human rights dialogue

Integrating Human Rights and Peace Work

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Readers Respond

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From 1995 to 1998, Paul van Zyl served as executive secretary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. In that capacity he helped establish the commission and develop its structure and modus operandi; he also played a central role in policy and strategy development throughout the life of the commission. He is a program director at the International Center for Transitional Justice in New York. www.ictj.org

Drawn to the topic by similarities to the situation in her home country in the former Yugoslavia, Ivana Vuco has spent the last several years researching conflicts and their implications for human rights in Nigeria. Through a grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, she is studying the possibilities for cooperation between Nigerian human rights and conflict resolution groups. She works on the Imagine Coexistence Initiative, funded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and directed by the Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at Tufts University. www.fletcher.tufts.edu/chrcr/projects/imagine.html

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Human rights advocates and conflict resolution specialists share a common aim—building stable societies based on mutual respect and the rule of law—and often work on the same conflicts, addressing closely related issues. Despite the substantive overlap in their work, however, they often talk past each other. At a recent meeting between peace workers and human rights advocates, a rights activist made it clear that her organization “does not do peace.” At the same workshop, a peace worker bemoaned the fact that the conflict resolution field has no guiding regime of laws and institutions comparable to that available to human rights advocates, implying that human rights principles were not a resource she could usefully apply to her own work.

This issue of Human Rights Dialogue is the seventh in a series exploring ways to dismantle the “human rights box,” to find creative ways to increase participation in the human rights movement, and to expand access to the benefits of a human rights framework. By exploring the relationship between human rights groups and peace groups in different settings, this issue seeks to shed light on the barriers to the integration of human rights and peace work and on the means to overcome those barriers. Contributors provide insights into the interaction between human rights and peace groups in the countries where they work or have conducted research: Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and South Africa.

The unfortunate fact is that both in the field and in the offices of international organizations, human rights groups and peace groups often work on separate tracks and even at cross purposes. Mutual stereotyping by group members is common: Conflict resolvers are characterized as willing to compromise rights or avoid sensitive discussions of abuses altogether to satisfy the interests of the parties and secure a political deal; human rights advocates are seen as idealistic and uncompromising in seeking redress for individual violations, even at the cost of prolonging conflict. In at least some cases, these stereotypes are expressions of a fundamental clash between the human rights groups’ principled, legalistic, rights-based approach to resolving conflict and the more pragmatic and cooperative interest-based approach taken by peace groups.

In general, contributors agree that there needs to be better coordination between peace groups and human rights groups. Peace workers have to be willing...
and able to design intervention strategies that ultimately promote human rights standards. Human rights workers need to learn conflict management skills in order to address community demands and communicate effectively the relevance of human rights to the parties in conflict.

These needs have not gone unnoticed. In the fall of 2000, major donors funded an institute devoted solely to addressing the problem—the Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution (CHRCR) at Tufts University. Executive director Ellen Lutz describes the CHRCR’s work in developing training and education programs that give peace workers and human rights advocates a better grounding in each other’s concerns and strategies.

Michelle Parlevliet and Ivana Vuco demonstrate that an approach that integrates human rights and conflict-prevention strategies can be both pragmatic and principled. The effective response of the South African Center for Conflict Resolution to an instance of conflict in Cape Town shows that a principled, rights-based stance can be the pragmatic response, according to Parlevliet. Vuco’s study of human rights and peace work in Nigeria describes how some human rights groups are taking a less adversarial approach to their work in a new, more open political environment.

In societies divided by ethnic, religious, political, or other intergroup tensions—Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, for example—this integration of approaches is harder. In these conflicts, as Jehan Perera and Christine Bell explain, differences in the emphasis each community places on human rights have had the unfortunate effect of dividing them along the lines of the parties in conflict. Comments by Alan Keenan and Jeevan Thiagarajah on the Sri Lankan conflict stress the role of politically powerful actors in perpetuating Tamil-Sinhalese divisions, which makes it difficult for an independent movement to unify peace and human rights groups. In response to Bell, Mari Fitzduff explains that in Ireland rights-based approaches were effective in making claims against the state but did not adequately address non-state actors, such as paramilitary groups.

The clash between human rights advocates and peace workers is most visible during formal efforts to resolve conflict, when the need for redressing abuses is most pressing. The typical human rights organization’s position is that there can be no peace without justice, in the form of criminal prosecutions for past abuses, and that impunity cannot be tolerated, even if the pursuit of justice prolongs the conflict. Peace groups, especially those oriented toward conflict resolution, are often more forgiving, tending to support reconciliatory approaches and nonpunitive measures, such as amnesty, as a means of ending conflict as quickly as possible.

Richard Wilson, Bonny Ibhawoh, and Vasuki Nesium and Paul van Zyl offer insights into this debate by discussing different notions of justice—retributive versus restorative, punitive versus nonpunitive—and linking these notions to the public legitimacy of the human rights framework. Wilson calls for a vigilant watch over activities conducted in the name of human rights; his concern stems from his observation that political elites in South Africa conflated human rights with “nation building,” which he argues undermined human rights and the rule of law in that country. In contrast, drawing on the case of Nigeria, Vuco and Ibhawoh argue that it is valid to use human rights language in serving the greater goal of social stability. The authors of the two commentaries on Wilson’s essay argue for expanding the notion of justice beyond legal prosecutions and for developing creative ways to achieve human rights accountability that are suited to local capabilities and culture.

International policymakers are also debating what it would mean to incorporate a human rights perspective into conflict prevention and resolution. Looking beyond the question of appropriating human rights strategies (e.g., litigation, naming and shaming, and the like), actors at this level are considering whether human rights can function as a broad framework in which to carry out peace work. In an interview with Dialogue, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Danilo Türk says that the human rights framework functions best at the level of norm-setting and that the desire for peace should serve as a further motivation for insistence on those standards. In the view of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), according to special advisor for conflict resolution Dayton Maxwell, a “human security” framework that is broader than a “human rights” framework can provide the basis for a more successful collaborative approach.
When the Belfast Agreement was negotiated in April 1998, political parties found that human rights issues provided a foundation for building a bridge between the opposing positions. While compromise on the central question of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland appeared impossible, underlying fears of domination and discrimination could be addressed by providing for human rights protections. Human rights standards provide a basis for separating legitimate negotiating demands (for example, equality) from illegitimate ones (for example, domination). Because they are universal and thus transcend the parties in conflict, human rights standards provide an important touchstone for what is just.

However, not all conflict resolution initiatives use human rights as a basis for measuring justice. Some people engaged in conflict resolution regard human rights demands as an obstacle to the establishment of a peaceful settlement. Human rights activists are criticized for being too focused on principle; they in turn view conflict resolution practitioners as too pragmatic.

Lurking just beneath the surface of the “principle versus pragmatism” debate is a more subtle and fundamental division over the causes of conflict and the best ways to end it. Some believe that conflict is rooted in interethnic hatred, while others view it as a consequence of racial domination and discrimination, or a government’s illegitimacy. If one believes that a conflict is about interethnic hatred, then this leads to one set of solutions; if it is about the denial of justice and equality, that leads to another.

Groups have been demanding human rights protections since the onset of the most recent phase of the Northern Ireland conflict in the 1960s. At first human rights activism centered on the civil rights of the Catholic/Nationalist community in terms of equal opportunity to obtain jobs, voting, and housing—the issues at the heart of the conflict’s reemergence. But after the state introduced security measures, a new wave of activism emerged, centering on issues concerning the rights to a fair trial, use of summary and arbitrary execution, mistreatment in prisons, abuse in detention, and police harassment and collusion with paramilitary groups. During the late 1980s local human rights groups became increasingly sophisticated in using international forums—including the UN, the Council of Europe, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International—to raise human rights concerns.

The approaches of different human rights groups and the human rights lobbying of political parties varied. The Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), established by a group of lawyers to examine the administration of justice in Northern Ireland, operated with three core principles. First, it would take no position on the constitutional question, but it asserted that, regardless of which government was sovereign, rights should be protected. Second, it insisted that international human rights norms were the applicable standard for questioning domestic practices; this was an attempt to maintain a principled basis for intervention and retain objectivity in evaluating the justice system. Third, it opposed the use of violence to achieve political ends. In later years the CAJ was criticized, particularly by Unionists, for failing to monitor and condemn the practices of paramilitary groups such as the Irish Republican Army. However, the CAJ’s opposition to political violence itself constituted an outright rejection of
such practices. In the absence of clear international law, and given the ambiguities of humanitarian law, a nuanced attempt to engage with paramilitary activities could have compromised the CAJ’s stance. Other human rights groups, such as the Pat Finucane Centre, more clearly situated their approach to human rights abuses within the constitutional context of Ireland’s partition and cited the state’s denial of equality as “the single most important explanation for the initiation and perpetuation of violent conflict” in Ireland. All human rights groups agreed that human rights abuses were part of the problem and therefore had to be part of the solution.

