During a violent conflict or period of gross human rights violations, the first priority in peacemaking and human rights protection is a cessation of violence. However, it is clear that attention cannot be limited to the cease-fire itself but from the outset must include planning at least for a period of political transition and social reconstruction, if the cease-fire is not to be merely a lull in hostilities and atrocities that continue to break out again and again, or if the postconflict society is not to be one forever undermined by tensions, antagonisms, and widespread mistrust. Increasingly, the study of past wars’ legacies and work by those who try to resolve current conflicts has expanded to include subsequent stages no less important than the end of major violence.

In most societies recovering from violence, questions of how to deal with the past are acute, especially when the past involves memories of death, suffering, and destruction so widespread that a high percentage of the population is affected. The complex process by which deeply divided societies recover the ability to function normally and effectively after violence is known as reconciliation; new and more refined understandings of this concept have deepened the simplistic definitions and assumptions with which it was once (and is often still) burdened. In many or most recent studies of the process, several concepts are assumed to be closely linked to reconciliation: justice, apology, forgiveness, individual healing, commemoration, and the reform of education1 are the most common.

References to educational reform are nearly always specifically about the political community’s past: how its content must be changed to include
information and interpretations that have been repressed or manipulated under dictatorial regimes, as well as new representations of former enemies, and how its methodology must change to promote tolerance, inclusiveness, an ability to deal with conflict nonviolently, and the capacity to think critically and question assumptions that could again be manipulated to instigate conflict. Far more scholarly attention, however, has been paid to the other concepts or processes, especially, recently, transitional justice. There is much scholarship on history education in general, and the process of history education reform in several prominent cases (post–World War II Japan and Germany, for example) has been widely documented and analyzed. But the relationship of secondary-school history education to reconciliation has not been extensively conceptualized, nor have there been many comparative studies investigating efforts to reform history education after different types of widespread violence in a variety of cultures.

In this introduction I will attempt to give an overview of our current understandings of sociopolitical reconciliation, with the benefit of about a decade of sustained attention from both academics and practitioners from many disciplines, and suggest where history education seems to fit into the sequencing and major components of reconciliation understood as a long-term, multilayered, and multigenerational process. I will then discuss some problems with the linkage of reconciliation and history education, and finally speculate about some specific ways in which history education can contribute to reconciliation, drawing mainly on the findings of a three-year, nine-case-study research project at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs [CCEIA]. The project considered representations of a range of types of violence, from the protracted but comparatively low levels of violence in Northern Ireland, to interstate conflict during World War II, to civil war in Guatemala and Spain. The case studies also cover different temporal contexts, from cases where violence is still ongoing at a low level (Northern Ireland) or reconciliation is in its thinnest possible state (India-Pakistan, North and South Korea, Russia with regard to the Chechens—although less conflictual Russian relations are considered as well) to cases of long-term reconciliation, where events involving mass killings took place over a half-century ago (Spain, Germany, Japan, Canada).

NEW UNDERSTANDINGS OF RECONCILIATION

Two terms in current use for postconflict stages, transition (as in “democratic transition” and “transitional justice”) and reconciliation, tend not to be used consistently; are confusingly applied; and, although they often refer to overlapping stages and components of the aftermath of social and political violence, are not identical. Despite the lack of precision in their usage, the two
concepts are important. Reconciliation is the broader and more complex concept: It refers to far more than a period when a state and its institutions are—in theory at least—on the road to a more stable and just social order, and that period’s peculiar needs.

Reconciliation, at best, is an imprecise term. It cannot be used without explanation to enlarge its meaning. It is also highly contested, because it is laden with overtones from one religious tradition, Christianity. Reconciliation has also acquired negative overtones from specific historical contexts when reconciliation with some groups was promoted at the expense of others (specifically, Southern whites at the expense of African Americans in the half-century following the United States Civil War⁴), and when the term reconciliation was used and promoted by political elites with links to earlier, repressive regimes in the interest of promoting stability and enforcing amnesia, or at least silence, about the crimes of the past (for example, Spain and Latin America).⁵

Yet, both the use of the word and the concept behind it endure and have been significantly broadened and deepened over the last half decade, in which interest from many disciplines and professions in history, memory, sustainable peace building, historical justice, and reckoning with the past has intensified.

I will approach reconciliation through a set of problems defined as basic definitions, Christian overtones, the components of reconciliation, and main actors, concluding with an introduction to promising conceptual approaches that resolve, to some degree at least, the problems that impede our understanding of reconciliation as a process amenable to policy approaches.

A Place to Start: Dictionary Definitions

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up as part of the negotiated transition from white minority rule to democratic governance in South Africa as a way to create a public record on the abuses of the apartheid era through public testimony. Perpetrators of politically motivated crimes were offered the possibility of amnesty in return for full public confessions. In covering the TRC hearings for South African Radio, poet Antje Krog listened for months to firsthand accounts of unimaginable suffering endured and inflicted during the apartheid years, given by survivors, families of victims, and perpetrators.

Meditating on what the commission was trying to do, and the desperate needs of the country as it redefined itself after the apartheid era, Krog wrote: “The victims ask the hardest of all the questions: How is it possible that the person I loved so much lit no spark of humanity in you? . . . The word ‘reconciliation’ . . . is my daily bread. Compromise, accommodate, provide, make space for. Understand. Tolerate. Empathize. Endure. . . . Without it,
no relationship, no work, no progress is possible. Yes. Piece by piece we die into reconciliation.” Her struggle to find words to flesh out the vague but promising concept, and the implication that it will require a painful national transformation akin to death and rebirth, show clearly the difficulty of defining and achieving reconciliation in the aftermath of serious atrocities.

One basic problem with the use of the term reconciliation in relation to political communities is that it can refer to a process between individuals as well, and the two processes are often conflated. This is an important distinction to bear in mind when considering the meanings of political reconciliation. There may be similarities or overlap between the process that two former enemies go through when they reestablish a relationship and the process of building a more lasting peace between groups, but they are not the same thing. For the purposes of this book, reconciliation is considered as a process involving political communities, not individuals with one another.

David Little considers the dictionary definitions of this abstract and elusive word and identifies those meanings that have the most relevance for peace building between groups. *Roget’s Thesaurus* provides two definitions which can be related to a minimum level of peace building soon after the end of a violent conflict:

1. “resignation, as in “to be reconciled to”; “to put up with”; “to bear”; “to tolerate”; and
2. “pacification,” “meeting half-way,” “laying down one’s arms,” “coming to terms,” “settling,” “accommodating.”

Little relates this definition to the tasks of the early stage of peace building, especially provision for basic security and securing mutual adherence to the terms of the cease-fire.

However, there is one more set of definitions for reconciliation which yields both its problems and its potential richness:

3a. “forgiveness,” “pardon,” “propitiation,” “absolution” (*Roget’s Thesaurus*); and
3b. “the action of bringing to agreement, concord, or harmony; to bring (a person) again into friendly relations to or with (oneself or another) after an estrangement; to set (estranged persons or parties) at one again” (OED)

In the words of political philosopher David Crocker, this might refer to what can be called “thick reconciliation,” as opposed to the “thin,” or minimal, reconciliation implied by the first two definitions. Or it might refer, as has happened all too often, to such an unrealistic state of affairs that it can be easily dismissed as utopian, or set a standard for defining reconcil-
iation that cannot be met. It is particularly important to keep this in mind when recalling that political reconciliation as it is most often discussed is sought following large numbers of deaths and severe human rights abuses, including torture, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing, which makes such high-minded processes even more unlikely and realistic definitions even more needed.

