Toward Peace with Justice

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE CARNEGIE COUNCIL
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Andrew Carnegie was a visionary, obsessed with the future of mankind. A Scot Presbyterian of humble origins, he invested his time, energy, and unequaled financial resources to leaving the world a better place than it had been before him.

Carnegie made an ethical commitment to eliminate the curse of barbarous warfare. In his second Rector’s Address at Scotland’s St. Andrews University, he lamented the persistence of “the foulest blot that has ever disgraced the earth, the killing of civilized men by men like wild beasts as a permissible mode of settling disputes.” Carnegie’s war against war has, a century later, culminated in trends that attest to the potential of his quest. True, he could not foresee the future that would ultimately unfold. And, indeed, he was psychologically traumatized and momentarily mentally paralyzed by the outbreak of the First World War. That disaster disrupted his most treasured expectations about the prospects for world peace. Nonetheless, his hopes and commitments remained steadfast, and these have since been picked up and carried forth by many subsequent leaders.

Changes in global norms have occurred since Carnegie’s lifetime. Carnegie held tenaciously to the conviction that war was a human invention—one that could be terminated by controlling destructive practices and by rejecting then-prevailing cultural mores that empowered war’s prevalence. In particular, he recognized that the eradication of war required the eradication of global values that rationalized the use of military force. Therefore, to change the course of history, our thinking about the ethical acceptance of military force had to change.

Today, Carnegie’s worldview has found a receptive global audience. There is little doubt that his vision has incrementally gained traction in the values of leaders worldwide. What is more, transformations in moral norms have resulted in changes in the ways states now behave toward one another. Evidence demonstrates that ideas can, and often do, have consequences. Changes in norms for behavior exert, over time, potent changes in the norms of behavior, in what statistically becomes the “new normal.” Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflict between sovereign states has dramatically decreased. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 1989 and 2014 (exactly a century since the founding
of the Church Peace Union—known today as Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs) only eight wars between sovereign countries have erupted; nearly all armed conflict involving independent states (94 percent) have been wars within countries, not between them.

A man of multiple motivations, Andrew Carnegie remains a man of mystery. He read from Scripture that one cannot serve both God and money, but he did: the first half of his life was dedicated to acquiring wealth, and the second to giving it away. “The man who dies rich,” he wrote in June 1889, “dies disgraced.” However, he also discovered that it is harder to wisely give than to receive.

Carnegie reached the conclusion that politically activated religious movements, and the ethical values that all the major religions espouse, such as the injunction against the taking of human life unjustly, could serve as the best barrier against militarism. This rationale seems on the surface reasonable. But was it? Were organized religious institutions really reliable allies in efforts to mobilize public opinion against war? Andrew Carnegie was a self-avowed Christian. He was attracted to those Scriptural tenets of early or primitive Christianity as interpreted by pacifist Amish, Brethren, Mennonite, and Quaker sects. In embracing these prescriptions, did Carnegie unwittingly misread the sorry practices of most other religious traditions? Should he have taken into consideration the views of his atheist-pacifist friend Mark Twain, who sarcastically said that “Christianity was a great religion which someone should try sometime”?

It is worth keeping in mind that the Church Peace Union (CPU) was comprised of a fringe faction, hardly representative of the traditions from which it arose. Did Carnegie’s trust in, and admirable support of, ecumenical cooperation rest on expectations about ethically inspired collective religious activism that were unlikely to be fulfilled? Organized religious institutions throughout history expediently and routinely have backed nations’ use of force. From this proclivity emerges another concern. Ever since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the independent territorial nation-state has been rendered a sacred object of loyalty.

At issue is how Carnegie’s pioneering vision for peace can be reconciled with the reality of state sovereignty unrestrained by ethical boundaries of state action. Where did Carnegie’s worldview draw the line between chauvinistic patriotism and a universal code of interstate conduct? If the expansionist state addicted to aggression is a big part of the problem, what, in Carnegie’s calculus, was the solution? Should the state be made subservient to supranational institutions empowered to regulate their interactions, or even superseded altogether?
Linked to this query is another curiosity: Did Carnegie subscribe to the prevalent view that there must exist two separate realms of morality—private and public? Did the ethical norms posed by almost all religious movements on how individuals ought to treat other individuals apply to relations between collectivities? In the latter case, were relations between and among entire nations to be ethically judged by the same principles prescribed to govern interactions between and among people? It is very likely that Carnegie thought so. He was acutely aware, and ahead of his time, in recommending that, to the extent that ethical principles define the limits of moral behavior (in compliance with Kantian philosophical reasoning), those ethical constraints must be universal—that is, applicable to all actors’ interactions, both those of people and countries. This was imperative. How else to close the gap between norms regarding how people should treat other people and how states should treat other countries? War—the slaughter of the many as authorized by the few—was to be condemned, just as civilized society condemns the murder of innocent citizens victimized by criminals.

The pressing challenge, then, was (and continues to be) how to convert ideas and ideals. They require collective action. For that, pressure must be organized and exerted. But so-called “political action groups” have a checkered history and blemished reputation. Was this strategy misplaced? Every organized movement to change public opinion and public policies generates a counter-reaction: countervailing powers always generate opposition to changes that threaten their interests. So was Carnegie’s approach, in the last analysis, practical? The evidence suggests that this tactical approach was, indeed, pragmatic. Change in ethical thinking has demonstrably unfolded throughout the globe—not simply on the problem of international peace but on all other issues on the global agenda, from the “high politics” of international security to the “low politics” of geo-economics and ecological issues. Hallgren’s vivid account of the birth and evolution of the Church Peace Union clearly demonstrates how precedent-setting Carnegie’s endeavors through mobilized collective action were.

Andrew Carnegie maintained an abiding faith in scientific discovery and the technology that science creates. He recognized that scientific discovery was the motor of progress, and he harbored no fears about the alleged incompatibilities of science with religious faith and ethical values. Indeed, Carnegie—like the Renaissance scientists during the Protestant Reformation in Europe—perceived a symbiotic relationship between science and religious ethical norms, each enriching the other. It was this conviction that led him to endow scientific research in order to
enable science to lead to a more valid understanding of the causes of war, the paths to its prevention, and the preconditions of peace.

History has made much fun criticizing the ascribed naïveté of Carnegie and other so-called “idealists,” ever since World War I shattered overnight such utopian dreams of a world without war. On the eve of that war, eminent scholars such as Norman Angell, author of the famous book *The Great Illusion*, had advanced the prediction that the prohibitive costs of warfare had rendered this wasteful habit obsolete. These liberal-idealists had powerful reasons for their prophecies of the end of war between states. Recall that during Carnegie’s formative years the great powers had been at peace since the 1871 Franco-Prussian War and that technological discoveries had steadily stimulated rapid economic growth alongside unprecedented strides in the expansion of trade. These were halcyon days when the prospects for international peace appeared to Carnegie and many others to be more promising than ever. That period was populated by high expectations, fueled by the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, which had endorsed new legal restraints on the use of force, including important new treaties for disarmament agreements.

As Hallgren elucidates, the onset of the First World War threw Carnegie into a deep and debilitating depression. Yet, as Benjamin Franklin eloquently noted, “the things that hurt instruct.” Did Carnegie learn from this painfully surprising and devastating development? Certainly, and Hallgren shows precisely how and why he did.

The final years of Carnegie’s life were invested in striking a balance between his “idealistic” ideology and a “realpolitik” worldview that accepted the necessity of power politics for the promotion of universal ethical values of international interaction. To that end, Carnegie sought to substitute the power of principle for the principle of power. But in pursuing this goal did he clearly confront the obstacles to such a timeless solution? This volume, produced to commemorate the Centennial of Andrew Carnegie’s last great accomplishment, will compel every reader to question his or her own values, and to question inherited conventional wisdoms surrounding the competing theories of international relations—realism and liberal idealism. It will also require us to reassess Carnegie’s capacity to integrate the two theoretical approaches without abandoning the wisdom contained in each. Did he succeed?

As with any adaptive organization, the CPU trustees faced the challenge of deciding how to apply and adjust its core principles and practices to the emergent issues that were rising to the top of the global agenda. Hallgren demonstrates how
“in some ways CPU trustees were exceptionally well-informed and insightful, antici-
pat ing the major historical developments of their own time.” Yet changing course
always risks losing sight of an organization’s original mission and tactics in the effort
to accommodate new international realities. Understandably, this challenge invited
some measure of division and discord with the Church Peace Union, as illustrated
when the trustees, in Hallgren’s words, “compromised their principles to support
U.S. intervention in the First World War.” But, as she also notes, on the whole the
trustees exercised sound judgment.

The cataclysmic convulsions in world affairs over the past century arguably
begged for new responses to new global realities. How could the Church Peace
Union and those re-organized entities that followed in its aftermath not have
shifted course? How else to respond to such unforeseeable dangers and innovations
as the rise of Nazism/Fascism and Communism; the Second World War; the advent
of atomic weapons and the global arms race; the emergence of the Cold War, and its
termination; the growth of such international organizations as the United Nations,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NATO, and the European Union; and
the threat arising from such newly recognized global issues as climate change,
human rights, and the revolution in military technologies? Indeed, in the absence
of re-adaptations, the whole Council endeavor would have become a nonparticipant
in international dialogue and discourse.

So, as we look both back and forward on the occasion of the Council’s Centen-
nial, the key questions to be asked are whether any ethically motivated organization
could have done better, and whether Andrew Carnegie would have approved of the
changes in course that the trustees inaugurated over a century of such cataclysmic
transformations. In response, I submit that, for all in the imperfections in this most
imperfect of worlds, the answer to the first question is an unqualified “no,” and to
the second a resounding “yes”!

CHARLES W. KEGLEY

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It was the era of Esperanto, women's suffrage campaigns, tenement reform, and, thanks to Andrew Carnegie, a lending library for every town, or at least every town that requested one. It was the start of the twentieth century, and advanced travel and communications—railroads, transatlantic shipping, the telegraph—had made the world much smaller. Reformers in Europe and the United States traveled back and forth, trading ideas on methods to improve the lives of ordinary people. Who could doubt that a new and improved world was dawning?
Historians call this time the Progressive Era, and they note that faith in progress, modernity, and science was the one thread uniting very different reformers of the 1880s to 1910s. Of course, each idealist had his or her own vision of the perfected world to come. Their fertile political imaginations created or refined the philosophies that would shape the twentieth century, including socialism, feminism, and pacifism.¹

It may seem strange to place Andrew Carnegie (1835–1919) in the company of social theorists and utopian ideologues. Carnegie was no starry-eyed dreamer. He’d become the world’s wealthiest man through not only hard work but also a keen eye for opportunity—and rapacious labor practices. But this self-educated former errand boy turned steel magnate was, like his contemporaries in radical movements and universities, a man who loved ideas and believed in Progress. And he invested heavily in it. After his retirement from business, Carnegie endowed numerous charitable corporations, annually dispensing some $10–$20 million of his approximately $250 million fortune. It was his intention to give away this fortune during his lifetime, as promised in his essays on the “Gospel of Wealth.” Through the nonprofit corporations he created, and the men he hand-picked to run them, he would create a legacy of social activism that has now lasted over a century.²

Once, when refusing to donate to what he admitted was a worthy cause, Carnegie explained that he could only give to those causes that truly inspired him. These included the gifts of libraries to over 2,500 towns across the United States, the United Kingdom, and even Central Europe (he credited his own rise from child worker to industrialist to his penchant for reading). He funded a variety of educational endeavors, ranging from universities to the retirement funds of university professors; and he established a Carnegie Hero Fund to reward heroism in ordinary life, especially to provide support for those disabled by their valiant acts. Familiar with the plight of the poor in Scotland, he created trusts charged with improving the lives of those in his hometown of Dunfermline, as well as the United Kingdom more broadly. Finally, after he realized that he could not give away his money quickly enough during his own lifetime, Carnegie created what became known as simply the Carnegie Corporation of New York to give away money on his behalf. The Carnegie Corporation received the bulk of his fortune, and over time took shape as a grant-making institution charged with promoting education, knowledge, peace, and democracy.³

The most important cause of Carnegie’s later years was international peace, which he believed would be achieved through arbitration treaties, an international court, and disarmament. He wanted national militaries downsized until they could serve as part of an international police force. At heart both a businessman and an intellectual, he found justifications for war illogical and its casualties insufferable. As he noted, “The crime of war is inherent, since it decides not in favor of the right, but always of the strong.” Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that peace was an achievable if not inexorable outgrowth of human social evolution; after all, nations were governed internally by laws based on principles of justice. Just as individuals had learned
to pursue justice through police and the courts, so would nations.4

To achieve these goals, Carnegie realized that both cultural and political transformation would be necessary. Even as an eighteen-year-old, Carnegie had criticized a religious periodical’s glorification of war heroes and battles. If young people could be made to look on war and weaponry with repugnance, he argued, it would bring mankind closer to achieving peace. He believed that the clergy should lead the way to this change and later in life he publicly rebuked ministers who praised military heroism.5

Politically, Carnegie was already campaigning for international arbitration as a route to peace as early as 1887—on his honeymoon. In conversation with William Gladstone, the former prime minister of Great Britain, Carnegie offered Gladstone a significant sum of money for either himself or his political party for a re-election fund. Then Carnegie turned the conversation to peace. Counting on the U.S. presidential victory of his favorite Republican, Senator James G. Blaine and then Gladstone's eventual return to office, Carnegie predicted that the United States and Great Britain would sign a treaty agreeing to international arbitration. This step would “make War impossible between English speaking men. It is coming,” he said, his faith in Progress unshakeable and infectious.6

By the early 1900s, Carnegie had grown increasingly committed to promoting international peace. In the midst of an international arms race led by Germany and Britain, conflicts between colonizers and colonized in empires around the world, and growing disorder in Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the industrialist campaigned tirelessly with political leaders and the press. In his earliest significant gift toward peacemaking, in 1903 Carnegie gave $1.5 million for the building of the Peace Palace at The Hague, which houses the Permanent Court of Arbitration. He was a major donor to the U.S. Republican Party, and a frequent correspondent with U.S. presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and later Democrat Woodrow Wilson. Carnegie met with Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and kept close contact with British prime ministers and members of parliament. In essence, the wealthy Scotsman spent the last decades of his life and a considerable portion of his immense fortune on a peace campaign aimed at the world’s most powerful men.7

To advance his cause, Carnegie also cultivated a strong relationship with the press. His sense of humor and fondness for dramatic statements, as well as his stature as the world’s richest man and greatest philanthropist, made him a press favorite. He was among the most written-about characters of his own day. His white-bearded face was immediately recognizable and his activism so widely known that his visage regularly appeared in editorial cartoons.

However, until 1906, Carnegie had steered clear of the messy organizational politics of the peace movement itself. That year, a young acquaintance of Carnegie’s, an ambitious and idealistic young Congregationalist minister named Frederick Lynch, asked the former steel magnate if he would take over the presidency of the New York Peace Society. Busy with commitments to his own charities, Carnegie initially refused. But then, as he told Lynch:

“Every night when I would lie down to sleep I would hear this voice within me saying, “Andrew, Andrew, aren’t you ashamed of yourself? Here for years you have been advocating arbitration in place of war, world courts, leagues of peace, and parliaments of nations, and then when the chance comes really to render the cause some practical help, and to lead a group existing to put your ideals into practice, you refuse. Shame on you!””

After three sleepless nights, Carnegie agreed to take over the presidency of what he then began to call “his society,” Lynch recalled. What followed was an immersion in the sometimes frustrating organizational politics of peace activism.8

In order to move the group forward, Carnegie had to unite two factions—those who wanted immediate disarmament and those who believed that disarmament should follow significant international treaties. This split divided the early twentieth-century peace
movement as a whole, and the factions’ inability to compromise often prevented them from undertaking significant antiwar work. Carnegie’s credentials impressed both factions, however, and this enabled them to cooperate. His vigorous efforts on behalf of disarmament and his condemnations of war as barbaric appealed to the first group, even as his work with politicians pushed him to accept the perspective of the second group, the realists. Carnegie recognized that presidents, prime ministers, and autocrats alike faced domestic and international political constraints; they were unlikely to trade present-day security for the promise of future peace. In Carnegie’s view, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany—steeped in Western culture—would have to take the first steps toward international arbitration before the rest of the world would follow.

It seems likely that Carnegie’s sudden immersion into the nitty-gritty details of leading a peace society helped inspire the founding of his own charitable corporations over the next few years; surely had the New York Peace Society realized all of his ambitions, and been truly “his society,” he would not have created the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace a few years later, with an endowment of $10 million.

In 1910, energized by a summer at his Scotland estate and hoping to do more for the cause, he created the Carnegie Endowment and appointed his close advisor and the former secretary of war, Senator Elihu Root of New York, as its first president. It was Carnegie’s practice to actively manage the selection of founding trustees of his charitable corporations, and their leaders met with him frequently. With the
exception of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, he refused to sit on these boards because he wanted them to set policies themselves. In the case of the Carnegie Endowment, the board brought together a variety of prominent businessmen, lawyers, and college presidents, ranging from the president of Harvard University, Charles William Eliot, to the former U.S. Representative from Mississippi, and future U.S. Senator, John Sharp Williams.11

As his endowments pursued their ambitious goals, Carnegie maintained his personal one-man campaign to stop war, pressuring President Taft and using his speeches and press conferences around the world to publicize his faith in international arbitration and disarmament. But the ideas he promoted, and the arbitration treaties with France and Britain that Taft signed at his urging, were rejected in the U.S. Senate. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, directed by Elihu Root, refused to campaign for the treaties for fear of becoming identified with one faction in a partisan battle. Carnegie could see the need for an organization that would cultivate broad public support for the types of legislation necessary to create a new international order.12

Following the defeat of the arbitration treaties, one afternoon in the summer of 1912, Carnegie’s advisor and friend Frederick Lynch suggested that the churches were a natural ally for the peace movement. Lynch had become the executive secretary of a peace committee established by the Federal Council of Churches, the largest national interdenominational organization of Protestant churches in the United States. Carnegie considered the matter aloud, as Lynch recalled, saying, “They have audiences already made, and that is a great thing. They are there every Sunday.” He suggested that Lynch ask the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for a “handsome annual appropriation” for the Federal Council for its church peace work. Lynch replied that the Endowment had already rejected such an appeal, and the two men began a series of conversations about the churches and the peace movement that would culminate two years later in the creation of the Church Peace Union.13

Lynch and Carnegie agreed that to have the greatest impact, their group should focus on cultivating international friendship and providing peace
education for young people. The following summer, Carnegie's enthusiasm grew when he met in Europe with a British member of parliament and an Anglican bishop. In England, too, churchmen and political leaders were attempting to promote international ties through the pulpit; hearing echoes of Lynch's program, Carnegie imagined the strength that an international, Christian, grassroots movement could give to politicians promoting arbitration and disarmament treaties.14

Immediately after his return from Europe, Carnegie asked Lynch for a systematic proposal of the program for a church peace group with a substantial endowment. Carnegie reviewed the proposal and asked Lynch if he believed that men of all denominations—Roman Catholic as well as Protestant—would agree to serve as trustees. Lynch thought they would, and wrote out a list of possible trustees then and there. The list contained Catholics and Protestants, including personal friends and advisors of Carnegie, and later the list was expanded to include two Jewish leaders.15

Serving as Carnegie’s emissary, Lynch asked each of the twenty-nine men on the list to serve as trustees; none refused. Carnegie was pleased, asking Lynch a few times each week to repeat the same fact: that no other board working among the churches included Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.16

On February 10, 1914, the trustees met at the Ninety-First Street Carnegie mansion for lunch and the inaugural meeting of what was to be known as the Church Peace Union (CPU). A founding trustee of the CPU, author Charles S. Macfarland, noted that the group assembled that day was diverse in political as well as social orientation. Macfarland described his peers as ranging from a “socially minded conservative” to a “constructive radical in the Peace Movement”; from professors and writers of the Baptist, Quaker, Congregationalist, and Methodist Episcopal faiths, to the then-president of the borough of Manhattan, the Hon. Marcus M. Marks, who represented liberal Judaism. Absent, but named as trustees, were the Roman Catholic archbishops of St. Louis and of Baltimore.17

Carnegie told the clergy assembled in his home that theirs was an historic meeting, bringing together the leaders of twelve religious sects. Theirs was a “divine mission” to end war.18

Carnegie had come to believe, as he told the assembled religious leaders, that “the strongest appeal that can be made is to the members of the religious bodies.” He granted the foundation $2 million in bonds, “the income to be used as in your judgment will most successfully appeal to the people in the cause of peace through arbitration of international disputes; that as man in civilized lands is compelled by law to submit personal disputes to courts of law or through other channels, this trust shall have fulfilled its mission.” Expecting this day to come soon, he asked them to distribute the remaining funds to the deserving poor.19

After the meeting concluded, Carnegie hugged Frederick Lynch—now secretary of the new Church Peace Union—and was, Lynch said, “as happy as a child.” Carnegie remained secure in his belief that Germany, Britain, and the United States would soon form treaties of arbitration, and that the rest of the world would then quickly follow. It was February 1914.

Andrew Carnegie’s New York mansion, now Cooper-Hewitt Museum
It was the first major initiative of the Church Peace Union, and participants had laid plans months in advance. Protestant leaders from Bulgaria, Denmark, England, France, Germany, and the United States were meeting on the shores of Lake Constance to inaugurate the new World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches. A beloved spot for travelers, the lake stands at the foot of the Alps at the convergence of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, its very location symbolizing the internationalism that the World Alliance was designed to promote. The CPU believed that by sponsoring the World Alliance it would be reaching new groups of Protestants, cultivating a grassroots movement for peace, friendship, and international arbitration.
The meeting convened on August 1, 1914, and Germany would invade Belgium three days later, drawing Europe and its colonies into the First World War.

Though well-meaning ministers from the belligerent nations sought to reach one another at the designated spot on the German side of the lake, German mobilization complicated their plans. At best, churchmen from outside Germany faced simple snarls in transportation; at worst, they faced weeks of detention. The first major international effort of the CPU had failed, and it had failed spectacularly.

In 1914, trustee and then-vice president of the CPU William P. Merrill remembered the ministers’ despair. He recognized that before they had even begun their work, “The delicate fabric of international law, woven so slowly and with such infinite pains, was shattered in a moment.” One of Merrill’s colleagues observed bitterly that “apparently war could stop a peace conference far more easily than a peace conference could stop war.” On the trains out of Germany the churchmen faced mockery from soldiers, and once at home, from cynics.

