Author
Stuart MacDonald
ICR Research
Abstract
We cannot measure soft power's impact with any reliability, yet nations spend billions on cultural diplomacy and values promotion. This measurement problem points to a deeper issue: the uncertain relationship between ethical frameworks and international influence. This article explores how metaethics—the philosophical study of what makes moral claims valid—might help us understand why values-based diplomacy proves so difficult to assess or execute. Drawing on cases from France's laïcité promotion to China's Belt and Road Initiative, I suggest that our inability to measure soft power stems partly from unexamined assumptions about how moral reasoning works across cultures. Metaethical analysis may not resolve these uncertainties, but it offers a framework for examining why ethical arguments seem both essential and impractical in international relations. Perhaps the question is not whether soft power "works," but what we even mean by ethical influence in a world of competing moral frameworks.
The Measurement Problem in International Ethics
When France bans religious symbols in schools whilst championing universal human rights, or when China promotes "shared prosperity" whilst restricting political freedoms, the contradictions seem obvious. Yet these tensions point to something more fundamental than hypocrisy: We lack any reliable way to assess whether values-based diplomacy achieves its aims, or even what those aims should be.
Consider the current confusion about international influence. Soft power indices rank nations by cultural exports, educational exchanges, and diplomatic networks, yet these metrics tell us little about actual influence. The 2025 Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index illustrates this paradox: China has surpassed the United Kingdom for the first time, rising to second place with a score of 72.8, demonstrating "sustained efforts to enhance its economic attractiveness, showcase its culture, and boost its reputation as a safe and well-governed nation." Yet this quantified improvement tells us little about whether Chinese values promotion actually influences behavior or merely reflects measurement methodologies.
The problem isn't just measurement but conceptual clarity. When nations project values internationally, what exactly are they trying to achieve? Changed behavior? Shifted attitudes? Moral approval? Without clear objectives or reliable metrics, soft power becomes an article of faith rather than a strategic tool.
Three Philosophies of Moral Truth
International relations discourse often assumes moral realism: that certain values are objectively correct, awaiting discovery or recognition by rational actors. Under this framework, nations promote their values—whether liberal democracy, socialist development, or religious governance—because they believe these represent universal truths. Disagreement becomes a matter of others failing to recognize objective reality.
But what if this assumption is wrong? Metaethics offers alternative frameworks that might illuminate different aspects of soft power dynamics:
Constructivism suggests that moral truths emerge from reasoning processes rather than existing independently. Different cultures develop different values through their particular historical experiences, social dialogues, and institutional evolution. From this view, what matters is not discovering pre-existing truths but understanding how societies construct their moral frameworks.
Anti-realism denies moral truths entirely, viewing values as expressions of preference rather than facts. Though philosophically coherent, this position offers little guidance for practical diplomacy.
These aren't the only philosophical options, nor can we definitively say which framework best describes reality. Other approaches—moral relativism, expressivism, error theory—offer their own insights. The value of metaethical analysis isn't in declaring a winner but in recognizing that our assumptions about moral truth shape how we approach international influence.
Consider the implications: If moral realism is correct, nations with "right" values have legitimate grounds for universal promotion. But if constructivism has merit, then presenting culturally specific values as universal truths becomes philosophically questionable. The framework we assume—usually unconsciously—influences whether we see resistance to our values as ignorance or legitimate difference.
Why Universal Claims Generate Resistance
Most nations acknowledge empirical disagreement about values whilst maintaining philosophical certainty about their correctness. This creates potential blindness to alternative moral frameworks that may undermine soft power effectiveness—though proving this connection remains elusive given our measurement problems.
Consider how the European Union promotes gender equality through its comprehensive Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025. The strategy aims for "a Union where women and men, girls and boys, in all their diversity, are free to pursue their chosen path in life, have equal opportunities to thrive, and can equally participate in and lead our European society." The European Commission promotes this vision globally through development aid, diplomatic dialogue, and institutional cooperation, positioning gender equality as both a fundamental right and a development imperative. EU officials know they face resistance in traditional societies, but typically interpret this as "backwardness" or religious extremism rather than potentially valid alternative reasoning about social organization. Whether this framing actually reduces EU influence is hard to demonstrate, but it certainly shapes how dialogue unfolds—or fails to.
The same dynamic might explain reactions to China's development model. Chinese officials present state-led development as objectively superior to market-based approaches, claiming universal validity for what constructivists would see as culturally specific reasoning procedures. Recipients may resist not the development assistance itself but the philosophical framing—though again, establishing causation proves difficult.