The term “conflict resolution” is a fairly recent one in Northern Ireland, although work aimed at resolving conflict is ongoing. Academic groups such as the University of Ulster’s Centre for Conflict Studies, and more recently the Institute for Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE), have used the language and literature of conflict resolution to approach discrete subsidiary conflicts in Northern Ireland and the conflict as a whole. Some of this analysis accords a place to human rights. For example, conflict resolution analysis of disputes over Orange Order (Protestant) marches through Catholic/Nationalist areas has been informed by analysis of human rights issues in relation to protests and policing. Some practitioners, most notably those affiliated with Mediation Network Northern Ireland, also work explicitly in a conflict resolution paradigm and have used human rights standards to inform their work.

The most heavily funded branch of conflict resolution practiced in Northern Ireland has been “community relations”—the branch that also has been most at odds with human rights approaches. Community relations programs are government-funded initiatives aimed at bringing Catholics and Protestants together and fostering mutual understanding. During the period prior to the peace agreement, the community relations industry, while undoubtedly affecting the lives of some individuals, was singularly unable to provide any broader structural initiatives aimed at challenging the conflict and its effects. Moreover, statistics now show that Protestant and Catholic communities were in fact becoming more segregated in terms of both housing and social interaction, and more divergent in their perceptions of the conflict and state structures.

Even defining community relations proved difficult. Cross-community initiatives were complemented and sometimes even replaced by single-identity community development work and cultural-traditions initiatives. Single-identity work involved only one community, but it was justified as community relations on the theory that only after working on their own community development would communities have the level of confidence needed to reach out to others. More problematically, cultural-traditions work involved “cherishing” traditions to foster mutual respect between communities, even when those traditions themselves instigated division and discrimination against the other community and often also against women.

Prior to the peace process, community relations proponents operated at best with a toleration of human rights groups and at worst with an antipathy toward them as divisive and partisan, obstacles to good community relations—and therefore peace.

Many human rights activists viewed community relations work as perpetuating the status quo.

Instead of viewing all difficult issues as political and subject to negotiation, human rights groups suggested that in some areas there were absolutes that, even if divisive, must be addressed. Many working from a human rights perspective viewed community relations work as perpetuating a status quo in which key causes of violence were not addressed and conflict could not be meaningfully resolved. The focus on intercommunal dialogue denied the role of the state in the conflict; dialogue between Catholics and Protestants, even on issues of justice and equality, was not an adequate substitute for the government actually delivering justice and equality.

While dialogue between conflict resolution and human rights practitioners is valuable, it should not necessarily lead to a uniform approach. During periods of conflict elsewhere, domestic human rights groups claiming rights abuses are routinely dismissed, particularly by those they criticize, as partisan; this was certainly the case in Northern Ireland. If the human rights NGO is to have influence, it must generate legitimacy both domestically and—just as important—internationally by a disciplined and rigorous approach to fact-finding and the application of international human rights standards. It will be more successful if it separates human rights issues from political issues.
On the other hand, groups with a conflict resolution mandate can and should engage in a broader way with a range of political issues.

The case of Northern Ireland suggests that meaningful resolution of conflict requires strategies that adequately address underlying human rights issues. Human rights protections are not the whole solution; broad agreement on political institutions is also necessary to resolve the conflict. Yet human rights are too often not recognized as part of the solution. It does not serve lasting peace for human rights protections to be subjected to barter and exchange.

Mari Fitzduff Responds

The founding documents of the Community Relations Council (CRC) show that, contrary to what Christine Bell suggests, human rights were an essential element in the work of conflict resolution/community relations. And any assessment of the projects funded by the CRC also shows that issues of rights, justice, equality, and political choice have been and continue to be essential to the dialogues taking place within CRC projects. Moreover, all of the Northern Ireland human rights organizations mentioned in Bell’s article accepted and benefited from CRC funding for their work on human rights (CRC Annual Reports 1990–2000).

The conflict resolution field does not have problems with human rights work per se, but rather with the selective and limited way in which some institutions and individuals have been promoting human rights in Northern Ireland. The human rights field is seen as having only two major focuses for its work: to provide a challenge to state abuses of human rights, and to promote a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.

When human rights organizations focus solely on state abuses, and exclude paramilitary abuses, the human rights agenda appears to be supporting a Nationalist/Protestant (as opposed to a Unionist/Catholic) agenda. Conflict resolution workers admire the necessary and often effective work on state abuses that has been undertaken by organizations such as the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), British-Irish Rights Watch, Liberty, and Amnesty International. But the fact that these organizations refused to give the same attention to the acts of the paramilitaries who were responsible for the majority of the 3,700 killed and the 30,000 injured in Northern Ireland gives the impression that they are against state killings but neutral on killings by paramilitaries—a very narrow human rights perspective. In addition, the CAJ had no Unionist spokespersons, which reinforced the perception that the human rights agenda was a Nationalist one. Although addressing only state violence has a logic, as Bell explains in her essay, many in both communities in Northern Ireland have not grasped it. After all, this logic does not prevail elsewhere: in regions such as Sri Lanka, Columbia, and Sierra Leone, human rights organizations routinely document and condemn human rights abuses by both state and nonstate actors.

Under pressure, the CAJ eventually stated in its literature that it opposed the use of “political” violence, and in the late 1990s Amnesty International was persuaded to condemn punishment shootings and beatings. However, much of the damage in ghettoizing human rights had been done already.

This was to affect the establishment of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) in 1999. Initially, the NIHRC was seen by many as a Nationalist organization. Now the NIHRC is taking steps to address the concerns raised by previous human rights approaches: It is addressing nonstate abuses and has Unionist spokespersons on its board, which may help convince people in Northern Ireland that its agenda is indeed necessary for all.

Practitioners of conflict resolution were frustrated by the repetition of the simplistic suggestion that a human rights approach was the only way to solve the conflict. Many in the human rights field gave the impression that if you did not agree with their particular way of pursuing human rights issues, you were against human rights. As a result, many in Northern Ireland saw human rights workers as generally judgmental, obsessed with political correctness, and lacking experience in dealing with the complex and muddy issues that conflict resolution workers often confront.

In many of the situations in which conflict resolution workers are involved, citing a Bill of Rights is not particularly useful. Whether dealing with a riot, trying to stop maiming and murder, or merely trying to get groups who hate each other to meet for the first time, one needs a very wide and sensitive repertoire of approaches: referring to people’s rights in such situations can be as useful as referring to the Ten Commandments.

The conflict resolution people’s skepticism about the usefulness of the Bill of Rights in solving the problems of Northern Ireland has proved well founded. Most of the remaining controversial issues—contentious parading (that is, Orange/Unionist marches through previously Protestant areas that have become Catholic) and the continuing violence at local community interfaces—have not been amenable to a human rights approach. Communities have appropriated human rights for their own particular needs. As one recent independent report has suggested, the result can be two communities, both of which see themselves as victims and who see their rights as having primacy over the rights of the other community. Conflict resolution activists with many years of experience in the field know that rights and responsibilities merely become weapons for division unless they are deployed within the context of long-term and sustained dialogue between communities in conflict.

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For a description of the Northern Ireland case study within the Carnegie Council program, History and the Politics of Reconciliation, see www.carnegiecouncil.org/themes/hpr_kitson.html.
Human rights and peace groups in Sri Lanka have come to be divided along ethnic lines, making ground-level coordination minimal. This is painfully evident among groups working in the northeast, where Tamil and Sinhalese military forces continue to fight the country’s eighteen-year-old ethnic conflict. Tamils make up only 12 percent of the population but dominate in the northeast; there, human rights activity is generally led by Tamil advocates and is focused on abuses committed by the Sinhalese-majority government. Peace activities tend to take place in Sinhalese-dominated, Buddhist areas outside the northeast.

