



Introduction

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In a talk at the Carnegie Council about his book *Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment*,¹ James Gustave Speth, a world-renowned expert on and leader in combating environmental problems, recited the grave threats facing the planet and lamented the failure of the international community to make progress against them in the past twenty-five years. He concluded that the solution rests largely with ordinary citizens “because the politicians have let us down.” Speth warned that “if citizens don’t take the helm, we will lose this fight.” In order to achieve Speth’s vision of “a new movement of consumers and households committed to sustainable living,” we need to understand what motivates people to act. We need to understand the social and cultural values that people bring to bear on environmental problems and how they mobilize those values to forge environmentalism—to create and sustain programs and movements of environmental action in their communities and their countries.

The aim of this book is to enhance our understanding about environmental values and their expression in different social and cultural contexts around the globe. Although much of the environmental literature focuses on institutional capacities and available environmental technologies, little of it examines the experiences of communities trying to define environmental values in the context of struggles over livelihoods and lives. This book presents new case material that links the scientific analysis to policy analysis and then goes one step beyond to do what few studies do: to examine the values of all the stakeholders and their processes of interaction. This holistic approach provides a basis for understanding how people in different parts of the world define environmental goals and objectives, how their values related to the environment are shaped by lived realities, cultural contexts, and political struggles in which they forge their ideas about nature and the environment, and whose values matter and whose don’t in setting environmental priorities.

This volume draws upon fieldwork conducted at ten sites in four economically, politically, and environmentally important, yet highly disparate, countries—the United States, China, India, and Japan—to analyze community responses to environmental degradation and to government policies that address the degradation. Our studies of growing competition over scarce resources, shifting government policies,

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and communities grappling with environmental crisis reveal some of the ways in which people make sense of their physical world and act upon it. In these stories we encounter the lived experiences, perceptions, and values that underlie competing claims regarding human interaction with the natural environment, and how those claims get articulated and negotiated within different political, economic, and social contexts. We also gain a clearer picture of how government policy contributes to the creation of environmental values: how it influences people to take steps to value and protect the environment.

Part 1 of this book develops a rich empirical base that brings to light the cultural assumptions, standards, and analytic techniques implicit in environmental values, actions, and policies. We build this base for the four countries both as a foundation for action and a model for future studies that might fill in the tableau of the rest of the world. Because values are complex, we did not try to separate them out as a sole focus of inquiry. Our goal is to report thoroughly on the cases, not to draw any specific conclusions about the relationship between values and policy. Part 2 provides a comparative perspective on the ways in which, in different societies, values come to be publicly “environmental” in the first place. Taken together, the empirical base and the comparative perspective help us to identify what policymakers can do to secure public support for and trust in environmental policies. In addition, the comparative perspective enables us to identify a wide range of factors that contribute to changes in environmental values and behaviors, and to explore the possibilities for a convergence of environmental norms across diverse cultures.

In documenting how the communities we studied make sense of the environmental problems they face and what environmental discourses prevail within them, we draw out the relationships between individual values and collective action and how values are interwoven with power and politics. Our studies demonstrate the fact that not all environmental values are accorded equal weight within the public domain, just as not all expressions of environmental value are seen as legitimately or properly “environmental.” Some values enter into environmental debates, policies, and legal decisions, while others are screened out or remain silenced.

Rather than treating environmental values only as a distinct identifiable set of green values, therefore, the studies in this volume treat them as dynamic, and contingent on specific social, legal, political, and economic conditions. Seen this way, environmental values are, in the words of commentary author Clark Miller, “dynamic elements of community relationships and dialogues, shaped by the ways people attribute meaning and importance to scientific facts, weave them into broader social narratives, and to embed them in the tacit assumptions and day-to-day practices of institutions and the broader social order” (p. 380). Context is important because it shapes the ways in which people apprehend and value the environment, and how their environmental values are expressed. Our efforts to contextualize environmental values are aided by cross-national comparison, which helps to avoid essentializing difference, while clarifying particularities and commonalities across different societies and cultures.

The Origins of the Book

This book dates back to early 1992, when under the auspices of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs and with the support of the then newly formed Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, I organized a series of meetings with Japanese and American environmental policy makers and their close advisers involved with the Earth Summit that was taking place that year in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The purpose of what we called the U.S.-Japan Task Force on the Environment was to enhance the efforts of government officials, scientists, and civil society to assemble an action program on the environment by exploring the moral assumptions and ethical principles underlying environmental policy decisions in both countries. The dialogue resulted in two 1993 reports that focused on this theme: *Whose Environmental Standards? Clarifying the Issues of Our Common Future* and *The Politics and Ethics of Global Environmental Leadership*. It engaged with policy debates about American and Japanese leadership roles and responsibilities for global environmental protection, about the U.S.-Japan relationship itself, and about opportunities for both countries to work together to solve shared environmental problems in a rapidly changing context for the conduct of international relations.

The choice of the two countries was significant: whereas Japanese officials had recently and very publicly pledged Japan to be a global environmental leader, among U.S. officials there was much less consensus about what priority to place on environmental issues or whether the problems were even serious enough to warrant that kind of priority. By the time of the summit it had become increasingly clear that a cautious American approach to the environmental negotiations would win out. As a result, Japanese officials were faced with a dilemma: whether to maintain their traditional position of deference to the United States in international diplomacy or break with their American partners. Within the Japanese delegation—and within the very robust contingent of Japanese civil society present at the summit—there was a good deal of frustration with the American position, and our hope was that the task force could help to clarify the points of difference and agreement, and diffuse the tension.

Among the many observations made by task force members, three stood out. First, a hypothesis was put forth that American individualism and Japan's community and consensus orientation had significant implications for the way each country approached environmental issues. For example, in the case of ozone layer depletion, one participant observed that Japan tends to accept general scientific consensus and act on it without insisting on absolute certainty. U.S. policymakers, on the other hand, tend to pay more attention to the dissenter if there is no strong consensus. The practical effect, in terms of the ozone issue according to participants, was that the Japanese favored a strong ozone protection treaty, with stronger controls on the chemical industry, while the Americans did not. Second, we observed that U.S.-Japan dissonance at the Earth Summit was attributable in part to the way each delegation regarded the other. Just as the Japanese delegation members felt that the Americans showed little respect for other cultures, the American delegates felt that the Japanese

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placed too much emphasis on the “extractable value” of natural resources—the pecuniary benefits realizable from their exploitation—rather than value the eco-systems themselves. Finally, our task force pinpointed the problem of international dissatisfaction with the American failure of leadership, which, according to several Japanese participants included a lack of willingness to listen to the ideas of others.