Even Nordic countries, often cited as soft power successes, complicate simple narratives. They tend to present their welfare models as products of specific historical circumstances rather than universal imperatives. The Nordic welfare model is "often hailed as a model in international forums," according to Nordic cooperation organizations, yet Nordic countries typically emphasize that "few other countries in the world provide such a good and well-developed financial safety net" without claiming this represents the only valid approach to social organization. Does this modesty enhance their influence? We assume so, but cannot prove it. What we can observe is that their framing invites dialogue rather than imposing truth.
Digital Acceleration of Metaethical Tensions
Digital platforms intensify these philosophical tensions by making competing moral frameworks simultaneously visible. When European officials tweet about women's rights, audiences may immediately encounter alternative perspectives—Islamic frameworks emphasizing complementary roles, Confucian approaches prioritizing social harmony, Indigenous traditions with different gender concepts entirely. Indeed, all of these views can be easily found on X/Twitter and other social media platforms.
This constant juxtaposition makes philosophical assumptions transparent. Claims that once seemed naturally universal now appear culturally contingent. The speed of digital communication amplifies consequences: Metaethical missteps that might previously have remained local now go viral globally.
Yet digital platforms also enable more sophisticated engagement. When nations acknowledge the constructed nature of their values whilst explaining their reasoning procedures, they can engage in genuine dialogue rather than moral monologue. The challenge is developing this philosophical sophistication whilst maintaining the conviction necessary for effective advocacy.
Practical Implications for Cultural Diplomacy
If constructivism accurately describes moral reasoning, several practical implications follow:
Reframe universal claims as contextual insights. Rather than declaring "Democracy is the best system," nations might say: "Our experience with authoritarian collapse led us to develop representative institutions that address our specific challenges." This respects alternative reasoning whilst sharing valuable experience.
Engage with foreign reasoning procedures. Before promoting market economics in societies with communitarian traditions, understand how those societies developed their economic values. This reveals points of genuine engagement rather than assumed superiority.
Acknowledge reciprocal learning. Western nations might genuinely consider Chinese infrastructure planning approaches or Islamic finance principles, demonstrating that moral reasoning flows multiple directions.
These approaches remain largely theoretical because they require philosophical sophistication that may conflict with domestic political demands for moral clarity. Yet as global power becomes increasingly multipolar, such sophistication may become competitively necessary.
The Constructivist Paradox
Constructivism creates a genuine paradox for international influence. If values emerge from cultural reasoning rather than objective discovery, how can nations promote them internationally without philosophical incoherence? Three responses emerge:
First, nations can share their reasoning procedures rather than their conclusions, explaining how historical experience led to current values whilst acknowledging alternative paths. Second, they can identify overlapping concerns addressed differently by various cultures, finding common ground without claiming universal truth. Third, they can engage in genuine moral dialogue, allowing their own values to evolve through encounter with alternative frameworks.
None of these approaches offers the moral certainty that traditionally underlies soft power. Yet in a multipolar world where audiences can choose among competing frameworks, philosophical humility may prove more influential than moral absolutism.
Opening a Philosophical Conversation
The intersection of metaethics and soft power suggests we may need to reconsider fundamental assumptions about how ethics functions in international relations. Rather than offering definitive answers, metaethical analysis opens critical questions: What gives moral claims their force across cultural boundaries? How do we engage with profoundly different reasoning procedures? Can universal values coexist with philosophical pluralism?
These questions matter because they reveal unexamined foundations beneath diplomatic practice. The difficulty of measuring soft power's impact, the contested reception of values-based diplomacy, the gap between ethical rhetoric and political action—these persistent challenges might stem from assumptions about moral truth that rarely receive scrutiny.
This analysis does not resolve these tensions but rather makes them visible and available for examination. If constructivism offers valid insights about moral reasoning, then perhaps our entire framework for thinking about values in international relations requires reconsideration. Yet even raising these questions proves challenging when diplomatic practice demands moral clarity and domestic politics rewards certainty over nuance.
For Carnegie Council's readership—scholars, policymakers, and engaged citizens committed to ethical international relations—metaethics offers not a solution but a lens. It provides vocabulary for discussing foundational issues typically left implicit, frameworks for understanding persistent failures in cultural diplomacy, and perhaps most importantly, permission to acknowledge uncertainty about matters we usually treat as settled.
The question is not whether metaethics provides the "right" approach to international influence, but whether ignoring these philosophical foundations remains tenable as global power structures shift and audiences increasingly question universal claims. In a multipolar world where moral authority cannot be assumed, perhaps the first step is simply recognizing that our certainties about ethics in international relations may themselves be constructions worth examining.
Stuart MacDonald is founder and director of ICR Research.
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs is an independent and nonpartisan nonprofit. The views expressed within this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Carnegie Council.