Thus, it is in this third area that a more in-depth definition of reconciliation is most necessary, but both the thicker and thinner types of reconciliation need to be accompanied by specific examples of policies and case studies to illuminate the range of meanings reconciliation can have. It should be pointed out as well that the implication of "re-" in reconciliation, expressed in 3.b as the bringing together of estranged parties, is also problematic: many historical conflicts involve parties whose relations were never harmonious or close, certainly not in the individualistic sense in which the word would be used between friends or family members who have quarreled.9 Hannah Arendt acknowledged this problematic when she wrote that reconciliation "seeks not to restore an imagined moral order that has been violated but to initiate new relations between members of a polity."10 For Arendt, argues Andrew Schaap, "A reconciliatory moment is not construed as a final shared understanding or convergence of world views, but as a disclosure of a world in common from diverse and possibly irreconcilable perspectives."11

Finally, the last part of Little’s definition (3b) also implies another important conceptual principle, which is well stated by Burkhard Schaefer: Contrasting reconciliation with such commonly linked concepts as mercy and forgiveness,12 he notes that "reconciliation is a symmetrical relation. I can be reconciled with you only if you are reconciled with me. Therefore, it requires as a minimum condition, if not an equivalence in power, then at least the survival of both sides in the process of reconciliation."13 Thus, reconciliation necessitates two interlocutors, both of whom must be engaged in the process, although the exact responses of each side need not be symmetrical. This relationship is not necessary for other processes that are commonly related to reconciliation, mercy, forgiveness, or empathy, which in principle could be initiated from one side in the absence of any gesture or overture from the other.

The Problem of Christian Overtones

Little points out that the third set of definitions of reconciliation implies the traditional theological, specifically Christian, understanding of the word. In this understanding, "restoring friendly relations with God and among human beings after profound estrangement, and doing that on the basis of ‘forgiveness,’ ‘pardon,’ etc., is an essential, if not the, essential
This brings us to one problem with the use of the word reconciliation: while it is natural and appropriate for strongly Christian groups or countries to refer to reconciliation with all its Christian implications (for example, Franco-German reconciliation, in which Christian groups, imagery, and language played an important role; other important examples include the establishment of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Polish-German reconciliation), the need to build peaceful relations and societies after conflict is hardly limited to the Christian world. The use of the word reconciliation has been rejected by the Israelis, for example, in their process of building a relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany (although outside observers commonly refer to German-Israeli/Jewish reconciliation); Israelis prefer the concepts of rapprochement and cooperation.

There are two main dangers in using this word for the historical development of a relationship between former enemies: One is that it will be seen, and resented, as having Western, colonial overtones by predominantly non-Christian societies. The other is that it will be seen as always implying certain processes, particularly forgiveness, which is central to the Christian tradition, and not other processes, such as justice, and thus will be too narrowly understood to be flexible enough for the variety of cultural and historical settings in which more stable, constructive relations with former enemies are being sought. The close link between forgiveness and reconciliation in the Christian tradition reduces the importance of justice in reconciliation, especially retributive justice. Yet justice is a process that many victims in many settings worldwide call for in powerful language, which is widely believed to be necessary if a culture of impunity is to be avoided, and which is now mandated by international law, particularly through the creation of the International Criminal Court.

Other words, such as coexistence, have been suggested as a substitute for reconciliation, yet the use of this word persists. An argument for its continued use, with the reservation that it should be carefully considered and defined, is the broadness and richness of the word, the range of meanings it embodies, which reflect well the complexity of sociopolitical reconciliation and its many processes and stages. (Coexistence, for example, by contrast, implies only the thinnest understanding of reconciliation, in which former enemies desist from trying to destroy each other.)

Components of Reconciliation—Parallel, Constituent, or Clashing?

One thing that clearly emerges from the literature about reconciliation is that it is in some way connected with a relationship to a “reckoning with” the past. Even in cases where reconciliation has been used as a part of a call to “let bygones be bygones,” to forget about the past, a certain relationship
to the past is implied; and, increasingly, reconciliation is being seen as including, even being predicated on, some degree of accounting for, not amnesia about, a difficult past. In addition, evidence from different case studies shows that even if amnesia is accepted or chosen by the generation that experienced the conflict, as in the Spanish Civil War, the contested past often returns as a subject for public debate in future generations.18

This accounting can take the form of some or all of the following eight components, elaborated by Crocker,19 among others: official acknowledgment of harm done; official apology and other official gestures; the promotion of public fact-finding or truth-telling fora (such as truth or historical commissions), including a platform for victims; the payment of reparations or the making of restitution; justice in the form of trials or lustration; establishment of rule of law; public gestures of commemoration through the creation of monuments, memorials and holidays, and other educational and cultural activities; institutional reform and long-term development; and finally public deliberation.

A key aspect of reconciliation in the minds of many scholars is less concrete than any of the above eight components, but would seem to be implied by many, if not all of them. This is the component of the transformation of the group identity, both of the groups associated with past perpetrators and of that associated with past victims. Barkan, for example, says that what the crucial processes outlined above can achieve is recognition, or acknowledgment, of the victim group, most often a group that has continued to be vulnerable and marginalized, and a validation of their collective memories of suffering: “Such validation can enable restitution to be an international healing process. It can foster mutual understanding by placing present generations on the moral foundation of coming to terms with historical injustices. It can promote the creation of a shared past in which both perpetrators and victims, being mindful of their past and present roles as well as the relationship between them, establish a new reality.”20

P. F. Digeser, in his study of forgiveness in international affairs, extensively considers the possibility of moral transformation of perpetrators of serious harm, and its difficulty when the crimes are “unforgivable,” or massive in nature. He posits some situations where the identities of perpetrators, both individuals and regimes, could potentially change enough over time; the latter case, which is more relevant for our purposes, could take place through the fall of an old regime and the coming to power of one largely or wholly unconnected with the perpetrator regime, as has happened with the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II or the government of the new, postapartheid South Africa, composed of those who were in opposition to the apartheid-era regime. He concludes that “the passage of time does not heal all wounds. It does not settle all accounts or satisfactorily resolve all disputes. But if the
reductionist claims [which reject the idea of total evil] are compelling, it
[the passage of time] does suggest that identities decay and change. In the
case of severe evil, the changeable character of identity may be the only
hope of evading absolute unforgivability.”