The task force was a valuable opportunity to candidly discuss tensions between American and Japanese negotiators in a private setting. But a seminar by its nature allows for the presentation of only a limited range of views—those of the seminar participants; missing was a clear sense of the range of views and debates going on within these societies at large, among citizens, activists, educators, scientists, and local policymakers. Once the hard work of fighting out the language of treaties and conventions is done and diplomats return home, the next task is to convince their publics of the need to make good on their commitments. Similarly, after the Carnegie Council task force reports had been written and sent to the press, questions remained: To what extent do the cultural, social, and economic priorities that the task force identified for each nation’s team of environmental negotiators accurately represent the priorities of U.S. or Japanese citizens? Do they reflect the values of ordinary Japanese and Americans whose lifestyle choices affect the environment and who are affected by and must respond to local, national, and increasingly international environmental policies and regulations? What kinds of policies should be adopted at home that can convince publics to embrace the Earth Summit agenda?

These questions led us to want to better understand the dynamics of environmental politics in each country and the ways in which values towards the environment could be expressed and acted upon within a policy context. Considering the conclusions of an important study of environmental negotiations that had just been released,² we reasoned that to improve the quality of communication between parties involved in international environmental negotiations, researchers and policy makers need better information on the differences and similarities of environmental values of the constituents of various countries and the political landscapes that shape the expression of those values in coping with similar environmental problems.

Two years after the release of the task force reports, I initiated the Carnegie Council project upon which this book is based to explore these questions. We expected that the project would find a gap between citizens’ values and public policy, and we decided to explore the gap in each cultural context, why it developed, and how to bridge it. We were particularly interested in how increasing international economic, cultural, and political integration—a phenomenon commonly known as “globalization”—was affecting the ability of local actors to manage the environmental consequences of growth. In addition, we wanted to understand better the impact upon environmental values of both globalization and the internationalization of environmental standards. Along with the United States and Japan, we believed it would be valuable to bring into the study India and China—two environmentally, economically, and politically significant developing countries that were coming to be viewed as success stories of globalization.

The participants in the planning phase were motivated by the possibility that such a study could prompt new thinking about approaches to environmental protection in their own country. The Americans emphasized the importance of providing insight for the domestic environmental policy community working both at home and abroad about the kind of technological and analytical assumptions embedded in American policies. Similarly, the Japanese researchers wanted to promote a new way of thinking in Japan through comparative study. The Chinese researchers wanted to demonstrate to an international audience the particular environmental challenges they face and thereby improve international trust and cooperation with China. Observing that the average citizen and policy maker in India is alienated from national policy, the Indian participants sought in the project a means to incorporate local people and their values into policy making. They also wanted to understand better what prompts people to adopt change either more or less eco-friendly lifestyles and they sought to do this through an exploration of the processes of technology transfer, technology absorption, and the values attached to them. As a group, we also wanted to scrutinize the school of thought promoted in both environmental policy and academic circles that says that people—poor people in particular—are chiefly concerned about their economic well-being, as distinct from their environmental well-being.³ And considering the tensions at Rio, we hoped that a comparative study of environmental values could point to ways of better promoting international cooperation.

The Study

This project can be seen as an experiment in collaboration. A Millian comparative “method of difference” or “method of agreement” did not fit our purpose, which was not to test explicit theories or hypotheses. Rather we aimed to get a fuller picture of local values, the transactions among stakeholders at different levels, and the interaction of community values and public policy.

Like our research foci, our research method privileged the local: We decided to rely on country-based teams of researchers to select the cases, choose suitable methods, and conduct and analyze the fieldwork. We reasoned that research teams using the qualitative methods appropriate to the sites and the research traditions of each country could most effectively carry out this research. Yet while the research teams in each country were closer to the local scene than a foreign researcher would be, the gap between the foreign researchers and the researchers on the country teams was replicated by a gap between the researchers and their local informants, which had to be mediated in the field and in the chapters that appear here.

To make the project comparative, we used a two-pronged strategy of approximate standardization and continuous interaction. Standardizing the methodology provided the structure needed to keep all the country studies moving in the same direction, while continuous interaction among the research teams enabled us to successively draw the project together by identifying common themes. At eight project meetings

that took place at intervals throughout the research and writing phases,⁴ we shared ideas, methods, and insights from our fieldwork, worked towards a common vocabulary, and made necessary adjustments to the research design. By bringing into relief the distinctiveness or commonness of what we were encountering in the field, this process informed each team about the findings of the others and influenced the way each team approached the fieldwork and the writing up of findings. In the intimate settings of these meetings, broad cultural and disciplinary differences were magnified, confronted, and usually understood through attention to the cultural context in which they were observed. The similarities and differences that we discovered in our methods and approaches helped shape the analyses of the research findings.⁵

Like the project, the book itself is a product of collaboration, with multiple analysts bringing their distinctive disciplinary and cultural perspectives to bear on the material. Part 1 is the product of researchers who selected the cases and carried out the studies; the chapter authors, who in certain cases are the same as the researchers and in other cases are writers who drew upon and expanded the original field reports; and the experts in environmental politics of each country who introduce the chapters. In Part 2, specialists in environmental justice, law and science policy, environmental politics, and global environmental governance analyze issues across the case material. Drawing upon their own theoretical concerns, they provide insights that might not be apparent to the researchers, and with which indeed the researchers might not always agree.⁶ This book, then, is intended to be a sourcebook and an invitation to others to use the material in a similar way.