The current armed conflict pits the Sinhalese-dominated government against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an organization that has claimed for itself the mantle of sole legitimate representative of the Tamils. In a population of 18 million, more than 65,000 people have been killed and nearly a million displaced. Tensions between the two ethnic groups extend back over decades. Successive Sinhalese-dominated governments have imposed a number of policies vehemently opposed by the Tamils, including the “Sinhala-only” language legislation of 1956, the discriminatory university admissions policies of the mid-1970s, and the state-sponsored settling of Sinhalese in the northeast throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Not surprisingly, Sinhalese and Tamils—and by extension peace groups and human rights groups—define peace differently and hold divergent views regarding conditions for achieving it. Nongovernmental peace organizations such as my own, the National Peace Council (NPC), seek to assist a negotiated peace. Institutional reform will be difficult to bring about in a majoritarian state, especially given the strain that tense majority-minority relations are placing on our parliamentary system. We aim to resolve the conflict through the establishment of a federal type of power-sharing arrangement between the Sinhalese and Tamils.

Human rights advocates, by contrast, define peace as an end to abuses perpetrated by the government. They seek to normalize the lives of Tamils, to secure equal rights and broad minority rights protection. They are also working to expose, condemn, and remedy abuses such as checkpoint violations, kidnappings, torture, and extralegal killings carried out by the Sri Lankan Army.

Understandably, the Tamil groups are not prepared to work for a cessation of war on the Sinhalese-dominated government’s terms. They are unwilling to take a stand for peace that would entrench a status quo in which they feel like second-class citizens, lacking security and basic rights that Sinhalese enjoy. The Sinhalese majority, meanwhile, fears Tamil separatism and is resistant to changing the country’s centralized system of governance.

Overcoming the long history of mistrust between ethnic groups is a tremendous challenge. The NPC is working to promote open and sustained interethnic dialogue. A more mature and constructive relation-
ship is emerging, albeit slowly. As a Buddhist monk who attended an NPC-sponsored event put it, “We could have talked about the LTTE attacks on the Temple of the Tooth and the Sacred Bo Tree, but this would have re-created the divisive debates outside. Instead we came to learn how these people [Tamils] from the northeast feel and go forward from there.” Yet even Sinhalese participants who are making an effort to be open-minded, like this monk, are often surprised to find that their Tamil counterparts wish to talk about their rights before talking about peace.

A major rights problem that undermines the legitimacy of human rights work in Sri Lanka is fundamentally political: the unwillingness of Tamil groups to condemn the human rights violations committed by the LTTE. Human rights groups will not make an issue of the LTTE’s recruitment of child soldiers, for example, because to do so would almost certainly mean a loss of access to LTTE-held areas. The LTTE is suspicious of civil society initiatives and does not permit independent actions in the areas under its control. Tamils who act against the war have reason to fear not only state security forces but also the LTTE itself. This precarious security situation accounts in part for the absence of Tamils from peace-oriented civic activities.

Outside of the northeastern region, human rights work actually has a better reputation than peace work. After the government crackdown on the Marxist-inspired second People’s Liberation Front insurrection in 1988-89, during which thousands of Sinhalese “disappeared” or were arrested, tortured, and killed, human rights groups visibly sought redress for the victims. This raised the profile of human rights work. In fact, peace work is often regarded as less concrete, purposeful, and productive than human rights work and is perceived by some Sinhalese as appeasing the LTTE.

Without interethnic dialogue and objective media reporting, Sinhalese peace workers often fail to comprehend the legitimate fears and aspirations of the Tamils. The peace movement is further weakened by its inability to attract Tamils to positions of leadership within it.

Another factor weakening the popular legitimacy of peace work is that the NGOs, including Christian religious groups, that constitute the peace movement are heavily foreign-funded. The truth is that foreign funding for peace work generally has been respectful of the independence and autonomy of NGOs, and the characterization that NGOs are marching to the tune of foreign interests is wrong. Recently, Sri Lankan business groups have begun to fund peace work, such as supporting families of missing service personnel and disabled soldiers and developing high-profile campaigns for peace. This is a very positive development from the point of view of the peace community.

Peace organizations in Sri Lanka must find more ways to foster relations between Sinhalese and Tamils and, by extension, links between peace and human rights groups throughout the country. The deeper that understanding and trust are built between the ethnic communities, the more possible it will be for both peace and human rights advocates to advance their work. What is needed are facilitative skills that have been absent thus far at the government and civil society levels. It is this absence that stands in the way of a bold approach to peace negotiations that could end the war.

**Alan Keenan Responds**

Jehan Perera offers an accurate portrait of the complex and frustrating relationship that exists between peace and human rights work in Sri Lanka. He suggests both the malleable character of the word “peace” and the unfortunate way in which ethnic divisions, encouraged or enforced by political powers, continue to hamper the activities of both fields. The relationship between those who yield political and military power and the work of peace and human rights groups in Sri Lanka deserves greater emphasis.

Consistently targeted for violent attack by combatants in all of Sri Lanka’s overlapping conflicts over the past twenty years, civil society groups, whether oriented toward human rights or peace work, remain very weak. It is true that there is some freedom for Sinhala people to organize and agitate. However, there are no real means for Tamil civilians in government-controlled areas to put effective political pressure on the Sri Lankan state, nor, it seems, is there a way for Tamils in LTTE-controlled areas to influence the LTTE in politically significant ways. Thus, while Perera may be cor-
rect in suggesting that there is more space in the southern parts of Sri Lanka for human rights discourse than for the discourse of peace, this has yet to translate into tangible human rights protections, whether for Tamils or for Sinhalese. And, with impunity for human rights violations now deeply institutionalized, there is little chance—and no expectation—that any negotiated settlement between the government and the LTTE would involve legal accountability for human rights violations over the past two decades of war and terror.

The lack of independent civil society has had an important effect on the kinds of rights arguments that Tamil groups generally articulate. These tend to involve either group rights—such as the central demand for autonomous political control of Tamil areas by Tamils—or rights to be free from the ethnic-based discrimination produced by individuals and state agents of another ethnicity. With the exception of the small but influential University Teachers for Human Rights, however, no one speaks in public about those rights that Tamils have as individuals, to be free from abuse by members of “their” community. This is a result not just of the terror and intimidation tactics of the LTTE, but also of the historical and continuing lack of effective political means for Tamils to influence government policies, which serves to legitimize the actions and representative claims of the LTTE. The two factors help fuel each other in a classic vicious circle.

The absence of a movement or organization capable of drawing Sinhala and Tamil people together around their shared experience of massive human rights abuses, both at the hands of “their own” political representatives and those of “others,” is, as Perera’s analysis indirectly reveals, one of Sri Lanka’s greatest social and political deficits.

The Sri Lankan government is now controlled by a coalition that seems committed to establishing a durable cease-fire and entering into negotiations with the LTTE. One of the crucial questions for those committed to human rights is whether it is possible—and if so, how—to introduce human rights concerns into the pre-negotiation process and later into the negotiations themselves. The issue here isn’t so much the now classic one of a trade-off between justice (or accountability) and peace. The question is whether the suspension of the armed conflict can lead to a larger de-escalation that might influence the human rights practices of both parties to the conflict. The government certainly has no interest in, or intention of, discussing its accountability for past crimes and rights violations. Yet it does seem willing to make some improvements in its respect for the human rights of Tamil citizens, at least as confidence-building measures in the initial stages of pre-negotiations. In this sense, some modest human rights improvements—for example, in the treatment of Tamil detainees or in the application of draconian “anti-terrorism” legislation—can function as a component of conflict resolution. Here “peace” and human rights do go together, in however limited a way.

The LTTE is all but guaranteed to reciprocate these gestures by discontinuing its attacks on Sinhala politicians, economic targets, and civilians, at least while the peace process is under way. But there is no equivalent push for them to reform their dealings with non-LTTE Tamils. Indeed, an extended cease-fire may well give the LTTE an opportunity to continue with its most notorious policies, such as the forcible recruitment of children and the violent intimidation of Tamils who attempt to articulate an independent political line.

Peace work and human rights work seem destined to remain on separate, at times even contradictory, tracks for the foreseeable future. Hope rests in the possibility that the present cessation of hostilities will last long enough to bring about a gradual de-escalation in attitudes and practices. This might open up space for more independent and effective political action and democratic accountability in both LTTE- and government-controlled areas. The question in the interim is how the work of “fostering relations between Sinhalese and Tamils, and by extension, human rights and peace groups,” which Perera names as one of the central tasks of peace organizations, can be done without ratifying, even legitimating, the anti-democratic control that the LTTE maintains over Tamil civil society groups.

In the short term, however, any respite from the war is itself a gain for human rights. Peace would help end the harassment, abuse, detention, torture, and disappearance of Tamils—and the murders and forced displacements of many Sinhalese and Muslims as well. Ultimately, it could enable a new political space to emerge for Tamils to assert their democratic rights against both the LTTE and the government.