The concept of changed identity is closely connected to that of trust, the
development of which, along with tolerance, is a concept closely related to
reconciliation, although there is virtually no conceptual or empirical work
linking the three. Nonetheless, it is clear that shattered trust between groups
and in institutions is one of the major costs of high levels of political vio-

lence, and so it seems intuitively reasonable to assert that rebuilding the ca-
pacity of former victims to have trust, whether in a state, its governing in-
stitutions—especially the police and military, or in the intentions of an
ethnic group, is a crucial part of reconciliation. For trust to be established,
or reestablished, reliable, consistent signals must be given that indicate that
the perpetrating group will not repeat the acts that led to a need for recon-
ciliation in the first place. This is the secondary, but still crucial, role such
public gestures as public acknowledgment of harm done, apologies, fora
for truth-telling (when they are created by the state, not, as in Guatemala,
by the Peace Accords and with the grudging, at best, cooperation of the
state), payment of reparations, and public gestures of commemoration—
again, most powerfully, when they involve the imprimatur of the state as
well as the involvement of civil society actors.

For a basic understanding of reconciliation, it is necessary to consider the
relationship of reconciliation to these basic mechanisms or processes: are
these parallel processes to reconciliation, and ones which promote recon-
ciliation, or are they in fact constituent components of reconciliation?
Susan Dwyer acknowledges this widespread and unavoidable confusion
regarding the term when she poses these questions: “What is reconciliation?
Is it the end-state toward which practices of apology and forgiveness aim?
Is it a process of which apology and forgiveness are merely parts? Or is it
something altogether independent of apology and forgiveness?” And, one
may add, how are we to separate tools of reconciliation from evidence of
reconciliation’s progress? For example, should the revision of history text-
books to include both unflattering parts of one’s own history and the for-
merly ignored experiences of victims be seen as the result of reconciliation
at other levels of society, or is it a mechanism for further, more widespread
reconciliation?

These areas of confusion continue to dog the use of the word reconcilia-
tion. However, the close connection between these processes and reconcili-
ation is not in doubt. A more problematic aspect of reconciliation is the
controversy over its relationship to justice, with which it is often believed to
be in tension: retributive justice is often seen as an adversarial process that
impedes the process of rapprochement between enemies and the building
of trust between them. In addition, a process called “national reconciliation” has often been promoted by those who would be implicated by many of the processes mentioned above, primarily justice but also truth-telling, acknowledgment, and reparations. This has been seen by victims, understandably, as a thinly veiled call for continued impunity for perpetrators and silence from victims and has contributed to distrust of the word reconciliation in many cases.

Who Are the Actors?

Reconciliation is a process that offers potential roles for a very broad, perhaps unlimited range of actors, yet attention has generally been paid thus far to a narrow range, mostly elites, national and religious leaders, and, less frequently, important cultural figures. In fact, it can be said that the fewer actors that are involved in the long-term process that is reconciliation, the more limited will be its scope. However, there seem to be some actors whose roles are more crucial than others, especially at certain stages of reconciliation. In early stages, the importance of political leaders cannot be overestimated: Konrad Adenauer’s leadership in rapprochement with the new state of Israel, especially over reparations; Willy Brandt’s falling to his knees in repentance at the site of the Warsaw Ghetto; Nelson Mandela’s personal commitment to a peaceful transition in South Africa—these are examples of political leadership in reconciliation initiatives that have been judged to be successful. (Germany’s reconciliation efforts over a half-century are now amenable to evaluation; the belief that South Africa has made a good start at reconciliation can only be tentative at best, and only the test of time will allow more definitive judgments to be made.) The importance of political leadership can be explained by the fact that heads of state and other high officials represent the body politic, and their actions convey the message that the state acknowledges past wrongs, that it has disassociated itself from the actions of its predecessor, and that henceforth it will be committed to justice. Without these top-level assurances, as numerous cases around the world attest, reconciliatory gestures and projects from nongovernmental and less highly placed officials will be viewed with suspicion.

However, if reconciliatory actions are limited to state-level leaders, reconciliation will remain at best a province of the leadership and the elite. The rich array of other actors who have had crucial roles in promoting reconciliation include religious organizations and grassroots leaders; government institutions, including local ones that initiate sister-cities or town-to-town programs; military institutions, which conduct joint exercises having in part a trust-building component between former enemies (examples include German military cooperation with both France and Israel); historians, writers, and other individual cultural figures; cultural and educational
institutions, including secondary-school and university programs and museums; national and international nongovernmental organizations, including educational and citizen-to-citizen initiatives; professional organizations, such as associations of physicians, journalists, and businessmen, which bring former enemies together in a pragmatic atmosphere of shared professional interests; economic actors, who mix reconciliatory gestures with self-interest but can have an important role in promoting reconciliation; and transnational organizations and international funders, whose financial support has made possible many initiatives, from truth and historical commissions to youth-oriented educational projects.

Recent Contributions to New Understandings of Reconciliation

Over the last half-decade, case studies, conceptual inquiries, and practical experience have vastly improved our understanding of reconciliation. Some general observations include the fact that reconciliation is increasingly seen (1) as a dynamic, complex, and long-term process, not an end-point; (2) as a spectrum rather than a fixed definition; (3) as a search for a way to engage and manage difference rather than for harmony or consensus; (4) as not synonymous with amnesia, forgetfulness, or “letting go,” and particularly not in the long-term context; and (5) in more realistic and practical terms. The following brief overview outlines some of the latest and most helpful thinking about political reconciliation.

Dwyer, Susan Opotow, and Lily Gardner Feldman have cast their studies of reconciliation as a conscious attempt to rescue the term from the vagueness, idealism, and sentimentality with which it is often used. They describe their work as an effort to bring realism into the definition of reconciliation, and Feldman deliberately sets reconciliation into a realpolitik context to emphasize that social and political reconciliation cannot be separated constructively from other processes, economic, diplomatic, and political.

Dwyer bases her fundamental definition of reconciliation on the idea of finding a way to resolve tensions in the narrative by which a nation defines itself:

We think of human reconciliation quite generally in terms of tensions—tensions between two or more beliefs, tensions between two or more differing interpretations of events, or tensions between two or more apparently incom- mensurable sets of values—and our responses to them. . . . Reconciliation is fundamentally a process whose aim is to lessen the sting of a tension: to make sense of injuries, new beliefs, and attitudes in the overall narrative context of a personal or national life.26

In addition, Dwyer’s conception of how reconciliation can be implemented usefully stresses the importance of building credibility for and trust
in the state and government institutions that before were viewed as unjust, indifferent, or active promoters of suffering: “Reconciliation at the macro level requires the credibility that can be established only by implementation of social and economic programs that concretely address the substantive injustices” of the former regime.27

Opotow moves the discussion of reconciliation away from its earlier vague emphasis on the attainment of such intangible qualities as forgiveness and healing and toward an emphasis on social change:

While reconciliation has enormous positive potential, it can disappoint when it is an empty ritual that cloaks injustice, thwarts social change, and maintains the status quo. The challenge of reconciliation after impunity and atrocity is to create a more just society. Reconciliation requires not only bringing people together to create a shared understanding, but to succeed, much more. It requires an unflinching confrontation with the underlying, chronic injustices faced by a society and the mobilization of its institutions to address these issues in ways that are distributively and procedurally just, and genuinely inclusive.28