The country chapters in Part 1 have a common structure. Each begins with an introductory explanation of the significance of the selected cases, a statement of the research biases, and a description of the methods and line of inquiry pursued in the chapter. The case studies follow, first an industrial pollution case and then a resource use case. Each case study section contains a historical narrative of the case and an analysis based upon field interviews of stakeholders—people and groups interested in and affected by the environmental problem detailed in the narrative. The chapter authors frame the studies with a comparative analysis of the stakeholder responses to the two (or, in the Japan chapter, four) cases, developing insights into values and value change and relating these insights to broader trends of environmental policy and political action in the country in question. Immediately preceding each country chapter is an introductory essay by an expert on the environmental politics of the country, who situates the cases within the broader national context.

The Four Countries

Readers will recognize the four countries we cover in this book as four of the countries most responsible for industrial pollution and global resource management and whose cooperation is most required if real progress toward environmental sustainability is to be achieved.⁷ Together these four countries account for half the world's population and economic output. They are also responsible for half the world's emissions of

carbon dioxide. In 2000, the four countries were among the top five in terms of total carbon emissions, and with GDP real growth rates in China and India continuing to soar, at 9.1 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively, their carbon emissions are expected to rise. Beyond this quintessentially global challenge, which Speth calls “the most serious issue of them all,” these countries face serious local resource and pollution concerns that often have cumulative regional and global effects.⁸

For the purpose of comparing and understanding how values are created in different contexts, however, the significance of these four countries lies not in what they have in common but in what makes each distinctive. As Clark Miller notes in his chapter, the four countries were not chosen at random:

Economically, the four span a diversity of approaches to bridging markets and government planning and the three largest economies in the world. They include the widely regarded icon of Western, laissez-faire, liberal, free trade economics and the intellectual leader of the nonaligned movement. Politically, they are four of the world’s current great powers, including the last remaining communist great power, the world’s oldest democracy, and two countries whose current forms of governance have been adapted from legacies of occupation by Western countries with noticeably different notions about how to construct a democratic polity. Their inhabitants include some of the world’s richest and poorest peoples, not to mention large, influential populations of many of the world’s major religions, including Buddhism, Protestant and Catholic Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Shintoism. Last, but certainly not least, each possesses a highly regarded, well-funded environmental science community. (p. 392)

Thus, these countries present both interesting parallels and important social, cultural, political, and economic differences that affect the relationship humans have with nature, the character of environmental action, patterns of political mobilization, and responses to post-industrial change.

In selecting the case studies within each country, project researchers sought to capture a wide range of variation within their country by including different socio-economic classes, climates, and ethnic groups. We decided that each team would pick at least one case that involved the environmental impacts of industrial development and at least one case of natural resource protection; yet, while adhering to this rule, the study allowed the research teams to select cases that are particularly salient in the society they were studying, rather than insisting upon strict comparability across the cases. (The full criteria for case selection are described in the final chapter, “How Shall We Study Environmental Values?”)

Our decision to distinguish two case types—resource use and industrial pollution—had its basis in the environmental studies literature, where this distinction is widely encountered.⁹ Because of their contrasts—in the most basic sense, between nature protection (“backward thinking”) discourses and development (“forward thinking”) discourses—the two case types would enable us to capture different human-nature interactions as well as the experiences of both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, we expected that the ways in which conflicts develop and are resolved would differ significantly in the two case types. In resource use cases, the resource is always seen to

be a public good; the conflict involves a competition of values over how the resource should be used. Pollution, on the other hand, except in its commodification through tradable permit or recycling schemes, is always a public bad, but one that is sometimes ignored. When part of a community ignores pollution and part tries to eliminate it, value differences emerge, and conflict erupts. Thus, whereas solutions to the resource use cases involve resolving a competition over values, we hypothesized that environmentalist solutions to industrial pollution would require facilitating a convergence of values over time by raising awareness of the pollution and its consequences. Still, we recognized that the distinction between the two kinds of cases, which is widely encountered in environmental policy literature, may not in fact be the most analytically important distinction, and thus we endeavored to examine its usefulness in the study.¹⁰

The China chapter describes two instances of ostensibly progressive policy initiatives to protect the environment undertaken or backed by China's central government. Recent studies of Chinese environmental politics document the rise of public concern for the environment in the form of government-sanctioned environmental civic associations.¹¹ In our two cases the government's green initiatives provoked a quiet backlash—quiet because of the persistent limits on freedom of speech and organization in China. The pollution study is set in Benxi, a city known for its steel production, in Liaoning Province in China's industrial belt. The air in the city became so polluted that by the 1980s Benxi had earned a reputation as “the city that cannot be seen by a satellite.” Reactions from the Benxi public to the effort to turn Benxi into a model environmental city underscore the class stratification taking place in China as a result of the transition to a market economy begun also in the 1980s: whereas the new white-collar class was happy to see blue skies return, the growing number of residents struggling to cope with a transitional market economy betrayed cynicism and contempt for the environmental measures.

Our Chinese resource use case is the Sanjiang Plain wetlands, in the extreme northeastern corner of China, where economic development has been at odds with recent wetlands conservation efforts. Here, public resentment of the environmental campaign has been even greater than in Benxi. For nearly five decades, out of concern about food scarcity, the central government promoted the Sanjiang Plain as a frontier for agricultural production and lured many migrants to the wilderness region to reclaim and cultivate the land. In the late 1990s a sudden about-face of government priorities led to a moratorium on land reclamation for agricultural development and other restrictions on land use. With the designation of a nature reserve in the Sanjiang Plain, initially by provincial authorities, there was growing awareness among both Chinese officials in Beijing and slowly also local officials of the importance of wetland preservation as a way of protecting wildlife and plant species and bringing other benefits—including the national security the sustained forest cover would provide from neighboring Russia. Nonetheless, local officials and residents alike felt betrayed by the more severe restrictions that came when the wetland was upgraded to a national level wetland and designated a “wetland of international importance.” While

nature reserve officials were optimistic about the possibilities for ecotourism and other forms of economic activity the wetland might bring, the failure to fund the reserve adequately, along with corruption among local officials, fueled anger among most interviewees, who had experienced the damage to their livelihoods and their futures resulting from the upgrading of the wetland.

Still, a contingent of stakeholders at each site were convinced that something needed to be done to clean up Benxi's pollution and preserve China's wetlands, and that doing so would bring other benefits (such as attracting foreign funding) to both locales. The influential political scientist Robert Putnam has coined the term "two-level game" to describe a situation in which international pressure enables government leaders to shift the balance of power in their domestic game in favor of a policy that they privately support but previously felt powerless to undertake.¹² One might expect that, with the Chinese authoritarian system, China's leaders would not need to play the two-level game, but our cases demonstrate that international pressure did provide needed legitimacy to the government's policies.

