the topics of ethics and corruption; focus group members will then share findings from their activities. A dialogue with the audience of undergraduate and post-graduate students will follow. A report of the event will be posted on Gabriel Almeida’s blog on the Global Ethics Network website.

The final part of the project will involve producing a short paper to summarize the focus group’s findings, discussions and research. The data and short paper can be used as a contribution to Ignatieff’s research related to the Carnegie Council Centennial.
Faced with the complicated conflicts in the South China Sea, few have been able to offer an effective approach to deal with the situation. During the process of observing and examining the issue, I have identified two possible ethical keys to this problem; however, many details remain to be discussed. The objective of this article is to offer new ideas, raise questions, and offer a special perspective, rather than provide exact answers.

The first possible way to calm the conflicts is “reasoning,” that is to say “to judge by law.” Most of us would take this for granted, but the problem lies in deciding which law or what rules we should follow. I would like to take this occasion to express my gratitude to Valentine Olushola Oyedipe, who replied to my essay on Carnegie Council’s social media site www.globalethicsnetwork.org with another essay even longer than the original. He looked at my ideas and inspired me to further clarify the necessity of taking Asian history into account when facing disputes in the South China Sea rather than simply referring to current international laws.

The existing international system is derived from the Westphalian system, by which time countries had determined their boundaries through wars and agreements. As Oyedipe pointed out in his reply, countries should not acquire more territory just because of history; we must judge it by current international laws. But are these...
laws suitable and able to solve modern conflicts in Asia? They seem to be, but unfortunately that’s not the case. Asian countries never went through a “balance of power” or a Westphalian system which decided borders clearly. As a result, both China and Vietnam have a large body of documentary evidence recording that the South China Sea has long been part of their territorial waters. This large volume of documents creates confusion which makes it difficult to find a standard to judge by.

To make matters worse, the complicated history in Asia cannot be ignored in the process of solving this problem because of both governments’ standpoints and their domestic public opinion. Both governments have presented many documents to prove their sovereignty over the islands in dispute.

As for domestic public opinion, as an undergraduate student in Peking University, I witnessed demonstrations near embassies in Beijing against the Chinese government’s weak attitude towards disputes over islands like the Diaoyu Islands (also known as the Senkaku Islands) as well as against the offensive actions of Japan and Vietnam. Most Chinese people have been taught that these islands have belonged to us from time immemorial. How then can we persuade the public to compromise with other countries? In my opinion, we must admit that we should supplement current international laws when faced with disputes in Asia. Now that we are unable to avoid it, we need to think about new standards on a historical basis. Clarifying historical details and the long-existing Chinese imperial tributary system and bringing this historical phase to a conclusion becomes more and more essential. Only when we have a clear definition of the original boundaries can we apply the international laws in effect. Asia has not concluded this history, but it is now fundamental to do so.

Now I would like to focus on China itself. Although most Chinese people hold the view that it is the United States’ “return to Asia” policy that makes the situation worse, in my opinion, it is how China identifies itself that provides the decisive factor in these events. What is China’s position in the world at present? What status should China hold in the future? What is the relationship between China and the existing international system? China’s answer to these questions determines how it will react to the challenges in the South China Sea. Historically, when China regarded itself as a center of the proletarian world revolution, it joined the Korean War regardless of heavy casualties and massive loss of property; when China noticed it had already been left behind by the rest of the world, it concealed its abilities and bided its time. However, China’s self-identification as well as diplomatic policy has lacked cohesion during the great economic reform that began in 1978. Although I myself am Chinese and live in the capital, I am not able to provide an exact answer. In my mind, observing China’s attitude towards itself rather than towards any other country is the most important part of many international issues, not only that of the South China Sea.

In summary, new ideas concerning Asian characteristics with respect to history and making China identify itself properly are two methods worthy of a try.
On Friday October 11, I conducted a ninety-minute focus group with students at the University of Oregon. The participants were members of Carnegie Global Oregon (CGO), a combined course-based and extra-curricular “convocation to commencement” program for students to learn about, and practice, an ethical orientation in all that they do. I joined CGO in my freshman year, which was also the CGO’s inaugural year. CGO freshmen members live together in the dorms, take two classes together (Anthropology: World Cultures, and Geography of the Middle East and North Africa), attend weekly meetings, and engage in ethical discussions with a multitude of guests throughout the year. After their freshman year, CGO members continue with the program by attending meetings, discussing current events and meeting with guests.

Thus the members of the focus group, as CGO members, were experienced in holding ethical discussions. The group consisted of eight members from CGO’s first and second cohort, along with the CGO’s Graduate Teaching Fellow. I would have also liked to include a few members from the newest (third) cohort of CGO, but as it was week two of their freshmen year, and they were busy acclimating to university life.

I chose Carnegie Council’s Centennial theme of Citizenship and Difference as a topic on which participants could share opinions without feeling the need to contribute facts or statistics to back up their points. My original intent was to center the discussion on issues in Eugene, Oregon, home of the University of Oregon. As discussion began, however, the students immediately focused on issues at the national level, likely because the timing coincided with the second week of the U.S. government shutdown. I decided it would be more pertinent to discuss citizenship and difference on a national scale, and used the focus group as an opportunity to examine how the United States is faring in welcoming and overcoming difference.

The questions posed to the group were those assigned under the theme of citizenship and difference and an additional three that I added to the discussion. The five questions under the theme of citizenship and difference were:

- How do people in your society “agree to disagree”? How do they live together when they do?
- What is unique to the way your society views citizenship and belonging?
- How much common life must be shared for democratic deliberation to be possible?
• What limits to tolerance are necessary to maintain open, public discussions and common order?
• How does your society adjudicate disagreement when citizens no longer share the same premises or allegiances?