Feldman, whose definition of reconciliation has evolved through close studies of Germany’s reconciliation process with a variety of groups (neighbors France, Poland, and the Czech Republic; Israel, a non-neighboring state; and a transnational group, the Jewish diaspora), stresses the importance of institutional change in furthering and assessing reconciliation, and rejects an emphasis on the search for harmony in reconciliation. In personal communications with CCEIA she states, for example, that educational programs for reconciliation have been productive for Germany and former enemies when harmony and “getting people to love one another” were abandoned as goals and the aim became rather to “promote channels of communication and recognition of differences.” She writes of reconciliation as a “continuing dynamic confrontation with the past.” In Germany, institutions, leadership, and international contexts

structure reconciliation as a dynamic, open-ended process. This concept does not infuse peace with a vision of harmony and tension-free coexistence but rather integrates differences. Productive contention in a shared and cooperative framework for identifying and softening (but not eliminating) divergence is a more realistic goal than perfect peace. Authentication of reconciliation thus emerges from challenge.29

She also notes that reconciliation for Germans has always had a dual meaning: there are two German words for reconciliation, one with philosophical/emotional implications (Versöhnung) and one with practical/material implications (Aussöhnung), which have been consistently used in German foreign policy since 1949.30 Feldman’s methodical review of the
role of a range of institutions and actors in Germany’s reconciliatory relations underlines the importance of concrete, practical measures in advancing reconciliation.

Another problematic area of reconciliation, perhaps the most problematic, in which there have been helpful writings is that of the tension between justice and reconciliation. Work by Crocker, Jennifer Balint, and Daniel Rothenberg has been helpful: Crocker, for example, argues against the belief of those who, like South Africa’s Archbishop Desmond Tutu, feel that retributive justice for perpetrators of atrocities must be sacrificed to promote social harmony, and for fair retributive justice. Crocker argues:

Punitive justice can have reconciling power in the sense that upon getting (no more than) what they deserve, perpetrators have set things right and can be reintegrated into society. . . . Fair trials and just punishments not only mete out what wrongdoers deserve and reject a culture of impunity; they also may bring people together as fellow citizens. Unfair trials, unjust verdicts, or excessive punishments, of course, do just the opposite.31

Balint acknowledges that the law and justice mechanisms have an important role, although not the only one, in promoting political reconciliation:

Enduring reconciliation is conditional upon official institutional—legal—acknowledgement of harm perpetrated. Without the authority of law and political-legal acts which frame and kick-start these processes, any reconciliation has less chance of being an enduring one. Yet the substance of reconciliation, that which becomes reconciliation, that fuels the process and permeates the institutional frame, cannot be spoken of legally or take the form of legal discourse. Rather, it must take a different track, grounded in the realities of peoples’ lives and fears and hopes. It is an uncertain path, and one which law can only support from a distance.32

Rothenberg confirms the unease of many observers who feel that defining reconciliation as a separate spiritual or emotional process incompatible with justice is simplistic and incomplete. In perhaps the clearest summary of the new and much more complex understanding of reconciliation, he says:

The rising significance of reconciliation is directly linked to a move away from the classic dichotomy between total amnesties (which have often been used) and large-scale prosecutions (which rarely, if ever, occur). More recently, the trend in the theoretical literature, and the actual practice of negotiating transitions, has involved a growing recognition that this binary distinction is inadequate for documenting the complex experiences of different countries or accounting for the multiplicity of distinct strategies of facing past political violence. As such, it is now common to consider political transitions as
involving an array of possible strategies and policy options, including: truth commissions, monetary reparations, apologies, mechanisms of restorative justice, economic investment, monuments and memorialization, psycho-social healing, the opening of security archives, and other means of facing past violence in order to build the foundations of a new democratic order.33

Finally, Barkan suggests that reconciliation has the potential itself to be a form of effective and achievable justice, because it is complex, contingent and based on negotiation, not on rigidly defined universal standards. Use of the many tools now at our disposal to reckon with the past—truth and historical commissions, revision of official historical narratives, reparations, both retributive and transformative judicial processes—“builds on the moral common denominator among diverging standards and communities. It is based on the recognition that justice depends, foremost, on negotiation and mutual acknowledgement by the protagonists. By accepting the principled failure to formulate a homogeneous moral theory, a theory of restitution [in Barkan’s usage, reckoning with the past, EAC] recognizes the very forging of a reconciliation agreement as itself a moral achievement.”34 This is perhaps the most positive, pragmatic and hopeful vision of reconciliation that any scholar of the field has articulated as of yet.

HISTORY EDUCATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO RECONCILIATION

How does the revision of history education, especially of history textbooks and the narratives they present, relate to the broad architecture of reconciliation? The purpose of history education at the secondary-school level, in the words of Laura Hein and Mark Selden, is essentially to “transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized past and the promised future of the community.”35 If the representation of a group’s past is now recognized as an integral part of identity, and identity includes not only how one views one’s own group but also how one views groups seen as “Other,” which would include especially former enemies, then understandings of history are crucial to a society’s ability to reckon with the past for the sake of a more peaceful future. This much is clear and not particularly controversial; what is more challenging is to identify how history education revision relates to other key components of reconciliation, and where it might fit into reconciliation as a long-term process.

Overall, it would appear that the revision of history education relates to two important components of reconciliation. The first is that identified in the passage by Balint quoted earlier: while justice and legal processes and macro-institutional reform processes (at the level of the state, including the legislature, judiciary, military, and security organs) are a necessary part of enduring reconc-
ciliation, at some point reconciliatory processes must reach beyond the level of the elite and become part of people’s lives, and also part of the midlevel and grassroots institutions, such as schools, whose workings relate more closely to the lives of average citizens. This is the process Balint defines as becoming “grounded in the realities of people’s lives and fears and hopes.”

In addition, the reform of history education can be construed as a sign of changed identity on the part of the state and many of its institutions. Hein and Selden, in comparing Japan’s and Germany’s revisions of narratives portraying their behavior during World War II, note that while “pressure on Japan and Germany to confront their wartime relations with other nations has become a major precondition for negotiating a common future,” Germans have moved further toward “embracing a new vision of their future and thus a coherently revised story of their past” through “publicizing, critically assessing and accepting responsibility for that history in order to make a clean break from the Nazi legacy.” Germany’s neighbors “have hardly forgotten the German invasions of either 1914 or 1939, but are willing to look beyond them because they . . . feel reassured by this new German narrative, and crucially, see a common European framework as the best prospect for taming German power.” While the authors are wise enough to limit the power they ascribe to the reform of historical narratives in the progress of reconciliation (here, interstate), they nonetheless recognize that the reform of secondary-school history textbooks and programs is an important part of the trust the new Germany has built with neighbors.

By comparison with contemporary Germany, Japan’s neighbors’ levels of mistrust stemming from memories of World War II occupation remain high. Takashi Yoshida’s chapter charts how the narrative presented to Japanese secondary-school students has changed since the war years and analyzes the role this process has played in Japan’s limited progress toward reconciliation with her neighbors.