Jeevan Thiagarajah Responds

Jehan Perera correctly points out that splits between the human rights and peace communities in Sri Lanka today mirror ethnic divisions in the society. Although the institutions and organizations working to protect human rights in Sri Lanka have been strengthened, the ongoing civil strife prevents full realization of the rule of law, access to due process, equality, and nondiscrimination. Sri Lanka’s war is unfinished, which prevents normalcy and a return to traditional forms of
Democracy is fragile in Nigeria. Democratic governance has crumbled under the burden of ethnic divisiveness three times in the past forty years; the current democratically elected civilian regime came to power in 1999, after fifteen years of military rule. The frequency of violent clashes between various religious, ethnic, and geographic communities and their potential destructive impact on the national government have made peace work a necessity for a wide range of local civil society groups.

Since the end of military rule, human rights groups have been reassessing their mode of operation. They hope to establish themselves as a constructive element in the consolidation of democracy. This is a departure from the past, when they were uncompromising critics of the government. As the executive director of the Lagos-based Constitutional Rights Project, Clement Nwankwo, sees it, “Targeting the civilian, democratic government as a human rights offender could be counterproductive, even dangerous and destructive; human rights work now should seek to uphold the government, not overturn it.” In a country where democratic governments have been too weak to sustain themselves in power for longer than a couple of years, such a claim seems valid.

As a result, human rights groups have adopted a multidisciplinary approach to conflict, combining the methodology and perspectives of the human rights field with those of the conflict resolution field. This confluence of approaches has so far evolved only within certain human rights organizations; as yet, no long-term cooperation has been established between the human rights and conflict resolution organizations.

Human rights organizations like the Constitutional Rights Project began to infuse their human rights advocacy with conflict resolution work for several reasons. First, human rights violations are often the root cause of conflicts, and thus the protection of human rights becomes an integral part of peace processes. The involvement of human rights organizations in conflicts can ensure that human rights issues are addressed in a timely and effective manner. Second, the magnitude and scope of conflicts expose the inadequacy of traditional, community-based conflict resolution methods. Conflicts in which communities turn against each other require strategies tailored to the complexities of the particular conflict, in addition to the traditional approach of identifying and exposing culprits. Human rights groups have thus begun their own conflict resolution trainings and negotiation sessions for the warring communities. Finally, the reconciliatory character of the conflict resolution field appeals strongly to human rights organizations seeking the middle ground in the work of advocating the protection of human rights, without underm
ing the legitimacy of Nigeria’s fledgling democracy. Unlike human rights organizations elsewhere that emphasize uncompromising justice as a pre-condition for lasting peace, some human rights groups in Nigeria have made reconciliation and dialogue the basis of their work.

That human rights are an indispensable part of peace processes is best exemplified in the oil-producing Niger Delta. Here, conflict resolution methods alone are plainly inadequate for a number of reasons. Most important, they fail to address the real source of conflict in the Delta: unresolved human rights claims by the local communities. Economic and political marginalization, merciless environmental exploitation, and the destruction of traditional indigenous structures are only some of the most frequently cited reasons communities turn against each other. The government’s tactic of forcibly pacifying the communities under the guise of resolving intercommunal violence has exacerbated the situation; for example, the government killed and displaced thousands of members of the Ogoni and Odi communities in several brutal military interventions in the 1990s. The human rights community is adamant that halting government brutality is an essential prerequisite for lasting peace. Since human rights groups typically have targeted the government, warring communities perceive them as more neutral; human rights groups have been better able to negotiate the tense security situation and address intercommunal violence. Because conflict resolution methodologies rely heavily on viable social structures and institutions, human rights methodologies have proved better suited to situations where traditional social structures and institutions have been seriously eroded.

The frequency and devastating extent of violent intercommunal conflicts have shown that a traditional human rights approach alone is also insufficient. While lobbying, disseminating information, and exposing the government’s activities all aim to remove the source of the conflicts, these activities do little to repair damaged relationships between warring communities in other regions. In response, human rights organizations are beginning to organize their own conflict resolution workshops for the warring communities. Some of them—for example, the Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta—have made it obligatory for their staff to take conflict resolution training. And they are becoming involved in peace processes through supervising the conflict resolution procedures set up by the government, overseeing the government’s analyses of conflicts, and supervising its execution of a peace process.

How to give human rights activism a more constructive role in society and promote a dialogue with the ruling regime is on the mind of every human rights worker in Nigeria. They all acknowledge that the field needs to use its expertise and experience to bring together different actors in conflicts. In the Niger Delta, for instance, a dialogue can be initiated that includes multiple communities, the oil companies, and the government. Some steps in this direction have been taken already. Some human rights groups have started doing their own independent studies of the conflicts, mediating meetings between the parties, and working to involve the government in the process. Others are working together with the government to instigate official inquiries and set up strategies for resolving the conflicts.

All of this marks a significant change in the work of Nigerian human rights groups. They have become more involved in aspects of conflict extending beyond human rights issues, thus making themselves a more relevant and more visible element of Nigerian civil society. And, whereas some human rights groups still see their role as primarily adversarial, most have opted for a more cooperative stance. Although some have questioned whether such a stance undermines the neutrality of the human rights field, this redefined position of the human rights groups might be just the type of support Nigeria needs at this moment.

The magnitude of these conflicts exposes the inadequacy of traditional, community-based conflict resolution methods.

integrating human rights and peace work
Bonny Ibhawoh Responds to Vuco and Wilson

The role of human rights, Richard Wilson argues, is to create the bedrock of accountability on which democratic legitimacy can be built. But need this be the sole function of human rights? Beyond accountability and retributive justice, is it valid to deploy human rights discourses for the larger ends of social stability and peace building? Today, human rights have become too important to be limited to their legalistic foundations. Beyond law and the quest for retributive justice, there is much that the legitimizing language of human rights can bring to our quest for peace and social stability, as Ivana Vuco’s essay suggests.

In highlighting the limitations of supposedly traditional African models of conflict resolution and restorative justice, the essays by Wilson and Vuco address a growing concern with the construction of localized narratives, which draw on culture and tradition, in human rights and peace work. Much of this concern springs from the old debate over the universality and cultural relativism of human rights, which in recent years has shifted toward a discourse on legitimizing universal human rights and making them relevant to local sociopolitical contexts. The debate reflects the tension between the universal and the local, and the ways in which the language of human rights has been deployed to further nation-building agendas.

When former archbishop Desmond Tutu used the African concept of ubuntu to justify the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s emphasis on restorative justice and social stability rather than retributive justice, he was following in a tradition of African leaders and intellectuals who have articulated distinct cultural interpretations of human rights to meet local political exigencies. In the 1960s, Tanzania’s president Julius K. Nyerere articulated a socialist-oriented concept of human rights, which prioritized social and economic rights over civil and political rights. Like Tutu’s ubuntu, Nyerere’s ujamaa (African socialism) was an attempt to manufacture legitimacy for state institutions using a combination of the language of contemporary human rights and perceived African traditions of communalist/restorative justice. Although such appeals to African traditions are often idealistic, they represent an attempt to legitimize nation-building agendas with the language of human rights.

Wilson clearly does not think that the compromised, nonlegal/juridical use of rights language can ultimately serve the ends of justice, human rights, and peace. He argues that regimes should seek legitimacy not through efforts to forge moral unity and communitarian discourses but, instead, on the basis of justice defined as proportional retribution and fairness. In contrast, Vuco understands the appeal that conflict resolution has to some Nigerian human rights organizations, which are employing the language of human rights as “an indispensable part of peace processes.” These organizations are seeking the middle ground in the work of advocating for the protection of human rights without undermining the legitimacy of the country’s fledgling democracy. In many other African countries, human rights groups have found it useful to draw on traditional community-based resolution methods, with their emphasis on securing consensus and on the reciprocal relationship between rights and social responsibilities, in their conflict resolution work.

The concern about detaching human rights from their legal foundation when they are deployed to legitimize nation-building agendas is a valid one. As Wilson rightly points out, the risk in this approach to human rights is that it obscures accountability and does not particularly serve to promote the rule of law. However, while legal enforcement founded on accountability and retributive justice is a core part of contemporary human rights, the normative traditions on which human rights are built are not solely legal. They are also moral, religious, and philosophical. The language of human rights can contribute a great deal more to efforts to secure peace and social stability when the breadth of its basis is recognized.

The tide of global justice is turning in favor of legality, prosecution, and punishment rather than reconciliation and forgiveness. The TRC represented a shift from this dominant paradigm of retributive justice. But rather than being a deviation from a supposedly global ideal, the TRC in its emphasis on reconciliation and restorative justice might in fact represent an African-inspired normative contribution to the universal human rights corpus. The move by Nigerian human rights groups from human rights advocacy to conflict resolution represents a similar paradigmatic shift. As Vuco notes, by making this shift, they have become more involved in aspects of conflict that extend beyond traditional human rights issues.