In New York, the start of the war led to a mental and physical breakdown for Andrew Carnegie. Though he and his wife attempted to hide his condition from the press, and little is known about its exact medical causes and symptoms, Carnegie stopped his rounds of public appearances, retreated from public view, and even ceased his decades-long correspondence with his closest friends. His wife, Louise, worried as he grew very thin, and the man who had spent decades holding press conferences and meeting with presidents and kings stared vacantly into space for an hour at a time. It had been only five months since the inaugural meeting and founding of the Church Peace Union—and since Carnegie’s optimistic prediction that after the attainment of peace the organization would disperse its funds to the poor.

From 1914 to 1919 the European war would split Americans across ethnic and ideological lines, breaking up political alliances, friendships, and even marriages. So it is not surprising that the war also led to splits in CPU leadership and policy. Ultimately, the World War led the CPU to reject absolute pacifism and embrace a measured realism. Its leadership committed even more thoroughly to internationalism and to “peace with preparedness,” a position that accepted that militaries and armaments would remain necessities until adequate international law and its enforcement became realities.

A politically astute position, it was embraced by President Woodrow Wilson and former president William Howard Taft; each man cooperated with the CPU in these years, with Taft even joining as a trustee in 1918. Faced with world war, the CPU threw itself into two major new arenas of notable importance: first, peace education for U.S. churchgoers; and, second, the design and promotion of a new organization designed to prevent war, the League of Nations.

The war in Europe created confusion in the United States in late 1914 and early 1915. Given slow communication and travel, as well as the security measures taken by the warring countries, it was several months before U.S. correspondents could even get to the front lines to see conditions for themselves. They were immediately confronted by the horrors of modern warfare, including the scale of the violence enabled
by advancing weapons technologies, such as machine guns, mustard gas, and mortars.

The long-time political and cultural relationship between the United States and Great Britain helped shape news coverage in the United States, even as Wilson called on the country to remain neutral in thought as well as deed. Germany’s invasion of Belgium and its U-boat campaign killed women, children, and the elderly; and British propaganda accused the German military command of a campaign of violence against civilians in Belgium, including rape, the murder and mutilation of infants, and even the crucifixion of prisoners—all gruesomely depicted in war posters in the United Kingdom and United States alike. U.S. journalists did not or would not counter such propaganda, which postwar investigations have since found to be greatly exaggerated or unverifiable. During the first two years of war in Europe, many U.S. political leaders and a swath of the broader public grew increasingly convinced that Germany’s kultur of militarism had caused the war and could only be stopped if the nation were utterly defeated.

In 1915 and 1916 the CPU turned its attention to peace education in the churches and Sunday Schools, a program praised for its innovation by trustee Charles S. Macfarland, who pointed out that peace had not been a significant thread in church-sponsored education before. The CPU organized panels of experts to address seminaries, printed handbooks for Sunday Schools, distributed peace songs, and even held an essay contest distributing $5,000 in prizes. Reinhold Niebuhr won the top prize for seminary students. Though Macfarland said that the peace education pamphlets led to "many a sermon" on peace, he also noted that, "The question is always raised as to how much of the results of such labor reached any further than the wastebasket." Peace education was a program designed to satisfy diverse opinions among the trustees and their congregations. Neither the "extreme pacifists" nor the "more militant" of the trustees was completely satisfied with it, but it managed to keep the CPU united during the rocky early years of the war.

The CPU went far beyond distributing literature, however, also organizing a countrywide speaking tour and rallies in major cities such as New York and Philadelphia in the fall of 1915. The New York Times said that CPU plans included recruiting several thousand ministers from "all the prominent pulpits in the country" to emphasize peace education through the churches and circulate an antiwar petition. The ministers called for the study of the causes of war and methods to prevent it, a world court to resolve international disputes, an international league for the promotion and maintenance of peace, and the reduction of armaments internationally, as

The CPU was wary of creating a culture that glorified war... for this reason the trustees voted to oppose military training for boys in school rapidly as possible, to the point where militaries were suited only for police actions. However, the petition explicitly stated that this last step should take place only when adequate provisions had been made for the strengthening
of international law; the CPU did not expect national leaders to disarm in the midst of war.6

Like their peers in the women’s pacifist movement, the ministers of the CPU’s leadership were wary of creating a culture that glorified war or military leaders. For this reason, the CPU trustees voted to oppose the institution of military training for boys in schools, a measure New York and other states were considering in order to compete with professionalizing European militar-ies. Further, CPU officers participated in a mass meeting held in Carnegie Hall to oppose increasing U.S. military budgets and armaments.7

These were the last major actions taken by the CPU before the United States joined the war. In January 1917, President Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany after it resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, and in April he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. Andrew Carnegie mustered the energy to congratulate Wilson on the declaration of war. Though he had once held high hopes that Kaiser Wilhelm II would cooperate in his plans for peace, in the spring of 1917 he accepted the view that only the complete military defeat of Germany would bring an end to the war. He assured Wilson, “You will give the world peace and rank the greatest hero of all.”8

The trustees and officers of the CPU faced difficult internal divisions over the declaration of war. The CPU, like many contemporary peace groups, had become paralyzed to the point that it could not issue policy messages. The internal stalemate broke by December 1917, when the organization’s leadership reconsidered its plans and methods and issued a report on its new goals and priorities.9

The CPU allied itself wholeheartedly with the Wilson administration and the war effort. The organization put one board member on the advisory committee for the federal government’s pro-war propaganda bureau, the Committee on Public Information, and advertised this alliance on the CPU stationery. The move was no doubt designed to assuage doubts about the loyalty of peace groups during the war, a time when just the word “peace” smacked of disloyalty and even treason to hyper-patriotic Americans.10

In the CPU’s most significant wartime policy move, and in a commitment that would shape the group’s work for decades, the board agreed to promote a “world organization for lasting
peace" to American ministers and the general public through the churches, cooperating with Wilson through work with his personal aide and trusted confidant, Col. Edward M. House. In this way, the organization was able to seize the opportunity to help shape the design of the new League of Nations, an opportunity that a more passive prowar or actively antiwar stance would have made impossible. Like so many other Americans, the CPU's leadership accepted that Wilson's goal in the war was to create democracy and a "just and permanent peace"; this new international organization would be central to that effort.11

Finally, in their December 1917 policy statement, the CPU agreed to cooperate with the League to Enforce Peace, a group that was decidedly realist in its methods and orientation. Led by former president William Howard Taft, the League to Enforce Peace accepted the need for military strength under current world conditions, even as it promoted international arbitration and eventual steps to reduce arms. Taft was a significant force in the Republican party, and the CPU and League to Enforce Peace represented a bipartisan effort toward stronger international law that would culminate in the struggle to pass the League of Nations.12

The changes in policy and orientation finally led to a reorganization of leadership. Trustee and Secretary Frederick Lynch spent part of 1917 and much of 1918 writing a report that recommended "a rather complete change in administration," and the board discussed this move in its December 1918 annual meeting. Dr. Henry Atkinson was installed as general secretary in 1918; under the reorganization, this position functioned as the chief executive. The World Alliance installed Atkinson as its executive at the same time, allowing the two organizations to cooperate more efficiently. Dr. Frederick Lynch became the CPU's education secretary. That year William P. Merrill also replaced Episcopal Bishop David H. Greer as president; Greer was seventy-five and was in failing health. Finally, filling vacancies, four new trustees joined the
organization, including former president Taft and Atkinson. The CPU’s most active element during the remainder of the war was the National Committee on the Churches and the Moral Aims of the War. Echoing Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, its goals included the spread of democracy, a guarantee for the rights and liberties of small nations, and the promotion of international cooperation to “achieve peace and safety to all nations, and make the world itself at last free.”

For this purpose, the CPU launched a speaking campaign designed to reach every man and woman in the country. Through the ministry of diverse Protestant denominations, they reached out for the first time to diverse audiences, including women and African-Americans. In this, the CPU leadership was both prescient and progressive. Women and African-Americans were essential to the war effort in the United States; leaders of both groups worked to promote war industry and pro-war sentiment in populations that had at first been reluctant to join the war. For women, this work would result in winning suffrage after the war, doubling the number of eligible voters after 1919. No one knew exactly how women, who were for the most part less well-educated than their male counterparts, would vote. Educating women in international affairs was important work—undertaken by the CPU and women’s groups—both during and after the war.

In reaching out to African-Americans, the CPU leadership recognized this group’s importance to the war effort and the peace, even if African-Americans were largely disenfranchised in the South. The CPU had no African-American officers or trustees, nor did it make an effort to ally itself with ministers of the predominantly African-American
Protestant groups. In the 1910s and 1920s, some peace and policy-oriented organizations, such as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, were beginning to create advisory positions for African-American leaders. The rights of racial minorities were a key area for contemporary international discussion. By seeking to work with African-Americans during the war, the CPU leadership was showing at least some effort to live up to the ideals of democracy and self-determination that it promoted in its literature.16

The late U.S. entry to the war turned the tide against an exhausted Germany in the spring and summer of 1918, and after the Armistice in November the battle to win the peace began in earnest. As a delegate of the League to Enforce Peace, the CPU’s education secretary, Frederick Lynch, attended the January 25, 1919, proceedings of the Versailles Peace Conference, in which members voted to create the League of Nations. There were no opposing votes, and Lynch viewed the conference proceedings with great optimism.17

The Peace Conference created a fifteen-member committee to draft a Covenant for the League of Nations, and the committee members consulted regularly with the delegates of the U.S. League to Enforce Peace. Lynch was part of an informal working group formulating “the things which the Americans would like to see written into the Covenant.” Lynch noted that their working group regularly included three members of the Versailles Conference’s official fifteen-member Covenant committee, including the radical French politician Léon Bourgeois, Britain’s Lord Robert Cecil, and Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos. Bourgeois and

“Respectable men and women content with the good and easy living are missing some of the most important things in life. Unless you give yourself to some great cause you haven’t even begun to live.”

―William P. Merrill

Rev. William P. Merrill was a Presbyterian minister, author, and renowned composer of hymns, some of which are still sung today. In 1911 he became pastor of New York’s Brick Presbyterian Church, attended by Andrew Carnegie. Along with Frederick Lynch, Carnegie personally chose Merrill to be one of the original Church Peace Union trustees, a post he held until 1953. He was also the CPU’s first president.

One of the CPU’s immediate concerns in 1914 was the increasing danger of war between the United States and Mexico. In May of that year, Carnegie heard Merrill’s sermon on this topic, “The Making of Peace,” and pronounced it one of the best sermons on peace that he had ever heard.

Merrill was a forceful advocate of disarmament, believing that “preparation for war inevitably leads to war.” In a noteworthy 1933 sermon, he argued that the international community’s failure to disarm after WWI had given Germany an excuse to rebuild its military. He was also critical of arms dealers, whom he accused of choosing greed over righteousness and of promoting “war-like thoughts.” However, Merrill was no isolationist. Observing the rise of fascism in Europe in 1938, he proclaimed that “Unless we wrestle mightily for the liberty of others, we shall not preserve our own.”

Merrill believed that the key to winning the struggle for peace and dignity lay with the world’s religious communities. By the time of his death, Merrill was one of America’s best-known clergymen. Today, one of Carnegie Council’s twin buildings—Merrill House—is named after him.
Cecil would both win Nobel Prizes for their work with the League of Nations in the following decades.18

On one memorable evening in Paris, Lynch and his working group met with President Wilson, and “to our delight, he outlined for us the plan of the League of Nations which he personally preferred. He kept us for a considerable time . . . .” Lynch reported to the CPU trustees that Wilson had been impressed by the League’s support among American churches. When Lynch proceeded to London with other members of the working group, they continued to refine the proposed Covenant, and Lynch was gratified by the amount of British and French press attention the working group was getting.19

But Lynch, immersed in dreams of world peace while in Paris and London, was shocked by the mood of American politicians when he returned to the United States:

“One can only say, ‘They know not what they do.’ To desert Europe now would be every whit as disastrous to her as to have withdrawn our troops a year ago and to have left England and France to bear the brunt alone. . . . The English and French see, what some here in America apparently do not see, namely, that to make of any value the victory the Allies have won, the Allies must stand fast together for many years.”20

At home, the CPU’s Committee on the Moral Aims of the War fought vigorously for the League. They sent 80,000 letters to ministers urging them to support the League of Nations; more than 17,000 ministers signed a pro-League petition, which was then sent to the Senate. CPU representatives cooperated with leading educators, women’s club leaders, labor leaders, and prominent politicians to testify on behalf of the League before Congress and to rally public opinion through publicity campaigns. At one point during their lobbying efforts, Senator Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, the Democratic chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, said to CPU trustee Charles A. Macfarland, “You are a minister of the Gospel. Convert Henry Cabot Lodge so that he will stop hating Woodrow Wilson and the Covenant of the League will be accepted.”21

Carnegie was the one man who might have attempted to perform such a miracle, but his health was failing and he died at the end of the summer of 1919. He had lived to celebrate the end of the war and to see his daughter, his only child, get married. He died still hoping that a vigorous League would prevent needless deaths in future wars.22

The Republican effort to defeat the League finally triumphed in 1920. Though some public opinion polls showed widespread support for the League, the Senate was unwilling to relinquish any of its power over U.S. foreign affairs. Looking back on these debates nearly twenty-five years later, during the Second World War, Macfarland passionately denounced the opponents of the League—some within the CPU itself—for succumbing to partisan politics.23

It was only six years after the founding of the CPU, but the world had been transformed. Educated men and women no longer believed that civilized Western culture had evolved past making war; few believed a new era of peace was within their grasp. Indeed, Frederick Lynch warned in 1919 that if the United States did not join the League of Nations, another two million American boys would be sent to fight and die in Europe.24 Yet CPU trustees, aware of the economic difficulties and nationalism rife in postwar Europe, did not descend into cynicism or apathy. For the next twenty years they promoted the League of Nations to the American public and politicians, while simultaneously turning their attention to the plight of minorities and the poor at home and abroad.
The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations was not only a significant setback for internationalism, it was also an indication of the rising power of American isolationism and conservatism—twin ideologies that would shape U.S. politics throughout the 1920s. As Church Peace Union trustee Charles S. Macfarland observed, the devastation of the war in Europe created a deep disillusionment that undermined many people’s faith in human nature, religion, and social progress. Nonetheless, the trustees as a group kept faith with their internationalist ideals of the pre-war years, weathering the attacks of a resurgent American right-wing during the 1920s.¹
Throughout the 1920s the ministers at the helm of the Church Peace Union consistently advocated greater international cooperation, mutual disarmament, and a culture of peace. As the country entered its first Red Scare, these ideas became more controversial, and CPU trustees found themselves at the center of a heated culture war. Opponents argued that disarmament was weakening the United States, preparing it for a communist takeover. In their eyes, pacifists, reformers, and proponents of disarmament were either communist dupes or actively allied with Moscow. Despite vicious ideological attacks, CPU officers and trustees took an assertive role in national politics, testifying before Congress, circulating newsletters and petitions, and attempting to influence both legislators and church congregations around the country.2

An “Educational Agency”: The CPU’s Day-to-Day Work

The 1920s was the CPU’s first decade of peacetime existence, and during this time General Secretary Henry Atkinson saw the Union’s work as that of an “educational agency.” Hoping to win public support for greater international cooperation to prevent war, he focused the organization on lobbying for political change and educating the public, especially church congregations.1

As they assessed the consequences of the Great War, the CPU’s officers became even more passionately committed to peace; their discussions of the war were tinged with a sense of regret that they had not done more to prevent the tragedy. Journalists and activists noted that churches in each warring nation, including the United States, had participated in promoting pro-war, nationalist propaganda. In the CPU’s work with the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work in 1925, participants joined Eastern Orthodox and Protestant churches from all over Europe in professing “repentance” for their “sins and failures for lack of love and sympathetic understanding,” and promised to help heal divisions between nations in the future.4 Atkinson condemned war and realpolitik in the CPU’s annual report that year, saying “War and war theory is inhuman, un-Christian, opposed to every human instinct, and is a dismal and ghastly failure as a means of settling international disputes.”5

With the consequences of the devastation still fresh in their minds, the trustees opposed any measures they considered militaristic or contributing to a “war culture.” They opposed military training in schools and pledges of military service in the oath taken by naturalizing citizens, and even expressed outrage at the creation of military preparedness holidays, which they condemned as an attempt by the “military faction of our Government” to “stir up war spirit.” Only a few years after their wartime cooperation with the federal government, and their praise of the U.S. military as a democratizing force, the CPU trustees had become deeply suspicious of the War Department and any attempts it made to influence peacetime politics.6

Hoping to influence the very young, the CPU continued to fund programs for peace education through art for young children. In the realm of international relations, CPU trustees celebrated the U.S. sponsorship and signing of the Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war, even as they noted that it lacked adequate enforcement. To that end, they saw their own disarmament work as a necessary counterpart to the pact.7

To promote greater international understanding, in 1924 the CPU founded an “Information Service,” which...
created a newsletter issued eight times per year. Staff mailed the newsletter to 15,000 recipients, focusing especially on members of the daily, weekly, and religious press that might want to reprint the stories. One trustee called it “one of the most valuable publications in the country at the present time.” Deeply suspicious of the “jingo” press, especially the newspapers of isolationist William Randolph Hearst, trustees saw the need for news stories that would promote the League of Nations, the World Court, and disarmament. In addition to the newsletter, the CPU operated a research department, which responded to inquiries on international affairs from the press, the ministry, debating societies, and students. 8

Print was a powerful way to reach literate audiences, but the ministers at the helm of the CPU believed that personal contact could be even more powerful. Many of the trustees and officers were accomplished public speakers, familiar with the then-popular lecture circuits that crisscrossed the country. CPU speakers traveled widely, both in the United States and internationally, to meet local leaders and speak to club meetings and congregations. Convinced that change could not be enacted from “a swivel chair in New York,” CPU trustees and a few full-time staff used connections with local ministers and activists to attempt to foster “disciples” in every community. 9

In its New York offices, “unsung women at the typewriter” performed the day-to-day work of the nonprofit, according to trustee and author Henry Atkinson.

Henry Atkinson was an academic, minister, author, and peace activist. Trained in economics and sociology, he was the general secretary of the Church Peace Union for almost four decades, from 1918 to 1955. Atkinson traveled extensively on behalf of the CPU. He spent much time in Europe setting up the framework for the World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches, and in the 1920s he visited India, China, and Japan to survey religions in Asia. There he interviewed Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, among others.

But Atkinson was also deeply concerned with issues closer to home, and never afraid to speak his mind. In a scathing report on the oppression of workers in the Colorado coal industry, Atkinson deplored mine owners as “un-American and un-Christian” for resisting workers’ efforts to bargain collectively for their wages.

Atkinson’s prophetic 1937 book, Prelude to Peace: A Realistic View of International Relations (quoted above), was described by a reviewer as “both an incisive diagnosis of the modern world’s war mania and a first-aid manual for treatment of the disease.” In it, he argued that armaments constituted “the greatest single menace to world peace” and laid out a disarmament program, which, while idealistic, was well-informed and persuasive. Unfortunately it was not heeded. Atkinson served on the boards of numerous organizations that worked to promote the rights of religious minorities, and denounced the rise of anti-Semitism in Germany early on in the 1930s. Following World War II, he was a strong advocate for, and subsequently a supporter of, the state of Israel.
Macfarland. Though the CPU was still decades away from its first female trustee, its Information Service was run by a woman, Miss G. S. Barker, whose official title in 1921 was assistant to the general secretary. Miss Barker ran the CPU office’s day-to-day operations, responsible for overseeing the staff as well as for hiring, creating the budget, and keeping records. In her role as the head of publications, she was also in charge of editing, layout, and proofreading “all printed matter,” and she maintained the mailing list of approximately 12,000 people. Miss Barker worked for the CPU for over twenty-five years, retiring after the Second World War.10

Print was a powerful way to reach literate audiences, but the ministers at the CPU believed that personal contact could be even more powerful and effective. In 1924 speaking “almost constantly,” and Atkinson reported that “almost every man who has been available has been used for every day that his services could be obtained.” One CPU staff member planned logistics for trustees to lecture in states as far away as Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Montana—states that were generally considered part of an isolationist West. Around the country, speakers worked to convince “ministerial associations, businessmen’s clubs, women’s clubs, educational leaders, editors, YMCAs and other organizations” that the International Court would help prevent future wars without compromising U.S. sovereignty. In some cases, trustees spoke alongside Carrie Chapman Catt, one of the nation’s most famous former women’s suffrage leaders, who had since turned to antiwar activism.11

The CPU’s attempts in 1924–1925 to gain official U.S. membership in, and recognition of, the League of Nations’ International Court of Justice illustrate not only the dedication of the trustees and staff but also their multi-pronged approach in attempting to create change. CPU Education Secretary Frederick Lynch, the long-time peace activist and friend of Andrew Carnegie, supported U.S. membership by speaking around the country, sending the text of his speeches to local newspapers, and presenting radio addresses. Nehemiah Boynton, an ally from the Federal Council of Churches, spent 1924 speaking “almost constantly,” and Atkinson reported that “almost every man who has been available has been used for every day that his services could be obtained.” One CPU staff member planned logistics for trustees to lecture in states as far away as Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Montana—states that were generally considered part of an isolationist West. Around the country, speakers worked to convince “ministerial associations, businessmen’s clubs, women’s clubs, educational leaders, editors, YMCAs and other organizations” that the International Court would help prevent future wars without compromising U.S. sovereignty. In some cases, trustees spoke alongside Carrie Chapman Catt, one of the nation’s most famous former women’s suffrage leaders, who had since turned to antiwar activism.11

Carrie Chapman Catt

Church Peace Union trustees presented to a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs a strong appeal urging the United States to join the Court. In November, three trustees met with President Calvin Coolidge to get his support for the measure. Finally, the following year trustees proceeded to testify before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where one canny congressman asked a CPU representative if he was trying to use the House Committee to “set a little fire” under the Senate.13

The CPU’s tremendous efforts, however, did not yield immediate results.
No amount of campaigning would bring strongly isolationist members of the U.S. Senate to support membership in the League of Nations or its International Court of Justice. Throughout the interwar years, the CPU and its allies steadily presented the public with a positive view of the League and Court, a necessary antidote to the caricatures circulated by their opponents, who ranged from tradition-minded isolationists publishing editorials in mainstream newspapers to highly vitriolic anticommunists speaking to clubs and associations, and self-publishing books. Yet, it seems likely that the CPU’s work helped lay the groundwork for American membership in the United Nations years later—after another world war persuaded politicians and the public that international cooperation was not a choice, but a necessity. Away from the League, in the realm of more traditional diplomacy, international cooperation did result in important victories, especially in the area of naval warfare. In the early twentieth century, an ongoing naval arms race both expressed international tensions and exacerbated them. Before the war, Germany and Great Britain had competed to create technologically advanced battleships, known by the apt term “dreadnoughts.” After the war, Great Britain was again an unrivalled naval power, but the increasingly aggressive and well-armed Japan had the potential to challenge American trade routes and colonial possessions in East Asia. In what would become known as the Five-Power Treaty, from 1921 to 1922 Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France agreed to maintain a set ratio of naval tonnage. The United States and Great Britain were to maintain 500,000 tons; Japan, 300,000 tons; and Italy and France, 175,000 tons each. The participating nations agreed to stop building large warships and to scrap old ships. Because older ships could be re-outfitted and used in war, as they had been during the Great War, this was a meaningful agreement to limit both naval size and spending.  