The passage of a half-century since the end of World War II has enabled some degree of assessment, including in the form of opinion polls and other quantitative studies, of Germany’s and Japan’s progress in reconciliatory measures and their reception by neighbors and other peoples; studies in comparable depth are lacking in cases of intrastate or communal violence (to some degree because many, like those cited in this volume, are relatively recent). Evaluative assessments, even the models for such evaluations, are needed to gauge the effect of different stages of history education revision in raising levels of belief in intrastate communities that the new narratives—in which the suffering of no community is ignored, blame for violence is apportioned in a way that seems fair to a majority of the country, and no ethnic group is demonized—give evidence of a new commitment by the state and the major groups within the state not to repeat the violent acts of the past. At this point one can only speculate that revisions of this nature, albeit not at all easy to
carry out, would have such an effect. Digeser posits that political regime change, the only conceivable case in which “unforgivable acts” could merit forgiveness, could be analogous to an individual perpetrator’s achieving a new identity through developing complete amnesia for the rest of his or her life about the unforgivable acts he or she carried out (an event that in the life of an individual, in fact, would be highly unlikely). He observes, however, that “this is not to say that the new regime cannot become morally blame-worthy for its past. If, for example, the new regime tries to whitewash or deny the crimes and injuries of the past it may become an accomplice to those crimes.”

A clear-cut case of such whitewashing would be re-revision of secondary-school history textbooks in a nationalist and apologist direction, such as that attempted by right-wing Japanese pedagogues in a government-approved (although, finally, not widely used) history textbook, *Atarashii Rekishi Kyôkasho* (*New History Textbook*); the fierce protests against the use of this textbook from neighboring countries reflect to some degree the sense that the current Japanese government is behaving as an accomplice to crimes that occurred some sixty years ago, and thus corroborates Digeser’s speculation.

More specifically, secondary-school history education revision would seem to fit into, complement, or deepen certain reconciliatory processes and stages identified above, including acknowledgment and truth-telling. Changes in history textbooks and curricula would function as a kind of secondary phase, which reflect and embody the state’s commitment to institutionalizing earlier processes such as truth and historical commissions and official gestures and processes of acknowledgment, apology, and repair. Again, there have been virtually no studies analyzing changes in history education in the wake of truth commissions. (In Europe, changes in history textbooks were made in the aftermath of the work of historians’ commissions, like the Czech-German Historical Commission, and bilateral history textbook commissions, such as those held between Germany and France and, more recently, Germany and Poland. These processes were deliberately planned and often carried out with the assistance of the Braunschweig-based Georg Eckert Institute, which has ongoing programs that both advise on such changes and also analyze them.)

Elizabeth Oglesby’s study on Guatemala, cited earlier, is one of the few such studies. She has found that, despite the mixture of approaches taken in different types of schools in Guatemala, school programs are beginning to incorporate some of the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission’s findings. The commission process was never embraced by the government: It was part of the peace settlement, essentially imposed by the outside actors who helped to negotiate the settlement and largely opposed by the government, which would mean that the Guatemala case contains public, but not official, truth-telling and fact-finding, and therefore its findings received no government support in providing vehicles to institutionalize them. Nonetheless, Oglesby argues it succeeded in establishing a historical
Secondary-school history curriculum, teaching, and textbook reform may also function as a part of commemoration, as a form of recognition of victims’ suffering (which many will also identify as a form of public justice). This has increasingly been the case in Spain, where rapid changes in history textbooks in the 1990s have meant more frank, sophisticated, and accurate (according to the best standards of academic historians) accounts of the suffering of the Spanish population and the republican forces during the civil war, and of those targeted for repression afterward by the Francisco Franco government. This is clearly one important part of the commemorative work begun by the Socialist government and carried on by civil society actors in the years the conservative Popular Party was in power to recognize and honor those victims who had been largely invisible until the death of Franco, including beginning the task of excavating mass graves.

Finally, history education reform would seem to be part of the process of democratization cited by Crocker in his listing of the components of reconciliation as a long-term project. Little or nothing has been written on the connection among long-term processes of reconciliation, the development of levels of reconciliation that could be identified as robust, and democratization. However, it would seem reasonable to speculate that where social memories of widespread violence are present,44 (even if, in the short term, the demands of peace call for the repression of widespread debate about the past and the imposition of a falsely reconciliatory narrative of harmony), only democratization would both allow for continued work on the past, to prevent it from continuing to exist in subterranean forms that could reappear and poison the present and provide the crucial structures that lower the likelihood of violence reoccurring by allowing deep moral disagreement to occur in a civil way. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, in their *Democracy and Disagreement*, begin to touch on this topic when they identify an area they call “middle democracy,” in which “much of the moral life of a democracy, for good and ill, is to be found. This is the land of everyday politics. . . . Middle democracy is also the land of interest groups, civic associations, and schools, in which adults and children develop political understandings, sometimes arguing among themselves and listening to people with differing points of view, sometimes not.”45 Very controversial questions of the past cannot be addressed in schools, certainly not in a sustained way, unless the conditions for public debate exist in the society.

Spain provides an invaluable case of a country that has experienced democratization following a disastrous civil war and a long dictatorship (and with no past history of democracy, either). Revisions in history textbooks and programs have followed the course of democratization, with a tentative record, “open[ing] up space for wider public discussion about the recent past” and “creat[ing] space for teachers and schools to consider treating topics that a few years ago would have been taboo.”43
beginning at the time of Franco's death and deepening progress as the country has become one of Europe's most stunning success stories of democratization, with the civil war and Franco era being discussed and debated throughout Spanish society. Russia's mixed experience in implementing reforms that allow for critical and open debates about the Soviet past, as described and analyzed in Thomas Sherlock's chapter, reflects an early stage of democracy that still faces many obstacles.

At a functional level, it is worth noting that history education reform also involves many of the actors, especially those below the level of leaders or high political elites, who have been found to play important roles in other processes of reconciliation. Government institutions at the state level, particularly ministries of education, and at the state/provincial or local level, including parent-teacher-type councils or associations, are clearly key actors, as are institutions that train or retrain teachers. Civil society institutions are potentially important, as are, increasingly, outside actors. Assessments of the roles of these outside actors, which can include transnational organizations such as UNESCO or the European Union; donors, both state and private; private consulting firms, like U.S.-based Creative Associates, which has provided new school textbooks for post-conflict Guatemala, Afghanistan, and Iraq; and research institutions like the Georg Eckert Institute, are in their infancy. Oglesby analyzes the role of the U.S. government through institutions like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in providing textbooks in Guatemala that cast the civil conflict as a problem of a “culture of violence” that needs to be transformed into a “culture of peace and human rights”—as opposed to a conflict in which the Guatemalan indigenous peasants were active agents. Sherlock discusses the problematic role of a nongovernmental U.S.-based organization, the Open Society Institute, in supporting Russian history textbook reform. These are, however, only the first of what should be many such studies. Other significant domestic actors include cultural and political elites, such as journalists and other opinion-makers, pedagogues, academic historians, and popular cultural figures, such as feature and documentary filmmakers and novelists.