The Japan chapter presents two industrial pollution case studies and two resource use case studies—in each pair a primary case and a secondary case for comparison. For the pollution cases, the sites are Minamata, a city in Kumamoto Prefecture, where factory effluent caused severe mercury poisoning, leading to intense social and political conflict; and along the Agano River in Niigata Prefecture in northern Japan, where there was a second incident of mercury poisoning, which came to be known as Niigata-Minamata. In contrast to Minamata, where victim suffering slowly gave rise to a powerful citizen's movement, in Niigata, because of a greater social and physical distance between polluter and victim, value and policy changes were not as pronounced, despite the severe human harm and social conflict that also occurred there. The resource use case sites are Lake Biwa, Japan's largest lake, where the national objective of increasing water resources to serve rapidly industrializing cities downstream, led to massive public works projects (including dam construction), which over three decades radically changed the landscape and lifestyles of the lakeshore; and the Nagara River, where a diversified social movement of leisure fishers and nature enthusiasts with conflicting motives mobilized to fight the construction of a dam on Japan's last remaining natural river.

As the Japan chapter shows, a shift in the terminology used to describe environmental problems from *kogai* (literally, "public nuisance") to *kankyo mondai* (environmental issues) tracks a change in Japanese conceptions of human-nature relationships. When the Minamata City and Lake Biwa studies begin, in postwar Japan around the 1960s, Japanese society is at what the Japan team refers to as the "embedded whole" phase—"where environmental values do not translate into a valuing of specific elements of nature or into a discrete concept of nature" (p. 171); rather, in this phase humans are viewed as being at one with nature. The authors trace how, with large-scale and rapid industrial development, marked environmentally by the outbreak of Minamata-like *kogai* crises, most Japanese saw themselves as apart or "abstracted" from nature. Over time, however, each community began to reconnect

with nature, thereby approaching what the authors call the “balanced whole” phase, in which the physical environment becomes valued again (“re-embedded”) as a fundamental part of human existence. This stage of environmental consciousness is marked by civic environmental movements—in our cases, the anti-detergent movement, or soap movement, taken up by the lakeshore residents of Lake Biwa in the late 1970s, an anti-dam movement at the Nagara River in the late 1980s, and the Moyainaoshi Campaign, the government-led initiative to heal Minamata begun in the 1990s. While the Minamata victims’ movement of the 1960s brought Japan’s *kogai* problems into the public eye for the first time, these later movements were all carried out in the name of *kankyo mondai*. What became lost in the terminology shift from *kogai* to *kankyo mondai*, however, was the claim of victimhood, which is implicit in *kogai* problems. The new terminology thus represents the influence of elites—in fact, the soap movement was engineered by the prefectural government and the anti-dam movement by a group of leisure fishers—and the obscuring of social injustice in environmental policy decisions and outcomes.

Our India pollution case centers on Delhi, which in 2000 was rated as the world’s fourth-most-polluted city,¹³ and where, as in Benxi, environmental politics is dominated by a new, politically powerful middle class. Unlike Benxi, where the conflict between environmental policy and livelihood may be more perceived than real, in Delhi the policy solution to industrial pollution—namely, the closure of thousands of factories around the city—directly affected the livelihoods of residents, from industrialists to casual workers, while bringing little if any reduction in air pollution. Even before the legal action that led to the factory closings, poor working conditions rendered factory workers more vulnerable to the toxic burden of the city’s polluting factories, and they are also the ones who had to bear the cost of the new green agenda. The study points to the politics of labeling—the politics surrounding what set of values gets labeled as “environmental” and therefore receives national and international recognition and support. In this case the judge who ruled in favor of the factory closings was hailed as the “green judge,” and the lawyer who sued to relocate the factories received a prestigious international award. Meanwhile, the middle-class elite regarded the plight of the displaced workers, who mobilized to fight for their rights to earn a living wage, as the unavoidable cost that must be borne for the sake of lessening the city’s pollution. The study demonstrates the interrelationship between the two forms of environmentalism, with the green agenda of the rich leading to greater social and economic marginalization of the poor and their concerns over fair distribution of resources and safe working conditions.

The Indian resource use case concerns fisheries in Kerala, the Indian state with the highest rate of literacy, where international aid helped to modernize the fisheries almost six decades ago, presenting fishers with a fundamental choice with which they are still grappling today: whether to maintain their traditional fishing practices, which are more sustainable, or to adopt mechanized technology at the risk of depleting marine resources. The Kerala study brings to light the local effects of technology transfer (in this case, outboard motors and large fishing trawlers) in particular, the ways in which

Kerala fishers made sense of their lives in light of the new choices. Contrary to romanticized images of traditional communities defining their identity in terms of indigenous practices, the authors point out, the artisanal fishers (the local moniker for those who use traditional crafts) shared many of the same interests in access to markets, capital, and technology as their “capitalist” rivals. As a result, the authors argue that the case demands a more complicated account of the material and symbolic relationships between people and resources than is represented by the familiar narrative of “a superior group . . . usurp[ing] the business terrain of a disempowered tradition” (p. 192).

As the title of the chapter on the United States, “Two Faces of American Environmentalism,” indicates, the two U.S. cases represent the principal cleavage within U.S. environmentalism: the environment justice movement and its concern with fair distribution of resources and toxic burdens, and the mainstream environmentalist agenda of resource preservation. The cases are thematically linked by the country’s addiction to cheap energy supplies. The tiny town of Grand Bois in southern Louisiana, which was sickened by oilfield waste deposited in a nearby pit, is the site of the U.S. pollution study. In the aftermath of the health crisis that results, Grand Bois’s Houma Indian and Cajun communities must make sense of their allegiance to their fellow community members, their generations-long commitment to the land, and their ties to the oil industry that has come to sustain them. This incident of a major oil conglomerate, Exxon Corporation, poisoning the community—an act which was entirely acceptable by national and state laws—is representative of many instances of environmental injustice in rural areas in the United States that depend on natural resource extraction for their economic livelihoods.