In support of this initiative, the CPU sent postcards to priests, ministers, and rabbis, asking them to sign and forward them to the U.S. Senate, and some 14,000 religious
leaders did so. The Federal Council of Churches, the United Synagogue of America, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, and the National Catholic Welfare Council (a group representing all American bishops) all supported the treaty. Little controversy surrounded its passage, a fact that historians attribute to the nation’s anti-war feeling so soon after the Armistice. It should also be seen as a product of the popularity of the British as close wartime allies and of fears of the Japanese as a “Yellow Peril” who might someday attack the United States from the Pacific.

After the initial naval limitation treaty, however, disarmament became bitterly contentious, and in the mid-1920s anti-communist organizations turned their attention to America’s “preparedness” for war. During the First World War federal officials and pro-war citizens had used journalism, advertising, and public relations tools to whip the population into a “white hot” patriotism remarkable for its conformity, fear, and anger toward Germans, as well as its ability to unite communities behind war bond campaigns, one of the main purposes of the flood of publicity. For some politicians and members of the public, the fear of enemies within did not disappear once the war was over. Instead, they shifted their focus from German militarists to Russian Bolsheviks.16

Indeed, even the well-traveled and highly educated leadership of the CPU was vulnerable to Red Scare fears. Returning from Europe in 1919, Frederick Lynch warned readers that Bolshevism was aimed at world conquest “as much as Prussia ever was, and has more persuasive arguments than Prussia ever had to back the force of arms.” Lynch attempted to use Americans’ fear of communism to gain support for the League of Nations, saying that only a strong international alliance could prevent postwar disorder, a Bolshevik or anarchist Germany and Austria, and another war in Europe.17

Most who feared communism’s spread were not as sophisticated as Lynch; they lacked his education, his experience, and perhaps his sense of ethics. Arguing that communist sympathies lay behind every effort to promote internationalism and disarmament, various group leaders and politicians gained popularity and national stature. Two organizations key to the rise of anticommunism were the American Legion, created for veterans of the Great War, and the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), a self-consciously elite group that coordinated the “antiradical” activities of other, larger women’s clubs. Officers of both the Legion and the DAR attacked the CPU and its efforts at disarmament in a battle over a naval spending bill in 1928.18

The bill was to provide the U.S. Navy with approximately $800 million over eight years to build cruisers, a class of ship that was not limited under previous treaties. Its supporters pointed to the sophisticated cruisers being built by Japan and Great Britain and argued that the United States would be helpless to protect itself or its international interests without such ships. The CPU’s trustees opposed the measure, though they held different opinions on the size of the U.S. Navy. Dr. William I. Hull was an officer in the World Alliance for Friendship Through the Churches and a professor of history and international relations at Swarthmore College, in addition to serving as a CPU trustee. He was a Quaker, a true pacifist, and he opposed all naval spending. Two colleagues who proceeded with him to Washington—Dr. Linley V. Gordon and Dr. Arthur J. Brown—supported maintaining the Navy in the proper ratio allowed by the treaty of 1921–1922, but they opposed expanding it.19

Dr. Hull, who had testified before Congress on previous occasions, seems to have been caught by surprise when
the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, Frederick Britten (R-IL), immediately attacked him by saying that "every copperhead, crank, and slacker in the country is opposed to this patriotic measure." The more moderate CPU trustees tried to intervene, saying they would be happy to answer questions the congressmen posed to Hull, but this effort was ignored by both Hull and the chairman, who proceeded to lock horns. Britten attempted to corner Hull into admitting his opposition to all armed forces. When Hull insisted that he came to testify only against the bill in front of them, and so was opposing only increased expenditures, that Hull had said he saw no reason for the Americans to have fought the British in the Revolutionary War.

Hull’s wife Hannah was an officer in the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a more radical peace organization than the CPU, and the general secretary of WILPF was astonished at the rudeness Hull had been subjected to—and the political fiasco that his testimony had become. She wrote a colleague, explaining that WILPF had decided not to present testimony on the cruiser bill because they had deemed the “atmosphere of the committee unfavorable,” surely a reference to Britten’s hostility to pacifists. She explained further: “This Congress business takes delicacy and technique. It is a job needing trained people. But to our surprise here comes this hearing too late for us to stop it. It was terrible and finally degenerated into an attack on Peace groups.”

After Hull’s testimony, the hearings changed focus from naval spending to peace groups and their suspect allegiances. WILPF was asked to turn over financial records, including salaries, to the committee. Negative publicity spread into the press. The New York Herald-Tribune called Dr. Hull “a confirmed international anarchist,” and outraged members of the public called for the trustees of Swarthmore to force his resignation.

Before the Naval Affairs Committee, the vice president of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Mrs. Sherman D. Walker, and the national commander of the American Legion, Mr. Edward E. Spafford, testified in favor of increased spending for naval cruisers. Encouraged by the same committee
chair who had led the attack on Hull, their testimony presented little information about the Navy, but focused on the threat of U.S. pacifists due to their presumed links to subversive organizations. Mrs. Walker suggested that Hull should be deported—if any other country would have him. Mr. Spafford said of those opposing the expanded Navy: “It makes no difference how high may be their standing in the field of education or of law, they are viewing the situation with a hyphen in their system.” During the Great War, the term “hyphenated Americans” was a pejorative code for immigrants suspected of disloyalty.\(^{23}\)

Perhaps more seriously, the hostile testimony of these leaders and the attendant newspaper publicity provided a national platform for anti-radicals, many of whom suggested that the Church Peace Union, Federal Council of Churches, and World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches were corrupt organizations—out of touch with the American public and serving as dupes for subversives who wanted to undermine U.S. power. This attack and others like it hurt the stature and organizing efforts of reform-oriented leaders from the pre-war years, and they contributed to a narrowing of political dialogue in the 1920s.

The naval spending bill passed, though it was smaller than originally proposed, allowing for the creation of fifteen new cruisers rather than twenty-five, as originally requested. Japan had four cutting-edge cruisers in its fleet. According to CPU trustee Arthur J. Brown, Japan saw U.S. naval spending as a direct threat to its security, and factions in the United States and Japan, especially those urging greater naval spending, saw war between the two countries as inevitable.\(^{24}\)

At the close of the 1920s, after their first decade of peacetime existence, the trustees could review a record of hard work resulting in both triumphs and defeats. They showed little desire to change their methods or agenda. In 1929, General Secretary Atkinson reported: “Our program has become in a large measure standardized and we are simply carrying on the work before us.” Because people around the world were “inured” to war, he said, it would take slow, steady work to create the conditions for peace.\(^{25}\)

Atkinson and his colleagues could not know just how quickly the world’s leading economies and governments would crumble in the 1930s, and how deeply these conditions would challenge the pacifism of the founding generation of trustees.
Facing the “Question of Aggression”: Work for Peace and Justice in the 1930s

The Church Peace Union’s annual report of 1929 did not mention that year’s stock market crash, or the looming threat of economic disaster that it created. By 1932, however, General Secretary Henry Atkinson warned trustees that “World-wide want, misery and hopeless despair are driving humanity to the brink of the bottomless abyss of anarchy.” From 1930 to 1941 the Great Depression—and the political destabilization it caused—would transform not only the work of the CPU but also the way an entire generation of internationalists would look at issues of war and peace.
In some ways, CPU trustees were exceptionally well-informed and insightful, anticipating the major historical developments of their own time. Attuned to international politics through travel, correspondence, and their extensive worldwide contacts, the trustees understood that the Great Depression in the United States had its counterpart in Europe, and they watched the rise of fascism in Germany with concern and repugnance. In Asia, they had paid close attention to Japan’s imperial adventures in the 1920s, and over the following decade they attempted to promote policies to curb its aggression.

Nonetheless, the organization continued to promote U.S. disarmament until early 1940—after Nazi Germany’s takeover of Czechoslovakia; and through 1941 the CPU trustees were reluctant not only to consider military intervention against Hitler’s Germany but even to advocate accepting German refugees into the United States.

Committed to peace, the trustees were nonetheless part of a tragic generation that would live through two of the most destructive wars the world has ever known. They had compromised their principles to support U.S. intervention in the First World War, joining many internationalists in convincing themselves that through its military the United States would be able to spread democracy, protect vulnerable civilians from the German military, and create a more peaceful world order. Like so many of their peers, they wanted to believe in the “war to end all wars.” Then, over the 1920s and especially the 1930s, CPU trustees and the wider public began to realize that in 1917 a “war fever” had obscured some difficult truths. Critics of the war, including veterans themselves, said that nationalism and greed were the true reasons that millions had died; and some alleged that stories of German atrocities against Belgian civilians had been exaggerated. In any event, it was increasingly clear that neither democracy nor international peace had resulted from the cataclysm.

In the 1930s, CPU General Secretary Henry Atkinson led the organization in condemning war and militarism, a stance that led the CPU to ally itself with isolationists in many legislative battles. This coalition was powerful and overwhelming to opponents of disarmament, including the rabid anticommunists the CPU had faced in the 1920s. By the end of the decade, however, the continued aggression of Germany and Japan would split antiwar forces along isolationist–interventionist lines. The CPU embraced American intervention in the form of aid to France, Great Britain, and China, but until the bombing of Pearl Harbor it continued to oppose active U.S. military involvement. After Pearl Harbor, the organization, and internationalism as a whole, would never be the same again.

In the early 1930s the CPU focused on domestic politics as much as international relations. Trustees expressed both compassion and pragmatism as they worked to blunt the effects of the economic collapse—and the political dangers created by widespread poverty and unemployment.

Within a year of the stock market crash, while Herbert Hoover was president, CPU trustees began to promote a greater federal role in the depressed economy. General Secretary Atkinson testified that summer before a congressional committee holding hearings on “Unemployment in the United States.” Representing a loose coalition of church groups, Atkinson supported three bills before the Senate. The first, and most important, would create federally-funded public works programs to build up infrastructure and provide wages for the unemployed. The second
provided for the creation of federal–state employment bureaus that would help workers find jobs more quickly. And the third would expand the capacity of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to gather timely unemployment data. In short but powerful testimony, he declared that the CPU could rely on its operating budget instead of its own funds to provide donations to allied nonprofits that needed financial help to keep operating. Just as U.S. unemployment reached its height in 1932 and 1933, turmoil in Europe began to create headlines. Germany began to create headlines. Its height in 1932 and 1933, turmoil in Europe was in a renewed arms race, possibly heading toward another war. With Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, Germany began to create headlines. With Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, France and Germany began to re-arm along their shared border. Though the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war was only five years old, it was obvious that Europe was in a renewed arms race, possibly heading toward another war. That year, even as the U.S. government sent mothers of fallen soldiers to visit their sons’ gravesites in France, the Chicago Tribune reported that the French were creating new gun turrets and a chain of underground frontier forts along the shared border with Germany. A Frenchman quoted in the Tribune said the Armistice of 1918 had been a mistake: “We just let them up to come at us again.” A similar cynicism infected many Americans. Most wanted nothing to do with another possible European war, which they saw as arising from a senseless nationalist striving for territory and prestige. In response to international tensions, the CPU saw both the need and the opportunity to inspire grassroots antiwar activism, but for many Americans antiwar feeling was inseparable from isolationism. The CPU’s attempts to strengthen the U.S. commitment to the World Court and League of Nations would be defeated again in the 1930s. Miss Barker, asked to critique the CPU’s work, concluded that the organization had failed in arousing church congregations to support new international institutions. Noting the CPU’s exceptional financial and intellectual resources, Miss Barker concluded that a change of direction was necessary. She found a receptive audience among the trustees when she questioned whether holding conferences resulted in “preaching to the converted” rather than building a stronger movement with greater popular support. She suggested putting more effort into engaging the grassroots, asking that CPU speakers go into rural areas and the West. As the head of the Information Service, she had found that many people in remote areas were curious about world affairs and the CPU program. More committed to grassroots organizing than ever before, the CPU cooperated with the Federal Council of Churches (FCC)—still the largest Protestant ecumenical organization in the country—to start a movement to create a peace committee in every church. As a start, each committee was to learn about its own denomination’s official stance on questions of international affairs. In this way, the ministers of the CPU and FCC—often leaders
within their own faith groups—hoped that internationalist views would gain wider circulation. The church peace committees were meant to serve as the center for education and activism that would energize local communities. In a similar effort, working with the World Alliance, the CPU created “cooperating centers” around the country. Most often based in churches, these groups met to study and discuss international affairs, distribute peace literature, contact their local newspapers, and lobby local political officials. There were 844 such units in 1932. Whether they were called “cooperating centers” or “peace committees,” the groups showed the CPU leadership embracing new methods of creating change in order to face the exceptional disturbances caused by the Depression at home and rise of fascism abroad.7

One vital question, perplexing both church peace committees and the CPU’s leaders, was how to protect minority rights in a world of strong national sovereignty. Wilson’s Fourteen Points, widely circulated in 1918, had promoted self-rule for linguistic and cultural groups, but in practice such nationalism was fraught with problems. Since the end of the Great War, CPU trustees in a special Committee on Minority Rights had discussed the problems of religious and ethnic minorities around the world—in Romania and across Eastern Europe, as well as in Belgium, Germany, and even Mexico.8

Cooperating with Jewish leaders such as Rabbi Stephen Wise, an Austro-Hungarian-born American Reform rabbi and Zionist leader, the Committee on Minorities closely monitored the situation of Jews in Germany. General Secretary Atkinson attempted to alert Americans to Nazi abuses of German Jews immediately after Hitler became chancellor. Ahead of many contemporaries, Atkinson understood that the physical assaults on Jews and the economic boycott of Jewish businesses were not isolated incidents, but were with more danger to the peace of the world than almost anything that has transpired in recent years.” He warned the U.S. public that reports of abuses against Jews had not been exaggerated, whether attacks included physical violence or more “insidious” economic boycotts that hurt Jewish people’s ability to make a living. The resolution asked that the U.S. government express its “strong disapproval” of the new regime’s abuses of human rights.9

The CPU was alert to the dangers, but in retrospect it is clear that “strong disapproval” was not enough. The organization did not go as far as the American League for Human Rights, led by the president of New York’s City College, Dr. Frederick B. Robinson. That organization responded to the violence in 1933 by asking the United States to open immigration for German Jewish refugees. This was an extremely unpopular political position, as high unemployment had increased competition for jobs and enflamed anti-immigrant sentiment. Furthermore, anti-Semitism in the United States was beginning to emerge as a potent political force. In the late 1930s especially, isolationist groups and their political leaders made openly anti-Semitic statements in political rallies and even Congress itself.10

The United States never opened immigration for German Jewish refugees, and the CPU seems to have been reluctant to push the issue. At the end of the 1930s, the organization promoted a bill that would allow over 10,000 refugee children from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to enter the
The son and grandson of missionaries, Gulick was born in the Marshall Islands and educated in the United States. In 1888 he went to Japan as a missionary and worked there for twenty-five years, becoming fluent in Japanese and writing many well-known books on Japan. In addition to his missionary work, he also taught in a number of Japanese schools and universities.

In 1913, Gulick returned to the United States because of poor health and began his life-long campaign to improve Americans’ understanding of Japan and to improve the treatment of Japanese-Americans. California, for example, passed laws forbidding first-generation Japanese immigrants from owning land—the only immigrant group in U.S. history to face such a prohibition. Gulick was tireless in his campaign to end such prejudices, publishing numerous pamphlets and books, lecturing to American audiences, and traveling back and forth to Asia on behalf of the Federal Council of Churches and the World Alliance.

In one of his most well-remembered efforts, he instituted a program that sent thousands of American “friendship dolls” to Japanese schools. Many reciprocated, and to this day one can still find Japanese friendship dolls on display in some American libraries. Gulick hoped that even if adults’ attitudes were hardened and difficult to change, children might learn to see past their supposed racial differences to understand one another’s common humanity.

In criticizing America’s treatment of its own minorities, the CPU was more outspoken. Always more popular in the Northeast and Midwest, it criticized the mistreatment of ethnic minorities in the West and South, connecting the oppressive policies of regimes abroad with American violations of the rights of Asian- and African-Americans. Close affiliate Sidney Gulick campaigned for equal rights for Japanese-Americans throughout the 1920s, and the CPU helped publicize his work, exposing the bigotry of the anti-Japanese movement in California and in U.S. immigration law. Gulick argued that U.S. violations of Japanese-American rights were well-publicized in Japan and so energized a thread of anti-American militarism in Japanese politics.12

The committee also criticized discrimination against African-Americans. “America’s shortcomings have lent strength to the reactionary forces in other nations and have nullified many of our own actions,” Atkinson noted. He declared that the nation could not advocate justice for those abroad when it did not provide justice for its own people; and he used this stance...
to justify the CPU’s support for a controversial anti-lynching bill. While some Northern liberals supported the bill and denounced the murders of African-American men in the South, the bill was too divisive for the Roosevelt administration to embrace. Doing so would have risked the Democratic Party’s hold on power, as the cooperation of Southern Democrats was necessary to maintain control in Congress. Only toward the end of World War II and into the 1950s would a broader public begin to connect U.S. treatment of African-Americans with Germany’s treatment of Jews. Here again, the CPU, while not always in the vanguard, showed a consistently progressive approach to social issues. 13

The CPU’s engagement with issues of economic and social justice at home was always meant to support the organization’s work for international peace. And just as its domestic work took place in the midst of a political ferment created by the Depression, so its international work was profoundly shaped by the more activist, radicalized American public of these years. The Depression energized populist movements that ranged across the political spectrum, but they all shared a repugnance toward war. Churches, universities, and women’s groups were especially active grounds for antiwar demonstrations and organizing. Until the late 1930s, measures promoting disarmament and neutrality drew on the combined energies of both isolationists and internationalists; each side was distrustful of the military and eager to avoid any repetition of the Great War.

Influenced by this movement, the trustees supported more radical policies than ever before, including a constitutional amendment, commonly called the Ludlow Amendment after its sponsor, Representative Louis Ludlow (D-IN), which would have required the American people to vote in a referendum before joining any foreign war. The only exception would be if the country were attacked. Peace groups, student groups, and many authors supported the proposal, which was put before Congress several times in the 1930s. Its supporters believed the measure would make foreign wars impossible, but even the most ardent isolationists in Congress rejected the measure as too restrictive, possibly crippling the United States in a foreign policy crisis.14 This more radical antiwar stance was also demonstrated by the trustees’ growing distrust of the U.S. military. One committee even proposed that the group oppose the service of ministers as chaplains in the Army and Navy, a move that outraged the usually staid New York Times editorial staff. The paper compared the service of chaplains to that of nurses, arguing that both provided essential aid to young men in need. The whole CPU board never supported the proposal, but soon thereafter the board issued an official statement that “The time has come when organized religion must proclaim that never again shall war be waged under the sanction of the church”—a repudiation of the CPU’s decision to work with the federal government during the war in 1917. In congressional hearings on disarmament bills throughout the decade, representatives of the CPU and allied peace groups disagreed with military leaders asking for increased budgets. Proponents of disarmament cast doubt on whether the testimony of military officers should be trusted, arguing that because they had been trained to wage war, not peace, they would always ask for greater budget appropriations.15

This distrust was only strengthened by the findings of the Special Committee on the Investigation of the Munitions Industry, popularly known as the Nye Committee, from 1934 to 1936. The importance of this committee’s work cannot be overstated. The Nye Committee publicized both the significant loans made by leading U.S. banks to Britain before the United States entered the First World War and the profits of arms manufacturers during the war. Senator Gerald Nye (R-ND) concluded that the United States entered the war in 1917 to protect its commercial interests. Congressman Frank Kloeb (D-OH) summarized the committee’s findings: “The war cost us 100,000 killed, 190,000 wounded, and $22,625,000,000 directly. The postwar cost to us has been
estimated as high as $200,000,000,000. All that to save an extension of credit of approximately $2 billion, which we were trying to pull out of the fire prior to our entry into the World War.” These and similar ideas blaming “merchants of death” for U.S. intervention provided the American people with an outlet for their anger and disappointment at the outcome of the war.  

In direct response to the Nye Committee’s findings, the CPU joined other peace organizations in calling for a nationalization of munitions manufacturing. The CPU’s trustees explained their position on the issue: “We must attack the institutions which breed war. One of these is private armament firms. They make big profits for their stockholders and are able to subsidize newspapers of the baser sort. Some manufacture war scares and throw the multitude into panic. We can never have a warless world so long as powerful syndicates and an incendiary press are allowed to coin gold out of the people’s fears and hatreds. If guns and warships are to be manufactured at all, their manufacture must be lodged in the hands of governments.” In October 1935, CPU President William Merrill preached a sermon to his wealthy Upper East Side congregation, presenting a choice between “God and Mammon,” in which selling arms represented sinful greed. One of the decade’s more radical antiwar measures, the nationalization of munitions manufacture never passed into law.  

Another measure inspired by the Nye Committee was remarkably successful, however. In 1935, with the support of church groups including the CPU, Congress passed the first Neutrality Act, which forbade munitions makers from trading directly with any nation involved in war, excepting civil wars. With the sinking of the Lusitania in mind, congressmen also included a provision in the law that warned U.S. nationals that they proceeded at their own risk if they traveled on board the ships of warring nations.  

Reflecting the complexity of international affairs in the 1930s, Congress amended the Neutrality Acts four times over the rest of the decade to adjust to changing circumstances in Europe and Asia. President Roosevelt, an internationalist who believed in a more active role for the United States in the world, feared that the Neutrality Acts would tie his hands, but while he supported amending them, he never vetoed them. One amendment in 1937 included a “cash-and-carry” provision, whereby warring nations that could pay cash and ship their own goods were allowed to trade with U.S. companies. Roosevelt supported this change in the hope that France or Great Britain could use it, if necessary.  

In the spring of 1939, after the invasion of Chinese Manchuria by Japan and the takeover of Czechoslovakia by Germany, internationalist organizations including the CPU argued that the Neutrality Acts should be amended again to allow the United States to trade with “victim” nations on a cash-and-carry basis. The acts were finally amended in late 1938 to allow the trade of weapons with any nation on a cash-and-carry basis, a move designed to aid traditional U.S. allies against Nazi Germany.  