But perhaps the key actors in the process of school history education reform are ordinary people at all levels of society—teachers, principals, parents, and students themselves. Teachers are particularly important, as nearly all the CCEIA studies show; a textbook, revised or not, is only as important as the degree to which it is used by the teacher. Alison Kitson's Northern Ireland chapter shows a mixture of teacher responses to the existence of sophisticated history textbooks that ask students to discuss controversial periods, events, and issues: some teachers "play safe" by avoiding contentious issues and narratives, often depending on the level of tensions and violence in the area where they teach. Rafael Valls shows in his interviews with Spanish students that students are frequently able to articulate what they would like to learn
about their country’s past and how it relates to their present lives and the challenges that face them in a democratic, European Spain, which nevertheless is composed of descendants of both sides in Spain’s bloody civil war.

Problems with History Education in the Context of Reconciliation

Before considering the possible specific contributions of history education to political reconciliation, it is necessary to take into account several problems inherent with it. The first is a conceptual problem, essentially a chicken-and-egg problem: history education potentially can promote reconciliation, but a certain stage of reconciliation needs to be reached before textbooks can be revised, the public can accept these revisions, which challenge narratives held dear by certain sectors of the population, and teachers can challenge discredited narratives and stereotypes and risk controversy in the classroom. At a practical level, this is because minimal conditions for security must be achieved and certain institutional changes established before concerns about history textbooks and programs can be addressed and debated. At the level of logic, this is related to the problem cited earlier: it is not easy to distinguish whether changes in a society promote reconciliation or reflect its development. That is, do revisions to historical narratives serve more to promote reconciliation, or do they reflect the fact that political and security conditions have been achieved that make such changes in public life possible? Elizabeth Jelin summarizes these problems of sequencing when she says: “In-depth studies focusing specifically on the incorporation of such issues into the educational system will probably show that these processes have a very strong institutional component, since they require reaching a minimum degree of consensus and an institutionally legitimized version of what took place. If the political conflict is not yet resolved, it is impossible to elaborate such a [revised] version of past events.” These problematics imply that history education reform is contingent on other reconciliatory processes, which may impede or prevent it, and also make it difficult to assess whether history education reform projects are a cause of deeper reconciliation or a by-product of it.

Another problem is that of the nearly universal tension between two demands on history education. The first is the need to support patriotism and provide young people with a usable past, which Robert Fullinwider defines as follows:

Students need a usable past . . . a past in which they can find values and projects to take as their own legacies. As heirs, they define their own lives around goals and commitments that build on what came before. Their moral and political identities reside in making “more perfect” the unions and Union they are a part of. There must be, then, something perfectible in those unions. The
role of Historian-Educators is to tell stories that let the “something perfectible” be revealed and carried forward.51

Opposing this need for an overall (although not necessarily totally) positive narrative of the nation is the need to provide a critical history, which may include a very large number of negative and unflattering events.52 James Wertsch, reflecting on “history wars” (which are found from the U.S. to Japan to Russia), defines this tension as the question of “whether the goal of history instruction is to promote critical thought and reflection on texts—that is, to engage in the practice of analytical history—or to inculcate collective memory grounded in ‘state-approved civic truth.’”53 The need for a usable past, which implies some kind of master narrative that is both officially sanctioned and not exclusively negative, is genuine and cannot be ignored, especially in a community involved in nation building after widespread violence. The tension between these two needs is particularly acute and seen particularly clearly in the Russia chapter.

Closely related to the problem of a usable past versus a negative one in history education is that of a clash between the needs of postconflict or transitional societies and the accurate depiction of a negative past. Balancing the need to avoid reigniting conflict or exacerbating social tensions and the need to foster solidarity without creating a falsely positive narrative is extremely difficult. The formula is highly context-dependent and includes such considerations as whether the oppressed group was a minority or a majority of the population, whether there is a new government in power that does not identify strongly with the one under which abuses occurred, how long ago the conflict was, whether the former enemies still live side by side, and how strong the possibility is of renewed conflict. All of these practical and political considerations exert influences on how, when, and to what degree historical narratives are revised in the direction of the standards of good academic history. Both the India-Pakistan and Korea chapters show the challenges of trying to revise historical narratives that used certain elements that served state-building needs but now stand in the way of reconciliation: a narrative of secularism based on equality among groups in a multi-faith country (India); sharp dichotomies between a group identified as “self” and another defined as an inimical “Other” (Pakistan, both North and South Korea, and the Indian narrative proposed by the Hindu nationalist party).

Finally, a constant problematic of history education is that it tends to be overburdened with expectations and meanings. It is only one part of a toolkit of reconciliatory mechanisms and indicators, and can be undercut or compensated for by other factors.54 Assessment of history education revision, as stated earlier, is difficult and has not been widely attempted. And at least anecdotal evidence shows that history is very unpopular as an academic secondary-school subject in many countries (but, interestingly, history as a university
subject does not seem to be particularly unpopular). While this does not lessen the importance of history education revision as a sign of official commitment to a new relationship to the past, it does throw into doubt the significance of history education for changing perceptions about the nation’s past; other sites of history-learning—family, popular culture, the media, religion, political discourse—are also influential and almost certainly much more so than classroom education.

What History Education Can Contribute to Sociopolitical Reconciliation

In summary, the cases in this study and others suggest some specific ways that history education can contribute to the process of reconciliation. First, revisions to the narratives of the nation taught in secondary-school history programs can reflect those critical truths about widespread violence that a transitional society, in what José Zalaquett calls its “foundational moment,”55 has established through a public process of investigation, truth-telling, and acknowledgment. These are the truths that Donald Shriver has identified as those “memories of the past [that] are mandatory for everyone in a community to own up to—if it is not to be a community forever divided by clashing assessments of the crimes of ancestors.”56 While we recognize, in this postmodern age, that there are limits to those facts that can be established and broadly recognized in any society, nonetheless truth-seeking and -telling mechanisms are now widely demanded and increasingly established, due to the recognition that some threshold level of agreement about the past is necessary after conflicts or severe human rights violations. History education is closely linked with this enterprise and can support it as part of a secondary phase, without which the earlier phase would have a very limited effect in society.

More specifically, new history textbooks and programs can help to establish a new narrative of the nation, including a new portrayal of the self and those previously designated as Other, either before conflict or as a result of the process of the conflict itself. Former enemies or excluded groups who might have been largely omitted from official histories can be brought back into the national narrative as agents who made positive contributions to the life of the nation; those who were portrayed in limited, simplistic, and negative ways can be re-humanized, as the Canada case demonstrates (for all that it also illuminates the perpetually incomplete nature of the process of “de-Othering”). Fuller histories can be established that move away from a focus on violent conflict to a broader portrayal of long periods of social coexistence and mutual enrichment, the social memory of which has often been overwhelmed by recent brutality.57 Revised history textbooks can promote more inclusive historical narratives, even potentially multiple narratives, to reflect
more heterogeneous societies and the varied experiences of their multiple communities.

History textbooks can also introduce students to the very difficult process of reconciliation itself: it may be a process they are living through, in whatever thin or thick form, but it may benefit from—using the concept of Russian Formalist literary critics—being “laid bare,” made an overt subject of study. Valls finds this an important piece of Spanish history textbook revision that is still largely missing: “The scanty information paid to Spain’s political and legal processes of reconciliation in regard to the difficult recent past is one of the most surprising and problematic features of the recently published history textbooks.” Northern Ireland is one of the few systems in which attempts have been made to link the study of foreign conflicts and reconciliation challenges with domestic conflicts. Kitson, however, did not find evidence of great success so far.