This is significant because one of the major challenges of human rights discourse in Africa (at both academic and policy levels) has been the need to legitimate universal human rights within local contexts. One way of doing this is by articulating a sense of human rights informed by local exigencies and perspectives, which the rest of the international community can also use. With the sanctity of the legalistic/individualist paradigm of human rights being increasingly questioned, an African sense of community obligation that goes beyond retribution can serve to strengthen the cross-cultural legitimacy of universal human rights. This may be the most significant impact of the South African TRC and the conflict resolution work of Nigerian human rights groups.
Challenging
Restorative Justice

Richard Wilson

In post-apartheid South Africa, human rights were dragooned into the service of nation building and thereby lost public legitimacy. Used by the emerging political elite to manufacture legitimacy for institutions like the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), human rights became the language of political compromise rather than of principle and accountability. From 1996 to 1998, while the TRC functioned, human rights came to be equated with amnesty, reconciliation, and restorative justice. This vision of human rights, quite detached from its legal foundations, conflicted with widespread notions of retributive justice in South African society. Moreover, the TRC deflected attention from the more serious project of transforming the legal system in order to make it more representative, quick, and fair. As a result, the TRC was not particularly effective in creating a new culture of human rights or respect for the rule of law.

During the peace negotiations in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party agreed on a broad amnesty from civil and criminal prosecution for apartheid-era human rights offenders. The TRC was established under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 to deal with the violence and human rights abuses of the apartheid era on a morally accepted basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation. The TRC was presented to the public as a necessary compromise for the democratic transition, and as being in accordance with traditional African restorative justice. Its establishment represented a judgment that social stability is a greater social good than the individual right to obtain retributive justice and to pursue perpetrators through the courts. Retributive justice was defined as “un-African” by prominent members of the ANC elite. TRC chair and former archbishop Desmond Tutu stated in 1996: “God has given us a great gift, ubuntu. . . . Ubuntu says I am human only because you are human. . . . You must do what you can to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire for vengeance. That’s why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than retributive.”

There were benefits to South Africa’s experiment in truth and reconciliation. Public recognition of repressed narratives brought together populations that had been separated by the racialized boundaries of apartheid. This created a baseline for shared understanding, allowed for a fusion of horizons, and defined the parameters for discussion of the past. No one can now claim that apartheid was a well-intended policy that somehow went wrong. Nor can anyone deny that tens of thousands of people were killed by the operatives of an abhorrent political system.

Yet the TRC’s objectives of facilitating reconciliation and creating a new inclusive and benevolent image of the nation were only partially fulfilled. For all their media coverage, TRC hearings were often little more than symbolic and ritualized performances. They had little impact on the cycle of vengeance in African townships.
integrating human rights and peace work

Ostensibly, the language of rights represented a departure from Afrikaner nationalism with its romantic images of race, blood, and land. In contrast, post-apartheid nation building appealed to civic nationalism as the new basis for moral integration. Yet this process of nation building also had its own coercive moral injunctions, as the new constitution and subsequent legislation deprived victims of their right to prosecute perpetrators.

My own ethnographic research in the townships of Johannesburg led me to the conclusion that, contrary to the established view within the TRC, retributive understandings of justice are as prevalent in South African society as those emphasizing reconciliation and forgiveness. The TRC vision of justice clashed with that of many victims. As one TRC statement-taker, Thabosso Mohasoa, told me: "Life in South Africa means fighting one another and retaliating. If he does it to me, then I will do it to him. . . . When taking statements people would be aggressive, saying, 'I want those perpetrators to be hanged.'" In another example, an ANC political activist told me: Victims "cannot forgive on behalf of the community. They are not the only ones who have suffered. . . . Forgiveness must be created by legitimate community institutions, not by the TRC who come in for one week and then say they’ve sorted everything out."

Evidence from other democratizing countries shows that retributive justice can itself lead to reconciliation, in the sense of peaceful coexistence and the legal, nonviolent adjudication of conflict. Pursuing civil claims for compensation within South Africa not only would have had the advantage of fortifying the rule of law but also would have linked human rights to popular understandings of justice and accorded human rights-oriented institutions much greater legitimacy. This in turn could have helped resolve the wider legitimation crisis of post-apartheid state institutions such as the criminal justice system, which has received only a fraction of the international interest generated by the TRC.

The delegitimation of human rights in relation to popular understandings of justice is also one factor in the upsurge of criminality in South Africa. At the high point of resistance to apartheid in 1986, there were 9,913 homicides in South Africa; in the year 2000, there were 23,823. This increase in criminality has continued unabated and contributed to the growth of violent vigilante groups across the country.

Equating human rights with amnesty and reconciliation conflicts with a state’s duty to punish human rights offenders as established in international criminal law. In other international contexts, human rights have developed in just the opposite, punitive direction. The establishment of the UN war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has led to a number of successful prosecutions and the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for genocide. With the extradition proceedings against General Augusto Pinochet in Britain in 1999, which established that heads of state do not enjoy sovereign immunity for acts of torture, and the likely establishment of the International Criminal Court, the stage seems set for international human rights law to transcend national legal systems and to prosecute those involved in gross human rights violations with greater vigor. The tide of global justice is now turning in favor of legality, prosecution, and punishment rather than diplomacy, reconciliation, and forgiveness.

It is imperative that today’s peace and reconciliation efforts be informed by a critical evaluation of the role of human rights ideas and institutions in the democratic transitions of the past decade. In the face of fractured social orders, democratizing regimes have grasped for unifying metaphors, and human rights talk has provided an ideological adhesive through terms such as “national reconciliation.” Such an evaluation would do well to examine what happens when human rights institutions are established in the context of political compromise, where neither opposing side in a civil war has won an outright military victory and where key figures of the ancien régime continue to occupy positions of political power, as F. W. de Klerk did in South Africa.

An examination of how new political leaders have used human rights to reimagine the nation and manufacture legitimacy for state institutions reveals why human rights have become delegitimized in the eyes of many citizens around the world. Democratizing regimes should seek legitimacy not through nation building, efforts to forge moral unity, and communitarian discourses but rather on the basis of accountability and justice defined as proportional retribution and procedural fairness. The role of human rights is to create the bedrock of accountability on which democratic legitimacy can be built.
While there have been sweeping changes in South Africa’s political profile, especially in the role that race plays in that profile, glaring inequalities in wealth have remained. South Africans can legitimately claim that the stated commitment of the African National Congress to greater equality has not been matched by concrete policy initiatives. Moreover, it is still an open question whether all segments of the South African population have come to terms with the racial mythologies sedi-
mented into the nation’s psyche, at the individual and institutional levels. We should indeed understand the South African transition as “a work in progress”; democratization is not an accomplishment but a series of ongoing struggles, and the ANC leadership should be held accountable for the outcomes of these struggles. In this context, Richard Wilson’s concerns about the legitimation of the nation-state are a welcome caution against political inertia. We should remain vigilant against blunting struggles for democracy and justice in a moment of post-liberation euphoria. Byzeroing in on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the vehicle of such political docility, however, Wilson may be misguided.

The South African TRC process had its shortcomings (the delayed and inadequate reparation process being just one example), but holding the TRC solely responsible for justice and human rights in the South African transition is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it imposes an unfair burden on the TRC itself. The TRC and the attendant amnesty provisions reflect the wrenchingly difficult dilemmas faced by everyone involved in working out the transitional arrangements. As with many other political transitions, the transformation of South Africa from a system of apartheid to a multiracial democracy involved what former archbishop Desmond Tutu often referred to as “terrible sacrifices made for liberation.” Against that backdrop, grappling with those constraints, the TRC worked toward a genuine confrontation with the abuses of the past. The TRC’s most far-reaching contribution to nation building was that it initiated a national dialogue on truth and reconciliation, a dialogue, moreover, that gave a forum to victims of human rights abuse. Wilson seems to subscribe to a notion of reconciliation put forward by the perpetrators of apartheid crimes, namely, that reconciliation involves sweeping the brutality of apartheid under the rug. The TRC’s vision of reconciliation instead requires a collective agonizing over the challenges of living in a society that is deeply scarred by apartheid but is not defined solely by the legacy of that brutality. Seldom has a nation under-
taken such a sweeping and public reexamination of its past.