The residents of Grand Bois contrast with the affluent and mobile families who moved in search of community to the focal point of the U.S. resource use case, Civano, on the outskirts of Tucson, in the desert region of southern Arizona. Civano was a high-profile state- and city-financed housing experiment designed to be a national model of sustainable development. A growth area of the United States, the region had long contended with the multiple threats that population growth and urban sprawl brought to this dry and ecologically sensitive region. While most of Civano residents were originally drawn to the development from both inside and outside Arizona by its promise of community and energy efficiency (which translated for many as lower utility bills), they soon became aware of and committed to the project’s conservation goals, seeing themselves as pioneers of sustainable living. The case reveals the values—community, economic, social, and cultural—underlying competing visions of sustainability, the difficulty of shifting from efficiency politics to sustainability politics, the compromises that had to be made in order to maintain an economically sound venture, and how people defined themselves in the process. The case shows that when policy makers create models of sustainable living, they can raise environmental consciousness and promote environment-friendly behavior. Yet the failure of the project to meet many of its original environmental goals and to consider the impacts of continued sprawl produced a limited notion of environmentalism that in the end had limited impact and support.¹⁴

Understanding Values Cross-Nationally

In Part 2, commentators weave thematic threads through the country chapters into commentary chapters that provide cross-national analysis across these very rich cases. They identify similarities across the cases, that while unsurprising, are nonetheless important: that environmental degradation and environmental policy have similar impacts on the poor and disenfranchised; that rich and poor people respond differently to environmental problems; and that environmental crises trigger social mobilization and social and value change. Yet they also identify significant differences from country to country in social relations and political culture, which affect the ways in which values are articulated and conflicts resolved or not resolved.

Sheila Jasanoff examines the use of the law in the case studies, both as a culturally specific expression of a society's political and moral values and as a reflection of a universal commitment to lawfulness. She focuses on the formal and informal uses of the law by citizens and government bodies "in their attempts to navigate the contrary currents of environmental protection and resource appropriation" (p. 330). Jasanoff compares the cases across five areas of the law: resource allocation and planning; victim compensation; environmental standard-setting; the mobilization of science in service to the law, or "knowledge-making"; and resistance to unjust environmental actions and policy. Jasanoff does not address the problem of non-adherence to the law (as Robert Melchior Figueroa does in a later chapter on environmental justice); yet her commentary is shaped by the understanding that adherence to the law is itself a value that "structures the expression of environmental values everywhere" (p. 330).

Jasanoff sees convergence across the cases in the ways in which the authority of institutions is undermined by interest-driven science (i.e., the manipulation of science by government and industry), the demand of courts and policymakers for indisputable scientific proof of harm, and the inadmissibility of "nonscientific" forms of knowledge, even when people's lives are being ravaged by pollution. But she is even more interested in how the strikingly different and sometimes conflicting values influence both the content of the law in each society and the way it is used, including methods of dispute resolution, the emphasis placed on particular types of legal standards, community building strategies, and social contracts. All of these differences in legal cultural have direct implications for the disparate ways in which environmental values are expressed and negotiated across the cases.

The aspiration to be modern—to attain technology-driven development and to establish democratic societies—motivated many of the people in the studies to accept or reject environmental policies and sometimes to seek to change them. Indeed, probing the communities' aspirations to be modern, and the various meanings they ascribe to the notion of modernity, is one way project researchers assessed environmental values in the field. The authors of the Japan study, who most directly

address the modernity drive, observe modernization as manifested in the processes of separating, or “abstracting,” humans from nature, and in Japan’s democratization, and attribute these processes to the strong aspiration among postwar Japanese to be modern. Notably, they cite one informant who takes issue with the critics of the proposed dam on the Nagara River. “It’s just emotional sentimentalism to want a river to remain just as it is,” the informant says. “Such thinking has no place in modern society.”

In “Environmental Transformations and the Values of Modernity,” Arun Agrawal identifies three values of modernity that influence approaches to the environment in all the case studies: the pursuit of progress; reason, based on scientific knowledge; and the belief in equality. All of the cases evolve under the rubric of progress: we see little questioning of modern forms of development except from a key actor in the Minamata case, Ogata Masato. While Jasanoff identifies a conscious effort by some people in the conservation cases to define themselves apart from this trend—what she calls an “antimodern” (as opposed to “premodern”) position—Agrawal stresses that these cases are nonetheless driven on both sides by the pursuit of material goods (e.g., economic benefit, flood prevention, and diplomatic leverage). Further, Agrawal observes that all the studies document people on both sides of the disputes engaging in the act of classifying the environment as a distinct policy domain that can be studied in isolation from other social processes. This manifestation of modernity does more than explain environmental problems; such classifications, says Agrawal, can also be seen “to constitute our views about [our relationship to] the environment.” Finally, Agrawal notes that in each case an environmental crisis prompted a social movement that revealed modern democratic values. Often, however, this democratic impulse is challenged and even “trumped” by political economic realities—that is, by a competing claim about modernity, as the above-cited quotation by the critic of the Nagara Dam protesters illustrates.

Justice constitutes a central theme in this volume. By examining environmental values in the context of specific policy actions, the studies reveal the varying degree to which people and groups have the power to order their lives—in other words, the degree to which their values matter. Robert Melchior Figueroa proposes an “environmental justice paradigm” that includes distributive justice and recognition justice, and he uses the cases in the book to illustrate the various modes of injustice that often characterize environmental controversies. In the case of Benxi, for example, he asserts that in implementing their green campaign, city officials did not adequately take into account the needs of the many people who have suffered the skyrocketing unemployment that has resulted from the changeover to a market economy. Similarly, he argues that the Civano development project failed to account fully for the interests of those harmed by Tucson’s further expansion (the Hopi and Navajo Indian tribes to the northern and inner-city Mexican Americans). This is environmental injustice even if these communities were unaware of the Civano project or had never considered its impact on their lives.

Figueroa traces the theme of justice through the cases to show that in every one of them a community is forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of a harmful industrial practice or an environmental policy, or is unjustly deprived of a resource. Compounding these inequities is a keen awareness within the victim community that their voices are not heard and that their values, interests, and identities are not respected. Those communities that are repeatedly denied a fair hearing within the policy process are often left feeling despair or anger, which they sometimes convert into social action in the form of an environmental justice movement.