Also in early 1939, the CPU’s trustees opposed expansion of the U.S. Navy, which represented America’s only means of military intervention in the wars in Europe or Asia. Dr. Walter Van Kirk, representing forty organizations including the CPU, the Young Women’s Christian Association, and the National Student Federation, opposed an increased budget and new naval base in Guam. As it had in the 1920s, the CPU presented spending on the military as a provocation to other nations and as a detriment to spending on more constructive domestic programs. Not only were these organizations united in opposing Roosevelt’s desire to strengthen the navy, but as their representative Van Kirk also accused the president of taking too much power in foreign policy and asked Congress to take a stronger role in international relations—though Congress was more isolationist than Roosevelt.  

In only a few more months events would shock Americans out of their isolationist “complacency,” as trustee Charles Macfarland called it. In September, Hitler’s tanks rolled into Poland, drawing France and Britain into war. In October, Germany began its air war against Britain. The merciless efficiency and great range of German tanks and bombers shocked the world; journalists coined the term blitzkrieg, or lightning war, to describe their power and speed. Over the next year, Germany would invade the Netherlands and overrun Belgium into France, quickly gaining direct control of most of the country. General Secretary Henry Atkinson responded by urging trustees to face “the question of aggression.”  

The European agents of the World Alliance, reporting on their activities to the CPU in 1940, communicated their sense of disorientation and disaster. Henry Louis Henriod, general secretary of the international office of the World Alliance, reported that his organization
had ceased its usual work, as meetings, speaking tours, and correspondence had become difficult or impossible. Instead, World Alliance agents had turned their attention to the needs of those in refugee and internment camps. In Switzerland, Scandinavia, the Baltic, occupied France, Vichy France, and Great Britain, internment camps held refugees and captured soldiers. Henriod and the World Alliance worked with international charities and local groups to provide them with chaplaincy services. They organized sports and book-lending programs for prisoners in Switzerland, for example, while turning their attention to the more serious issues of food shortages and overcrowding for the estimated one million refugees in Vichy France who had fled before the German army.23

Finally, in June 1940 the CPU’s trustees changed course in a move the press called “radical” for the group. The trustees urged America to give all aid possible to France and Great Britain, short of entering the war, and they called on Americans to resist war hysteria, respect the rights of minorities, and be generous in aid to refugees. Yet the trustees presented a united front in their insistence that entering the war would not help the Allies, nor achieve other “desirable objectives.”24

But events proceeded swiftly. The following summer the group had moved from accepting intervention to promoting it, circulating a pamphlet entitled “Peace Aims.” The pamphlet, reflecting the official view of trustees as adopted at their semi-annual meeting, declared that neutrality was impossible as the war in Europe represented a struggle between “organization by conquest and organization by consent.” Looking ahead to the postwar world, the trustees said that no peace would be possible without justice, and they argued for a “supranational law” and institutions with enforcement powers through sanctions and an international police force. Such a new, international government should be created only with the consent of the governed, they explained, and offices would be filled through elections. The trustees recognized the failure of the League of Nations as they looked ahead to an improved forum for international cooperation.

"People will sacrifice national sovereignty only in proportion to the success of joint efforts to secure for all a practical, powerful, and, at the same time, flexible supranational sovereignty which will be trustworthy and show promise of achieving what their disparate and conflicting national sovereignties have failed to achieve."25

Just as they had in 1917, the trustees faced the new war with conflicting feelings: a sense of bitter failure mixed with hope for the future. Following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the CPU did not hesitate to support the U.S. entry to the war. Yet trustee Charles Macfarland, looking back from 1945, shared his sense of despair as the United States entered its second world war in just over two decades: "Many of us, who had spent the best years of our lives trying to build peace on a firm foundation of cooperation, had been defeated.”26

Though Macfarland blamed isolationism for creating the conditions that led to the Second World War, he also took some responsibility for the CPU’s on-and-off alliance with isolationists in legislation designed to prevent war. He criticized the United States for neglecting the security of its far-off Asian protectorates, such as Guam and the Philippines, and for refusing to use force. "While our destinies became involved in a world order, we sought security by hiding our heads in the sand," he said of the American people—and, to some extent, of the CPU trustees.27
After the attack on Pearl Harbor and following the U.S. declaration of war on Japan, a friend asked CPU General Secretary Henry Atkinson how he could find the courage to continue, given that his twenty-five years of peace activism had apparently come to nothing. Atkinson answered, “The men and women with whom I am working are the men and women who believe that no cause is lost as long as there is one person left who believes in it, and is willing to give his time, his best intelligence, and his life for that cause.”
The passionate engagement and devoted work of the CPU’s staff, trustees, and allies—evident from the organization’s founding—bore fruit in the 1940s, as the organization successfully campaigned for the creation of the United Nations and engaged with issues of minority rights at home and abroad. It was a pivotal decade, a unique opportunity for internationalists and progressives to shape U.S. and world politics.

Atkinson, already in the employ of the CPU for over two decades, emerged from the pressures of these years as a bold, even visionary leader, ready to fight for his chosen causes. More outspoken, more determined, and less palatable to some trustees than he had been in previous decades, Atkinson was the primary figure of the CPU throughout the 1940s. To Atkinson, two key victories were necessary to win the peace: first, the creation of international structures to prevent future wars; and, second, the defeat of the intellectual theories and social practices of racial hierarchy that had been the basis for Nazism. Afraid to repeat the failures of the interwar years, he embraced compromise when necessary to achieve real-world results. If his victories were flawed, they were victories nonetheless.

The Triumph of Internationalism: The Founding of the United Nations

The CPU’s greatest contribution of the 1940s lay in its strong support for U.S. leadership and commitment to the formation of a United Nations. As soon as the United States joined the war, the Church Peace Union turned its long experience in educating and organizing faith leaders, congregations, and civic organizations to a “Win the War—Win the Peace” campaign centered on the creation of international institutions to promote postwar cooperation. Historian Andrew Preston has credited the leadership of American ministers with a significant boost to U.S. internationalism during and after World War II, as their support for the Atlantic Charter, Dumbarton Oaks agreements, and the United Nations gave a moral legitimacy to the push for institutions of world government. And the CPU was an integral part of this campaign. As an organization separate from denominational and congregational politics yet connected to key faith leaders across Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, the CPU was uniquely situated to lead when it came to divisive issues.

To Atkinson, the creation of a new world order was the “overall strategic concept” driving the CPU and its offshoot, the World Alliance, during the Second World War, and he maintained a tight focus on this goal in all of his activities. As one contemporary remembered, Atkinson “frequently had testimony from Washington and all parts of the country that the World Alliance played its part in the change in public opinion in the United States from isolation to cooperation.”

Though a nationwide campaign for greater international cooperation
and a “world government” began as early as 1941, no one knew how this proposal would take shape. Historians have highlighted key thinkers, most notably John Foster Dulles in the Committee for a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches, who worked behind the scenes to create a blueprint for the United Nations and to cultivate support for the organization in the White House and the State Department. Atkinson was another of these thought leaders. He was a member of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), formed from a variety of internationalist leaders from academia, politics, and the ministry. During the war CSOP sent its reports to the Roosevelt administration, and one committee member met with Roosevelt eight times. Eleanor Roosevelt followed CSOP’s activities so closely that she finally joined the group herself, and Dulles acknowledged the organization’s contributions. No doubt Atkinson’s deep understanding of the League of Nations, based on the CPU’s role in its creation and campaigns for U.S. membership, proved valuable to the committee.

The CSOP and similar committees called for the creation of institutions for international cooperation to prevent war and promote world prosperity. By 1942 and 1943 internationalist speakers connected to the CPU declared that this new world order would be comprised of an executive-legislative unit with representatives from member nations, an international police force, strengthened international laws, and a Bill of Rights for nations—all of which would freely join the new international league. A new world order was necessary, advocates argued, to realize President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vision of the Four Freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom to worship, and freedom of speech. Internationalists translated the Four Freedoms into key goals that they believed only a strengthened world government could realize: maintaining the peace, promoting trade and international labor standards, and spreading principles of democratic government.

Of course, the U.S. Senate had rejected the League of Nations, with its similar structure and high-minded goals, after the First World War, and in 1942 Republicans in Congress were already mocking these nebulous post-war plans. Republican Senator Gerald Nye, whose findings on armament manufacture had once so inspired CPU leadership, satirized proposed antipoverty programs, describing the imagined scenario of Vice President Henry Wallace pouring milk down the throats of Chinese people—none of whom wanted milk. Atkinson saw the dangers of latent isolationism in Congress and the public, and he acted to rally religious leaders of the three largest American faith groups behind new structures of international cooperation.

Built on Carnegie’s original vision of interfaith cooperation, the CPU had access to leaders of each group as well as a long tradition of cooperation. Though other faith-based organizations, such as the Federal Council of Churches (a purely Protestant group), represented a much greater membership than did the CPU, they were more limited in reach.

Innovative interfaith cooperation was the key to the most significant CPU accomplishment in the battle for what would become the United Nations. In 1943 the CPU sponsored and published “Pattern for Peace,” a two-page pamphlet promoting post-war international cooperation. Representatives of Catholicism, Judaism, and Protestantism shared authorship and issued separate introductions to the document, which argued that the “moral laws of the universe” supported world organization. Its publication changed the terms of debate, in effect saying that to oppose U.S. membership...
The movement to establish the permanent form for the Church Peace Union, leading to the formation of its first regional office in San Francisco and the hiring of a “Pacific Coast Secretary” to manage its initial budget of $8,000 donated by the Carnegie Endowment and $5,000 from local sources. A small staff of volunteers coordinated efforts to promote internationalism up and down the West Coast.10

The same year that it issued “Pattern for Peace,” the CPU also helped sponsor bipartisan speaking tours, in which one Democrat and one Republican toured the country to promote a new “Council to Win the Peace,” focused on promoting a permanent United Nations administration. Speakers including Missouri Congressman Harry Truman (D) crisscrossed the traditionally isolationist Midwest. After an Iowa tour, Senator Carl Hatch (D-NM) said his Iowa audiences had agreed that the return to isolationism after the First World War had been a “tragic mistake,” and they saw that—like it or not—the United States had a responsibility in world affairs. During one congressional recess, nine separate pairs of congressmen traveled the country on such speaking tours.11
United Nations, supported by Roosevelt at the highest levels, proceeded from such initial agreements as the Atlantic Charter of 1941 to more concrete planning at the Yalta Conference and Dumbarton Oaks toward the end of the war. Finally, in the spring of 1945 some 3,500 representatives and staff from over fifty nations came together in San Francisco for two months of meetings to create the charter for the new world organization. Issues such as the powers of the Security Council and the independence and self-government of colonies created conflict, but world leaders, as well as American internationalists, were determined to make any necessary compromises to ensure the United Nations would include key member states and satisfy enough Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Senate to be ratified. Keen to capitalize on the good feelings generated by the wartime alliance, they adopted the philosophy that something was better than nothing, and hoped that an imperfect mechanism for international cooperation could be improved upon later. Their strategy paid off, as the Senate approved UN membership by a vote of eighty-nine to two in July 1945.

Not everyone, however, approved of the vague language and loopholes built into the UN Charter. Richard Dier, in San Francisco for the Baltimore newspaper the Afro-American, criticized white Americans' defense of the trust estate provisions in the charter. "Despite listening to optimistic speakers for over eight hours, I still came away unconvinced," he told readers. Why hadn't all "dependent peoples" been placed under UN trusteeship and given a path to self-government? To Dier, the UN appeared to be set up to defend empires, not dismantle them. Without resolving the question of minority rights, it was clear that the UN Charter would perpetuate inequality, and so any post-war peace it promoted would be short-lived.

The CPU Fights for the “Double V”: Victory over Nazism Abroad and Racism at Home

The war against Nazi Germany had brought the problem of race in the United States to the forefront of domestic and international politics. Disgust over the Nazi treatment of Jews deepened the commitment of many in his condemnations of U.S. racism during and after the war.

Since the 1910s and 1920s, CPU trustees had taken progressive views on race. They had condemned lynching, the most violent manifestation of white power and hatred toward minorities, chiefly committed by white mobs against African-American men in the South. In addition, close affiliate Sidney Gulick had studied the state and national laws that kept Japanese and Chinese immigrants separate and unequal, and he had condemned anti-Asian prejudices in speaking tours and publications. But in the 1940s, for the first time, CPU General Secretary Henry Atkinson lent his name and stature as the organization's most senior staff member to the issues of racial discrimination in America. As in his campaigns against Nazism, Atkinson showed a sensitivity to the economic impact of discrimination as well as an abhorrence of segregation and racial violence.

Atkinson did not himself take a leading role in the fight against racism, but by acting behind the scenes to try to influence policymakers, and by sponsoring conferences and committees against racism, he provided a platform for others who took a much more aggressive ideological stance. In doing so he allied himself with cutting-edge groups such as the NAACP and the civil rights crusader and prominent African-American politician Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.

Atkinson began his World War II-era civil rights activism with a letter to President Roosevelt on race relations. As always, he was concerned with pragmatic politics as well as ethical considerations, and particularly with the potential for racial conflict during the country’s intense wartime mobilization
against the seemingly invincible Axis powers. As such, he pointed out that there existed "discrimination against the Negroes in the service of their country" in defense work, wartime housing, and the military.15

In highlighting work and housing, Atkinson was focusing on economic concerns that affected hundreds of thousands of African-Americans who had flocked to Northern cities booming with war work only to find discriminatory hiring, artificially depressed wages, and substandard housing. As in the First World War, during the Second World War economic competition over housing and jobs ignited race riots and racial violence in communities that had expanded too quickly for the existing infrastructure. Atkinson suggested that President Roosevelt, who had already created a Fair Employment Practices Commission to address inequalities in war work, go further by ordering the army to form a racially integrated division. The plan originated with the NAACP, and Atkinson supported it as proof to African-Americans at home and critics abroad that the United States was living up to its democratic ideals, and in no way fighting the Nazis in Europe while practicing "the principle of Nazi race discrimination at home." A man steeped in political and social activism, Atkinson surely understood that the success of such an interracial division could be used as a wedge to campaign against segregation in other institutions and to prove African-American equality. Roosevelt’s reply is not preserved, but Atkinson and the NAACP did not succeed in winning a permanently integrated division. Only during the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944 to January 1945) were army divisions integrated temporarily, though even this limited success should be seen as significant and as contributing to the later integration of the military during the Korean War.16

This was a time when many Americans were still in thrall to the same types of racial theory that had given rise to Nazi eugenics. For example, though the African-American physician Charles Drew had developed the blood bank system, he could not persuade the Red Cross to quit separating blood donations by racial categories. Indeed, his attempt to end such a system resulted in his dismissal. Even school textbooks and children’s stories reinforced messages of racial hierarchy.17

In the following year, Atkinson became the co-chair of the Council Against Intolerance in America, a position he shared with congressmen, a Catholic bishop, judges, and leading academics. In this capacity, Atkinson served as chair for a talk by Walter White, president of the NAACP, during an interracial conference on the "grave racial tensions" in New York and around the country, a reference to outbreaks of violence and race riots.18

Soon after the end of the war, Atkinson moved from a sponsor to a speaker at anti-discrimination rallies, lending fiery oratory to controversial topics, including criticism of the Allies. "We will have no peace throughout the world unless we have a law guaranteeing equal rights for all peoples everywhere in the world," Atkinson told a racially diverse crowd in December 1945 at a conference of the American Association for the United Nations. Atkinson
b canned the Allies for putting down the Indonesian independence movement, comparing their actions to the Italian “rape of Ethiopia.” The following year, at a rally for racial justice and equality, Atkinson spoke alongside fiery civil rights activists Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., New York’s first African-American representative and a lifelong advocate of racial equality and civil rights, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress.19

For the next several years, Atkinson would participate in talks and conferences criticizing violence and discrimination against African-Americans; and by the early 1950s speakers at the CPU’s new Merrill House headquarters, on New York’s East Sixty-Fourth Street, would freely condemn racial violence in the South.20

For all its support of equal rights, however, the CPU was notably silent on the issue of Japanese-American internment during the war. Eager to support the war effort, there is no evidence that either officers or trustees questioned the assumption that Japanese-Americans would have loyalty to Imperial Japan, America’s wartime enemy. While tens of thousands of men, women, and children of Japanese descent in the western United States lost their homes, businesses, and possessions, and spent years in crowded and poorly constructed camps, the CPU turned a blind eye, as did the vast majority of the American public. Nor did the CPU protest President Truman’s later decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It appears that, though the CPU could be progressive on many social issues, it was not a vanguard organization. Closely linked to the most powerful politicians, academics, and ministers in the country, its trustees and administrators shared many of their concerns—and were equally blind to some others.

A “Haven of Refuge”: The Board Disagrees Over the Creation of Israel

If any issue could be more divisive than the U.S. treatment of its African-American minority, it was the question of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The trustees and administrators of the Church Peace Union generally enjoyed a harmonious relationship, and officers such as Atkinson and his assistants treated the trustees’ biannual policy statements as mandates that set the agenda for their daily work. During and after World War II, however, CPU support for the creation of a Jewish homeland led to the most serious rift among trustees and officers in the organization’s history.

Since the early 1930s, Atkinson had been agitating against anti-Semitism in Europe and at home. His experiences in Germany after Hitler took power—when he witnessed first-hand the violence and discrimination against Jews—seem to have made a deep, lifelong impression on him. In 1943, after the U.S. public learned of the Nazis’ program to exterminate the Jewish people, the Church Peace Union joined major Jewish organizations as well as the massive labor union, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, in a Madison Square Garden rally urging the Allies to provide a haven for Jewish refugees. The rally—and a similar appeal made by the archbishop of Canterbury directly to the British Parliament—resulted in a British and American conference in Bermuda. Should either nation open immigration to Europe’s Jews and other persecuted
groups inside the Third Reich? There was the possibility that Germany would begin to push unwanted peoples onto its wartime opponents in great numbers, creating a refugee crisis for them to deal with in the midst of the war. Neither nation would accept the political or military risks that such a plan would entail, and the Bermuda conference resulted in no action.21

Atkinson was appalled. He argued that in the face of the Nazis’ murderous program—and the Allies’ murderous inaction—it would be immoral for America’s Christians to oppose the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. “Palestine is the only feasible solution to offer an immediate haven of refuge in this desperate emergency,” he wrote in an article in Reinhold Niebuhr’s magazine, Christianity and Crisis. But as historian Andrew Preston noted, Atkinson underestimated Arab resistance. He saw the arrival of European Jews as a boon to Palestinian Arabs, as he believed the Europeans would be bringing their education, culture, and know-how to the area.22 This position reveals a seeming contradiction in Atkinson’s thinking, one shared by many key liberals in his generation. Though Atkinson campaigned against racial prejudice in the United States, and supported decolonization in Asia, he also maintained a sense of European superiority. The issue of minority rights in Palestine—a problem confronting the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom—would not be resolved as easily as he had hoped.

By 1944 the CPU had hired Congregational minister Carl H. Voss as an extension secretary. Initially, he worked to support Atkinson in campaigning for the United Nations in the "Win the

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CARL H. VOSS (1911-1995)

"Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen."

—Carl H. Voss

Rev. Carl H. Voss was a Congregational minister, author, and founder of the American Christian Palestine Committee, which advocated for the creation of an independent Israeli state. He became extension secretary of the Church Peace Union in 1943, and traveled extensively on behalf of the CPU and the World Alliance. Although he began CPU activities by campaigning for the United Nations, with CPU General Secretary Atkinson’s support he soon turned most of his efforts to campaigning for the establishment of Israel—work that brought opposition from trustee Charles P. Taft, II (son of President Taft), who later resigned.

A Pittsburgh native, Voss held a Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh and also studied at the Chicago Theological Seminary, Union Theological Seminary, and Yale Divinity School, as well as the People’s College in Denmark and the University of Geneva. He served the Congregational Church across much of the Eastern United States, and held academic positions in Israel, Switzerland, England, and the United States.

Following World War II he urged the United States to provide more aid in support of the migration of Holocaust survivors to the newly founded Israeli state. He was also a proponent of a strong United Nations, and the author of several books on religion and Middle East policy.
War—Win the Peace” campaign, but increasingly he began to campaign for the establishment of the state of Israel. Voss and Atkinson believed this campaign was a matter of awakening Christians to their duty to the Jewish people, which translated directly to the formal creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Voss became the executive secretary of a new committee, the Christian Council on Palestine, which had a membership of 2,000 ministers. Its statement of purpose emphasized the desperation of Jewish refugees, describing its main goal as “finding havens of refuge for the millions of homeless, stateless Jews who wander the earth without hope, exiles who have emerged from the Nazi hell after Hitler’s holocaust of 5,000,000 Jews.”

The group pledged to push the Americans, the British, and their wartime allies to honor previous agreements made to establish Israel. Voss’ work included cooperation with the Federal Council of Churches’ influential Department of International Justice and Goodwill. In addition, he traveled the country on a lecture tour that included Texas, Missouri, and Michigan, and reached ever-larger audiences through writing and radio addresses. In his annual report, Atkinson was careful to explain to the trustees that this new organization acted in accordance with the trustees’ own resolutions, even as it was set up as a separate organization from the Church Peace Union and the World Alliance.

President Roosevelt had a contradictory stance on the creation of Israel. To the British and Soviets, he said he supported it; to the leader of Saudi Arabia, he said he opposed it. The Department of War and Department of State both advised him against alienating the Arabs in the region, who might respond to U.S. support for Israel by allying themselves with the Soviets. Roosevelt’s death in spring 1945 brought Harry Truman to office. Then, as now, Truman was known as a politician who acted out of a sense of right and wrong; and resisting the staunch opposition of the State Department, he sponsored studies on the possible impact of Israel’s creation in Palestine.

It was at the peak of this conflict in 1946 that Atkinson and Voss ran afoul of an influential trustee, Charles P. Taft, II. Taft was a son of former president William H. Taft—himself a CPU trustee during the World War I era. A lawyer and Yale graduate, Charles Taft was the scion of a Republican family still active in Ohio politics; he was also a key fundraiser and activist in a variety of social and reform causes. Indeed, Taft had attended the San Francisco conference that founded the United Nations in 1945.

Taft criticized the CPU’s support for the “Palestine movement,” saying he had stopped going to the group’s board meetings because he had “no confidence in its management.” President Emeritus of the Trustees William Merrill, still acting as president until a replacement could be found, rushed to assure Taft that the secretaries of the CPU acted as individuals, not representatives of the CPU itself, and that they were not actually connected with “the extreme Zionist platform,” though he admitted that these distinctions could be confusing to the general public. While perhaps somewhat disingenuous in distancing the CPU from its secretaries’ pro-Israel statements, Merrill staunchly defended his own actions and those of Atkinson. “I can only say that Atkinson and I and others have doubtless made mistakes, but we have tried to be true to the ideals and aims of Mr. Carnegie in establishing the Union. It is not easy to plan and carry on work among three religious bodies, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish.” Merrill encouraged Taft to contact Atkinson directly with his concerns, and to bring them up in detail at the next trustees meeting.