As Hein and Selden note, “education models citizenship through its form as well as its content.” Revisions in the methodology, as well as the content, of history textbooks and programs can promote long-term reconciliation by enhancing critical thinking skills, willingness to question simplistic models, empathy skills, and the ability to disagree about interpretations of the past and their implications for present social issues without resort to violence. As Kitson points out, “Of particular importance is the inclusion of inquiry and interpretations that potentially provide teachers with a powerful tool to address contested issues without fear of partisanship.” Teaching that presents students to history as an academic discipline with widely accepted standards and methodologies rather than as a political tool or expression of nationalism can help make the study of history “at its best . . . not simply a collection of facts, not a politically sanctioned listing of indisputable ‘truths,’ but an ongoing means of collective self-discovery about the nature of our society.”

New pedagogical methods that can be employed as a result of a transition from authoritarian or totalitarian political systems can thus contribute to larger goals of education in modern democratic states, to develop civically engaged citizenries capable of democratic methods of disagreement and resolving differences.

Finally, the revision of historic textbooks and programs in societies that have undergone widespread violence is crucial for a polity’s conceptions of future relationships as well as of their members as citizens: “Narratives of the nation, in textbooks as well as elsewhere, must change over time to accommodate both global shifts of power and domestic social transformations. . . . One key issue is how to imagine peaceful, cooperative links with former enemy nations. A second involves representing the relationship between citizen and state.” The process of how these new links come to be imagined is not yet well known or documented. In his study of Korean history textbooks in an ambiguous period of bilateral contacts accompanied by political stasis on the part of one rigidly repressive partner, Roland Bleiker hypothesizes that
this would have to be a more inclusive vision of the past, an "ethics of differ-
ence [that] does not essentialize difference, but seeks to create the conditions
under which different identities can coexist," as opposed to a portrayal which
condemns the Other to the eternal status of enemy.

This process implies promoting students’ ability to approach the past with
scholarly detachment, with moral judgments suspended, and then to use their
knowledge to contribute to an enhanced moral understanding of present
dilemmas and their own future obligations. Historian and moral education
specialist Peter Seixas identifies six questions well-educated history students
should be able to ask of difficult pasts: three political—who were the trans-
gressors, who should take responsibility, and what does taking responsibility
entail?—and three educational—what is it we are obliged to remember from
the past, how can or should we judge the actions of people in the past, and
what can we learn from the conflict of the past for the ethical issues that face
us today?62 'This seems to me a wise definition of the basic task of history ed-
ucation in the service of thick reconciliation—which to some degree is always
a future, aspirational state, neither unachievable but also never completely
achieved. What we need now is much more detailed knowledge about the
processes of positive history education reform in the aftermath of violence:
different societies’ experiences of history education reform; how it differs in
different contexts; what the roles, the successes, and failures of different actors
have been; and how it should be evaluated. This is a global task, one for which
the contributions of many different disciplines and societies are vital.

NOTES

1. I will focus here on secondary-school history education, since the authority of
secondary-school curricula and textbooks derives, in the words of Laura Hein and
Mark Selden, from the fact that "directly or indirectly, they carry the imprimatur of the
state," and while “ideas about the past derive from other sources, such as monuments,
museums, movies, popular fiction, and family stories, yet formal education carries a
special weight.” Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and

2. See, for example, the work of legal, ethics, and education scholar Martha Minow,
whose seminal study Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Geno-
ceide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998) lists education as one crucial
response to mass violence along with the basic tools of transitional justice: trials, truth
commissions, reparations, lustration, and memorialization. Cf. 144–145. Margot Stern Strom, founder and president of the Boston-based nonprofit educational group Facing History and Ourselves, writes that in order to serve peace and justice, education must convey the message "that history is largely the result of human decisions, that prevention is possible, and that education must have a moral component if it is to make a difference." See Margot Stern Strom, Facing History and Ourselves Resource Book (Brookline, MA: Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation, Inc., 1994, xvi). A collection of empirical studies by an international team, of great importance for the field, is Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, Eds., My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). The articles in this volume consider transitional justice and social reconstruction issues, prominently including education, although not history education per se, in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

3. This project was enabled by the generous support of the United States Institute of Peace and the Spencer Foundation.


5. See, for example, Elizabeth Jelin on Latin American associations with reconciliation, in State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. xvii.


9. As Elizabeth Oglesby points out in chapter 6, “In Guatemala, some Mayan groups protested the use of ‘reconciliation,’ saying the conflict in Guatemalan society was not a matter of the last forty years, but of the past five hundred; in other words, Guatemalan society has never had ‘conciliation’ so it is difficult to talk about re-conciliation.”


12. See, among many others, John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 30. Lederach locates reconciliation at the intersection of four key concepts divided into four to five constituent components: Truth (comprising acknowledgment, transparency, revelation, clarity); Justice (equality, right relationships, making things right, restitution); Mercy (acceptance, forgiveness, support, compassion, healing); and Peace (harmony, unity, well-being, security, respect).


14. Little, “Some Thoughts on the Notion of ‘Reconciliation.’"


17. See, for example, the mission statement of the New York City–based Coexistence Initiative, in which coexistence is conceived similarly to reconciliation in this paper, although note that reconciliation is listed as a component within coexistence: www.coexistence.net/coexistence/index.asp?page_id=164&catid=79 (accessed July 9, 2004).

19. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs,” pp. 48–62. His list seems to me to be one of the most complete of the many propounded by writers on reconciliation. Note, though, that he includes reconciliation as one of his eight components; I do not believe an argument is strongly enough made here for reconciliation as a process apart from the other eight, and my argument is that robust reconciliation necessitates most if not all of the other processes, and is the result of them, rather than a separate process.

20. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore, MD, and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 320. Note that Barkan uses the word restitution in a broader sense than that of returning belongings or property to “include the entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices” (xix). Barkan provides an important discussion of the concept of recognition as a reconciliatory process. He writes that “craving for recognition must therefore validate dialogue and the participation of distinct cultures as a precondition for resolution of conflicts: not the domination of one ideology over another, but the recognition by both winner and loser of their intertwined histories and equal worth as humans,” p. 321.


22. In this vein, Nicholas Tavuchis even distinguishes between interpersonal and collective apology when he recognizes its power to create a public record: “[A]lthough still within the conceptual purview of what is recognized as interpersonal apology, the major structural requirement and ultimate task of collective apologetic speech is to put things on record, to document as a prelude to reconciliation.” See Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Forgiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 109. Tavuchis also discusses the importance of apology being unconditional and perceived as sincere, in order for it to convince the receiver of the apology that the apologized-for acts will not be repeated.