Figueroa also stresses the importance of public recognition of the damage to environmental identity—cultural identity as it relates to one’s environmental surroundings—by both environmental assaults and insensitive policies, which is typically overlooked in remedies to environmental injustice. Damage to environmental identity can be devastating and irreversible, and justice measures that do not account for it are only partial. Among our cases, such damage is most severe in Grand Bois, Minamata, and Kerala, although Figueroa suspects that the environmental identity of traditional herders and hunters who live in the Sanjiang Plain and the residents of Benxi may also have been harmed in ways that are not fully explored in the cases.

Clark Miller concludes Part 2 by examining the implications of the case studies for global environmental governance. Miller advises that our project be understood as an instance of “comparative globalism,” probing the ways in which people in local settings are jointly “confronting and interpreting key elements of a global environmental agenda.” Miller proposes three lenses—framing, styles of reasoning, and trust—through which to view environmental values related to governance while taking into account the culturally grounded ways in which people come to hold environmental values. Framing, Miller writes, is the process by which “people are taught to interpret and value what they see happening around them in new ways.” Styles of reasoning are the ways in which people connect their observations about the world to these broader frameworks. And trust in institutions is the crucial element in establishing standards, or “shared styles of reasoning,” that can achieve public legitimacy.

Starting with framing, Miller uses two pairs of contrasting examples—first, China and Japan and, then, India and the United States—to show how differently people confront similar environmental challenges. In discussing the first pair, he underscores the distinction between top-down and bottom-up initiatives for environmental improvement. Meanwhile, in the case of the United States, the principal antagonists are corporate interests and activists, whereas in India the sharpest conflicts are drawn in class terms. Furthermore, the United States study frames the problems in terms of consumer choice, whereas the authors of the India case studies are “staunchly critical of consumerism” (p. 385). It is noteworthy that the particular frames Clark identifies are in fact those of the national research team, which in turn reflect local framings. Miller goes on to discuss the lenses of styles of reasoning and trust, explaining that “only as specific frames begin to get taken up and made use of in individual and collective decisions do they begin to have real bite in terms of social and environmental outcomes” (p. 386). He concludes with a lesson for global governance: we need to

build institutions of global environmental governance that are able to acknowledge and legitimize the expression of plurality in the world system.

Forging Environmentalism across Cultures

Within the human rights field, there is substantial scholarly debate over whether rights belong to the group or the individual person and how to reconcile the two sets of rights bearers in the implementation of human rights principles. By contrast, in the case of environmental issues, as these studies demonstrate, the line between individual environmental values and community values is blurred. While many social scientists maintain that values do not matter, that individuals may talk about values but act on the basis of interests, these studies show that values are an integral part of a process of identity formation and social mobilization.¹⁵ In all the places we studied—among the Kerala fishworkers, the Minamata disease victims, the Houma and Cajun of Grand Bois, the housewives of Lake Biwa, the Delhi factory workers and owners, the fishers of the Nagara River area, and the residents of Civano—it is by forming attachments to communities that people find ways to confer legitimacy on their values, invoke them, and convert them into action. By documenting this process across the cases, these chapters show how values are synthesized to form discourses, social positions, and shared community norms that influence reactions to environmental conditions and policies, and sometimes bring about policy changes.

We find that the environment is a meeting point for a range of policies and actions. How and when people recognize environmental degradation to be a problem, and how they respond to the problem and to government efforts to address it reflect not only values concerning the natural world, but also values concerning work, health, religion, family, and community. As David Jenkins observed during his work on the United States study:

Environmental values are deeply embedded in other values, and to separate them does not reflect the lives and concerns of people. . . . Follow the thread of any environmental value—from wilderness preservation to sustainable development—and what one finds is a tangle of politics, science, economics, nature, technology, and individual agency, all informed by local culture.¹⁶

In other words, we see no distinct sphere of environmental values that stands apart from other values.

This does not mean, however, that talk about sustainable development is merely a smoke screen for self-interested politics. To the contrary, it is evident that people hold deep feelings about the physical world they inhabit. One of the most poignant examples in the book is the reluctance of the Minamata fishers to accept the fact that the fish in Minamata Bay were contaminated, which would mean abandoning their traditional way of life and sustenance. Their belief in the beneficence of nature brought a devastating consequence: some went on eating the fish and suffered the crippling and often deadly disease as a consequence. As a Minamata poet fisherman movingly wrote:

No one can understand
 why I love the sea so much.
 The sea
 has never abandoned me.
 The sea
 is the blood of my veins.¹⁷

Similar feelings underlay the ambivalence of many fishers in Kerala about adopting new fishing technology because they fear its impact on Kadalamma, Mother Sea. They reasoned that they have been blessed in the past because they have never disturbed her.

Nobel laureate in economics Amartya Sen lent his weight to the global debate over sustainable development when he argued that the concept should be broadened beyond the narrow “needs” focus given to it back in 1987, when it was first conceived and popularized by the Brundtland Report (also known as *Our Common Future*).¹⁸ Referring to the oft-cited line in the report that defined sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs,” Sen wrote:

Certainly, people have “needs,” but they also have values, and, in particular, they cherish their ability to reason, appraise, act and participate. . . . We are not only patients, whose needs demand attention, but also agents, whose freedom to decide what to value and how to pursue it can extend far beyond the fulfillment of our needs. . . . Should we not be concerned with preserving—and when possible expanding—the substantive freedoms of people today “without compromising the ability of future generations” to have similar, or more, freedoms? Focusing on “sustainable freedoms” may not only be conceptually important. . . . It can also have tangible implications of immediate relevance.¹⁹

Our cases describe both realized and unrealized attempts by people to exercise their freedom to choose how to value the environment. They each give rise to the question of *who* has the freedom to express their values, and produce remarkably similar conversations regarding fairness, justice and privilege that bring into relief class divisions. India, for example, has seen the evolution of two distinct forms of environmentalism: a green agenda for the new middle class and a resource scarcity agenda for the nation’s chronically poor, with the former winning out over the latter. While these two forms of environmentalism are very different, they are hardly isolated from each other: the green demands of the rich increase the marginalization of the poor, forcing them to defend their livelihoods. In this political environment resistance to the middle-class-supported environmental campaign is regarded by elites to be an immoral, as well as illegal, act. Similarly in our China cases, we see widespread support for the government’s resolve to act upon new scientific evidence of environmental degradation among the new middle class, and cynicism toward the government-led environmental agenda among the widening ranks of the unemployed and the peasant class. The phenomenon of divergent environmentalisms cuts across de-

veloping and developed countries. In the United States in the 1980s social justice advocates gave birth to an environmental justice movement to challenge mainstream environmentalism's preoccupation with resource preservation at the expense of the serious toxic pollution concerns facing poor, disenfranchised communities.²⁰ Our two U.S. cases are emblematic of this divide. And, in Japan, in all the cases lower-class fishers and residents repeatedly lose out to powerful corporate interests.