The three additional questions were:
• Are there any differences of culture or opinion in our society that are insurmountable?
• In what ways do differences between members of a society strengthen that society?
• Is the United States an open place to those who hold different views or practice different lifestyles?

Many of the questions took on a new light under our government’s current inability to function but other, more general, themes also emerged. The first question—How do people in your society “agree to disagree”? How do they live together when they do?—initiated what was to be a stimulating ninety-minute discussion. On being asked “How do people in your society ‘agree to disagree’?” one member responded that when we disagree in the United States, we tend to avoid the uncomfortable topic. If our friends have different views, especially on politics or religion, we do not talk about those subjects. Or, if we do, we compartmentalize our feelings. It is possible to have discussions—even heated—on contentious topics, so long as it is not taken personally. If a relationship is such that every time you see someone you are thinking not only of his or her political views, but also his or her positive aspects as a person, we can “agree to disagree” on contentious issues.

For some group members, opposing views on certain issues were more difficult to hear than others. One student stated that it was particularly difficult for her to hear opposition to marriage equality, because it is something she strongly supports. She finds it helpful to put views in the context of the individual’s background, but her reaction to opposing views also depends on how those views are presented. Often if the other person presents his or case intellectually rather than personally, each argument can be respected and we can “agree to disagree.”

For better or worse, one cannot realistically break one’s entire life down into spheres of personal and political. The discussion of the third question (How much common life must be shared for democratic deliberation to be possible?) emphasized the necessity of a measure of personal in the political sphere. Another participant noted that most of Congress now goes home on the weekends, whereas they had stayed in Washington, D.C. in the past, enabling a great deal of socialization among representatives of opposing parties. Currently members of Congress only see those in the opposing party in their role as the ‘other’ party and no longer interact socially, making the political personal.

As society becomes more polarized, either politically or economically, we have less interaction with those who are different. This decreased interaction means less humanization of the other group. This pattern holds true both between members of Congress and between Congress and its constituents. One participant brought up the example of GOP-led states refusing Medicaid expansion, which in her view would be detrimental to many low-income residents of those states. She asserted that because leaders no longer see, or directly interact with the constituents they work for, they avoid seeing the real world consequences such a decision can have.

While discussing the sixth question (Are there any differences of culture or opinion in our society that are insurmountable?), we decided that certain issues are insurmountable, while others will only take time. Gun laws were deemed insurmountable. Both sides feel equally passionately that guns should or should not be present in our society. For issues like abortion or gay rights, the evolving ethic allows for laws to be made in the gray area so that the majority of people can feel at ease. Gun control, on the other hand, seems to be too black and white.

Part of the problem with seemingly insurmountable issues in our society is what one respondent described as a predominant culture of competition rather than compromise. Even if a compromise is reached in democratic deliberation, which would indicate that each side is giving a bit of ground to reach a deal, a winner and a loser are announced. While we should have the ability to come together and accept that we will not get every item we want, we refuse to negotiate because if we cannot have it all, we lose.

The final question posed was “Is the United States an open place to those who hold different views or practice different lifestyles?” The group, despite all of our disappointment at our current political state, decided that yes, it is. Although the United States is sometimes still starkly segregated on the local level, in general our country sees diversity as a unifier, and as a source of pride. However, we do not currently have a good example of how to deal with the issues that this diversity inevitably brings. Those assigned the task of making the difficult decisions, and working through deliberations are failing to provide an example of how we, as college students ready to engage in the world, can encourage the dialogue and cooperation that will enable us to overcome the many obstacles ahead.

Despite the somewhat disheartening tone the focus group took in expressing frustration at our federal leaders’ inability to deliberate as they should, many participants noted that they enjoyed having the chance to sit down and discuss such difficult questions. A few participants even suggested we do this again, perhaps using questions from other Centennial themes to foster discussion. We hope that by the time further discussions occur, the shutdown will have been resolved and we can move on to a different topic of discussion.
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Milan Chen is currently pursuing an MA in international studies at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan, from which she also obtained a BA in European studies. Alongside her studies, Chen is also working for National Chengchi University as a teaching assistant and a researcher. She is fluent in English, Mandarin, Spanish, and Italian. She believes young people must get involved with setting the social and political agendas of today, weighing in on issues such as inequality, child labor, climate change, and social justice.

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Jack Friedman is a graduate student at American University, pursuing an MA in philosophy and social policy. Previously, Friedman attended Elon University, graduating in 2011 with a BA in philosophy. His primary academic interest is in the intersection between politics and religion—especially with regard to the recent democracy-inspired revolutions of the Arab Spring.

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Nana Abena Ofori-Atta
Nana Abena Ofori-Atta is a Master’s student of international affairs at the University of Ghana, Leon. She aspires to become a well-rounded and ethically minded career diplomat. Ofori-Atta graduated from the University of Cape Coast with a major in French and a minor in English in 2001. She worked as a teacher and tutor until she entered the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010 as a foreign service officer, a position she still holds today.

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Berenike Schott is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in conflict resolution along with a certificate in Arab studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Her research interests concern the role of religious groups in armed conflicts as well as in efforts toward nonviolent conflict transformation. She has worked with nongovernmental organizations dedicated to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Liberia, Nigeria, and Tanzania, as well as with the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany. Schott received her BA, summa cum laude, from the University College Maastricht, the Netherlands.

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Alison Walt
Alison Walt is an undergraduate student at the University of Oregon, majoring in geography with a focus on culture, politics, and place. In 2012, she received the University of Oregon’s Junior Scholars Award for academic excellence. She is currently studying Arabic, and hopes to work for the State Department or in some other capacity that would enable her to travel and learn more about other cultures.
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