23. Given the prominence of forgiveness in other taxonomies, its absence in my own begs an explanation: Briefly, I am not convinced that forgiveness on the part of an entire political community toward another one can be expressed, identified, verified, or assessed, particularly after atrocities that scholars, including P. F. Digeser, in Political Forgiveness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001) and “Forgiveness, the Unforgivable and International Relations,” and Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) have identified as “unforgivable.” Forgiveness is particularly problematic because, first, it places responsibility primarily
on those who have suffered injustice, and, two, it is often called for in the absence of any gesture of remorse or repentance on the part of perpetrators of mass crimes; such gestures, except for well-publicized exceptions, are strikingly lacking in every case study I know of. While political apology is well studied (cf. especially Tavuchis, *Mea Culpa*), political forgiveness is much less theorized. In addition, there are important cases in which there has been what can reasonably be considered steady progress in reconciliation and which have not included any references to forgiveness, most notably German-Jewish and -Israeli reconciliation.


25. Timothy Garton Ash notes that “Taken to the extreme, the reconciliation of all with all is a deeply illiberal idea.” “True Confessions,” *The New York Review of Books*, 17 July 1997, pp. 33–38, quote on p. 37. Crocker’s identification of democratic deliberation, which implies democratization itself as a necessary part of long-term reconciliation, implies as well that harmony or unity are not part of the definition of true reconciliation. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs.” See also citation of Lily Gardner Feldman’s work in the following pages.


27. Ibid., p. 95.


30. Ibid., p. 334.


34. Barkan, op. cit, p. 319.

35. Hein and Selden, *Censoring History*, p. 3.


37. This conception is reflected in the words of a young Slovak civil society activist, Balasz Jarabik, to whom I described my early work on reconciliation. He pointed out that, regarding the struggle to overcome hostility, stereotypes, and intolerance in Central Europe, at the village level public opinion is made by the mayor, the priest, and the local teachers. It is figures like these, he said, that those interested in promoting long-term reconciliation must reach if it is to be successful at the grassroots level. Although he referred to one region, even in very different societies, the
figures he identifies, secular educators, spiritual leaders and teachers, and local political leaders, are crucial to change at the grassroots level. It was this observation that inspired the Carnegie Council’s decision to focus on the role of secondary-school history education in reconciliation.


39. Barkan sees the importance of German reckoning with the past as going well beyond its own new relationships with neighbors and other former victim groups: “Sponsored by Germany’s struggle to cleanse itself of the past, restitution became a precedent for moral claims in international justice and was introduced into international public discourse as an implied new normative morality. Op. cit., p. 22.

40. See also the chapters on Japanese textbooks in Hein and Selden by Gavan McCormack, Aaron Gerow, and Nozaki Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, also Andrew Horvat and Gebhard Hielshcr, eds., Sharing the Burden of the Past: Legacies of War in Europe, America, and Asia (Tokyo: The Asia Foundation, 2003).

41. Digeser, “Forgiveness, the Unforgivable and International Relations,” p. 23, N27.

42. The Georg Eckert Institute is unique worldwide as an institution dedicated to school history and social studies textbook reform in the interest of peaceful development and reconciliation. While it once focused mainly on Western Europe, it now increasingly looks at other regions. More information can be found at www.gei.de (accessed July 23, 2004).

43. Oglesby is now preparing to expand her study of history education after the holding of truth commissions to see how the commissions’ findings are reflected in secondary-school history programs regionally, which should enrich our understandings of the connection between public truth-telling, official acknowledgment, and the content of school history education.

44. Michael Ignatieff challenges those who believe that enforced forgetting, or amnesia, can contain the danger of memories of mass violence that are not publicly addressed, and questions whether such memories can ever successfully be suppressed, when he writes that “no questions of national identity in the present can ever avoid encountering the painful secrets of the past. In this sense, as long as these questions are alive . . . there can be no forgetting.” Warriors’ Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998), p. 181.


46. See both Takashi Yoshida’s and Rafael Valls’s chapters (2 and 5), which explore the role of Japanese pedagogues in promoting a nationalist re-revision of some Japanese textbooks and mention the role of a Spanish writer and journalist, also a conservative, in challenging the post-Franco work of Spanish historians, who have largely made critical assessments of Franco’s regime. The Spanish conservative’s challenge to the mainstream of recent Spanish academic historical research has apparently not affected the narrative in Spanish school textbooks, in contrast to Japan; the changes in Japan’s textbooks have been subtle except for one notorious case, New History Textbook, which in the end was not widely used despite its notoriety.

47. But note that Penney Clark in chapter 3 points out that studies show that teachers tend to rely most on textbooks. Also see a similar observation in Alison Kitson’s chapter 4, especially when other resources and means of support for teachers are scarce or lacking.


50. Charles Taylor makes a case for patriotism, as opposed to nationalism, with which it is often merged: "We need patriotism as well as cosmopolitanism because modern democratic states are extremely exigent common enterprises in self-rule. They require a great deal of their members, demanding much greater solidarity towards compatriots than toward humanity in general." "Why Democracy Needs Patriotism," in Joshua Cohen, ed., For Love of Country? (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), pp. 120–21.


52. Thomas Sherlock describes an extreme version of this problem, the “profound disorientation and anxiety” that overwhelmingly negative late Soviet and early post-Soviet revelations about Soviet history caused among Soviet and then Russian citizens, and the challenge this produced to a coherent national project. See both his “Destroying Settled Pasts and Building Uncertain Futures: The Role of History and Myth in the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 2001, in manuscript, and the chapter in this volume.


54. Wolfgang Hoepken gives a good assessment of the subtle role history education may play in the success or failure of reconciliation: “The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the bloody war were not caused by historical memory or by education. However, the way in which the Second World War was remembered through education and in public knowledge may well have influenced the political events that led to the violent clashes of the early 1990s.” Wolfgang Hoepken, “War, Memory and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 13, no. 1, pp. 190–227, quote on p. 204.

55. José Zalaquett defines a foundational moment as “a period when societies intently address social-contract kind of questions—that is, matters concerning the very basis of the political system they are about to build, rebuild, or transform, and how, on such grounds, political compromises can be justified.” José Zalaquett, “Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Human Rights Violations and War Crimes,” in Jonathan Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford and Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 223.


57. Interesting efforts in this direction are underway in Polish textbook representations of the Jews of Poland, which moved from widespread absence in pre-1989 textbooks and programs to a tendency to associate Jews narrowly with the tragedy of the Holocaust to current interest in teaching about Jews, as well as other minorities, as important actors in Poland’s past, with whom there was a wide range of cultural and social interactions over the centuries. This last shift would entail broadening the definition of what is Polish as well, to include not only ethnic Poles but all those who were
historically present in significant numbers in the Polish lands. See the Carnegie Coun-
cil report on a faculty development workshop on teaching for tolerance and recon-
ciliation in Poland held in Lublin in 2001 at www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/
58. Hein and Selden, Censoring History, p. 5.
60. Nearly all the case studies in this volume consider changes in pedagogy. See
especially Sherlock, Valls, and Kitson.
61. Hein and Selden, Censoring History, p. 43.
62. Peter Seixas, “History Education and Moral Judgments about the Past,” paper
presented at a symposium at the University of British Columbia on “History Edu-
cation and Political Reconciliation,” November 7–9, 2003, unpublished.