Across the cases the international environmental movement is a powerful force in conferring legitimacy on a particular set of environmental values—in deciding which of these voices will enjoy the favor of environmentalists. When local groups forge alliances and build networks internationally, they bring about an intentional convergence of values and approaches that can fuel political mobilization and strengthen their movements, as in the cases of the Kerala fishworkers and the Nagara anti-dam movement. We also see the positive impact of international standards on political mobilization, as in the case of Lake Biwa, where the lawyers who filed suit to halt public works projects used human rights language, which they claimed as “Japanese” because it was enshrined in their constitution during the U.S. Occupation. Yet often times, international involvement has the unintentional effect of silencing or radically altering local movements.

In the Nagara case, for example, the recreational fishers succeeded in bringing international attention to their cause through the international networks they forged at the 1992 Earth Summit and later through the World Commission on Dams. However, as they succeeded in popularizing their own movement, they drowned out the local commercial fishers who had first protested the planned dam. As a result, the opportunity was lost for a robust public debate on environmental justice that could have taken the fishers' voices into account. Similarly, international environmentalists ignored the plight of the Delhi workers while praising the Delhi authorities' efforts to clean up their city. The media took notice only when many thousands of protesters took to the streets, bringing traffic to a halt for several days in November 2000.²¹ Yet even then, the media framed the problem in terms of worker protests *against* environmental measures rather than as a different expression of environmental values, one that promoted a healthy working environment and better living conditions for all. In the Sanjiang Plain case, local farmers and recent migrants to the region hardly stand a chance of having their voices heard in the face of intense international pressure for China to preserve her wetlands.

In reaction, some communities intentionally avoid terminology associated with the international environmental movement. In Grand Bois, Delhi, and Kerala members of the affected community showed reluctance even to define their problems in terms of “the environment.” Indeed, victims and movement leaders saw “the environment” as carrying an agenda that stood in opposition to their own environmental values. In Grand Bois and Delhi the reaction against the term is visceral. In Kerala, a mark of the advancement of the movement was the movement leaders' ability to articulate clearly their problem with the term, which they associate with resource conservation as an externally imposed environmental ethic. The term entered their radar when international

environmentalists developed ecolabeling schemes and promoted a proscription on turtle exclusion devices, which the fishworker leaders regarded primarily as means for foreign powers to safeguard market access. Instead of such an “imposed and restrictive form of international environmentalism” (p. 243), they characterized their movement as defending sustainable livelihoods, with a priority on the well-being of vulnerable humans, which they maintain is not the same as resource conservation.

Thus, we find that in many instances local vocabularies do not reflect the international discourse, and vice versa. Such a schism also occurs between local and national levels, creating a roadblock to public recognition of certain environmental problems. The national and international attention the Kerala fish workers and Nagara dam protesters gained through NGO networking was absent in the oilfield waste contamination case in Grand Bois, Louisiana, for example, where there was initially no national movement to champion the cause of the affected residents. In fact, because oilfield waste is “nonhazardous” by law, even the American environmental justice movement did not at first notice the problem.

Much has been written about globalization’s homogenizing effects and the damage it does to local cultures. With the loss of control for many individuals and communities at the local level has come, paradoxically, a greater attachment to place, a quest for cultural belonging, and a rise in the desire for cultural identity.²² In Kerala, following the national and international expansion of the fishworkers movement, the fishworkers returned to an appreciation of local roots, leading to revisionist thinking about the value of anything foreign. Calls for local autonomy and a say in the policies that affect one’s community also accompany growing environmental awareness in Delhi, Minamata, Nagara, Lake Biwa, Civano, and Grand Bois. As time passes, we may well also hear them in Benxi and in the Sanjiang Plain.

The environmental advocate William Shutkin underscored the intimate connection between values, community, and environment and the imperative of sustainable freedoms when he wrote:

The environment is the sum of all those places in cities, suburbs and rural areas that play an essential part in constituting our sense of ourselves as individuals and members of a community that demand our care and attention if they are to enhance, rather than diminish, that sense. To ensure the production and protection of a healthy environment requires the participation of those whose quality of life ultimately depends on it: ordinary citizens.²³

One way to call attention to the global environmental crisis and build a movement that can lead to the large-scale citizen environmental activism sought by Speth is to acknowledge the various ways that people make sense of their world by publicly recognizing environmental and cultural identity. A lesson of all these studies is that we cannot adjudicate resource use and pollution conflicts solely on a scientific and technological basis or through “one world” approaches to environmental problems. In our quest for a solution to the crisis we need to resist a single narrative—as the India study underscores. Rather, we need a “fusion of horizons,” where “the moral

universe of the other becomes less strange,” to borrow the words of the philosopher Charles Taylor.²⁴

A principal ethical concern of environmental policy should be to devise systems of governance that hear the voices of all affected citizens. The democratic space must include room for communities to forge environmentalism consistent with what they value in their lives. Some political systems more than others allow people to freely express their values, yet even in the most open systems the right of free expression is circumscribed for certain groups. The convergence of environmental discourses across nations and locales and the silencing of local discourses reminds us that too often movements get valorized as local when they are not only. The multiple scales at which even a seemingly local problem occurs in terms of causes and effects complicate existing ethical questions regarding, for example, who sets the environmental agenda, whose voice counts, who bears the risk, who decides, and who pays? There are and will be conflicts of value frames surrounding such questions locally as well as internationally. Our hope is that in its focus on grounded understandings of the interplay between values and knowledge, this book might help guide us toward ways to resolve those conflicts justly, improve global environmental governance, and ultimately protect our cherished earth.