Second, holding the TRC responsible for justice and human rights in the South African transition lets other public institutions, political actors, and the government off the hook. It is a travesty that there have not been more prosecutions for apartheid-era crimes, that the reparation program has been stalled, that the vast majority of black South Africans continue to live in intolerable conditions. The current government, the legal system, and all those who continue to reap the dividends of apartheid-era injustices should be held accountable for their actions or inactions on all these counts.

While many may share Wilson’s perception that the TRC substituted a policy of “reconciliation” for widespread prosecu-
tions, they ignore the fact that the TRC actually denied amnesty to the vast majority of applicants. These people, along with all the perpetrators who did not apply for amnesty, remain vulnera-
ble to prosecution. The TRC itself strongly advocated a vigorous prosecution strategy to hold these people accountable.

We might not want to limit our understanding of account-
ability for human rights violations to prosecutions alone. The numbers of ordinary citizens who came before the TRC, and the even larger numbers who remained transfixed by its pro-
ceedings through two and a half years of public hearings, belie Wilson’s claims that the majority see justice primarily as punish-
ishment for wrongdoing. Wilson himself seems to assume that prosecutions and a punitive notion of justice can provide a “bedrock of accountability” for human rights. One of the sig-
nal contributions of truth commissions in general, including the South African TRC, is that they have helped to expand and plu-
ralize the axes of justice. Incidentally, although Wilson seeks to use this case to offer a general critique—that truth commissions equate human rights with reconciliation and amnesty—the South African TRC differs in key respects from the more than twenty truth commissions that have been instituted around the world. It is the only one that had an amnesty provision; many truth commissions do not even have reconciliation as a goal.

The “legal foundations” of human rights that Wilson refers to are but one of the many institutional and normative founda-
tions for human rights. In addition to prosecutions, there are other avenues through which a more complex notion of account-
ability for human rights can be pursued, including reparation programs, institutional reforms, or even other legal mechanisms such as civil suits. Situated in this expanded vision, truth commis-
sions help us view human rights not narrowly and legalistically, but as one of many complementary means through which our aspirations for justice can be furthered.

Interestingly, even legal mechanisms such as the various international legal proceedings against Pinochet often have their greatest impact not in delivering proportionate punish-
ment for wrongdoing but rather in their symbolic affirmation of the principle of accountability. Moreover, to the extent that there is a broader international trend in favor of legality, prose-
cutions, and punishment, it is all the more important that our vision of human rights not be limited to tribunals and court-
rooms. Developments such as the International Criminal Court make powerful and laudable strides against impunity; however, we should see these institutions as productively complementing rather than substituting for local initiatives. This is a time of great creativity and potential in human rights struggles at the local and global level—and in the long run, it is that imagina-
tive and institutional vitality that will further democratization.

The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable comments of their colleagues Mark Freeman, Pablo de Greiff, and Priscilla Hayner.
For forty years, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has integrated the promotion of human rights into its programs. As the development and assistance arm of the U.S. government, USAID is uniquely positioned to help a range of organizations in countries around the world in their work to achieve the rights enumerated in international human rights documents. Increasingly, USAID is emphasizing conflict prevention as a way of averting the human rights violations that invariably occur during conflicts. Dayton Maxwell, special advisor to the administrator of USAID, spoke to Human Rights Dialogue about human rights in the context of USAID’s policies under the Bush administration.

DIALOGUE: What principles guide USAID’s conflict-related programs?
MAXWELL: We are developing new strategies to help manage the proliferation of intrastate conflicts and the terrible human costs they exact. We recognize that the time frame for addressing potential conflicts must be lengthened and our post-conflict commitment extended. The principal responsibility for preventing conflicts lies with the potential parties to the conflict. But USAID seeks to facilitate broader participation by civil society in peace efforts.

The first imperative in preventing conflict and building peace is establishing human security. Without security, human rights are seldom safe. We must find more effective ways to assure economic and physical security for populations that are vulnerable to, or targeted for, abuse. The establishment and support of free-market democracies is a critical safeguard for human rights. We must also learn how to integrate our post-conflict relief and reconstruction efforts more quickly and directly into our development assistance, democracy, rule of law, and good governance programs.

DIALOGUE: How are the human rights dimensions of conflicts being addressed in USAID’s conflict prevention and peace-building efforts?
MAXWELL: Conflict prevention and recovery actions offer unique opportunities for advancing human rights. Clearly, the earlier we identify potential conflicts and head them off, the more we prevent the massive human rights abuses that conflicts inevitably cause. Helping contending groups live together in peace can only serve the cause of international human rights. Holding elections requires addressing human rights issues in writing election legislation, training election workers, promoting voter registration and education, and providing security. Economic incentives can encourage different groups to work together to address issues relating to health care, public services, school construction, agricultural production, and other necessities. All of these can further our goals of protecting human rights and improving individual security.

On a larger scale, we at USAID are developing a highly professional conflict-vulnerability assessment process that will be used by teams going to conflict-prone countries. This work requires considerable development
and testing before it will be made public, but it does include human rights issues.

Making political agreements with host country officials to assess, design, and implement conflict-prevention activities is extremely sensitive. The donor nations and international community could engage in a process to establish a culture of conflict prevention acceptable to all countries and to our human rights commitments. It could be similar to the process leading to structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s, when sensitive and initially contentious economic policy reforms to development assistance were required; they have become standard business through intensive efforts to review the benefits to host countries.

DIALOGUE: Are there dilemmas that have arisen within USAID as it simultaneously works to advance human rights, promote democracy, and prevent conflict?

MAXWELL: Of course. For example, to establish effective governance, the inadequacies of the preceding government, as well as of the one in authority, must be addressed. This can cause tensions between human rights groups that generally seek justice for past abuses and the on-the-ground assistance and peace workers who don’t wish to jeopardize recovery and peace-building by focusing too intently on issues of past injustice. Here is another example: Should we advance our rule of law objectives by training police officers to be accountable to their communities in spite of the atrocities they sometimes commit, because ignoring the problem would result in even worse abuses? We are continually learning how to make the right judgments for the stark realities facing us. The bottom line, however, is that we are committed to helping states deal with the dilemmas that arise.

DIALOGUE: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 established the increased observation of internationally recognized human rights by all countries as a principle goal of U.S. aid policy. While the goal remains, the terms “human values,” “human security,” and “citizen security” are used more often in government circles today than “human rights.” Does the change in policy priorities and language translate into a change of policies and strategies for pursuing human rights?

MAXWELL: We remain absolutely committed to human rights principles. What has changed since 1961 is the number of groups that are dedicated to human rights issues. Some of them interpret human rights in ways that go beyond international law.

As for security, Article Three of the Universal Declaration states clearly: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” Our own nation was founded on the principle of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”

The term “human security” appears prominently in the World Bank’s “World Development Report 2000/2001—Attacking Poverty,” which among other things recommended addressing the vulnerability of the world’s poor to violence. The report defined “security” primarily in economic and financial terms; however, the term increasingly also carries implications of physical security of persons. While alleviating poverty remains a very important issue for the United States, assuring people’s security is a very important part of the human rights picture.

DIALOGUE: In your opinion what rights dimensions might be useful to donor countries in their conflict-prevention efforts?

MAXWELL: Today’s challenge is to resolve societal differences through nonviolent management techniques. Human rights have an important place in this. I do not want to suggest that some rights are more important than others, but clearly when the right to life, liberty, and the security of person is respected, few conflicts arise. For the international community to assure that right, however, is not always a simple matter. Hence our conflict-prevention efforts. Beyond that, I believe our effort to promote democracy, free markets, and the rule of law—all of which are firmly rooted in universal human rights—is the right approach.

DIALOGUE: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many asserted that human rights concerns abroad would be swept aside in the interest of fighting terrorism. In your opinion, is this a valid concern?

MAXWELL: On the contrary. I think there actually may be increased opportunities to raise human rights norms and standards in our foreign policy and make them more prevalent in all of our relief, development, and governance activities. The polarization resulting from terrorist acts can potentially ease discussion of human rights in international forums. Now that terrible acts that get to the heart of the rights of citizens have been committed, there is less room for ambiguity and compromise in political dialogue.
IALOGUE: One of the roles of the UN is to enhance member states’ capacities for early warning, conflict prevention, and long-term peace building. Are there any UN efforts under way to set standards of accountability in the area of conflict prevention that include strong human rights components?
TÜRK: I do not think that it would be wise to propose additional standards of accountability for prevention purposes only. Conflict prevention should be an additional motivation for insisting on the standards of human rights codified in international law and for sensitizing the international community to violations of existing human rights standards.

