| |
 The way America does business with the world, or U.S. global engagement, is arguably the most critical foreign policy issue of the day. In a febrile Presidential election environment, the various candidates—doubtless mindful of rock-bottom approval rates for the United States across the world—speak of the priority of "restoring our leadership," of "renewal" of engagement, or of the "prestige" that stems from "moral leadership". Behind the pious declarations, however, there is the question of how and what to be attached to the issue; what might constructive engagement entail?
The complexity of the issue is such that when specific approaches are put on the table [a "G-15" as an expanded version of the G-8, a "concert of democracies"] there is immediate and forceful pushback. All in all, the challenge and contours of engagement will continue to be debated into the next administration.
 Negative overseas opinion polls notwithstanding, U.S. global preeminence is unchallenged, and will be so for the foreseeable future—militarily, culturally [Joseph Nye's notion of "soft power"] and, despite today's choppy waters, economically. This preeminence, however, does not mean that U.S. security is guaranteed. Indeed, in a world where terrorism and asymmetrical warfare [via such tactics as suicide attacks] have dramatically changed the rules of military superiority, one must look beyond battlefield capabilities. In this regard, preeminence does not mean omnipotence. In a recent op-ed in the Financial Times, Philip Stevens writes:
"If American power is still indispensable, it is no longer sufficient. America's choices condition, often decisively, the decisions of others. But their assent cannot be taken for granted."
The lessons of the unruly post-Cold war environment have surely been that, on a raft of new or exacerbated security challenges—terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, energy security et al—the engagement of a coalition of the willing and able is not just morally appealing, but strategically smart. To quote one veteran observer, it is both possible and desirable "to define multilateral engagement in terms of American national interests."
Finally, if one accepts the logic and value of multilateralism, this must be a multilateralism that is institutionalized, embedded in policy. The floated notion of "a la carte" multilateralism is notionally appealing, but specious. There is an inherent contradiction between commitment to multilateral behavior on the one hand, and on the other selective application based on narrow parochial interests.
Approach
The Council's global engagement initiative will consist of a series of critical case studies. This will entail a three-tiered focus:
1.. U.S. relations with partners among the established democracies. Here, an obvious candidate is the NATO alliance; NATO has expanded, and will continue to do so, well beyond the alliance's original theater. What are the implications of this, and of the related question of EU enlargement, for the United States?
2. U.S. relations with what might be termed "problematical allies." Here, Russia and Pakistan come immediately to mind as states where obvious crucial U.S. interests are manifest, but where cooperation/partnership is undermined by internal political developments.
3. U.S. relations with states of deep concern. Iran is the obvious candidate, in that, despite President Bush's infamous "axis of evil" nomenclature, Iran both actually and potentially has a role to play in a number of key policy challenges, including Iraq and Afghanistan.
> View Program Resources
|
|