Notes

1. A transcript of the talk is available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/4469, accessed 15 December 2004. See also James Gustave Speth, *Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), ch. 9.

2. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., *Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

3. See Ragnar E. Lofstedt, “Why Are Public Perception Studies on the Environment Ignored,” *Global Environmental Change* 5, no. 2 (1995): 83–85; Raymond M. Duch and Michael A. Taylor, “Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition,” *American Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 3 (August 1993): 747–79; and Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, “Economic Security and Value Change,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 336–54.

4. The meetings took place in New York City (in April 1998), where the protocol was agreed upon and the project launched; Kusatsu, Japan (July 1999); New York City again (October 1999); Wuxi, China (January 2000); Beijing, China (July 2000); Udaipur, India (January 2001); and Tarrytown, New York (September 2001). Before or after the formal meetings in Kusatsu, New York (October 1999), Beijing, and Udaipur, researchers also visited one of the sites of the host research team (Lake Biwa, Grand Bois, Benxi, and Delhi/Agra).

5. The research meetings included the principal researchers from the four country teams. In the case of India, however, the researchers who selected the case studies and participated in the process of collaboration across research teams did not submit a chapter for this volume. Thus, after the final project meeting in September 2001, I commissioned the authors—Amita Baviskar, Kavita Philip, and Subir Sinha—to write the chapter that appears here using the research protocol developed by the project. They drew upon fieldwork they had previously conducted in Kerala and Delhi and supplemented it with fieldwork conducted specifically for this study. Despite the change in authorship, the case studies and the approach to the case

studies remain generally consistent with those of the Indian researchers who attended the project meetings and submitted fieldwork reports for group discussion.

6. Project participants considered the idea of allowing chapter authors to respond to the commentary authors within this text, but space did not permit it. As editor, I facilitated dialogue between the commentary authors and the country chapter authors and queried authors when I suspected possible disagreement or misreading of the case material.

7. Steven Gardiner argues that it is wrong to think that climate change can ever be successfully addressed without the full cooperation of China, India, and the United States. See Steven Gardiner, "The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol," *Ethics & International Affairs* 18, no. 1 (2004): 28.

8. For example, according to the United Nations Environment Program, the air in Asia's cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Delhi, is among the worst in the world. In China, contaminated drinking water is arguably the country's most serious environmental problem, with as much as 25 percent of the population lacking access to an "improved water source." India is doing only a little better than China, with 16 percent of the population lacking such access. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency found that "forty percent of surveyed rivers, lakes and estuaries are not clean enough to meet basic uses such as fishing or swimming because of non-point specific pollution." And in Japan the quality of lake water in a number of areas is deteriorating. For documentation on carbon emissions and all of these statistics, see www.carnegiecouncil.org/forgingenvironmentalism.

9. For a discussion of the distinction in the literature, see Steven Yearley, *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization* (London: Sage, 1996), 43–51.

10. Steven Yearley does precisely this in a paper written for this project, available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/forgingenvironmentalism. Unfortunately, space limitations prevented its publication in this volume.

11. The China Environment Forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars has done extensive documentation of the development and work of environmental civic organizations in China. See especially, Elizabeth Knup, "Environmental NGOs in China: An Overview," *China Environment Series* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997), 9–15; Jennifer Turner and Wu Fengshi, eds., *Green NGO and Environmental Journalist Forum* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), available at www.wilsoncenter.org/cef. See also Elizabeth Economy, *The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), ch. 5; and Nick Young, "Searching for Civil Society," *Civil Society in the Making: 250 Chinese NGOs* (Beijing: China Development Brief, 2001), 9–19.

12. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 427–60.

13. This statistic has been cited widely and attributed variously to the World Health Organization and the World Bank.

14. Advocates of Civano are quick to point out that the Civano experience did pave the way for future, more successful sustainable development projects in Tucson. For example, Wayne Moody, the city planning director during the development of Civano, built on the experience to develop Milagro, a similar, albeit much smaller, demonstration project in inner-city Tucson. Not only does this project directly serve the less well off, but also it was more successful at incorporating environment-friendly features than was Civano (Moody, e-mail communication, 14 July 2004).

15. Of course many social scientists agree with this. See, for example, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Charles Tilly, Marco Giugni, and Doug McAdam, *How Social Movements Matter* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

16. David Jenkins, *United States Research Report to the Carnegie Council Understanding Values Project*, Carnegie Council, May 2001, 3–4.

17. Cited in Douglas Allchin, University of Minnesota, Resource Center for Science Teach-

ers Using Sociology History and Philosophy of Science, available at www1.umn.edu/ships/ethics/minamata.htm, accessed 2 September 2004.

18. The Bruntland Report, published as *Our Common Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), is the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, led by Gro Harlem Brundtland, then prime minister of Norway. Barbara Rose Johnston, *Life and Death Matters: Human Rights and the Environment at the End of the Millennium* (Walnut Creek, CA: Altimira Press, 1997), 9–12, 330–39.

19. Amartya Sen, “Why We Should Preserve the Spotted Owl,” *London Review of Books* 26, no. 3 (February 2004).

20. Environmental justice advocates and scholars disagree on the role of race and class in the victimization. See for example, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, *Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, 1987; Environmental Justice: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994); Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai, “Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards,” *University of Colorado Law Review* 63, no. 4 (1992): 921; as well as Bryant and Mohai’s edited volume *Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Robert D. Bullard, “A New ‘Chicken-or-Egg’ Debate: Which Came First—The Neighborhood, or the Toxic Dump?” *The Workbook* 19, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 60.

21. For example, see “Delhi Pollution Protest Spreads,” BBC News, 21 November 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1032513.stm, accessed 3 January 2005.

22. See John Tomlinson, “Globalization and Cultural Identity,” in *Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Andrew G. McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 269–77.

23. William A. Shutkin, *The Land That Could Be: Environmentalism and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), xv.

24. Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” in *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 136. The phrase “fusion of horizons” is originally that of the philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom Taylor credits.