Privately, Merrill confided to Atkinson that he considered Taft a valuable member of the trustees. Perhaps tired out by this controversy between his trusted associates, which he was trying to keep secret from the secretaries and other staff, Merrill confided that the CPU needed to begin planning for his retirement. “We need a young and strong man in that place,” he wrote to Atkinson.
Atkinson was stung by the attack from Taft, whom he addressed as a “friend whose opinions I have valued and still value.” He responded by arguing for his positions and submitting evidence that he had acted in good faith. On Palestine, he pointed out that in 1943, 1944, and 1945 the trustees had thoroughly discussed the CPU’s position and had agreed to the creation of the Christian Committee on Palestine and the hiring of Voss as a half-time spokesperson. In addition, one of his associate secretaries wrote a memo, a copy of which Atkinson sent Taft, stating that Atkinson had never asked his staff to campaign for the establishment of Israel in Palestine.29

But Atkinson could not resist attempting to explain his position to Taft and perhaps convince him of its merits. “It seems incredible to me that we should feel less responsibility now than we did when we were fighting Hitler,” he wrote. As a repudiation of Christians’ historical violence and oppression of Jews, Atkinson argued that modern Christians had an obligation to emerge from a shameful history of anti-Semitism by honoring their agreements with the Jewish people. He was likely referring to the Balfour Declaration, a 1917 document in which the British Foreign Secretary said that his government approved of the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.30 Atkinson pleaded for his friend’s understanding, adding that “It has been my unpleasant duty over the last several years to deal with a number of serious matters on which there are strong differences of opinion,” mentioning the thorny questions of Palestine and of minority rights more broadly.31

Soon after this exchange, Taft stepped down as trustee and proceeded to serve as the first lay president of the Federal Council of Churches, the country’s largest ecumenical Protestant organization, and to became an officer and influential founder of the World Council of Churches, a new organization that Taft and many Protestant leaders around the world saw as a successor to an increasingly irrelevant World Alliance, still funded and sponsored by the CPU.32

This rare conflict among the trustees and officers of the organization shed light on one of the CPU’s most important post-war commitments. In line with presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well as with numerous voting blocks

And at long last, they had achieved the mandate of founder Andrew Carnegie to establish a world police force, law-making body, and court to advance the cause of peace.

The End of an Era

The generation that founded the Church Peace Union had lived through two world wars, but they were reaching old age, and those who survived would soon be retiring. In their lifetimes they had seen peace strengthened and then shattered twice over. The seeming solutions that many Americans had embraced after the First World War—disarmament, isolationism, distrust of a nationalistic press and its atrocity stories—had not only failed but had exacerbated the abuses of militarist governments in the 1930s, leading directly to the Second World War. As they steered the CPU through the difficult 1940s, Atkinson and the trustees embraced domestic campaigns aimed at convincing the public and key decision-makers to create structures of international government. And at long last, they had achieved the mandate of founder Andrew Carnegie to establish a world police force, law-making body, and court in order to advance the cause of peace.

The Church Peace Union had been founded at a time when supporting peace and believing in the imminent end of war was mainstream. But by the end of the Second World War, many felt that peace seemed all too close to appeasement. Over the next fifty years the CPU would change its name and strategies to fit a world in which campaigning for peace meant recognizing that war could be just, and that America might not always be the best judge of such justness.
The 1950s through early 1960s are often remembered as a golden era in the United States, marked by an expanding economy and relief from the pressures of economic depression and war. But for those who were attuned to international affairs, it was also a frightening decade. Only three years after the end of World War II, Henry Atkinson described the deterioration of international politics in his *Report of the Secretaries and the Auditors for the Year 1948*, as tensions mounted between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two years later the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb, giving rise to the U.S.–USSR arms race, and shortly thereafter the United States was at war with the communists in northern Korea. Suddenly, another world war—this time with nuclear weapons—seemed at once both a distinct possibility and an unthinkable tragedy.
Instead of a postwar peace, Atkinson noted the pervasive atmosphere of “war emergency” that would soon have Americans building fallout shelters in their backyards. Torn between his long-time pursuit of disarmament and his support for anti-communism, Atkinson criticized U.S. military spending while at the same time admitting the necessity of a strong defense system. At one point Atkinson compared the United States to Rome during its decline. Overall, Atkinson’s annual addresses had become darker and more backward-looking.2

The postwar world presented new challenges and demanded new approaches. “What have the churches and religious minded people to contribute?” Atkinson asked the trustees, injecting an unusually uncertain note into his annual address. For answers, Atkinson and his fellow board members increasingly relied on A. William Loos, a Dutch-born Congregational minister, who served as the CPU education secretary from 1946 to 1955. As Atkinson entered his seventies and his health began to decline, Loos took on increasing responsibilities, and in 1955 the board named him executive director, the chief administrator for the CPU in its daily operations and in overseeing programming. Loos, part of a new generation of leaders who had not known Andrew Carnegie, would begin a thorough reorganization of the CPU in his first years in this position.3

Loos’ first order of business as executive director was to ensure the continuing quality and impact of CPU programs by attempting to create a development program. He and his top advisors had concluded that the CPU would need more than its endowment to operate as an influential nonprofit in the field of international relations. To this end, he cut expensive projects that no longer seemed effective, including a variety of grassroots efforts. Loos believed the CPU’s greatest opportunity to affect policy was through reaching key policymakers, and he began to aim the organization’s efforts at men and women of influence, especially those in politics and government. Finally, as demonstrated by the change in name from the Church Peace Union to the Council on Religion in International Affairs (CRIA) in 1961, he moved the organization toward a more inclusive international framework of world religions, which he relied on as the basis for a system of ethics that would create the groundwork for world peace.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the staff and trustees of the CPU/CRIA remained devoted to its core principles. Under both Atkinson and Loos, the organization promoted a stronger United Nations, aid to impoverished people around the world, and opposition to communism based on containment and negotiation rather than “roll back”—that is, the belief that the United States should fight to take communist territory. For the CPU, the 1950s presented an opportunity to modernize and adapt to changing times.

“The Free Spirit of Man”: Fighting Communism While Reforming Capitalism

CPU leaders had spoken out against Soviet communism since 1919, when then-secretary and trustee Frederick Lynch had warned that another European war could well result from the communist philosophy of world revolution. Though 1920s anti-communists had attempted to portray the CPU as a “pink” organization, or one that undermined U.S. defenses against communism, the CPU was squarely allied with the anti-communist movement during the 1950s and 1960s. It was not investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee, even though Henry Atkinson’s work for peace and anti-fascism in the years leading to the Second World War had brought him into contact with American communists.4

Anti-communist crusader Joseph McCarthy, 1954
In fact, the CPU joined other religious organizations in denouncing communism; and Atkinson agreed with President Truman that communism was “an instrument for world conquest” that would destroy “the kind of world in which the free spirit of man can survive.” Yet, even as he conceded the need to resist communism’s spread around the world, Atkinson also understood the ideology’s attractions. He recognized that America itself had helped raise the expectations among colonized people that the postwar world would bring not only freedom but prosperity. In the cases of China, India, and South Africa, for example, he told audiences that people’s basic human needs were not being met; and for what he estimated as the half of the world still in poverty, Atkinson saw that communism offered what seemed like a “shortcut to utopia.”

This understanding attitude toward communist sympathizers and allies around the world differentiated Atkinson and the CPU from other anti-communists in America, especially the vehemently anti-communist fundamentalists. Christian fundamentalism was on the rise in the 1950s, and many of its fiery preachers supported a military roll-back strategy. In their view, containment did not go far enough to fight such an ungodly ideology. Under both Atkinson and Loos, the CPU/CRIA was staunchly anti-communist, but it fell into what historian Andrew Preston has called the “liberal” position, marked by sympathy for the attraction of communism to former colonies and the world’s poor.

Liberals criticized the abuses of untrammeled capitalism, highlighted the dangers of ultra-nationalism, and sought ways of working with communists to decrease international tensions. Atkinson’s advocacy of foreign aid to the Middle East in 1954 demonstrated some of the complexities of the liberal position, combining anti-communism with concern for the poor, and sensitivity to anti-colonialism with a commitment to Israel. Atkinson joined religious and labor leaders to ask Congress and President Eisenhower to support spending $350 million to foster regional development in the Middle East; the United Nations would administer the aid, which would include another $150 million raised from member nations. Recognizing the history of European colonialism in the region, the experts who designed the plan explained that they wanted to reorient the Middle East from attraction to “the East and Russia” toward the West, and thus to “advance the security of the free world.” The CPU explained that the aid would help the forty million people in the region, whom they described as living in “virtual peonage.” Careful to protect Israel, the CPU asked the U.S. government to refrain from arming the governments of the region, and said the aid should be contingent on the Arab nations’ acceptance of Palestinian refugees and a peace treaty with Israel.

Of course, events did not turn out quite as Atkinson and his allies had hoped. Although the United States did provide significant aid to nations in the 1950s, including Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, the region remained volatile, with leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt trying to gain advantage by dealing with both his U.S. and Soviet allies, a strategy that exacerbated tensions leading to the Suez Crisis in 1957. Nor did the U.S. refusal to arm anti-Israeli governments prevent ongoing strife between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Like Atkinson, A. William Loos took a thoughtful approach to anti-communism. As education director, he edited the CPU’s 1953 pamphlet “Communism and the West—the Basic Conflicts,” which attempted to add greater nuance to contemporary debates in the country. Loos asked readers to think about how to avoid another global war and how to alleviate conflicts with communist Russia. Loos and author John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary agreed with conservatives that communism represented totalitarianism and atheism and so had to exist in tension with what they described as the pluralism and Christianity of the West. But after outlining the conflicts of the two
different economic systems, Bennett and Loos pointed out that tensions were aggravated by the nationalism of both Americans and Russians—a thinly veiled criticism of the most stridently anti-communist Americans.9

In the hope of averting a nuclear disaster and finding a common ground with Soviet leaders, in 1960 Loos helped write the proposal for an influential series of U.S.-Soviet conferences that would become known as the Dartmouth Conferences after their first location. Working with Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, Loos proposed that the USSR's intellectual and cultural leaders meet with counterparts from the United States to exchange views, get to know one another, and tour the "enemy" country. While these were not official summits, behind the scenes they had the endorsement and cooperation of the State Department. Loos took part in two such conferences: the first held at Dartmouth and the second held in the Crimea. Author James Voorhees has praised these conferences as an important step toward peace because they promoted a “multilevel dialogue” outside official state channels.10

A New Generation of Leaders

During the controversy over the creation of Israel in 1946, the CPU's president of the board of trustees, William Merrill, had said his office demanded a younger man's strength and energy. Entering his late seventies, and after serving as president for over thirty years, Merrill's health was flagging. By 1950 the board had selected Ralph W. Sockman for the position.11

Sockman did not immediately implement changes in the CPU's ideology or activities, but his succession was important. He was the first president of the trustees from a new generation that had had no contact with Andrew Carnegie. Born in Ohio to a farming family, he moved to Manhattan, earned degrees at Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary, and led Manhattan's Christ Church United Methodist on Park Avenue. A star radio preacher, his weekly show National Radio Pulpit reached Americans across the country, and he received some 30,000 pieces of fan mail a year. Known for connecting Christian principles with everyday life, Sockman was also the author of many popular books and a professor at Union Theological Seminary. His leadership helped bring the CPU into the late twentieth century, most notably through the appointment of A. William Loos as executive director.12

Sockman respected Atkinson's role and leadership while the older man remained the organization's general secretary, but Atkinson could not maintain the pace of earlier years. A letter from John Inman suggests that Atkinson was losing his memory and suffering from dementia. After retiring at age seventy-eight, he spent his last years in a Baltimore hospital, and he died in 1960 at age eighty-two.

As education director under Atkinson, Loos had taken on a few responsibilities previously held only by the executive director or general secretary, different titles for what was essentially the organization's chief executive officer. For example, Loos addressed the trustees directly in memos on policy issues and also led a reassessment of the education program. Once Atkinson retired, the trustees moved quickly to appoint Loos as his successor. Loos had a doctorate from Edinburgh University, and was at once “very strict” and yet “accepting and supportive,” as his assistant Ulrike Klopfer remembered. While his formal manners could be intimidating, a wit and warmth lay underneath. Under Loos the organization's overarching goal was to stimulate dialogue, and this meant moving away from the CPU's historical orientation of working for social change through ministers influencing their congregations.13

As soon as the trustees appointed Loos as executive director in 1955, they moved to reevaluate the CPU's relationship with the World Alliance for Friendship Through the Churches (World Alliance), the organization set up and funded by the Church Peace Union six months after its own founding in 1914. The trustees suspended publication of the World Alliance newsletter and funds for its programs, with the exception of payments to long-term Alliance staff. When Carnegie established the
CPU, he had believed that international exchanges and conferences among religious leaders would help lead to a new era of peace, but each world war had demonstrated the vulnerabilities of religious leaders during nationalist and totalitarian crises. Furthermore, the creation of the World Council of Churches by ministers in Europe following the Second World War made the World Alliance appear obsolete, and even a few key World Alliance leaders had joined the World Council and were arguing for disbanding the CPU’s World Alliance.  

Atkinson had fought attempts to disband the World Alliance since the 1940s. The older CPU leadership, including former president of the trustees William P. Merrill, believed the World Council was no replacement because it was too closely tied to the Protestant denominations. This limited its work in terms of interreligious cooperation, and it also meant its leadership would be less likely to embrace cutting-edge, controversial reforms. By operating outside denominational frameworks, the World Alliance had been less answerable to hierarchies and congregations, and so could provide pressure on key issues from outside these frameworks. Atkinson had devoted tremendous energy to the World Alliance over the course of his career; according to one estimate he had spent half of each year working in Europe. It appears, however, that after the Second World War the World Council of Churches had grown so quickly, and had created such enthusiasm among European ministers, that the World Alliance had become moribund.  

Under Loos, the Church Peace Union reevaluated other practices it had been following for decades. Already as education secretary, he had decided...
to focus on one youth conference per year; and once he became executive director the CPU ceased its 1930s and 1940s-era attempts to create grassroots change through committees in every church. This change reflected new realities in U.S. politics. In the early days of the Cold War, international affairs had become an arena of technocratic expertise. With the U.S. and the USSR dividing the world into spheres of influence, understanding the economic and political relationships connecting nations in contested regions around the world had become very complicated. For example, understanding the U.S. military’s reach—through international bases, military alliances, the navy and air force, and nuclear weapons—became vastly more difficult in the 1950s than it had been in the 1930s, when lower military budgets and strong isolationism meant it was relatively easy for a layperson to understand and debate the size and strength of the navy, then the primary means of U.S. military engagement around the world.

The government’s increasing reliance on “soft power”—that is, foreign aid of various types—further complicated Cold War relationships. More and more, the United States sought to strengthen its alliances by sharing technological know-how with poorer regions of the world, hoping to prevent communist revolutions by helping people to grow better yielding crops and to develop reliable sources of energy. How could the ordinary American possibly keep up with these combinations of hard and soft power, different for each region and country, and reliant upon an understanding of science, economics, and weaponry?

Both Atkinson and Loos expressed frustration with the increasing distance of the State Department from the American people in the 1950s. As the U.S. government wound down its World War II-era campaigns for winning the war and establishing the United Nations, the State Department began to hold fewer meetings with nongovernmental organizations. Loos wanted the CPU to take a role in helping the American public understand its own government’s international policies, and he also wanted to shape policy discussions at the highest level to be sure that men in power considered the ramifications of their decisions through an ethical and religious framework.

Finally, as Loos gained increasing responsibility at the CPU/CRIA, he wanted to increase the organization’s effectiveness while at the same time cutting costs. To do this he sought to create change among social leaders who would then sway their own constituents. Loos explained his ideas to the board in early 1962. He disagreed with Walter Lippman, whose Essays on the Public Philosophy had posed mass opinion as a threat to the informed decision-making of an educated political class, but he also disagreed with C. Wright Mills, who feared the concentrated power of what he called the “power elite.” Loos explained that he agreed with David Truman, who saw intervening structures in society that mediated between the elite and the general public. These institutions included “corporations, trade unions, churches, and professional societies, the major media of communication, the political parties, and, in a sense, the principal state and local governments.”

What was now called the Carnegie Council on Religion and International Affairs would “reach into this intervening structure” to find people to participate in its seminars and read its printed matter. Loos argued that this work was crucial, because many people in power did not recognize their own influence, and so could misuse it. Still others, aware of their responsibility, were too isolated from ideas beyond their own and were not using religious or ethical frameworks in their decision-making. To create constructive change, the CPU should foster “authentic dialogue” among these intervening ranks of society.

When Loos expressed his satisfaction that in the organization’s seminars on foreign policy “the level of registrants has been raised,” he implicitly accepted the political science division between an informed elite and an uninform mass public. He celebrated the involvement of “high levels of leadership.” But Loos was by no means dismissing the rest of the public. Rather, he hoped that reaching out to powerful men and women, including lawyers, business people, and labor leaders, would “decrease the alienation of the American public from Washington.” Nonetheless, his sense of political change was clearly oriented more toward people in power than his predecessor’s, a change that reflected both new political realities and postwar theories distrustful of mass political movements.

The two greatest endeavors of Loos’ early administration—the creation of Worldview magazine and the launch of a series of Washington “Consultations on the Soviets”—were designed to affect those with the capacity to enact political change, especially a circle of leading religious leaders, academics, government employees, and politicians.
Deepening the Conversation

As he looked back on his tenure as executive director, Loos cited the creation of Worldview magazine in 1958 as one of his greatest accomplishments. He had transformed the organization’s newsletter, mainly a house organ, into a journal of opinion with influence that could be judged by the number of reprints of its articles and the number of people quoting and discussing it.20

The initial issue of Worldview was modest in appearance, dark in tone, and ambitious in intellectual goals. Looking more like a pamphlet than a magazine, it was twelve black-and-white pages. CPU leaders felt that a yawning chasm separated the realms of religion and politics, and this journal was one of Loos’ most intensive efforts to bring the two together. First edited by Catholic layman William Clancy, the CPU’s new education director, its early issues presented analyses of foreign affairs from a variety of religious as well as secular points of view. The magazine’s editor said its founding was inspired by the troubled world of jostling nation-states and thermonuclear weapons. “We hope it will be read,” he concluded simply.21

In its first year of existence, Worldview had a subscription list of 700; Loos and Clancy wanted that number to grow to 5,000. “We recognize that what we are looking for is a highly selective leadership,” Loos said; as prominent supporters of the magazine, he cited Democratic activist and historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray, diplomat Frank P. Graham, and the philosopher and social theorist Will Herberg. Each man qualified as a major public intellectual.22

Herberg was a former Marxist who would become an editor of the conservative National Review in the 1960s; Schlesinger, a staunch liberal Democrat, was a close advisor to John F. Kennedy. Both could support Worldview because the magazine presented multiple perspectives on controversial issues. Worldview presented opinions and analysis on the Vietnam War, for example, but it never threw its weight behind the antiwar movement. Likewise, as it published a special issue on birth control in 1960, it included opinions from the National Catholic Welfare Conference, which represented U.S. cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, as well as Protestant and Jewish thinkers, and the former research director for Planned Parenthood. Loos noted that the New York Times itself had cited the special issue.23

Maintaining a neutral political stance was important for the organization. In 1960 it filed to renew its tax-exempt status in New York State, and as such it had to pledge to use its funds for “exclusively charitable and religious activities”—in other words, not for lobbying. In fact, its representatives had to promise not to “attempt to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise,” and even to refrain from urging members of the public to campaign for or against pending legislation. Ulrike Klopfer remembered the importance of this policy, explaining that as a nonprofit the organization had to stay away from advocacy. This was a significant departure from the more freewheeling early years of the CPU, when trustees and staff had regularly testified before Congress in order to influence legislation.24

Public advocacy was now off limits if the organization’s nonprofit status was to be preserved, so Loos sought to change policy through broadening the perspectives of policymakers by bringing them into contact with philosophers and religious scholars. To this end, Loos launched a series of high-level, off-the-record conversations in Washington in 1958. Initially called the “Consultations on Negotiation with the Soviets” and later simply the CRIA Consultations, these lectures and discussion sessions covered a range of current events, including the U.S. relationship with China and Cuba and the Berlin Crisis of 1959.25 Loos created the Consultations with Ernest Lefever, whose knowledge of Washington politics would prove invaluable. Lefever, a minister with a Ph.D. from Yale Divinity School, had spent 1945 to 1948 supervising YMCA welfare work with German prisoners of war. Raised a
pacifist, he later said that a visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp transformed him into a supporter of national self-defense. He would wrestle with questions of human rights, religious ethics, and war for the rest of his life, making a career in international affairs. Lefever drew up the proposal for the first consultation, held in early 1958.

Loos and Lefever wanted to attract congressmen, cabinet members, and high-ranking members of the press to conversations with academics and religious leaders. Thanks to Lefever, the first consultation was strategically held at a location neither too close nor too far from the Capitol. This, Lefever wrote, would prevent people from popping in and out of their seminars to pursue their work on the Hill. All conversations would be off-the-record so that those seeking re-election could speak without worry about future ramifications. Lefever cleverly maximizing the number of speakers in order to attract powerful members. The very first Consultations a great success. “These men are always talking to each other, and it is exceedingly important to get them talking on a deep level with specialists from outside the government,” he reported to the trustees. The records of the discussion held in March 1959, which focused on the Berlin crisis, show how important these meetings were to participants. The U.S. confrontation with the Soviets over the fate of West Berlin had reached a crescendo of tension, and attendees—including Representative George S. McGovern (D-SD) and Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY)—discussed ways to prevent World War III. They considered whether the United States could defeat the Soviet Union using conventional military forces and traditional weapons, and even whether it should accept a Soviet annexation of West Berlin in order to mobilize public opinion to increase the U.S. military budget. Joining the elected representatives in the room were leading political philosophers, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, as well as representatives of the Catholic Association for International Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Participants believed their wide-ranging discussion was so useful that they circulated a summary among members of Congress and senior State Department personnel—but they made sure no names of the discussants were attached.

Finally, just over five years after he became the executive director, Loos led the move for the Church Peace Union to change its name to the Council on Religion in International Affairs (CRIA). The name emphasized the broader goals of the organization: to educate key members of the public, as opposed to reaching out to church congregations through ministers. Furthermore, “Religion” was more inclusive than “Church.” While Loos would consistently refer to the Judeo-Christian tradition of the West as providing an ethical framework for international affairs, he and his staff were expanding the organization’s contacts with religious thinkers from Asia, including both Buddhists and Hindus. Loos also ensured that Catholics were well-represented in staff posts, Worldview articles, and as speakers in the Consultations. The decision to drop “Peace” from the title was also significant. It reflected the organization’s shift in focus from advocacy to education, and it gave the group the appearance of political neutrality so essential to receiving the tax exempt status needed for fundraising and expansion.