The link between human rights and prevention of armed conflict is indirect. Human rights norms and actions were devised not to prevent armed conflicts but because of their inherent value. Early warning of a potential armed conflict could be an indirect effect of human rights reporting in a country. The situation facing ethnic minorities, especially the existence of discrimination, can be a critical indicator of an incipient armed conflict.

There is hope that the existing international and mixed criminal tribunals and the future International Criminal Court (ICC) will have a deterrent effect. The jurisdiction of the ICC will complement the jurisdictions of states. This should provide a strong incentive to states parties to prosecute offenders and thus contribute to the prevention of future armed conflicts.

IALOGUE: What are some of the practical limitations on integrating international human rights norms, standards, and practices into the UN’s preventive and peace-building responses?
TÜRK: There are practical obstacles to the mainstreaming of human rights into all UN activities. UN activities in the field of human rights are concentrated on norms and procedures and seldom reach all the relevant areas of policy making. Also, these activities are not immune to political selectivity and ideological interpretations.

The UN is sometimes expected to deliver results in situations where norm-based activities simply do not suffice. Post-conflict peace building requires good diagnoses of all the relevant social, political, and practical problems and a realistic program of work if it is to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Concrete tasks such as establishing an independent judiciary or credible media require not only a good understanding of human rights but also technical skills and resources. Very often the former is available while the latter are in short supply.

IALOGUE: Should the field of human rights develop its conflict prevention potential more fully and, if so, how might this be done?
TÜRK: Human rights reporting has an important potential for conflict prevention. The early warning issued by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Rwanda regarding the situation in that country in 1993 and 1994 and reports by NGOs in the 1980s on the situation in Kosovo prove this. But shortcomings in human rights reporting may have contributed to the failure to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001. Human rights reports need to deal not only with violations of human rights but also with the social and political context of violations. Reports should make policy recommendations. We need both the picture of what is going wrong and an assessment of how that may affect the overall political situation. Human rights reports should venture into that field of assessment, with the understanding that alternative assessments and recommendations are possible.

Careful monitoring and capacity building would also make UN activities to improve the human rights situation and political stability in host countries more effective. However, it is difficult to establish both types of activity in
Human rights norms and action were devised not to prevent armed conflicts but because of their inherent value.
In January 2001, local South Africans forcefully evicted a group of Angolans and Namibians from two squatter camps near Cape Town. The squatters' houses and belongings were destroyed, even though several of the squatters were married to South African citizens and/or had valid residence permits; some had even been naturalized. While those evicted sought refuge at the police station, the local municipality looked for organizations that could assist in addressing the crisis. Eventually, the municipality sought out the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), an independent nongovernmental organization in Cape Town, to intervene and facilitate a lasting solution to the conflict.

The intervention team, comprising staff from CCR’s Mediation and Training Services project and the Human Rights and Conflict Management Programme (HRCMP), realized that resolving the conflict in this squatter area required employing both a conflict resolution perspective and a human rights perspective. An exclusive human rights point of view would fail to engage the needs, fears, and interests that caused the reluctance of the local residents to accept the “foreigners” in their midst. Focusing narrowly on the fears of the South African residents, however, would give insufficient consideration to the rights of the Angolans and Namibians. An integrated approach was necessary to reconcile the needs and interests of the parties within parameters laid down by the South African Constitution and the law, and to raise rights awareness among the parties.

Intervention was not easy. The local residents were reluctant to accept the idea that the conflict related to issues of rights. The South African residents did not talk in terms of rights: “rights” was a foreign notion to them. They talked about such issues as the lack of employment, infrastructure and housing, the police presence in the area, and how the “foreigners” might take their jobs. Emphasizing their own socioeconomic plight, they were not receptive to the notion that the “foreigners” had rights. Raising rights concerns in relation to this conflict revealed that xenophobia was a major underlying cause of tension. The South Africans vehemently rejected the idea that their actions were motivated even in part by xenophobia; in their view, the sole problem was the squatters’ alleged criminal activities. The South Africans threatened to leave the mediation process if the issue of xenophobia was not dropped.

Our intervention team decided to focus on the needs and interests of both parties rather than to confront the South Africans. We framed the issue of xenophobia in terms of the concerns of the parties to the conflict, slowly building an understanding among the South African residents about the rights of the Angolans and Namibians living in the settlements. Grounding a conflict resolution approach in the experiences of community members—by discussing issues important to them, such as housing, development, employment, and safety—proved to be an effective (if slow) way of addressing...
reventing wars and massive human rights violations—and rebuilding societies in their aftermath—requires strategies that incorporate perspectives from both the conflict resolution and human rights fields. Yet collaboration between the two fields does not always come easily.

In the fall of 2000, faculty from the two areas at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy founded the Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution (CHRCR). The impetus for creating the center was our collective professional experience and academic knowledge, which pointed to a lack of collaboration between professionals in the two fields. We could see that professionals in each field have a grating disregard for one another. Moreover, neither field has a formula that is sufficient to meet the needs of achieving peace or protecting human rights in conflict settings or of preventing conflict and human rights abuses from occurring.

CHRCR works to develop cross-disciplinary understanding and collaboration between the two fields. Through conferences, training programs, and publications, CHRCR’s aim is to help grassroots and internationally oriented practitioners in each field better understand the priorities, norms, techniques, and processes of their counterparts, thereby overcoming some of the suspicion and tension that exist between the two communities. For example, in some volatile conflict situations, human rights advocates could be more effective if they expanded their tool kits beyond naming, shaming, and seeking remedies in judicial forums to include conflict resolvers’ broader array of negotiation and diplomatic techniques. Conflict resolvers could better ensure that negotiations lead not just to a ceasefire but to a permanent peace if they were more willing to assert basic norms of international human rights and humanitarian law.

One of our projects, Healing Societies, directly addresses the most widely cited tension between the two fields with regard to post-conflict objectives: exacting justice versus seeking reconciliation based on amnesty for past crimes. Sometimes this tension becomes absorbed into the conflict, undermining the aims of both fields. For example, in Rwanda where Tutsis were the primary victims of the genocide, justice has come to be viewed as a “Tutsi issue.” Hutus, who received greater support from international NGOs that emphasize reconciliation or coexistence, have come to be identified with the latter issue. This phenomenon can also be seen in the case of Sri Lanka, as described elsewhere in this issue by Jehan Perera, where Sinhalese dominate the peace movement and human rights are generally associated with the Tamil minority.

The Healing Societies project focuses on the overlaps between post-conflict objectives and ways they all can be achieved in particular post-conflict circumstances. Instead of emphasizing one objective over another, the project starts with the premise that all five of the following post-conflict objectives should be met in order for a society to heal fully: (1) ending violence and stopping human rights violations so that survivors feel physically safe; (2) coming to terms with the past accurately and completely; (3) doing justice; (4) creating
integrating human rights and peace work

conditions—including repairing past harm and strengthening civil society—that make it possible for society to move forward; and (5) achieving reconciliation and coexistence between former perpetrators and those with whom they were in conflict.

The differences between the two fields can be turned to advantage, and opportunities for synergy need to be identified and promoted. For example, one concern peace workers and other observers often raise is the impact of human rights reports on sensitive conflict resolution initiatives or negotiations. Alvaro de Soto, the United Nations mediator in El Salvador, acknowledged that human rights reports were a hindrance at first, but explained that he later developed channels to anticipate them and used their pending release to urge the parties to avoid embarrassment by reaching accords that included significant human rights protections.

The two communities face similar dilemmas, as in the case of the difficult tradeoffs inherent in the timing of their actions. For conflict resolvers, seeking a rapid resolution to end the violence may set the stage for intensified conflict in the future. Adopting a longer-term response that focuses on altering underlying societal conditions, however, runs the risk of perceived failure and the prolonging of suffering or loss of life as the conflict drags on. Similarly, when focusing on immediate violations, human rights advocates end up paying less attention to underlying systemic causes of abuse and the long-term structural remedies needed to correct them. Efforts can be made to help both communities navigate these decisions in such a way that they are mutually reinforcing.

Whether to maintain neutrality presents another shared dilemma. Conflict resolvers often see human rights NGOs as waging a nonviolent war against those parties to the conflict who abuse human rights, and for this reason they disassociate themselves from human rights advocates. Some conflict resolvers even take the view that the substance of any agreement reached is irrelevant so long as it satisfies the parties’ needs. Human rights advocates also make claims to neutrality; yet there is another camp of both conflict resolvers and human rights advocates that questions whether it is morally permissible to be outcome-neutral when massive human rights abuses have occurred. Like Ambassador de Soto, they recognize the importance of raising human rights issues with the participants during the negotiation process and helping them to recognize that sustainable peace and the protection of human rights are intertwined.