By 1962 the Church Peace Union no longer existed. Under the firm guidance of new executive director Loos, it had shed old programs and readied itself for expansion. Trustees had dissolved its decades-long relationship with the World Alliance, its chief international program, and they had sacrificed their freedom to testify for and against legislation. Through Worldview and the Washington Consultations, CRIA had begun the outreach to key opinion- and decision-makers that would become a hallmark of its work in bridging the chasm between religion and realpolitis.
CHAPTER SEVEN


At the end of a 1967 CRIA conference on the role of the churches in foreign relations, one participant concluded: “If we do not understand why people are desperate and question the priorities of our nation, and therefore undertake desperate action, we do not understand the nation in which we live.”
With debate ranging from the role of just war theory and the war in Vietnam, to the dilemma of choosing to obey one’s government or one’s conscience, to the question of who should speak for the churches and how the churches should function in modern society, the conference featured academics, State Department representatives, a *New York Times* reporter, and leaders of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths. No resolutions could be adopted, as participants disagreed passionately about every issue raised. Yet the intense discussion was itself a victory for CRIA leadership, who were committed to deepening dialogue among members of government, journalists, and religious leaders as a means of strengthening the American commitment to internationalism.²

Under the leadership of A. William Loos, CRIA’s officers and board attempted to stand a principled middle ground during these exceptionally tumultuous years. The Cold War remained the central focus of all foreign policy, but protest movements and revolutions around the world were exploding the simple binary of communism and autocracy versus capitalism and democracy. CRIA’s leaders had long been sympathetic to the U.S. civil rights movement, the plight of impoverished peoples, and decolonization; and throughout the 1960s and into the mid-1970s they engaged with more radical questioning and more complex debates than they had in the immediate postwar era.

At the same time, however, Loos and the board grappled with limited funding and the problems of creating a new development program. Though public interest in international affairs was at a high point, the Council could not afford to spread itself too thin. Loos kept questioning how best to use the funds at his disposal, focusing especially on education and exchanging ideas through conferences and publications. The Council moved flexibly to engage with the most important topics of the era, with evidence suggesting that it had an impact disproportionate to its size.

**Influencing Policymakers and Informing the Public**

By the late 1960s participants in a CRIA Washington Consultation questioned whether the U.S. democratic experiment could survive. If social leaders embraced civil disobedience, one speaker asked, what would come next—a dictatorship of the Left or the Right? CRIA programming in these years took on a special significance because it brought together men and women who disagreed, and yet were able to remain civil enough to exchange ideas. The organization’s commitment to neutrality over advocacy gave it a special role as a trusted source of information, a vital quality as political opponents offered different facts and versions of events.³

CRIA programs followed the same basic outlines as in previous years. Its Washington Consultations brought officials, legislators, and staff into contact with religious thinkers. At the same time, the Council hosted a series of seminars that were short conferences held in regional centers that brought various experts together with local leaders from business, education, and the churches and synagogues. Trustee Hans Morgenthau helped guide the themes and content of these seminars; and as one later Council member has noted, his contributions brought “realist thinking into the earlier idealism of the CPU.” The primary purpose of the seminars was to support democracy by educating local leaders who could guide political decision-making and fuel consensus in their communities. Loos and the other CRIA officers believed this would strengthen U.S. internationalism and the ties between the government and the governed. In both the Washington Consultations and the seminars, discussions were private and off-the-record so that attendees could feel comfortable asking questions and exploring new, possibly unpopular ideas.⁴

The seminar series presented new directions for the organization. In 1969, Loos pointed out that the seminars had reached into the southeastern United States.
William Loos was a Congregationalist minister. He joined the Church Peace Union in 1946 as education secretary, rose to executive director in 1955 (making him its de facto chief), and was named president in 1963. Loos ran the organization for almost twenty years, retiring in 1974. Under his leadership, in 1961 the CPU changed its name to Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA), reflecting a wider focus on a range of ethical issues in international affairs.

In his early years at the organization, Loos made many trips abroad on its behalf to Europe, Canada, Asia, and the Middle East. He launched *Worldview* magazine in 1958, and other initiatives included a series of Washington-based seminars known as CRIA Consultations for government personnel, academicians, and religious leaders. In spite of objections from some board members, he also created CRIA Conversations—monthly off-the record presentations by well-known speakers on international affairs, held in the Council’s boardroom. These quickly became a great success and evolved into today’s Public Affairs Program, whose events are open to the public and are recorded for a worldwide audience.

Loos occasionally wrote for *Worldview* magazine and other publications, and published several books and edited volumes, including *Two Giants and One World: A Discussion of Soviet-American Relations* and *Religious Faith and World Culture* (1951), which continues to be in print more than sixty years later.

States for the first time, and they had involved a broader swathe of local professionals. In an additional departure from the standard format, the inclusion of military officers and consultants among seminar speakers signaled an important change. The leaders of the Church Peace Union of the 1920s and 1930s had not trusted military officers to testify impartially on questions of military strength and budgets. After the 1950s, however, as an organization attempting to educate and foster conversation, CRIA welcomed the participation of military officers. In fact, in a 1961 letter Loos praised the ethics of military officers as superior to those of civilians in charge of the military.1

The chief publication of the organization during this period, the monthly *Worldview*, continued to grow under the editorial direction of James Finn. In 1964 it expanded from twelve to sixteen pages, and it began to transform into a more professional-looking publication, complete with more sophisticated graphic elements. *Worldview*’s editorial staff also changed, with James Finn becoming editor in 1961, joined by Susan Woolfson as an editorial assistant in 1962. The new staff remained dedicated to the magazine’s original goal: presenting an intelligent reader with multiple viewpoints and in-depth information on crucial foreign policy questions. And while its subscription list grew only slowly, its influence began to expand as it was increasingly cited in other journals and publications.8

While in the 1960s Loos made optimistic projections about the growth of *Worldview*’s subscription list, by 1973 he admitted that its growth had been slower than he had hoped. However, the news magazine’s survival was itself
a victory, Loos noted, for by the 1970s similar publications were closing. He defended the magazine's "tremendous impact," its number of new subscriptions (373 in 1973), and most of all its value in enhancing CRIA's reach and reputation. "I think it ought to be recognized that this journal is worth many thousands of dollars in public relations to a small organization with modest resources which not only aspires to be but must be a national organization if it is to be effective."7

Loos' need to defend the publication centered on its expense. Like virtually all such niche publications, and a great many larger ones (for example, The Nation on the Left and The National Review on the Right), Worldview was not self-supporting but rather received tens of thousands of dollars in public relations to a small organization with modest resources which not only aspires to be but must be a national organization if it is to be effective.8

CRIA had ventured into fundraising only in the 1950s, and its development program advanced slowly, with some missteps, into the 1960s and 1970s, yet the program's importance cannot be overstated. The success of fundraising efforts was crucial to the continuation and expansion of quality programming, but neither Loos nor his staff had much expertise in this area. In 1963, Loos said development efforts would focus on "individuals (familiar), corporations, and family foundations." He believed that CRIA's "excellent" reputation among those in the know in foreign policy circles could be extended, and he had high hopes for the success of a direct mailing campaign. He reassured trustees that the organization would not pursue "mass publicity," but instead outreach to "the select few." In 1966, however, Loos admitted to trustees: "Our development program is advancing very slowly. We have had to learn that this task is more difficult than we could have imagined."9

CRIA cut costs by closing its regional offices. Opening regional offices was an experiment begun on the West Coast during World War II as part of the effort to campaign for the United Nations. With a part-time director and a largely volunteer staff, the founding of the West Coast office was a response to the public demand for information and the need of activists for direction. Over the 1950s the West Coast office expanded and more regional offices were created, including one in the Midwest. Loos credited these offices with showing that CRIA was not simply an "East Coast Establishment" organization, but one with nationwide concerns and reach.

And while financial reality necessitated the closure of both the California and Midwest offices in 1969, Loos did not see this as a retreat to the East Coast but simply as a way to remain efficient. To ensure that CRIA maintained a
national focus, it would hold seminars around the country. CRIA’s officers sought to extend the organization’s reach in other ways as well. For example, CRIA’s leadership supported equal rights for African-Americans throughout the 1960s and 1970s; and in 1965, Loos served as national chairman of the Council for Christian Social Action and was a member of the Committee for Racial Justice Now of the United Church of Christ. Speakers and participants at a 1967 CRIA conference agreed that prejudice against African-Americans was an “undisputed evil,” which justified civil disobedience.

As the United States became more integrated, so too did CRIA, with increasing numbers of women and African-Americans invited to participate in events and contribute to Council publications, as well as to join the staff and board. Years after Miss G. S. Barker had retired from her work overseeing publications for the CPU and administering its office, CRIA hired Susan Woolfson, a Vassar graduate, to work at Worldview. And, like Barker before her, Woolfson ultimately spent more than two decades at the nonprofit and rose through the ranks, eventually becoming managing editor. Area experts who spoke and wrote for the organization included a few women, such as Betty Goetz Lall, an expert on nuclear arms and disarmament. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, women and African-Americans were invited to oversee the Council by holding places on the board of trustees. Of twenty-eight trustees in 1973, three were women—one of whom was Jewel LaFontant, an African-American lawyer from Chicago who was a founding member of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), an officer in the Chicago NAACP, and a civil rights activist who helped integrate Chicago through sit-ins at local restaurants. She was also a prominent Republican. While on the CRIA board she served as deputy solicitor general for Richard Nixon.

As Loos and the trustees expanded Worldview and other programming, diversified CRIA’s staff and leadership, and re-started its fundraising program, it also faced one of the greatest challenges to its policy of political neutrality: debate over the Vietnam War. CRIA at the Crossroads: The War in Vietnam

By the middle of the 1960s religious leaders were bitterly divided over the war in Vietnam, and their public debates helped precipitate a national crisis of conscience over the conduct of the war. In the Catholic Church, the strongly anti-communist Cardinal Francis Spellman traveled to Vietnam in 1965 to support the troops and the cause. The same year, Catholic priest Daniel Berrigan joined Lutheran minister John Richard Neuhaus and Rabbi Abraham Heschel to form Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam. Martin Luther King, Jr. would become national co-chair two years later. Surveys showed that a majority of American Jews opposed the Vietnam War; and the World Conference of Churches, a Protestant body, condemned America’s role in the war. Yet Evangelical Christian leaders and churches, and tradition-minded Americans of all faiths, believed it was necessary to support the president in time of war, condemned antiwar protesters as disloyal, and saw the spread of communism in Asia as a threat to religion and morality worldwide.

As with clergy and religious leaders, so with the laity. The opinions of ordinary Americans regarding U.S. involvement in Vietnam centered on ethical and religious questions, and so churches and synagogues had resumed their vital role as a platform for discussions on American foreign policy. Controversies surrounding the Vietnam War dominated CRIA’s work from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s; and while the organization focused its publications and programming on many other issues,
discussion of these topics frequently circled back to the war. Indeed, discussions became so heated, as military officers and peace activists debated, that CRIA officers scrambled to institute new rules to be sure that all sides could be heard.14

In public political discussions, the terms of debate—and the rules of engagement—had changed tremendously from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. In 1962, Loos participated in an ABC television special on “The Churches and Communism,” in which he lent his moral authority to containment when he explained that he supported the expansion of U.S. defense capabilities as necessary to stop a worldwide communist revolution. Just eight years later, however, Loos seems to have lost his faith in the traditional Cold War strategies and outlook, telling trustees, “We must avoid the black-white fallacy . . . . We must begin by giving up our absolute thinking in terms of black-white, good guys and bad guys, total virtue on one side and total evil on the other, complete victory and unconditional surrender in time of war.”15

To a contemporary audience, this quote clearly condemns the most hawkish approach to the Vietnam War. But Loos’ change of perspective was not unusual. A majority of Americans turned against the war after the 1968 Tet Offensive, when the North Vietnamese attacked South Vietnamese and American troops during the Vietnamese New Year celebrations, thus dramatically contradicting the Johnson administration’s claims that the North Vietnamese would soon be defeated. The negative public response led Johnson to promise to cease bombing North Vietnam above the twentieth parallel and to limit the number of U.S. troops sent to Vietnam. Both CRIA’s publications and its trustees’ statements of this period hint that many within the organization disapproved of the war. Trustee and public intellectual Hans Morgenthau condemned the Johnson administration’s conduct of the war as early as 1965 with an article in the New York Times Magazine entitled “We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam.” While Worldview presented opinions from a wide variety of scholars and experts, James Finn’s editorials highlighted the war’s disproportionate impact on poor and working-class Americans who bore the brunt of the draft; predicted that the public and politicians would abandon Great Society programs as the costs of the Vietnam War mounted; and provided a counterpoint to those who condemned conscientious objectors. Finn consistently used his position as editor to highlight the opinions of antiwar intellectuals and
Loos believed that if civil rights groups turned their attention to Vietnam, it had the potential to “blunt the sharp-cutting edge of the civil rights movement.”

Loos himself remained carefully neutral in public, regarding debates over the righteousness of the war in Vietnam as so complicated—and so emotional—that they could detract from worthy work in other arenas. In a letter to James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality, Loos praised Farmer for persuading CORE to avoid voting on a resolution regarding withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Loos believed that if civil rights groups turned their attention to Vietnam, it had the potential to “blunt the sharp-cutting edge of the civil rights movement.” While civil rights issues were “relatively clear cut,” Loos said that in his long career in international relations he had found every issue to be “infinitely complex,” and he urged Farmer to continue to use his office to guide his own and other civil rights organizations to steer clear of foreign policy issues. Loos’ letter reflected the particular circumstances in 1965: the civil rights movement was on the cusp of a huge victory as the Voting Rights Act was being debated and amended in Congress. It would be passed and signed into law just a few weeks after Loos wrote his letter to Farmer; and as with all civil rights legislation, its passage meant continued work and struggle to be sure the law was put into effect. Perhaps Loos was concerned that antiwar statements by CORE would alienate too many congressmen at a key moment.  

Despite good intentions, however, Loos’ opinion ran counter to the political outlook of a new generation of activists. While Loos had steered CRIA through years in which Cold War technocrats had the greatest impact on foreign policy, in the 1960s a powerful grassroots movement demanded its due. With echoes of earlier populist movements in American history, sixties-era activists claimed that all people had the moral sense to judge foreign policy for themselves. In 1966, CORE demanded the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, and in 1967 Martin Luther King, Jr. spoke out against the war. Notably, when civil rights organizations and leaders spoke out against the war they highlighted not only the disproportionate number of African-Americans who were drafted and served in the military but also the political and economic oppression in all former colonies that marked the legacy of European colonization.

Engaging the Multinational Corporation: Anti-Apartheid, Divestment, and Corporate Ethics

As CRIA’s leaders worked to advance African-American equality at home, they also pushed for greater racial equality and economic opportunity in post-colonial Africa. In 1971 the organization sponsored a talk on the role of multinational corporations in Africa, long before such discussions were becoming commonplace. The dialogue with businessmen over labor practices and hiring in Africa expanded naturally, and in 1973 the Council began to cooperate with the Aspen Institute to hold conferences with corporate leaders on business ethics. This was an innovative area of expansion for CRIA. Today, the American public expects multinational corporations to engage with shareholders and consumers on ethical questions, such as working conditions and environmental impact, but working directly to influence corporations—as opposed to lobbying the U.S. government to force corporations to change—was a departure from decades of tradition. Loos explained to trustees that the change was an acknowledgment that top multinational corporations had eclipsed most nation-states in terms of economic size and power.

U.S. churches in the early 1970s were in the vanguard of a movement to investigate corporate practices in Africa, publicize them, and call for divestment to punish the unethical, and CRIA helped bring this work to the attention of a broader public. In 1971 activist Tim Smith held a lengthy talk at Merrill House in which he presented his work for the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ. Smith’s talk prompted a lively discussion, with the key concerns being that pressure to push U.S.-led multinationals out of Africa could result in less leverage in negotiating with the South African government and could hurt African workers more than it did the corporations. It was the sort of discussion that perfectly fulfilled CRIA’s mission: a cutting-edge issue that deserved greater publicity, a speaker who combined
activism with religion, and an audience asking tough, pragmatic questions with direct policy implications. CRIA followed the example set by the Episcopal Church and Church of Christ, and Chairman of the Board Charles Judd and Assistant to the President Ulrike Klopfer led an examination of CRIA’s investment portfolio and its subsequent divestment from companies doing business in South Africa. Noting the widespread discussion of divestment and the role of multinational corporations in international affairs, CRIA surveyed top business executives to find out whether they would be interested in programs on business ethics, and the encouraging results led them to begin a new project, the Corporate Consultations, in partnership with the Aspen Institute. After an initial meeting focused on South Africa and General Motors, the next session focused on Latin America and included presentations from leaders of Dow Chemical, IBM, and General Motors, as well as Latin American executives from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Gulf Oil. As it geared its programs toward executives, CRIA’s leaders pursued fund-raising with the very same corporations its speakers had chided for their policies in Africa, including Gulf Oil and IBM. Nonetheless, executives seemed eager to engage with ethical questions and discuss best practices with academics, religious scholars, and one another, a fact that Loos emphasized to skeptics among the trustees. Over the following decades and right up to the present, CRIA’s programs on business ethics became an important strand of the organization’s work, and would come to be known as the Carnegie Leadership Program.

In his final annual report to the trustees as president in 1973, Loos emphasized the importance of corporations to CRIA’s mission to create peace with justice, noting Daniel Bell’s finding in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* that of the top one hundred economic units in the world, fifty were multinational corporations rather than nations. He admitted that CRIA would need the support of business if it was to survive financially, but he defended this new arena of CRIA’s work. “What I am saying is that we do not undertake this program in the first instance because we need this kind of support—substantive, financial, and moral—from the multinational corporation. We undertake the program because to do so is clearly an extremely important segment of our basic assignment, i.e., to work for international peace with justice.”

In his 1973 report to the trustees, Loos looked back with satisfaction on nearly twenty years with the Council. He had shepherded the Church Peace Union through significant changes: a departure from activism and lobbying, a move toward the more multicultural name and outlook of the Council on Religion in International Affairs, and the initial steps toward creating a development program. Loos steered the nonprofit through the post-World War II years of unremitting hostility toward the USSR and the concomitant political conformity into and through the vibrant debates over the Vietnam War. Even as he was forced to cut back on some expenses, Loos was proud of the quality and impact of *Worldview* and the unique mix of individuals who CRIA attracted to its regional seminars, Merrill House conversations, and both Washington and corporate consultations. It would be up to his successors to find a way for CRIA to navigate the continued economic challenges of the late 1970s, as well as the changed religious and political culture of the Reagan years.
The 1970s was a decade of collapse—collapse of the idealism of the 1960s, of the post-World War II economic boom, and of faith in U.S. government. Infamously, Tom Wolfe labeled it the “me decade,” an acknowledgment of the end of the community-oriented activism and ideology of the 1960s. But perhaps the growth in individualism should be seen less as selfishness than as a coping mechanism in the face of rising cynicism, and even despair.
America’s industrial economy was slipping. Heavy manufacturing jobs, the heart of the American postwar recovery and the foundation of the nation’s middle-class, had begun to disappear. Further crippling the economy, oil shocks had sent the entire industrialized world into recession. The United States had lost Vietnam to the communists, and withdrawal from the conflict had taken years—at the cost of many additional American and Vietnamese lives—as President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sought an elusive “peace with honor.” Finally, the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 and the resignation of Nixon in 1974 made the faith in government of earlier generations seem naïve.

In such an environment, CRIA’s mission to ensure that moral and religious viewpoints were considered in international policymaking now ran the risk of appearing antiquated. It was not that religion was no longer relevant to American life. Evangelical movements were experiencing growth as measured both by number of congregations and church attendees, and their congregants were increasingly active in the nonprofit world. Rather, the problem was that policymaking elites had been divided down the middle ideologically: between conservatives, who were open about their desire to bring religious values into politics, and liberals, who embraced secularism or saw their religious beliefs as part of a larger, humanistic value system. As these groups grew more polarized in the 1980s and early 1990s, it created some confusion about the name and role of the Council on Religion and International Affairs. Indeed, administrators and trustees joked about the difficulty of explaining the organization’s name to outsiders. “Religion” did not stand for any one denomination, nor did it mean that CRIA pursued a religious agenda. Further, some trustees and staff recognized that the name might now limit the organization’s funding base.¹

At the same time, CRIA was contending with an increasingly crowded field both in seeking donations and in capturing an audience for its programs. The number of nonprofits and foundations in the United States was soaring. Historian Peter Dobkin Hall has estimated that 90 percent of today’s nonprofits were founded after 1950. The raw numbers of U.S. nonprofit organizations increased from about 250,000 in 1940 to over 1.1 million in 1980.²

When A. William Loos stepped down as president in 1974, he challenged the board of trustees to find a new path for CRIA in terms of programming, audience, and fundraising. Because Loos had started working under General Secretary Henry Atkinson in 1946, he represented continuity with the Church Peace Union’s first generation of staff and trustees, and thus to Andrew Carnegie himself. With Loos’ retirement, the board faced an opportunity—and a risk—as it strove to reinvent the organization for the late twentieth century.

### The Johnson Years: Experimentation and Dialogue

The board’s choice of Philip A. Johnson to replace Loos hewed closely to the traditions of the organization. Johnson was a Lutheran minister who held positions of leadership in his denomination, qualifications closely resembling those held by Loos, Atkinson, and the first generation of trustees. Furthermore, like the Church Peace Union’s first secretary, Frederick Lynch, Johnson was an activist. His work to integrate the South Side of Chicago in the late 1940s and early 1950s had brought him national attention and awards. His selection expressed CRIA’s commitment to both racial equality and business ethics.³

Johnson maintained CRIA’s traditional programs and added a few new ones as he attempted to solve the identity crisis he confronted after Loos’ retirement. He supported the continuing publication of Worldview magazine, which in 1976 had nearly 17,000 subscriptions, including over 3,000 purchased by Trans-World Airlines for its passengers to read in-flight. Still under the direction of James Finn, Worldview had begun to skew a bit to the political right over the 1970s, as Finn and contributor Richard John Neuhaus began to transform from liberals into neoconservatives, but it still presented a variety of viewpoints from the leading lights of academia, politics, and journalism.⁴
In addition to *Worldview*, CRIA published books and pamphlets on international affairs for a scholarly audience. Johnson continued the CRIA Conversations program, in which for a small subscription fee Council “members” could come to Merrill House approximately once a week to hear notable speakers address a wide variety of issues. Run by Jerry Harris during the late 1970s and well into the 1980s, the Conversations led to capacity crowds at Council headquarters and to hundreds of new contacts for the organization. A favored venue for diplomats, policymakers, and authors, the program drew an especially well-informed audience.\(^5\)

In addition, Johnson initiated two new programs. For one, he administered a research grant focusing on Brazil, leading some board members to question whether CRIA was ready for “operational” work. In addition, he began what was called the Center for Transnational Studies, headed by Michael P. Sloan. Founded in May 1976, the Center continued the work of the Corporate Consultations begun under Loos, focusing on multinational corporations as entities central to the pursuit of peace with justice due to their economic and political power. Using conferences and publications, the Center drew participation from those in developing countries, from the leadership ranks of corporations, and from financial institutions. Among the Center’s notable publications was *Investment Codes of Conduct: A Compendium* (1978).\(^6\)

In terms of fundraising, Johnson, like Loos before him, had hopes for a direct mail campaign asking *Worldview* subscribers to become CRIA members. Both Johnson and his board also hoped to raise CRIA’s profile through a new initiative they called the “moral audit,” which would present the public with an itemized assessment, much like a report card, based on the nation’s foreign policy in the previous year. Despite these efforts and the development work that absorbed most of Johnson’s time, the organization was not advancing toward its fundraising goals.\(^7\)

To guide Johnson’s programming decisions, the board created a seven-member Long-Range Planning Committee, and each member was asked to respond to a set of predetermined questions designed to help define the Council’s priorities for the next three to five years. All agreed that CRIA should maintain its focus on ethics, values, and morals in international affairs, though their definitions of religion were broad. Trustees cited world religions and ethics as forming the foundation of CRIA’s work, showing their acceptance of trends toward multiculturalism and secularism.\(^8\)

The sharpest debate centered on whether the organization should engage in advocacy. One trustee argued that it was impossible to be relevant ethically without taking a stand, and he urged CRIA to agitate against nuclear war, “the overriding ethical issue of our time.” Two more trustees supported advocacy. One asked whether CRIA could be “more controversial where suitable,” while another said bluntly that “CRIA should fight for causes.” These opinions represented a departure from decades of policy dating back to the 1950s, and a more tradition-minded member of the committee said that CRIA simply lacked the constituency and the expertise to advocate for causes responsibly.\(^9\)

Rather than narrowing CRIA’s focus, the majority of trustees wanted to broaden it. Engaging with CRIA’s
traditional constituency of the churches, they wanted to offer continuing education in world affairs for clergy. They also hoped to engage with university audiences more thoroughly through faculty workshops and the creation of materials for classroom use, especially on campuses with strong religious traditions. Trustees considered whether they could create TV or radio programs for discussion groups, and whether they could get a National Endowment for the Humanities grant for their work.10

In its concluding set of meetings, the Long-Range Planning Committee decided to focus on education over advocacy, though members agreed they might occasionally take an informed stance on a controversial issue. CRIA would focus on the ethical dimensions of foreign policy broadly, rather than embracing a small number of issues. But who was to be their main constituency—experts or the public? Board members agreed they were not a “mass” organization, but instead would aim at reaching the “gate-keepers, the influentials, the decision-makers, concerned people,” while maintaining the possibility of reaching a larger audience.11

Surviving, then Thriving: New Directions in the 1980s and 1990s

The following year, 1979, the board and Philip Johnson parted ways. Facing the need to cut annual budgets by $50,000, trustees decided to end the Washington Seminars, begun in 1958 with the “Consultation on the Prospects of Negotiation with the Soviet Union,” that for twenty years had brought Washington policymakers together with scholars of religion and morality. The board also approved a revision to the budget of Worldview, reducing support for the magazine to 20 percent of the
Robert J. Myers (1924–2011)

“A better understanding of the role of values in U.S. foreign policy may be a first step towards shared normative values to begin to break the more disruptive patterns in international affairs.”

—Robert J. Myers

Robert Myers was a senior-level intelligence officer turned journalist, academic, publisher, and author. He was president of the Council from 1980 to 1995. Born in northern Indiana, Myers was only nineteen when he left DePauw University for the U.S. Army in 1943. After basic training in California, he was sent to the University of Chicago for training in Japanese language and area studies. In 1944, Myers was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services—a precursor to the CIA, which he joined in 1949. For the next ten years he served the agency in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia.

Myers received a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Chicago in 1959, and became the CIA chief of station in Cambodia the following year. From 1963 he served as deputy chief of the Far East Division. Upon his departure from the agency in 1965, Myers received the Intelligence Medal of Merit. Myers’ civilian career was no less impressive. Soon after leaving the CIA, he co-founded Washingtonian Magazine, and in 1968 he became publisher of The New Republic. During Myers’ tenure he oversaw the launch of the Council’s quarterly peer-reviewed journal—Ethics & International Affairs—and the renaming of the council to the more encompassing Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

Following his retirement from the Council in 1995, Myers moved to Palo Alto, California, where he continued contributing to the field of international relations as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution until 2007. organization’s total annual budget, to be instituted gradually after 1979. Editor James Finn pointed out that this would have negative long-term effects on the publication, and thus possibly hurt the reputation of CRIA itself, but trustees pointed out that the operating budget had to be brought under control.12

Curtis Roosevelt, the grandson of Franklin Roosevelt and an employee of the UN Secretariat, led the trustees in their work with legal and business advisors to find a new president. Their choice of Robert J. Myers for the position reflected their vision of a new future for the organization, oriented less toward the major religious bodies, both denominational and interdenomina-
tional, and more toward business and publishing.13

Myers had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, where he was stationed in Asia, helping to mobilize Chinese and Koreans against the Japanese invasion. He went on to earn graduate degrees at the University of Chicago, where he studied with Hans Morgenthau and wrote his dissertation, “The Development of the Indonesian Socialist Party.” He then returned to government service in the newly-created Central Intelligence Agency, rising to station chief in Cambodia and then deputy chief for East Asia. He left the agency in the mid-1960s to found the Washingtonian magazine, and a few years later he took over as publisher of the New Republic.14

Myers was the first president of the organization to have a background in business, and his successes in publishing, his academic and real world expertise, and his contacts in business and government made him an attractive candidate. From 1980 to 1995, Myers left
a strong stamp on CRIA. Much like Loos in the post-World War II period, Myers transformed the nonprofit to suit a new era. His first step was to put the organization’s finances in order. He resumed publishing annual reports, which had lapsed during the previous few years, thereby creating a degree of financial transparency by presenting the organization’s annual budget, the worth of its assets, and a list of donors.

In 1980, Myers’ first year, donors included eight religious denominations and organizations, among them the Episcopal, Lutheran, and Presbyterian Churches in America. Together, these composed a quarter of the organization’s thirty-two funding sources that year. By 1985 only three of the original eight religious funders remained, and they were in a tiny minority of the organization’s list of 119 sponsors, which had expanded to include law firms, banks, corporations, and individuals. For the first time, organizations based outside the United States were also among the growing number of donors, including the Korean Traders Association, Taiwan Cement Corporation, and the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities.15

In his first annual report, Myers noted the positive turn in the organization’s fortunes. At the end of 1979 its assets were just under $5.8 million; by the end of fiscal year 1980 assets were $7.2 million. By 1986 the assets had more than doubled, to $18 million, and the annual operating budget had increased from just under $500,000 to over $800,000. When Myers left eight years later, after a downturn in the financial markets, the Council’s assets stood at $18.3 million and its annual operating budget was $1.9 million.16

This list of assets did not include the value of Merrill House, which grew significantly after the Council acquired the adjacent brownstone, previously the home of historian and journalist Theodore H. White. A longstanding friend of CRIA, White had given the organization the right of first refusal to his home upon his death. Though it was a substantial expenditure at the time—$1.5 million represented a significant chunk of the endowment—it was a once in a lifetime opportunity to expand the Council’s headquarters. Eva Becker, then the office manager and bookkeeper (promoted to vice president for finance and administration in 1992), remembered one CRIA Conversation held in the original Merrill House in which seventy-five people had crammed into a room built to accommodate only forty-five, representing a fire hazard and city code violation. With savvy foresight, Myers and Becker jumped at the chance to purchase White’s property in 1987, though immediately afterwards the financial markets plunged and the planned renovations had to be delayed.17 Nonetheless, once the adjoining townhouse was remodeled and integrated with the existing building over the course of 1988 to 1990, it doubled the Council’s space and allowed for larger audiences and additional staff. In 1982 the staff consisted of eight people, and grew to thirteen by 1994.18

Adopting new technology—notably, the computer—allowed staff to work more efficiently. After she was hired in 1980, Becker worked to convince Myers to purchase the Council’s first computer, and once Deborah Carroll joined the team as a database manager in 1986 she persuaded Myers that an IBM computer would offer an even greater improvement. Myers particularly appreciated the way computers allowed for the creation of a new membership database that could generate address lists and correlate members by their interests for targeted mailings. Eventually, Carroll oversaw the creation of
the Council’s first Local Area Network, which allowed staff to access and share the same materials—before the Internet made computer networks an office necessity.19

By all accounts, Myers was a strong executive who unified the board and helped keep CRIA focused on a core mission. In his first annual report as president, he redefined CRIA for readers: “CRIA is an independent, nonpartisan, nonsectarian, and tax-exempt organization founded in 1914 by Andrew Carnegie.” The following year he added, “CRIA does not take advocacy positions.” To underscore the Council’s neutrality on questions of denomination and its commitment to humanistic values over specific doctrines, in 1986 Myers and the board changed the organization’s name to the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. As Loos had before him, Myers helped the Council adapt to a changed landscape, not only in how foreign affairs was conducted but in how nonprofits operated.20

John Tessitore, who Myers hired as senior editor of Worldview in April 1980 and promoted to editor just a few months later, replacing Finn, remembers some discussions of advocacy at board meetings in the early 1980s. “If you did it, it had to be a black-and-white issue,” he recalled. “For example, what do you do about the U.S. involvement in Latin America? Would CRIA go directly against the current administration?” The Reagan administration supported vigorous anti-communist measures in Central America, while opponents inside Congress and the academy objected to the U.S. contribution of weapons and military advisors in the “dirty wars” that produced political and economic chaos, civilian casualties, and the torture and abduction of political opponents. Yet stepping forward into policy debates would be an irrevocable step away from neutrality; and the Council did not want to sacrifice its nonprofit status or its reputation as a reliable venue for thorough and accurate discussion of geopolitical issues.21

Worldview was an important means of providing the public with different viewpoints and objective analysis on current events. Yet in calling attention to neglected issues in foreign affairs, it could also be used to try to spark political change. Tessitore recalls publishing an article on global warming in the early 1980s, long before it had become part of the public debate, as well as articles on the approaching sub-Saharan African famine and the Green Revolution. In the early 1980s, Worldview also published steadily on the wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as on economic development in Latin America more broadly. Contributors included former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, historian Henry Steele Commager, former head of the CIA William Colby, and the Dalai Lama.22

As testament to the magazine’s influence, Tessitore cites a call he received out of the blue one day from Sargent Shriver, President Kennedy’s brother-in-law and an advisor in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. “I love your magazine,” Shriver told Tessitore. “I
want a subscription for my niece Caroline.” This conversation, and others like it, supported the staff’s conviction that *Worldview* was a valued source of news for wonks and policymakers alike.23 Circulation had tripled in five years following a successful direct mailing program, and CRIA expanded the number of issues from ten to twelve per year. Yet the magazine—like so many niche publications—was not breaking even. As a cost-cutting measure, Myers reduced the publication from a four-color to a two-color cover and from glossy paper to news stock, which significantly reduced overhead. However, as the cost of postage rose it became clear that *Worldview* would never become self-sustaining, and Myers decided to stop publication in 1985.24

The following year, CRIA began publishing a variety of newsletters in its place—each on a distinct topic and with a distinct audience, with mailings ranging from just over one thousand to tens of thousands. In 1987 the Council also began to publish a peer-reviewed journal, *Ethics & International Affairs*, first annually, though it would later become biannual and then quarterly. Now in its twenty-eighth year, *Ethics & International Affairs* remains the Council’s signature publication, published by Cambridge University Press, and Tessitore returned to the Council in 2007 to serve as the journal’s editor.25

Other programming stayed in place under Myers. The afternoon Conversations Program of off-the-record presentations and discussions remained a winning formula, and were so popular that in 1982 they were augmented by an early morning “breakfast” program as well. Presentations over 1982 and into 1983 included “The Case for the Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Troops from Western Europe,” by Robert J. Hanks, from the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; “U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa,” by Franklin A. Thomas, president of the Ford Foundation; and “Some Basic Problems of Israel’s Foreign Policy,” by Israel’s permanent representative to the United Nations.26

Education programs focused on creating a curriculum for college students to consider issues of ethics in international affairs, funded by a grant from the Exxon Education Foundation. Luminaries in the field of political science and international relations created lectures that they presented to college audiences around the country, and newsletters reprinting the lectures went out to up to 10,000 social science faculty.27

As in Johnson’s time, under Myers the organization experimented with administering some research projects directly. In a multi-year project, the Lilly Endowment funded a study of the overlapping and interdependent relationship of the U.S. government and American churches in their responses to refugee crises abroad. CRIA hired a small staff to undertake the study. J. Bruce Nichols directed the program, and his subsequent book on their findings created interest among scholars of migration, law, religion, and political science. Judging by its reviews, the book succeeded in creating the type of cross-disciplinary dialogue on ethics and religion that the Council had long considered key to its mission.28

One of the Council’s greatest changes of the 1980s and early 1990s was an increased programming focus on Asia, including talks and publications on U.S. relations with Japan, the Philippines, Korea, China, and Taiwan. In 1990 the Council had both a vice president and a director of Asian programs; that year’s programming focused on completing studies of development in South Korea, presenting analyses of Japanese politics and the economy,
and administering a three-year grant for the study of democracy and development in the Philippines. This involvement in Asia even extended to opening research centers abroad. In 1991, using a grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Council cooperated with the University of Asia and the Pacific to open the Asian Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in the Philippines.29

No doubt Myers’ own expertise in the region helped shape the emphasis on Asia, but an even more important factor was the growing economic strength of Japan and the “Asian Tigers” of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. In the 1980s, Japan eclipsed West Germany as the world’s second greatest economy; and while the United States remained dominant in terms of gross national product, in heavy manufacturing and electronics Asian companies began to take over American markets. Pundits warned that a ballooning U.S. national debt had made way for Japan, a creditor nation, to thrive. Subsequent events supported this thesis, and American politicians and a revival of “Yellow Peril” stereotypes in some media outlets. Myers said these developments had the potential to “threaten the fragile attempts at building an international order made in the postwar years, as well as the domestic economy in the long run.” In response, and with George Washington University as a co-sponsor, the Council presented speakers and produced a newsletter on “The U.S.–Japan Economic Agenda” over the late 1980s.30

Under the name of the Carnegie Leadership Program, the Council’s business ethics programs grew under the direction of Audna England, whose programs replaced the Center for Transnational Studies. England’s program focused on cutting-edge ethical questions, including bioethics and environmentalism, as well as such continuing areas of concern as development in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Though the Council rarely advocated openly for change, its invited speakers were free to do so, and on clear-cut moral issues—or those with a growing public consensus behind them—Council programming publicized social and economic inequality. One such example was apartheid. In 1988 the Carnegie Leadership Program held a one-day conference on South Africa in which South African opposition leader Denis Worrall was a featured speaker. Worrall, an
Afrikaner, had left his position as the South African ambassador to Great Britain for political reasons in 1986, and that year he visited the United States and made headlines when he said that there had been "instances" of black children being tortured in South African jails. He formed an anti-apartheid Afrikaner political party in 1988, the same year he spoke at the Council. Proving the exception to the long-time tradition of neutrality, the Carnegie Leadership Program supported the Sullivan Principles, which demanded that U.S. corporations working in South Africa advocate for racial justice and equal treatment for their employees. Today, business pressures, including the Sullivan Principles, are widely considered an important element in the eventual dismantling of the apartheid state.

The Carnegie Leadership Program devoted ongoing programming to African affairs, maintaining a vigilant eye on the policies of international corporations extracting raw materials or setting up manufacturing on the continent. In 1990, after a failed coup in Nigeria and subsequent international concern over the government’s jailing and execution of nearly 200 people, England joined eight congressional representatives and education and business leaders in a fact-finding mission to that country. In the following year England—with a delegation of businessmen, academics, and journalists—participated in a fact-finding mission in South Africa, where the group met with representatives of various political and social groups, including members of the African National Congress, and took a tour of Soweto, the famed black township that was the historic center of apartheid resistance.

With this type of high-profile programming, which focused on the most pressing international issues, perhaps it is no surprise that in 1991 the Council’s work received coverage in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Associated Press and Dow Jones newswires, as well as many other American, Canadian, and Asian publications.

**Conclusion**

Under Myers’ leadership the Council adapted to the rapid social, political, and technological changes of the 1980s to mid-1990s, and not only survived but thrived. In his first several years as president, Myers led the organization in a process of experimentation. He cut expensive programs that had been in place for decades, such as the Washington Seminars and Worldview magazine, and he expanded the development program successfully. With the change in name from the Council on Religion in International Affairs to the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, he cleared the way forward for what had always been an organization with essentially secular, humanistic goals to better compete for attention and donations in a crowded nonprofit field. Furthermore, instead of relying on the mainline Protestant denominations for funds and personnel, the Council modernized by adopting practices borrowed from business, including the use of cutting-edge technology such as databases and networked computers. Finally, and most importantly, Myers showed a talent for hiring dedicated staff. Their creation of excellent programs attracted new donors to the Council’s growing reputation, and a growing donor base led to the Council’s ability to fund new, high-quality programs.
When Andrew Carnegie founded the Church Peace Union in 1914, many educated Americans shared his belief that Western civilization had evolved beyond large-scale war. Yet one hundred years later, war and violent conflict appear endemic. Today, wars seem to end only to begin again, whether in the next spin of the twenty-four hour news cycle or in the next generation. Recently, evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson has even suggested that the impulse to make war is encoded in human DNA. Genocide and terrorism, once crimes without specific names, are now so frequently reported that parents need to find ways to explain them to their young children. ¹
In this atmosphere of perpetual conflict, the work of Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs has the potential to make a greater impact than at any other time in its history. From the 1980s to early 1990s, Robert J. Myers helped pave the way for this new Council with his work to modernize the organization and create its international partnerships. His successor, Joel H. Rosenthal, who became president in 1995, has built on this stable foundation to innovate and expand, leading the Council to embrace new communications technologies to better reach a wide audience both at home and abroad.

In the decade of 2004-2014 the Council has expanded its audience exponentially; and as its programming now reaches into the homes of tens of millions of Americans, it also connects a growing network of educators and information seekers around the world. The Council’s wide reach and its reputation for integrity attract the highest caliber of speakers and authors to public programs, ranging from Nobel laureates to investigative journalists to generals and White House advisors.

One hundred years after its founding, the Council appears to be fulfilling Carnegie’s mandate: educating a large nationwide audience on international affairs, facilitating transnational connections of friendship and information exchange, and working to inspire people to become more informed and active in creating a better world. While few people today share Carnegie’s perception that the end of war is imminent, the Council’s work makes it possible for growing numbers to benefit from his legacy.


In his 1992 book *The End of History and the Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama theorized that liberal democracy would be the triumphant, final form of government for humankind. This concept has since been caricatured by critics, but the book’s title and central argument expressed something crucial to understanding the early 1990s: the enthusiasm and sense of triumph at watching the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, and the defeat of Soviet communism—all mainly through peaceful means. At the same time, however, the title conveys a sense of weightlessness, of disorientation: What could be next? Ever since the United States had become the world’s preeminent military and economic power after World War II, it had been locked in a deadly rivalry with the Soviet Union. During the presidency of Bill Clinton, the United States was unrivalled in military and economic power, yet it lacked a strong guiding principle in foreign relations.

In these years, the Carnegie Council's Education, Studies, and Merrill House Conversations programs focused on rapidly accelerating globalization and questions of American responsibility in the world, including issues of poverty, human rights, and the ethical use of military force. Increasingly, the scholars and activists who participated in Council events came from different world regions, and so brought expertise rooted in their own nations’ and communities’ experiences. Council President Rosenthal has noted that the nonprofit frequently selected a mix of academics, policymakers, and activists for its talks, a choice that anchored discussion in concrete and compelling examples. South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa were regions increasingly represented in
as well as to the legacies of racism and sectarianism in the United States, South Africa, Central Europe, and Iraq, the Studies department created a project on History and the Politics of Reconciliation in 2000. Under Director of Studies Joanne Bauer and Senior Program Officer Elizabeth A. (Lili) Cole, the program examined the role of history education in high schools and museums, the work of truth commissions and tribunals, and the challenges of overcoming religious divisions. Their core question was why some conflicts end and others cycle into violence.3

The result was a series of case studies and conferences that encouraged cutting-edge interdisciplinary work in the field of historical memory. Scholars who participated noted that the Council’s support was “a source of intellectual sustenance” that “lent credence” to a new project in a field that was, as Cole put it, an “emerging, exciting, but intellectually still messy area.” Professors and policymakers met in sites around the world—from Madison, Wisconsin, to Leipzig, Germany—discussing a series of case studies spanning decades and continents. Many of these were eventually published as papers and books. The capstone conference, cosponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, convened twenty-eight teachers, policymakers, and activists from around the world.4

As Americans debated whether or not to intervene in the world’s ethnic and religious conflicts, they were also growing more aware of the environmental impact of industrialization and consumerism. The Council had begun to include programs on environmental policies and bioethics in the 1980s, and in the 1990s and early 2000s, this

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**JOEL H. ROSENTHAL (1960–)**

“The spirit of this work is one of mutual learning. For me, ethics is a practical thing. There is something intellectually satisfying about reflecting on the good life. But ethical inquiry can be more than that. It can help us in specific ways to imagine a better future.”

—Joel H. Rosenthal

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Prof. Joel Rosenthal is an author, ethicist, and educator who has been president of Carnegie Council since 1995. He is also adjunct professor, New York University and chairman of the Bard College Globalization and International Affairs program in New York City.

During his tenure as president, the Council has developed its Carnegie Ethics Studio, producing multimedia programs for television, radio, and web audiences worldwide. The Council has also established its Global Ethics Network of Fellows located in two dozen countries around the world. Under Rosenthal, the Council has focused its efforts toward making a broader impact through providing free, accessible, educational programs to a global audience. The Council’s resources are based on the work of scholars and authors representing a multitude of perspectives and every part of the world.