Our Negotiating Self-Determination project is an example of a project designed to facilitate communication between the two fields concerning one of the underlying causes of violent conflict and human rights abuses and to develop more effective responses on the part of both human rights advocates and conflict resolvers. This project explores whether self-determination claims are more likely than other claims to lead to violence and whether the resultant conflicts are more difficult to resolve. It looks at how the international community should respond to demands by minority groups within states for greater political and economic power; when, if ever, the international community should intervene to defend existing borders or facilitate their reconfiguration; and under what conditions it might be preferable to redraw borders. A better understanding of the relationship between self-determination claims and violent conflict can help in developing preventive intervention strategies for addressing the two fields’ respective concerns in divided societies.

CHRCR also emphasizes research that evaluates the practical value of intergovernmental and non-governmental intervention initiatives. For example, our Imagine Coexistence Project is evaluating efforts by The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and refugee resettlement groups in Bosnia and Rwanda to promote the coexistence of people returning to communities that have been deeply divided by international conflict and mass violence. Our aim is to uncover what has worked and what has not as a means of increasing the effectiveness of efforts to help people in communities previously divided by conflict to successfully build a single viable community.

To stress the urgent need to build bridges between practitioners in the human rights and conflict resolution fields is not to argue that the fields should merge. To the contrary, the strength of the individual fields is that each approaches the problems underlying violent conflict, the suffering it causes, and its aftermath from different but synergistic perspectives. The challenge these two fields face is to strengthen their communication and cooperation so that together they can come closer to achieving their shared goal of peace.
In this context, the single biggest impediment to peace is the association of ethnicity with state structures set in place to combat terror. However, I disagree with Perera’s contention that the human rights discourse is dominated by Tamil concerns focused on the northeastern part of the country. As Perera suggests, there is a history of human rights abuse that predates the ethnic conflict. Its most violent phase began with the quelling of the first People’s Liberation Front insurrection in 1971. Seemingly every month since then, Parliament has approved additional emergency-rule measures circumscribing human rights irrespective of one’s ethnicity.

If there is a lesson in Sri Lanka’s experience, it is that the state is willing to use the apparatus it has in place to deal with internal civil strife anywhere. The methods used today by the government to combat perceived Tamil terror in the north and east are the same methods that were used with ruthless efficiency to quell the second southern insurrection in the late 1980s. The number of persons, mostly Sinhalese, who died or went missing at that time outstrips the toll of the conflicts in the north and east to date.

Institutional reform to establish a future power-sharing arrangement between the Sinhalese and Tamils is not enough. There can be no peace without justice. The state’s unwillingness to recognize the impact of Sri Lanka’s overlapping conflicts on its people and to accept responsibility for its role in abuses only makes a return to greater militancy more likely. Impunity presents the greatest threat. Without a change on the part of the state, the cycle of violence—like that seen in the successive People’s Liberation Front insurrections of 1971 and 1988–89 and the government’s repressive reactions to them—will be perpetuated. In the northeast, successive terror and counterterror measures have taken their toll on the community. There are bitter scars.

Both the government and the LTTE must address vigorously the citizenry’s need for recognition and justice. In a multiethnic island nation, these needs assume larger-than-life proportions. In the context of an internal civil conflict, restorative justice would be a more pragmatic approach if pursued formally. If existing social pressures are not to lead to many small wars at the end of this long one, the peace community and the human rights community must work together to make rights and justice the fundamental basis of society.

The South African residents did not talk in terms of rights: “rights” was a foreign notion to them.

The South African residents did not talk in terms of rights: “rights” was a foreign notion to them.
readers respond

A Past, Present, and Future Challenge for the Health and Human Rights Movement

The Spring/Summer 2001 issue of Human Rights Dialogue, “Rights and the Struggle for Health,” illustrates how a human rights perspective might be applied to issues ranging from the delivery of medical care to ensuring a safe environment, from local advocacy to global campaigns to tackle the pandemic of HIV/AIDS. Although there is certainly no single “human rights approach” to health, there are identifiable themes and principles that have emerged, as noted in both the Marks and the Rubenstein essays.

Our work on these issues has led us to a concern with how to spread human rights principles and applications to the vast majority of health professionals and other health workers. In general, there are few health practitioners who actually employ a health and human rights discourse in their daily work, and there are few human rights groups working on health rights. Indeed, it seems that the enthusiasm for the discourse of human rights in health—as measured by some international journals and other academic forums—has not spread beyond a relatively insular group.

A goal of the health and human rights movement must be to foster a culture of human rights among the larger community of health care practitioners, and, in this regard, we feel there has been a lack of attention in the field as a whole to the education of health-related professionals. A few pioneering organizations have created health and human rights curricula and offered workshops and courses oriented to medical and other health-sciences students. We applaud these initiatives, and we believe these efforts should be carried out much more widely in order to reach a preponderance of future clinicians and health-policy makers. Until providers in countries such as Peru are educated in human rights—both the rights of their patients and their own roles in larger struggles for democracy and social justice—the discourse of human rights in health will remain just that: a discourse.

We have learned from our experiences with students from Peru and across Latin America through the Peruvian civil association EDHUCASalud (Educación en Derechos Humanos con Aplicación en Salud, “Civil Association for Health and Human Rights Education”). We have seen that one-shot workshops cannot suffice to educate providers in health and human rights; in the long-term, the educational training that future professionals receive must be reformulated. However, we have also seen how some medical and health-sciences students who have been exposed to human rights concepts and training have assimilated these concepts and transformed them in their daily work and will forever be guided by certain core principles and aspirations of human rights. In short, we believe that strategies to create a new profile of future health professionals deserve more attention within the health and human rights movement in order to expand the impact of this nascent field.

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A Broad Focus on Health

To receive the best available health care should be the right of every human being on the planet. That seems obvious, yet often other factors decide just who receives what kind of care. I was pleased to see that the issue of Human Rights Dialogue dedicated to human rights and the struggle for health did not concentrate on just some of those factors, present mostly in the so-called countries of concern, but rather showed that a wide array of factors can influence diminished rights to proper health care and that some of them are present even in the highly industrialized, developed nations.

Two articles about the AIDS crisis showed the stark discrepancy in life expectancy between patients in developed countries and those in poor countries. The polluted lands of indigenous people in Ecuador and their inadequate access to health care obviously cry out for action. The same goes for assuring that no medical professional abuses his profession in “dual loyalty” matters by assisting in the torture or mistreatment of people. Rather, it is important to encourage them to serve as witnesses to such abuses, as Neshad Asllani did in Kosovo. But in those areas, as Stephen Marks wrote, there has already been significant thinking and action using the health and human rights approach.

It is disturbing to see that the circumstances described in Sarah Zaidi’s article on Ecuador can also be found in South Carolina and that certain economic measures, like welfare reform, may diminish the chances for people to receive proper health care, even in one of the world’s richest nations—the United States. I commend the authors who took the bold step of recognizing such measures as an attack on the human rights frame-
Health and Human Rights in the Philippines

As a resident of a developing country, I read the essays featured in the Spring/Summer 2001 issue of Human Rights Dialogue, “Rights and the Struggle for Health,” with particular interest. The Philippines has faced a multitude of problems over the last thirty years. Slow but real development was cut short by fourteen years of martial law under the Marcos dictatorship, which not only placed power play at the forefront but also involved numerous human rights violations.

People’s right to health was recognized but was attended to by only a few professionals and agencies. Health-care personnel, and programs seemed a low priority in the face of torture and displacement. The Department of Health struggled to make generic drugs available to the majority of the population who live below the poverty line, to run information campaigns about reproductive and sexual rights, and to cope with such basic problems as tuberculosis and children’s diarrhea, which is widespread and simple to solve yet has gone unchecked. And today, especially among former sex workers at the American bases, there is HIV/AIDS. All of this is in addition to the need for safe water and basic sanitation and for health workers to attend to the urban and rural poor in the slums, villages, and squatter areas.

Hardly any public or official dialogue about health and human rights is heard. The understanding and concern, although present, have not been deepened, disseminated, or confronted.

The Philippines must profit from the dialogues, operational experience, and solutions developed within the global village. We welcome the opportunity to listen and to learn.

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For Further Reading:

On the cover: TEPELENA, ALBANIA, 17 MARCH 1997—Villagers occupy a hillside outside the town of Tepelema, about 40 km north of the Greek border. They are holding an ad hoc town meeting to decide whether to link up with fellow rebels in Vlore, or go it alone and establish an independent local militia. (Photo Credit: Mark H. Milstein/Red Dot)