As a scholar and teacher, Rosenthal has focused on ethics in U.S. foreign policy, with special emphasis on issues of war and peace, human rights, and pluralism. His first book, *Righteous Realists* (1991), is a study of Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr, among other American realists. Rosenthal’s recent writing is a series of reflections on the moral dimensions of globalization, including essays on patriotism, the “global ethic,” and the role of religion in democratic societies. He lectures frequently at universities and public venues across the United States and around the world.
programming expanded to include an ambitious multi-year project on comparative environmental values. It was also one of the first in which the Council sponsored primary fieldwork. The project, with funding by the United States–Japan Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the Henry Luce Foundation, was based in cooperating centers in China, India, Japan, and the United States. Researchers investigated how people in each society conceptualized environmental issues, particularly controversies over resource use and industrial pollution.  

Participants found that citizens were torn between an emerging global environmental value system and their more traditional, local values, with the extent of this conflict varying from culture to culture. Team members met one another in each participating country, and they also presented their work at the Fourth Open Meeting of the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Research Community, held in Rio de Janeiro in 2001. The Council sponsored a series of seminars for activists and policymakers, and published their findings as a book, *Forging Environmentalism: Justice, Livelihood, and Contested Environments*, edited by Joanne Bauer, which was greeted with enthusiasm by academics in the field.  

During these early years of Rosenthal’s tenure, with the encouragement and support of then chairman Jonathan E. Colby, the new president worked to sharpen the organization’s focus on education. “Targeting youth seemed to make sense,” Rosenthal recalled. “It was the place we could make a mark—there was an opportunity to serve that constituency.” Traditionally, one of the biggest challenges for international affairs organizations is an aging audience, so Rosenthal set about engaging young people through a two-pronged strategy: first, by expanding faculty seminars as a means of reaching students in the classroom; and second, by supporting opportunities for young scholars and professionals. The Council had funded faculty seminars since the 1980s, and under Rosenthal such programming expanded, reaching universities all over the country. In a six-week faculty development seminar held at Columbia University in 2001, funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, faculty from a wide spectrum of specialties met to discuss the ethics of global governance, with topics ranging from issues of citizenship and corporate responsibility to human rights and global climate change. Professor Steven Venturino of Loyola University said the program offered him “invaluable opportunities to couple humanities scholarship with thoughtful and dynamic approaches to international relations and global ethics.” With assistance from the Dillon Fund and the Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education, programs for faculty later became international, with exchanges with Chinese faculty members at Shanghai International Studies University, and Japanese and European scholars at Oxford University.  

In another initiative to engage young people, in the mid-2000s the Council started a membership program for young professionals under forty years old, known today as the Carnegie New Leaders program.
Since his time as the Council’s education director, one of Rosenthal’s goals had been to “put a signature on ethics and international affairs so there was an editorial vision for the Carnegie Council.” To develop such a framework based on international ethics from a realist perspective, he worked with Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Michael J. Smith to help start the Ethics Section of the International Studies Association, the principal society for professionals and students in the field. Ensuring that publications existed to guide and inspire new generations of scholars, the Council sponsored the book *Traditions of International Ethics*, and Rosenthal collaborated with leading scholars to create the collection, *Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader*, which has been published by Georgetown University Press in three editions from 1995 to 2009. Both books have been well-received and are used extensively in political science and international affairs classrooms. Supported by these and other efforts, Rosenthal has seen a significant shift in the discipline over the past twenty years. As he noted, “Take any director of an academic program in international relations—if you ask them about ethics as a part of their curriculum, they’re not surprised anymore.” Today, initiatives like the Council’s Global Ethics Fellows program ensure that ethical questions are woven into the profession, and scholars just starting out have a place to find panels, start discussions with like-minded professionals, and build a network of peers and mentors.  

The increasing attention to ethics in international relations, and the growing profile of the Council, is highlighted by the growing readership for the Council’s peer-reviewed journal, *Ethics & International Affairs*, which expanded from an annual to a biannual publication in 2001, and then to a quarterly publication in 2004. Published by Cambridge University Press since 2011 and read in dozens of countries worldwide, the journal is a major tool in the promotion of ethics as an area of scholarship and professional specialization.

**September 11 and the “War on Terror”: Elevating the Dialogue**

The loss of life and confusion of September 11, and the sense of vulnerability and violation that followed, marked the end of a period of American innocence and self-confidence. Very quickly, the conduct of the George W. Bush administration raised thorny questions about human rights and national sovereignty that polarized the foreign policy environment. The Council’s response was a series of high-profile public discussions. “In a heated political atmosphere, we felt our best contribution would be to offer the opportunity for civilized public reflection,” Rosenthal recalled. The Council invited speakers from across the political spectrum to discuss and question the “War on Terror” in its specifics, and to address the hardest questions of just war theory; the use of force; and the tensions between and among human rights, sovereignty, individual liberty, and the demand for security. From Michael Walzer to William Kristol, the talks—many organized by Public Affairs Program Director Joanne Myers, highlighted the Council’s commitment to education over partisanship. According to Rosenthal: “Our job was to frame the questions as ethical questions. We tried to be educational rather than polemical or political.”

The Council never took specific policy positions, but the staff did use their
choice of speakers and topics to call attention to what they considered the most vital ethical issues. Several staff members recalled one talk as particularly significant: the 2006 Morgenthau Memorial Lecture (and accompanying interview with former CBS anchorman Dan Rather), delivered by Alberto J. Mora, the former general counsel of the Department of the Navy under President George W. Bush. Once Mora learned of the torture of prisoners in United States custody, first in Guantanamo Bay and later at Abu Ghraib, he worked within the Department of Defense to challenge the legality of such measures. Unable to persuade his superiors to change their policies, Mora resigned in January 2006, one of the highest-ranking officials of the Bush presidency to publicly break ranks over the conduct of the administration. Eva Becker, then the vice president of finance and administration, remembered this lecture as a defining moment for the Council. With a professional film crew hired to ensure that a high-quality recording was made, the Council’s event attracted considerable attention.

By consistently honoring its commitment to present a range of views on an issue, supported by well-researched and fact-checked materials, the Council had earned a distinct position as a convening authority. The staff’s commitment to focusing on the ethics behind each aspect of the country’s attempt to address the terrorist threat has continued, for example in 2013 when the Council invited both a vociferous critic of drone warfare, journalist Jeremy Scahill, and an ardent defender of drone use, Jeh Johnson, then the former general counsel of the Defense Department.¹¹

From Studies to Studio: Embracing Technology to Serve a Wider Public

In 1914, Carnegie founded the Church Peace Union in the hope of reaching Americans through their religious leaders, and the trustees launched the World Alliance for Friendship Through the Churches to unite Europeans and later Asians with American faith communities in a campaign for peace. After the Second World War this vision changed as the CPU began to focus on policymakers over the public. This narrowed audience suited a Cold-War era, in which many policymakers valued specialized knowledge and considered the average American apathetic and ill-informed on foreign policy questions. It also made sense given the Council’s budget constraints; attempting to influence the highly educated and influential was a more economical way to try to achieve change.

From its launch in 1958, Worldview magazine was the most broad-based of all of CRIA’s, and later the Carnegie Council’s, programs—reaching audiences in the thousands and then the tens of thousands, with a maximum circulation of over 20,000. Today, in contrast, the Council’s journal reaches over 100,000 academics annually; over 100,000 audio podcasts are downloaded each month, along with over 40,000 visits to the Council’s websites; and Carnegie Ethics Studio programming is broadcast to approximately forty million homes each week. By taking advantage of communication breakthroughs of the past two decades, and working to meet people where they are—whether that’s on iTunes, Twitter, Facebook, or watching TV on Sunday morning—the Council has found new ways to share its wealth of programming.¹²

Jeremy Scahill

Jeh Johnson

While in retrospect it may seem clear that a dynamic website and multimedia content would attract more attention to the Council’s work, embracing new technologies was not always an obvious step for trustees and staff in the 1990s. When Rosenthal attempted to explain
a blog to Robert Myers, then a trustee, the former Council president replied that if everyone is a writer, then no one would be a reader! Rosenthal had other misgivings. Quality control would be an important factor in frequently posting new material. And he also faced a nagging question: What type of audience for the Council’s programming existed? If they built an expensive multimedia studio to present the public with audio and video programming, “would anybody care?” Fortunately, the answer has been a resounding yes.\(^{13}\)

For decades the Council, like many similar organizations, had focused on creating seminars and conferences, which then led to publications—a methodology that primarily reached an audience of professionals, academics, and students. Rosenthal remembered a “lightbulb” moment at the end of the 1990s, when C-Span came for the first time to film selected Merrill House talks for its “All About Books” program. After a Board retreat at Pocantico Hills led by then chairman Alexander H. Platt, the Council decided to build its Carnegie Ethics Studio so that it could record its own audio and video for broadcast. Its weekly Global Ethics Forum program, a half-hour of discussion on international affairs, is now distributed by MHZ, a network of over thirty public television stations, and by CUNY TV.\(^{14}\)

“We’ve always been willing to try new things,” declared IT Director Deborah Carroll. As the executive producer of the Studio, Carroll has been at the forefront of experimenting with new ways to deliver content around the world, including YouTube, Ustream, and WordPress blogs. “If it’s something we can do, we give it a try to see if it resonates with the audience.” Carroll notes that the Council’s website ranks very high with Google based on its volume of visitors and relevance; this “magic formula,” as Carroll calls it, is the key to attracting new site visitors.\(^{15}\)

Social media have allowed the Council to expand its reach even further. While its television programming reaches audiences in the United States, the Council’s Facebook friends—numbering well over 100,000 as of mid-2014—were weighted toward people in the eighteen to twenty-four age bracket, with the largest group living in Pakistan and Egypt. In another effort to reach young people, the Council’s annual student essay contest and

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"Namaste" by Saori Ibuki, prize-winning entry in Carnegie Council international student photo contest, 2013

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Carnegie Ethics Studio films panel including Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (left) and Dutch government official Albert Koenders

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photo contest have been designed to elicit their ideas and participation.\textsuperscript{16} Rosenthal believes the Council’s success in reaching diverse audiences lies in its longstanding commitment to ensuring the quality of the information it shares and presenting the ideas of people across the political spectrum. This has made the Council a trustworthy source that people can turn to even when they do not trust other media. “We stand for a core set of values, and a way of thinking,” Rosenthal has said.\textsuperscript{17} To underline this point and sharpen the Council’s brand, Chairman Alexander H. Platt suggested and oversaw the subtle but significant evolution in the Council’s name from Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs to Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. As advocates for ethics through education, the Council’s agenda has become even clearer.

To mark its Centennial, in 2012 the Council launched an ambitious, many-faceted, multi-year project called “Ethics for a Connected World.” Components include the Global Ethics Network, an international consortium of universities engaging students and educators in intercultural dialogue and ethics-based education. Global Ethics Fellows and their institutions form the heart of the network; in mid-2014 there were thirty-two fellows in fifteen countries. Many fellows appoint a student as an Ethics Fellow for the Future, and mentor him or her in a year-long project. There is also an online social network that is open to all students and educators across the world. In addition, the Centennial project features international symposia in Edinburgh, Sarajevo, and New York, and “Global Ethical Dialogues”—research visits to destinations including Latin America, Asia, and the Balkans, led by Centennial Chair Michael Ignatieff. Another component is the Thought Leaders Forum, a series of interviews conducted by Senior Fellow Devin Stewart with public intellectuals from a wide variety of regions and backgrounds.\textsuperscript{18}

**Conclusion**

From 1914 to the present the Council’s administrators, staff, and trustees have engaged with the most pressing issues facing the United States and the world. Reviewing the organization’s last one hundred years, differences between its past and present are obvious, but most remarkable are the clear connections between the founders’ ideals and those of the present generation, even if their strategies have shifted from telegram and sermon to tweet and podcast. Today, as President Joel Rosenthal and scholar Michael Ignatieff work to re-launch the Council on its Centennial, they ask audiences—and guide them—to search for a global ethic, the common core of values shared across all cultures. It is a project that clearly recalls the original mission of the Church Peace Union: to join men and women of many faiths to campaign against unnecessary loss of life in large-scale war.

Contemplating his latest venture after the day of its first board meeting in 1914, Carnegie remarked to Frederick Lynch, “Hasn’t it been a great day! And what a splendid lot of men we’ve got there! They can do anything.”\textsuperscript{19} To the jaded reader of the twenty-first century, this type of statement can make Carnegie and his project appear naïve. Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the canny Scotsman. Through his unwavering focus on his ideals, and the energy he maintained through relentless will and optimism, Carnegie founded a trust that has lasted one hundred years and has affected countless lives across the globe. Whether and how its work will live up to Carnegie’s hopes and dreams is an open question, one that is up to succeeding generations to decide.
One hundred years. The phrase itself suggests an accomplishment and an aspiration. It is hard to exaggerate the velocity of change in the globalized world of 2014. Institutions that were once the pillars of Main Street and Wall Street continue to evolve at break-neck speed, some to adapt, many to disappear.

Why has the Council endured? In reviewing the history, it is clear that the Council has embraced change. It has been responsive to the moment. It has stayed true to its educational mission. It has not been afraid to make major shifts, broadening its signature approach from religion to ethics, and its communications from print to digital.

Through the years the Council’s message has been remarkably consistent. All of its leaders shared a common view: they saw no reason to make an artificial distinction between idealism and realism. All found it perfectly logical that individuals and nations will act in their self-interests, while also believing it possible to find ways to channel those interests toward better outcomes.

The Council lost its innocence the day it was born. This proved to be a virtue. The outbreak of World War I showed that peace could not be established by rational plan, followed by force of will and a simple belief in the unity of mankind under a global ethic. The lesson was painful but instructive. The human dimension of conflict—the ethical dimension—would be the subject of all the Council’s activity to follow. This dimension would involve deep analysis of power, interests, competing values, and human imperfections. Simple moral assertions and appeals to sentiment would not do.

The Council endured for another reason. It provided connection. As a Carnegie institution, we became part of the great historic movements enabled by Andrew Carnegie’s philanthropy—movements for peace, social justice, scientific progress, education, and artistic expression. We were empowered to join in with like-minded people around the world. As an institution endowed in perpetuity, we are connected not only to the efforts of those who came before us but also to those who will come
after. To paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr, nothing that is worth doing can be achieved in a lifetime. The Council answers the need for scope, to work together with others for something big and enduring.

At the beginning of our hundredth year I wrote a “Letter to Andrew Carnegie,” reporting to him on the progress of our Council and the prospects for the more peaceful world he so fervently desired. While delivering this letter to an audience gathered in the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, the Carnegie spirit was palpable. At the conclusion of our Centennial activities, I will share my “Letter to Our Successors, 2114” with those gathered in New York to mark the occasion. In it, I will share my understanding of our current challenges, as well as my hopes for those who will gather for the bicentennial a hundred years on. Looking both backward and forward at this moment of reckoning, it is exhilarating to feel a direct link to people with whom we share so much and yet will never meet.

A RE-FOUNDING

The Council has operated humbly, rigorously, and in the spirit of mutual learning. On this hundredth anniversary, the Council’s leaders have determined that this is a moment to recommit to that effort and to bring its work into the next one hundred years with all of the enthusiasm, creativity, and energy of its original founders.

In 2014 twelve donors committed $100,000 each to participate in our Centennial Founders project. The project is part time-capsule, part mission-statement. Each Founder has been asked to prepare a statement on what he or she sees as the greatest challenges facing the world and what the Council might do to play its part in addressing them. A common characteristic of our Centennial Founders is their commitment to education. Each understands the need and the unparalleled opportunity we have now to create educational experiences and resources for worldwide audiences.

In this re-founding moment, it is our goal to make new ideas and the highest quality resources available to any person anywhere who seeks to learn more about ethics and international affairs. It is also our goal to give them an opportunity to have a voice in the dialogue.

WORK TO BE DONE

No one can predict the world of 2114. But we do know that the people who inhabit it will share many of our human concerns. For all that we cannot know about the
future, it is reasonable to assume that Thucydides’ account of human motivation, as illustrated in his classic Histories of the Peloponnesian War, will endure: perceptions of interest, fear, and honor will continue to steer human behavior.

The issues before us are challenging. But can we say they are worse than those that faced our predecessors? It is hard to make that case at the moment. For all of the dire situations we can chronicle in 2014—the threat of climate change; vast poverty; persistent financial, racial, and gender inequality; intractable religious and ethnic conflict; and the persistence of bigotry and hatred—we cannot deny the real progress that has been made. Slavery, imperialism, racism, wars of conquest—all commonplace in Carnegie’s lifetime—are now recognized as illegitimate and unjust.

The norms of expected and required behavior are changing. Day-to-day life is shaped by global forces that are gaining speed and intensity. Financial instability, climate change, terror networks, and satellite communication are changing the way we live. The most basic human needs—jobs, health, and security—are now fully embedded in global systems. Looking ahead, common interests will need to be supported by common values and agreed-upon procedures.

The possibilities for mutuality will be tested in the coming decades. In a global world, collective action problems become acute. Addressing climate change will require an evolution in the perception of interests. An evolution of interests will also be required to deal with deadly conflicts in remote regions of the world where no one particular great power may have a direct interest. It will take leadership and education to help make the point that in some aspects of life in the twenty-first century, we are all in it together.

Another theme bound to dominate is that of pluralism and self-determination. By pluralism, we mean living together with differences. Self-determination, unleashed in earnest a hundred years ago, remains the bedrock idea of international law and ethics. On regular occasions we see how uncomfortably it sits with pluralism. Once released, the principle of self-determination is difficult for political leaders to harness. In the aftermath of World War I, self-determination became the great principle but also the great variable of the twentieth—and now the twenty-first—century.

What institutions will speak for ethics a hundred years from now? As religious and academic institutions evolve, there seems to be less capacity among them to mount public education initiatives beyond their constituencies. Religious institutions are under internal stresses of their own, while academic institutions continue to reward specialized research. It is reasonable to ask whether they will be
committed to a broad, general discussion of ethics and public life and, if so, where that space might be found. It is our intention that the Carnegie Council will be ready for duty.

One of Andrew Carnegie’s favorite phrases was, “My heart is in the work.” For all that has been accomplished over the past hundred years and all that there is to come, there is no substitute for the spirit of the enterprise as captured in that phrase. It is not always easy to make the pitch for progress when we see one catastrophe after another. It often seems like one step forward, two steps back. But without such efforts we might easily slide from skepticism to cynicism—and, ultimately, to nihilism. In the face of so many challenges, the Council continues to be a place where we can keep imagining a better future.

JOEL H. ROSENTHAL

President
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
NOTES

CHAPTER ONE
7. Nasaw, passim.
9. Ibid.
10. Lynch, 28; Nasaw, Kindle edition, chap. 35 and passim. Carnegie believed that the Americans, British, and Germans came from similar ethnic backgrounds and so a “Teutonic” alliance would lead the way to peace. To promote such an alliance, he had met with Kaiser Wilhelm II on more than one occasion, and he had urged Theodore Roosevelt to do the same.
12. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 158-160.
16. Ibid., 160.
20. Lynch, 163.

CHAPTER TWO
5. Ibid., 52.
7. Macfarland, 51.
8. Nasaw, chap. 42.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, “For Preparedness”
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 5.
19. Ibid., 5-6.
20. Ibid., 18.
23. Ibid., 76.

Chapter Three

1. Macfarland, 79.
3. Macfarland, 89.
5. Ibid., 19.
7. Macfarland, 87.
9. Macfarland, 89.
10. Atkinson, Report to the Trustees (1926), 17-18; Macfarland, 91, 94.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
18. See fn 2.
19. Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Statements of Dr. William I. Hull, Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA; and Rev. Dr. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, New York City, on the Bill (H.R. 7359) for the Increase of the Naval Establishment, 15 February 1928, in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional, (accessed 1 September 2013).
20. Ibid., 1649-1652, 1655, 1676; Congress, House, Frederick Britten on the Bill (H.R. 7359) for the Increase of the Naval Establishment, Congressional Record, 15 March 1928, 4848, in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional database (accessed 1 September 2013).
22. Congress, House, Frederick Britten on the Bill (H.R. 7359) for the Increase of the Naval Establishment, Congressional Record, 15 March 1928, 4848, in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional database (accessed 1 September 2013).
23. Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Statements of Mrs. Sherman D. Walker, Vice President and Chairman of Committee on National Defense and E.B. Johns on (H.R. 7359) A Bill for the Increase of the Naval Establishment, 17 February 1928, 1341, in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional database (accessed 1 September 2013).
24. Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between the Wars (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2010): 164, Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Statements of Dr. William I. Hull, Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA; and Rev. Dr. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, New York City, on the Bill (H.R. 7359) for the Increase of the Naval Establishment, 15 February 1928, 35, in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional database (accessed 1 September 2013).


3. Ibid.


5. Edmond Taylors, "War Hates Rise Amid Graves of Soldier Dead," Chicago Daily Tribune, 12 Nov. 1933, 1. These trips were called the Gold Star Mother pilgrimages by contemporaries.


8. Macfarland, 139-162.


10. Most infamously, the renowned aviator and leader of America First, Charles Lindbergh, made anti-Semitic comments at a political rally that helped destroy the credibility of his organization. The legacy of America First is still controversial, see Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison: U. of Wisconsin, 1953) and Ruth Sarles, A Story of America First: The Men and Women Who Opposed U.S. Intervention in World War II (NY: Praeger, 2003); Congress, House, Statement of Jacob Thorkelson (R-MT), Congressional Record, 18 October 1939, 584, in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional (accessed 19 September 2013).


19. Ibid.

20. Congress, Senate, Neutrality, Peace Legislation and Our Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 14 April 1939, 127 in Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection, ProQuest Congressional database, (accessed 19 September 2013); Ibid.


27. Macfarland, 190.
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15. Henry A. Atkinson to Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 17, 1942; Box 162, Correspondence with President and All Departments of U.S. Government, Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs Collection, Columbia University Libraries Special Collections.
22. Preston, 336–337.
24. Ibid.
28. Ibid, Merrill to Atkinson.
30. Ibid, Atkinson to Taft.
31. Ibid.
32. Treaster, “Charles P Taft.”

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8. "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs," The Miller Center at the University of Virginia.
17. Ibid., 12.
20. Ibid., 3.

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid.

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2. Hall, 3.
9. Ibid., 1–3.
13. Curtis Roosevelt letter to Donald P. Moriarty, January 26, 1979; Memorandum to the Executive Committee of CRIA from Robert Delany, March 30, 1979.
17. Eva Becker, interview by author, May 2014.
19. Ibid.; Deborah Carroll, interview by author.
23. Tessitore interview.
24. Tessitore interview.
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4. Quotes are from Annual Report 2003, 18, by Jeff Olick and Elazar Barkan, respectively; ibid.
8. Rosenthal interview.
13. Rosenthal interview.
15. Deborah Carroll, interview by author, May 1, 2014.
17. Rosenthal interview.
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“This is an adventure such as has never been tried before.”

—Andrew Carnegie, February 10, 1914, on the founding of the Church Peace Union, now known as Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs